diff options
author | Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> | 2016-07-29 17:38:46 -0700 |
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committer | Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> | 2016-07-29 17:38:46 -0700 |
commit | 7a1e8b80fb1e8ead4cec15d1fc494ed290e4d2e9 (patch) | |
tree | 55a36d4256f1ae793b5c8e88c0f158737447193f /kernel | |
parent | a867d7349e94b6409b08629886a819f802377e91 (diff) | |
parent | 7616ac70d1bb4f2e9d25c1a82d283f3368a7b632 (diff) |
Merge branch 'next' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security
Pull security subsystem updates from James Morris:
"Highlights:
- TPM core and driver updates/fixes
- IPv6 security labeling (CALIPSO)
- Lots of Apparmor fixes
- Seccomp: remove 2-phase API, close hole where ptrace can change
syscall #"
* 'next' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security: (156 commits)
apparmor: fix SECURITY_APPARMOR_HASH_DEFAULT parameter handling
tpm: Add TPM 2.0 support to the Nuvoton i2c driver (NPCT6xx family)
tpm: Factor out common startup code
tpm: use devm_add_action_or_reset
tpm2_i2c_nuvoton: add irq validity check
tpm: read burstcount from TPM_STS in one 32-bit transaction
tpm: fix byte-order for the value read by tpm2_get_tpm_pt
tpm_tis_core: convert max timeouts from msec to jiffies
apparmor: fix arg_size computation for when setprocattr is null terminated
apparmor: fix oops, validate buffer size in apparmor_setprocattr()
apparmor: do not expose kernel stack
apparmor: fix module parameters can be changed after policy is locked
apparmor: fix oops in profile_unpack() when policy_db is not present
apparmor: don't check for vmalloc_addr if kvzalloc() failed
apparmor: add missing id bounds check on dfa verification
apparmor: allow SYS_CAP_RESOURCE to be sufficient to prlimit another task
apparmor: use list_next_entry instead of list_entry_next
apparmor: fix refcount race when finding a child profile
apparmor: fix ref count leak when profile sha1 hash is read
apparmor: check that xindex is in trans_table bounds
...
Diffstat (limited to 'kernel')
-rw-r--r-- | kernel/capability.c | 46 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | kernel/seccomp.c | 144 |
2 files changed, 92 insertions, 98 deletions
diff --git a/kernel/capability.c b/kernel/capability.c index 45432b54d5c6..00411c82dac5 100644 --- a/kernel/capability.c +++ b/kernel/capability.c @@ -361,6 +361,24 @@ bool has_capability_noaudit(struct task_struct *t, int cap) return has_ns_capability_noaudit(t, &init_user_ns, cap); } +static bool ns_capable_common(struct user_namespace *ns, int cap, bool audit) +{ + int capable; + + if (unlikely(!cap_valid(cap))) { + pr_crit("capable() called with invalid cap=%u\n", cap); + BUG(); + } + + capable = audit ? security_capable(current_cred(), ns, cap) : + security_capable_noaudit(current_cred(), ns, cap); + if (capable == 0) { + current->flags |= PF_SUPERPRIV; + return true; + } + return false; +} + /** * ns_capable - Determine if the current task has a superior capability in effect * @ns: The usernamespace we want the capability in @@ -374,19 +392,27 @@ bool has_capability_noaudit(struct task_struct *t, int cap) */ bool ns_capable(struct user_namespace *ns, int cap) { - if (unlikely(!cap_valid(cap))) { - pr_crit("capable() called with invalid cap=%u\n", cap); - BUG(); - } - - if (security_capable(current_cred(), ns, cap) == 0) { - current->flags |= PF_SUPERPRIV; - return true; - } - return false; + return ns_capable_common(ns, cap, true); } EXPORT_SYMBOL(ns_capable); +/** + * ns_capable_noaudit - Determine if the current task has a superior capability + * (unaudited) in effect + * @ns: The usernamespace we want the capability in + * @cap: The capability to be tested for + * + * Return true if the current task has the given superior capability currently + * available for use, false if not. + * + * This sets PF_SUPERPRIV on the task if the capability is available on the + * assumption that it's about to be used. + */ +bool ns_capable_noaudit(struct user_namespace *ns, int cap) +{ + return ns_capable_common(ns, cap, false); +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL(ns_capable_noaudit); /** * capable - Determine if the current task has a superior capability in effect diff --git a/kernel/seccomp.c b/kernel/seccomp.c index 7002796f14a4..54d15eb2b701 100644 --- a/kernel/seccomp.c +++ b/kernel/seccomp.c @@ -173,7 +173,7 @@ static int seccomp_check_filter(struct sock_filter *filter, unsigned int flen) * * Returns valid seccomp BPF response codes. */ -static u32 seccomp_run_filters(struct seccomp_data *sd) +static u32 seccomp_run_filters(const struct seccomp_data *sd) { struct seccomp_data sd_local; u32 ret = SECCOMP_RET_ALLOW; @@ -554,20 +554,10 @@ void secure_computing_strict(int this_syscall) BUG(); } #else -int __secure_computing(void) -{ - u32 phase1_result = seccomp_phase1(NULL); - - if (likely(phase1_result == SECCOMP_PHASE1_OK)) - return 0; - else if (likely(phase1_result == SECCOMP_PHASE1_SKIP)) - return -1; - else - return seccomp_phase2(phase1_result); -} #ifdef