diff options
| author | Zhang Shurong <zhang_shurong@foxmail.com> | 2023-07-09 00:28:17 +0800 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Hans Verkuil <hverkuil-cisco@xs4all.nl> | 2023-07-19 12:57:50 +0200 |
| commit | 1047f9343011f2cedc73c64829686206a7e9fc3f (patch) | |
| tree | fa7e6c139e2fc03f42f9ba69e2967c31f95ab498 /drivers/media/usb | |
| parent | c30411266fd67ea3c02a05c157231654d5a3bdc9 (diff) | |
media: az6007: Fix null-ptr-deref in az6007_i2c_xfer()
In az6007_i2c_xfer, msg is controlled by user. When msg[i].buf
is null and msg[i].len is zero, former checks on msg[i].buf would be
passed. Malicious data finally reach az6007_i2c_xfer. If accessing
msg[i].buf[0] without sanity check, null ptr deref would happen.
We add check on msg[i].len to prevent crash.
Similar commit:
commit 0ed554fd769a
("media: dvb-usb: az6027: fix null-ptr-deref in az6027_i2c_xfer()")
Signed-off-by: Zhang Shurong <zhang_shurong@foxmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Hans Verkuil <hverkuil-cisco@xs4all.nl>
Diffstat (limited to 'drivers/media/usb')
| -rw-r--r-- | drivers/media/usb/dvb-usb-v2/az6007.c | 8 |
1 files changed, 8 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/drivers/media/usb/dvb-usb-v2/az6007.c b/drivers/media/usb/dvb-usb-v2/az6007.c index 2dcbb49d66da..2410054ddb2c 100644 --- a/drivers/media/usb/dvb-usb-v2/az6007.c +++ b/drivers/media/usb/dvb-usb-v2/az6007.c @@ -788,6 +788,10 @@ static int az6007_i2c_xfer(struct i2c_adapter *adap, struct i2c_msg msgs[], if (az6007_xfer_debug) printk(KERN_DEBUG "az6007: I2C W addr=0x%x len=%d\n", addr, msgs[i].len); + if (msgs[i].len < 1) { + ret = -EIO; + goto err; + } req = AZ6007_I2C_WR; index = msgs[i].buf[0]; value = addr | (1 << 8); @@ -802,6 +806,10 @@ static int az6007_i2c_xfer(struct i2c_adapter *adap, struct i2c_msg msgs[], if (az6007_xfer_debug) printk(KERN_DEBUG "az6007: I2C R addr=0x%x len=%d\n", addr, msgs[i].len); + if (msgs[i].len < 1) { + ret = -EIO; + goto err; + } req = AZ6007_I2C_RD; index = msgs[i].buf[0]; value = addr; |