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| author | Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> | 2022-03-07 17:29:47 -0800 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> | 2022-03-07 17:29:47 -0800 |
| commit | 4a01e748a51cdc0527fdc913546dd46e822aa00d (patch) | |
| tree | 8dbdba3aa96fb2323ba8194e8838dddf917752e5 /tools | |
| parent | ea4424be16887a37735d6550cfd0611528dbe5d9 (diff) | |
| parent | 0de05d056afdb00eca8c7bbb0c79a3438daf700c (diff) | |
Merge tag 'x86_bugs_for_v5.17' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip
Pull x86 spectre fixes from Borislav Petkov:
- Mitigate Spectre v2-type Branch History Buffer attacks on machines
which support eIBRS, i.e., the hardware-assisted speculation
restriction after it has been shown that such machines are vulnerable
even with the hardware mitigation.
- Do not use the default LFENCE-based Spectre v2 mitigation on AMD as
it is insufficient to mitigate such attacks. Instead, switch to
retpolines on all AMD by default.
- Update the docs and add some warnings for the obviously vulnerable
cmdline configurations.
* tag 'x86_bugs_for_v5.17' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip:
x86/speculation: Warn about eIBRS + LFENCE + Unprivileged eBPF + SMT
x86/speculation: Warn about Spectre v2 LFENCE mitigation
x86/speculation: Update link to AMD speculation whitepaper
x86/speculation: Use generic retpoline by default on AMD
x86/speculation: Include unprivileged eBPF status in Spectre v2 mitigation reporting
Documentation/hw-vuln: Update spectre doc
x86/speculation: Add eIBRS + Retpoline options
x86/speculation: Rename RETPOLINE_AMD to RETPOLINE_LFENCE
Diffstat (limited to 'tools')
| -rw-r--r-- | tools/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h | 2 |
1 files changed, 1 insertions, 1 deletions
diff --git a/tools/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h b/tools/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h index 6db4e2932b3d..ab4e53715d8a 100644 --- a/tools/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h +++ b/tools/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h @@ -204,7 +204,7 @@ /* FREE! ( 7*32+10) */ #define X86_FEATURE_PTI ( 7*32+11) /* Kernel Page Table Isolation enabled */ #define X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE ( 7*32+12) /* "" Generic Retpoline mitigation for Spectre variant 2 */ -#define X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE_AMD ( 7*32+13) /* "" AMD Retpoline mitigation for Spectre variant 2 */ +#define X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE_LFENCE ( 7*32+13) /* "" Use LFENCEs for Spectre variant 2 */ #define X86_FEATURE_INTEL_PPIN ( 7*32+14) /* Intel Processor Inventory Number */ #define X86_FEATURE_CDP_L2 ( 7*32+15) /* Code and Data Prioritization L2 */ #define X86_FEATURE_MSR_SPEC_CTRL ( 7*32+16) /* "" MSR SPEC_CTRL is implemented */ |