diff options
| author | Alan Coopersmith <alan.coopersmith@oracle.com> | 2014-01-22 21:11:16 -0800 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Alan Coopersmith <alan.coopersmith@oracle.com> | 2014-12-08 18:09:46 -0800 |
| commit | eeae42d60bf3d5663ea088581f6c28a82cd17829 (patch) | |
| tree | 8ea21c65aa6ee2a0d9acb6e31f04435a3867c467 | |
| parent | 90cc925c5991fcb203f72d00b04419cd754a9b2c (diff) | |
dix: integer overflow in ProcPutImage() [CVE-2014-8092 1/4]
ProcPutImage() calculates a length field from a width, left pad and depth
specified by the client (if the specified format is XYPixmap).
The calculations for the total amount of memory the server needs for the
pixmap can overflow a 32-bit number, causing out-of-bounds memory writes
on 32-bit systems (since the length is stored in a long int variable).
Reported-by: Ilja Van Sprundel <ivansprundel@ioactive.com>
Signed-off-by: Alan Coopersmith <alan.coopersmith@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Peter Hutterer <peter.hutterer@who-t.net>
| -rw-r--r-- | dix/dispatch.c | 3 |
1 files changed, 3 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/dix/dispatch.c b/dix/dispatch.c index d844a0942..55b978dea 100644 --- a/dix/dispatch.c +++ b/dix/dispatch.c @@ -2000,6 +2000,9 @@ ProcPutImage(ClientPtr client) tmpImage = (char *) &stuff[1]; lengthProto = length; + if (lengthProto >= (INT32_MAX / stuff->height)) + return BadLength; + if ((bytes_to_int32(lengthProto * stuff->height) + bytes_to_int32(sizeof(xPutImageReq))) != client->req_len) return BadLength; |