diff options
| author | Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> | 2019-07-11 13:40:59 +0200 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> | 2019-07-17 23:17:38 +0200 |
| commit | a0d14b8909de55139b8702fe0c7e80b69763dcfb (patch) | |
| tree | a9f6b04591b9087f4a64086c27ac46c09a2f82aa /arch/x86/kernel/traps.c | |
| parent | 4234653e882740cbf6625eeee294e388b3176583 (diff) | |
x86/mm, tracing: Fix CR2 corruption
Despite the current efforts to read CR2 before tracing happens there still
exist a number of possible holes:
idtentry page_fault do_page_fault has_error_code=1
call error_entry
TRACE_IRQS_OFF
call trace_hardirqs_off*
#PF // modifies CR2
CALL_enter_from_user_mode
__context_tracking_exit()
trace_user_exit(0)
#PF // modifies CR2
call do_page_fault
address = read_cr2(); /* whoopsie */
And similar for i386.
Fix it by pulling the CR2 read into the entry code, before any of that
stuff gets a chance to run and ruin things.
Reported-by: He Zhe <zhe.he@windriver.com>
Reported-by: Eiichi Tsukata <devel@etsukata.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: bp@alien8.de
Cc: rostedt@goodmis.org
Cc: torvalds@linux-foundation.org
Cc: hpa@zytor.com
Cc: dave.hansen@linux.intel.com
Cc: jgross@suse.com
Cc: joel@joelfernandes.org
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190711114336.116812491@infradead.org
Debugged-by: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'arch/x86/kernel/traps.c')
| -rw-r--r-- | arch/x86/kernel/traps.c | 6 |
1 files changed, 1 insertions, 5 deletions
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/traps.c b/arch/x86/kernel/traps.c index 87095a477154..4bb0f8447112 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/traps.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/traps.c @@ -313,13 +313,10 @@ __visible void __noreturn handle_stack_overflow(const char *message, #ifdef CONFIG_X86_64 /* Runs on IST stack */ -dotraplinkage void do_double_fault(struct pt_regs *regs, long error_code) +dotraplinkage void do_double_fault(struct pt_regs *regs, long error_code, unsigned long cr2) { static const char str[] = "double fault"; struct task_struct *tsk = current; -#ifdef CONFIG_VMAP_STACK - unsigned long cr2; -#endif #ifdef CONFIG_X86_ESPFIX64 extern unsigned char native_irq_return_iret[]; @@ -415,7 +412,6 @@ dotraplinkage void do_double_fault(struct pt_regs *regs, long error_code) * stack even if the actual trigger for the double fault was * something else. */ - cr2 = read_cr2(); if ((unsigned long)task_stack_page(tsk) - 1 - cr2 < PAGE_SIZE) handle_stack_overflow("kernel stack overflow (double-fault)", regs, cr2); #endif |