CONFIG_SECCOMP_FILTER -static u32 __seccomp_phase1_filter(int this_syscall, struct seccomp_data *sd) +static int __seccomp_filter(int this_syscall, const struct seccomp_data *sd, + const bool recheck_after_trace) { u32 filter_ret, action; int data; @@ -599,10 +589,46 @@ static u32 __seccomp_phase1_filter(int this_syscall, struct seccomp_data *sd) goto skip; case SECCOMP_RET_TRACE: - return filter_ret; /* Save the rest for phase 2. */ + /* We've been put in this state by the ptracer already. */ + if (recheck_after_trace) + return 0; + + /* ENOSYS these calls if there is no tracer attached. */ + if (!ptrace_event_enabled(current, PTRACE_EVENT_SECCOMP)) { + syscall_set_return_value(current, + task_pt_regs(current), + -ENOSYS, 0); + goto skip; + } + + /* Allow the BPF to provide the event message */ + ptrace_event(PTRACE_EVENT_SECCOMP, data); + /* + * The delivery of a fatal signal during event + * notification may silently skip tracer notification. + * Terminating the task now avoids executing a system + * call that may not be intended. + */ + if (fatal_signal_pending(current)) + do_exit(SIGSYS); + /* Check if the tracer forced the syscall to be skipped. */ + this_syscall = syscall_get_nr(current, task_pt_regs(current)); + if (this_syscall < 0) + goto skip; + + /* + * Recheck the syscall, since it may have changed. This + * intentionally uses a NULL struct seccomp_data to force + * a reload of all registers. This does not goto skip since + * a skip would have already been reported. + */ + if (__seccomp_filter(this_syscall, NULL, true)) + return -1; + + return 0; case SECCOMP_RET_ALLOW: - return SECCOMP_PHASE1_OK; + return 0; case SECCOMP_RET_KILL: default: @@ -614,96 +640,38 @@ static u32 __seccomp_phase1_filter(int this_syscall, struct seccomp_data *sd) skip: audit_seccomp(this_syscall, 0, action); - return SECCOMP_PHASE1_SKIP; + return -1; +} +#else +static int __seccomp_filter(int this_syscall, const struct seccomp_data *sd, + const bool recheck_after_trace) +{ + BUG(); } #endif -/** - * seccomp_phase1() - run fast path seccomp checks on the current syscall - * @arg sd: The seccomp_data or NULL - * - * This only reads pt_regs via the syscall_xyz helpers. The only change - * it will make to pt_regs is via syscall_set_return_value, and it will - * only do that if it returns SECCOMP_PHASE1_SKIP. - * - * If sd is provided, it will not read pt_regs at all. - * - * It may also call do_exit or force a signal; these actions must be - * safe. - * - * If it returns SECCOMP_PHASE1_OK, the syscall passes checks and should - * be processed normally. - * - * If it returns SECCOMP_PHASE1_SKIP, then the syscall should not be - * invoked. In this case, seccomp_phase1 will have set the return value - * using syscall_set_return_value. - * - * If it returns anything else, then the return value should be passed - * to seccomp_phase2 from a context in which ptrace hooks are safe. - */ -u32 seccomp_phase1(struct seccomp_data *sd) +int __secure_computing(const struct seccomp_data *sd) { int mode = current->seccomp.mode; - int this_syscall = sd ? sd->nr : - syscall_get_nr(current, task_pt_regs(current)); + int this_syscall; if (config_enabled(CONFIG_CHECKPOINT_RESTORE) && unlikely(current->ptrace & PT_SUSPEND_SECCOMP)) - return SECCOMP_PHASE1_OK; + return 0; + + this_syscall = sd ? sd->nr : + syscall_get_nr(current, task_pt_regs(current)); switch (mode) { case SECCOMP_MODE_STRICT: __secure_computing_strict(this_syscall); /* may call do_exit */ - return SECCOMP_PHASE1_OK; -#ifdef CONFIG_SECCOMP_FILTER + return 0; case SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER: - return __seccomp_phase1_filter(this_syscall, sd); -#endif + return __seccomp_filter(this_syscall, sd, false); default: BUG(); } } - -/** - * seccomp_phase2() - finish slow path seccomp work for the current syscall - * @phase1_result: The return value from seccomp_phase1() - * - * This must be called from a context in which ptrace hooks can be used. - * - * Returns 0 if the syscall should be processed or -1 to skip the syscall. - */ -int seccomp_phase2(u32 phase1_result) -{ - struct pt_regs *regs = task_pt_regs(current); - u32 action = phase1_result & SECCOMP_RET_ACTION; - int data = phase1_result & SECCOMP_RET_DATA; - - BUG_ON(action != SECCOMP_RET_TRACE); - - audit_seccomp(syscall_get_nr(current, regs), 0, action); - - /* Skip these calls if there is no tracer. */ - if (!ptrace_event_enabled(current, PTRACE_EVENT_SECCOMP)) { - syscall_set_return_value(current, regs, - -ENOSYS, 0); - return -1; - } - - /* Allow the BPF to provide the event message */ - ptrace_event(PTRACE_EVENT_SECCOMP, data); - /* - * The delivery of a fatal signal during event - * notification may silently skip tracer notification. - * Terminating the task now avoids executing a system - * call that may not be intended. - */ - if (fatal_signal_pending(current)) - do_exit(SIGSYS); - if (syscall_get_nr(current, regs) < 0) - return -1; /* Explicit request to skip. */ - - return 0; -} #endif /* CONFIG_HAVE_ARCH_SECCOMP_FILTER */ long prctl_get_seccomp(void) |