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authorGünther Noack <gnoack3000@gmail.com>2022-10-18 20:22:09 +0200
committerMickaël Salaün <mic@digikod.net>2022-10-19 09:01:44 +0200
commitb9f5ce27c8f8be409d6afca9797a2da01e5cebbb (patch)
tree6b732e7cdba7f9241fc131784a438a09f2b0b162 /security/landlock/fs.c
parent52a13488d1783ae014a3abe15f78810162425e94 (diff)
landlock: Support file truncation
Introduce the LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_TRUNCATE flag for file truncation. This flag hooks into the path_truncate, file_truncate and file_alloc_security LSM hooks and covers file truncation using truncate(2), ftruncate(2), open(2) with O_TRUNC, as well as creat(). This change also increments the Landlock ABI version, updates corresponding selftests, and updates code documentation to document the flag. In security/security.c, allocate security blobs at pointer-aligned offsets. This fixes the problem where one LSM's security blob can shift another LSM's security blob to an unaligned address (reported by Nathan Chancellor). The following operations are restricted: open(2): requires the LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_TRUNCATE right if a file gets implicitly truncated as part of the open() (e.g. using O_TRUNC). Notable special cases: * open(..., O_RDONLY|O_TRUNC) can truncate files as well in Linux * open() with O_TRUNC does *not* need the TRUNCATE right when it creates a new file. truncate(2) (on a path): requires the LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_TRUNCATE right. ftruncate(2) (on a file): requires that the file had the TRUNCATE right when it was previously opened. File descriptors acquired by other means than open(2) (e.g. memfd_create(2)) continue to support truncation with ftruncate(2). Cc: Nathan Chancellor <nathan@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Günther Noack <gnoack3000@gmail.com> Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com> (LSM) Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20221018182216.301684-5-gnoack3000@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Mickaël Salaün <mic@digikod.net>
Diffstat (limited to 'security/landlock/fs.c')
-rw-r--r--security/landlock/fs.c104
1 files changed, 99 insertions, 5 deletions
diff --git a/security/landlock/fs.c b/security/landlock/fs.c
index 87fde50eb550..adcea0fe7e68 100644
--- a/security/landlock/fs.c
+++ b/security/landlock/fs.c
@@ -146,7 +146,8 @@ retry:
#define ACCESS_FILE ( \
LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_EXECUTE | \
LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_WRITE_FILE | \
- LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_READ_FILE)
+ LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_READ_FILE | \
+ LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_TRUNCATE)
/* clang-format on */
/*
@@ -1154,9 +1155,23 @@ static int hook_path_rmdir(const struct path *const dir,
return current_check_access_path(dir, LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_REMOVE_DIR);
}
+static int hook_path_truncate(const struct path *const path)
+{
+ return current_check_access_path(path, LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_TRUNCATE);
+}
+
/* File hooks */
-static inline access_mask_t get_file_access(const struct file *const file)
+/**
+ * get_required_file_open_access - Get access needed to open a file
+ *
+ * @file: File being opened.
+ *
+ * Returns the access rights that are required for opening the given file,
+ * depending on the file type and open mode.
+ */
+static inline access_mask_t
+get_required_file_open_access(const struct file *const file)
{
access_mask_t access = 0;
@@ -1174,19 +1189,95 @@ static inline access_mask_t get_file_access(const struct file *const file)
return access;
}
+static int hook_file_alloc_security(struct file *const file)
+{
+ /*
+ * Grants all access rights, even if most of them are not checked later
+ * on. It is more consistent.
+ *
+ * Notably, file descriptors for regular files can also be acquired
+ * without going through the file_open hook, for example when using
+ * memfd_create(2).
+ */
+ landlock_file(file)->allowed_access = LANDLOCK_MASK_ACCESS_FS;
+ return 0;
+}
+
static int hook_file_open(struct file *const file)
{
+ layer_mask_t layer_masks[LANDLOCK_NUM_ACCESS_FS] = {};
+ access_mask_t open_access_request, full_access_request, allowed_access;
+ const access_mask_t optional_access = LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_TRUNCATE;
const struct landlock_ruleset *const dom =
landlock_get_current_domain();
if (!dom)
return 0;
+
/*
- * Because a file may be opened with O_PATH, get_file_access() may
- * return 0. This case will be handled with a future Landlock
+ * Because a file may be opened with O_PATH, get_required_file_open_access()
+ * may return 0. This case will be handled with a future Landlock
* evolution.
*/
- return check_access_path(dom, &file->f_path, get_file_access(file));
+ open_access_request = get_required_file_open_access(file);
+
+ /*
+ * We look up more access than what we immediately need for open(), so
+ * that we can later authorize operations on opened files.
+ */
+ full_access_request = open_access_request | optional_access;
+
+ if (is_access_to_paths_allowed(
+ dom, &file->f_path,
+ init_layer_masks(dom, full_access_request, &layer_masks),
+ &layer_masks, NULL, 0, NULL, NULL)) {
+ allowed_access = full_access_request;
+ } else {
+ unsigned long access_bit;
+ const unsigned long access_req = full_access_request;
+
+ /*
+ * Calculate the actual allowed access rights from layer_masks.
+ * Add each access right to allowed_access which has not been
+ * vetoed by any layer.
+ */
+ allowed_access = 0;
+ for_each_set_bit(access_bit, &access_req,
+ ARRAY_SIZE(layer_masks)) {
+ if (!layer_masks[access_bit])
+ allowed_access |= BIT_ULL(access_bit);
+ }
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * For operations on already opened files (i.e. ftruncate()), it is the
+ * access rights at the time of open() which decide whether the
+ * operation is permitted. Therefore, we record the relevant subset of
+ * file access rights in the opened struct file.
+ */
+ landlock_file(file)->allowed_access = allowed_access;
+
+ if ((open_access_request & allowed_access) == open_access_request)
+ return 0;
+
+ return -EACCES;
+}
+
+static int hook_file_truncate(struct file *const file)
+{
+ /*
+ * Allows truncation if the truncate right was available at the time of
+ * opening the file, to get a consistent access check as for read, write
+ * and execute operations.
+ *
+ * Note: For checks done based on the file's Landlock allowed access, we
+ * enforce them independently of whether the current thread is in a
+ * Landlock domain, so that open files passed between independent
+ * processes retain their behaviour.
+ */
+ if (landlock_file(file)->allowed_access & LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_TRUNCATE)
+ return 0;
+ return -EACCES;
}
static struct security_hook_list landlock_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = {
@@ -1206,8 +1297,11 @@ static struct security_hook_list landlock_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = {
LSM_HOOK_INIT(path_symlink, hook_path_symlink),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(path_unlink, hook_path_unlink),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(path_rmdir, hook_path_rmdir),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(path_truncate, hook_path_truncate),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_alloc_security, hook_file_alloc_security),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_open, hook_file_open),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_truncate, hook_file_truncate),
};
__init void landlock_add_fs_hooks(void)