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author | Chuck Lever <chuck.lever@oracle.com> | 2013-04-30 18:48:54 -0400 |
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committer | J. Bruce Fields <bfields@redhat.com> | 2013-04-30 19:18:21 -0400 |
commit | 676e4ebd5f2c3b4fd1d2bff79b68385c23c5c105 (patch) | |
tree | 2e6af168ab04ed0c337c4faff795c60a6b6da472 /net/sunrpc/cache.c | |
parent | ed9411a00464860cafe7e07224818cdf04fd9e89 (diff) |
NFSD: SECINFO doesn't handle unsupported pseudoflavors correctly
If nfsd4_do_encode_secinfo() can't find GSS info that matches an
export security flavor, it assumes the flavor is not a GSS
pseudoflavor, and simply puts it on the wire.
However, if this XDR encoding logic is given a legitimate GSS
pseudoflavor but the RPC layer says it does not support that
pseudoflavor for some reason, then the server leaks GSS pseudoflavor
numbers onto the wire.
I confirmed this happens by blacklisting rpcsec_gss_krb5, then
attempted a client transition from the pseudo-fs to a Kerberos-only
share. The client received a flavor list containing the Kerberos
pseudoflavor numbers, rather than GSS tuples.
The encoder logic can check that each pseudoflavor in flavs[] is
less than MAXFLAVOR before writing it into the buffer, to prevent
this. But after "nflavs" is written into the XDR buffer, the
encoder can't skip writing flavor information into the buffer when
it discovers the RPC layer doesn't support that flavor.
So count the number of valid flavors as they are written into the
XDR buffer, then write that count into a placeholder in the XDR
buffer when all recognized flavors have been encoded.
Signed-off-by: Chuck Lever <chuck.lever@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: J. Bruce Fields <bfields@redhat.com>
Diffstat (limited to 'net/sunrpc/cache.c')
0 files changed, 0 insertions, 0 deletions