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authorMichael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com>2014-04-03 19:52:25 +0300
committerJuan Quintela <quintela@redhat.com>2014-05-05 22:15:03 +0200
commit9f8e9895c504149d7048e9fc5eb5cbb34b16e49a (patch)
tree4d13c798595979f4650e00acfb74a03fc54047da /hw/usb/bus.c
parent3476436a44c29725efef0cabf5b3ea4e70054d57 (diff)
usb: sanity check setup_index+setup_len in post_load
CVE-2013-4541 s->setup_len and s->setup_index are fed into usb_packet_copy as size/offset into s->data_buf, it's possible for invalid state to exploit this to load arbitrary data. setup_len and setup_index should be checked to make sure they are not negative. Cc: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Juan Quintela <quintela@redhat.com>
Diffstat (limited to 'hw/usb/bus.c')
-rw-r--r--hw/usb/bus.c4
1 files changed, 3 insertions, 1 deletions
diff --git a/hw/usb/bus.c b/hw/usb/bus.c
index fe70429304..e48b19fc29 100644
--- a/hw/usb/bus.c
+++ b/hw/usb/bus.c
@@ -49,7 +49,9 @@ static int usb_device_post_load(void *opaque, int version_id)
} else {
dev->attached = 1;
}
- if (dev->setup_index >= sizeof(dev->data_buf) ||
+ if (dev->setup_index < 0 ||
+ dev->setup_len < 0 ||
+ dev->setup_index >= sizeof(dev->data_buf) ||
dev->setup_len >= sizeof(dev->data_buf)) {
return -EINVAL;
}