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authorLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>2023-04-24 11:40:26 -0700
committerLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>2023-04-24 11:40:26 -0700
commit1a0beef98b582b69a2ba44e468f7dfecbcfab48e (patch)
tree6a96784e5d3edd9859a1aaca1555da97fd8c5483 /security
parentdc7e22a368c2a217d2d3338b3bd984fdd0301173 (diff)
parentbd8621ca1510e6e802df9855bdc35a04a3cfa932 (diff)
Merge tag 'tpmdd-v6.4-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jarkko/linux-tpmdd
Pull tpm updates from Jarkko Sakkinen: - The .machine keyring, used for Machine Owner Keys (MOK), acquired the ability to store only CA enforced keys, and put rest to the .platform keyring, thus separating the code signing keys from the keys that are used to sign certificates. This essentially unlocks the use of the .machine keyring as a trust anchor for IMA. It is an opt-in feature, meaning that the additional contraints won't brick anyone who does not care about them. - Enable interrupt based transactions with discrete TPM chips (tpm_tis). There was code for this existing but it never really worked so I consider this a new feature rather than a bug fix. Before the driver just fell back to the polling mode. Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-integrity/a93b6222-edda-d43c-f010-a59701f2aeef@gmx.de/ Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-integrity/20230302164652.83571-1-eric.snowberg@oracle.com/ * tag 'tpmdd-v6.4-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jarkko/linux-tpmdd: (29 commits) tpm: Add !tpm_amd_is_rng_defective() to the hwrng_unregister() call site tpm_tis: fix stall after iowrite*()s tpm/tpm_tis_synquacer: Convert to platform remove callback returning void tpm/tpm_tis: Convert to platform remove callback returning void tpm/tpm_ftpm_tee: Convert to platform remove callback returning void tpm: tpm_tis_spi: Mark ACPI and OF related data as maybe unused tpm: st33zp24: Mark ACPI and OF related data as maybe unused tpm, tpm_tis: Enable interrupt test tpm, tpm_tis: startup chip before testing for interrupts tpm, tpm_tis: Claim locality when interrupts are reenabled on resume tpm, tpm_tis: Claim locality in interrupt handler tpm, tpm_tis: Request threaded interrupt handler tpm, tpm: Implement usage counter for locality tpm, tpm_tis: do not check for the active locality in interrupt handler tpm, tpm_tis: Move interrupt mask checks into own function tpm, tpm_tis: Only handle supported interrupts tpm, tpm_tis: Claim locality before writing interrupt registers tpm, tpm_tis: Do not skip reset of original interrupt vector tpm, tpm_tis: Disable interrupts if tpm_tis_probe_irq() failed tpm, tpm_tis: Claim locality before writing TPM_INT_ENABLE register ...
Diffstat (limited to 'security')
-rw-r--r--security/integrity/Kconfig23
-rw-r--r--security/integrity/digsig.c8
2 files changed, 28 insertions, 3 deletions
diff --git a/security/integrity/Kconfig b/security/integrity/Kconfig
index 599429f99f99..ec6e0d789da1 100644
--- a/security/integrity/Kconfig
+++ b/security/integrity/Kconfig
@@ -68,13 +68,34 @@ config INTEGRITY_MACHINE_KEYRING
depends on INTEGRITY_ASYMMETRIC_KEYS
depends on SYSTEM_BLACKLIST_KEYRING
depends on LOAD_UEFI_KEYS
- depends on !IMA_KEYRINGS_PERMIT_SIGNED_BY_BUILTIN_OR_SECONDARY
help
If set, provide a keyring to which Machine Owner Keys (MOK) may
be added. This keyring shall contain just MOK keys. Unlike keys
in the platform keyring, keys contained in the .machine keyring will
be trusted within the kernel.
+config INTEGRITY_CA_MACHINE_KEYRING
+ bool "Enforce Machine Keyring CA Restrictions"
+ depends on INTEGRITY_MACHINE_KEYRING
+ default n
+ help
+ The .machine keyring can be configured to enforce CA restriction
+ on any key added to it. By default no restrictions are in place
+ and all Machine Owner Keys (MOK) are added to the machine keyring.
+ If enabled only CA keys are added to the machine keyring, all
+ other MOK keys load into the platform keyring.
+
+config INTEGRITY_CA_MACHINE_KEYRING_MAX
+ bool "Only CA keys without DigitialSignature usage set"
+ depends on INTEGRITY_CA_MACHINE_KEYRING
+ default n
+ help
+ When selected, only load CA keys are loaded into the machine
+ keyring that contain the CA bit set along with the keyCertSign
+ Usage field. Keys containing the digitialSignature Usage field
+ will not be loaded. The remaining MOK keys are loaded into the
+ .platform keyring.
+
config LOAD_UEFI_KEYS
depends on INTEGRITY_PLATFORM_KEYRING
depends on EFI
diff --git a/security/integrity/digsig.c b/security/integrity/digsig.c
index f2193c531f4a..6f31ffe23c48 100644
--- a/security/integrity/digsig.c
+++ b/security/integrity/digsig.c
@@ -132,7 +132,8 @@ int __init integrity_init_keyring(const unsigned int id)
| KEY_USR_READ | KEY_USR_SEARCH;
if (id == INTEGRITY_KEYRING_PLATFORM ||
- id == INTEGRITY_KEYRING_MACHINE) {
+ (id == INTEGRITY_KEYRING_MACHINE &&
+ !IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_INTEGRITY_CA_MACHINE_KEYRING))) {
restriction = NULL;
goto out;
}
@@ -144,7 +145,10 @@ int __init integrity_init_keyring(const unsigned int id)
if (!restriction)
return -ENOMEM;
- restriction->check = restrict_link_to_ima;
+ if (id == INTEGRITY_KEYRING_MACHINE)
+ restriction->check = restrict_link_by_ca;
+ else
+ restriction->check = restrict_link_to_ima;
/*
* MOK keys can only be added through a read-only runtime services