diff options
| author | Alan Coopersmith <alan.coopersmith@oracle.com> | 2014-01-22 23:40:18 -0800 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Alan Coopersmith <alan.coopersmith@oracle.com> | 2014-12-08 18:09:47 -0800 |
| commit | 6692670fde081bbfe9313f17d84037ae9116702a (patch) | |
| tree | 4cfe8c4053f1c2ef90c52b83fa1d384437cc64d7 | |
| parent | e0e11644622a589129a01e11e5d105dc74a098de (diff) | |
dri2: integer overflow in ProcDRI2GetBuffers() [CVE-2014-8094]
ProcDRI2GetBuffers() tries to validate a length field (count).
There is an integer overflow in the validation. This can cause
out of bound reads and memory corruption later on.
Reported-by: Ilja Van Sprundel <ivansprundel@ioactive.com>
Signed-off-by: Alan Coopersmith <alan.coopersmith@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Peter Hutterer <peter.hutterer@who-t.net>
Reviewed-by: Julien Cristau <jcristau@debian.org>
| -rw-r--r-- | hw/xfree86/dri2/dri2ext.c | 3 |
1 files changed, 3 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/hw/xfree86/dri2/dri2ext.c b/hw/xfree86/dri2/dri2ext.c index ffd66fad6..221ec530b 100644 --- a/hw/xfree86/dri2/dri2ext.c +++ b/hw/xfree86/dri2/dri2ext.c @@ -270,6 +270,9 @@ ProcDRI2GetBuffers(ClientPtr client) unsigned int *attachments; REQUEST_FIXED_SIZE(xDRI2GetBuffersReq, stuff->count * 4); + if (stuff->count > (INT_MAX / 4)) + return BadLength; + if (!validDrawable(client, stuff->drawable, DixReadAccess | DixWriteAccess, &pDrawable, &status)) return status; |