diff options
| author | Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@kernel.org> | 2023-09-04 22:04:52 -0700 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de> | 2023-10-20 11:46:09 +0200 |
| commit | dc6306ad5b0dda040baf1fde3cfd458e6abfc4da (patch) | |
| tree | ab8c2d9e033fd30aa27b58f2ffd9b0fb23ac1e88 /Documentation/admin-guide | |
| parent | de9f5f7b06a5b7adbfdd8016f011120a4e928add (diff) | |
x86/srso: Fix vulnerability reporting for missing microcode
The SRSO default safe-ret mitigation is reported as "mitigated" even if
microcode hasn't been updated. That's wrong because userspace may still
be vulnerable to SRSO attacks due to IBPB not flushing branch type
predictions.
Report the safe-ret + !microcode case as vulnerable.
Also report the microcode-only case as vulnerable as it leaves the
kernel open to attacks.
Fixes: fb3bd914b3ec ("x86/srso: Add a Speculative RAS Overflow mitigation")
Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de>
Acked-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/a8a14f97d1b0e03ec255c81637afdf4cf0ae9c99.1693889988.git.jpoimboe@kernel.org
Diffstat (limited to 'Documentation/admin-guide')
| -rw-r--r-- | Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/srso.rst | 24 |
1 files changed, 17 insertions, 7 deletions
diff --git a/Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/srso.rst b/Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/srso.rst index b6cfb51cb0b4..e715bfc09879 100644 --- a/Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/srso.rst +++ b/Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/srso.rst @@ -46,12 +46,22 @@ The possible values in this file are: The processor is not vulnerable - * 'Vulnerable: no microcode': +* 'Vulnerable': + + The processor is vulnerable and no mitigations have been applied. + + * 'Vulnerable: No microcode': The processor is vulnerable, no microcode extending IBPB functionality to address the vulnerability has been applied. - * 'Mitigation: microcode': + * 'Vulnerable: Safe RET, no microcode': + + The "Safe RET" mitigation (see below) has been applied to protect the + kernel, but the IBPB-extending microcode has not been applied. User + space tasks may still be vulnerable. + + * 'Vulnerable: Microcode, no safe RET': Extended IBPB functionality microcode patch has been applied. It does not address User->Kernel and Guest->Host transitions protection but it @@ -72,11 +82,11 @@ The possible values in this file are: (spec_rstack_overflow=microcode) - * 'Mitigation: safe RET': + * 'Mitigation: Safe RET': - Software-only mitigation. It complements the extended IBPB microcode - patch functionality by addressing User->Kernel and Guest->Host - transitions protection. + Combined microcode/software mitigation. It complements the + extended IBPB microcode patch functionality by addressing + User->Kernel and Guest->Host transitions protection. Selected by default or by spec_rstack_overflow=safe-ret @@ -129,7 +139,7 @@ an indrect branch prediction barrier after having applied the required microcode patch for one's system. This mitigation comes also at a performance cost. -Mitigation: safe RET +Mitigation: Safe RET -------------------- The mitigation works by ensuring all RET instructions speculate to |