diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'crypto')
| -rw-r--r-- | crypto/asymmetric_keys/restrict.c | 62 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_parser.h | 6 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_public_key.c | 21 |
3 files changed, 33 insertions, 56 deletions
diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/restrict.c b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/restrict.c index b4c10f2f5034..ac4bddf669de 100644 --- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/restrict.c +++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/restrict.c @@ -1,6 +1,6 @@ /* Instantiate a public key crypto key from an X.509 Certificate * - * Copyright (C) 2012 Red Hat, Inc. All Rights Reserved. + * Copyright (C) 2012, 2016 Red Hat, Inc. All Rights Reserved. * Written by David Howells (dhowells@redhat.com) * * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or @@ -9,20 +9,12 @@ * 2 of the Licence, or (at your option) any later version. */ -#define pr_fmt(fmt) "X.509: "fmt +#define pr_fmt(fmt) "ASYM: "fmt #include <linux/module.h> #include <linux/kernel.h> -#include <linux/slab.h> #include <linux/err.h> -#include <linux/mpi.h> -#include <linux/asn1_decoder.h> -#include <keys/asymmetric-subtype.h> -#include <keys/asymmetric-parser.h> -#include <keys/system_keyring.h> -#include <crypto/hash.h> #include <crypto/public_key.h> #include "asymmetric_keys.h" -#include "x509_parser.h" static bool use_builtin_keys; static struct asymmetric_key_id *ca_keyid; @@ -62,45 +54,55 @@ static int __init ca_keys_setup(char *str) __setup("ca_keys=", ca_keys_setup); #endif -/* +/** + * restrict_link_by_signature - Restrict additions to a ring of public keys + * @trust_keyring: A ring of keys that can be used to vouch for the new cert. + * @type: The type of key being added. + * @payload: The payload of the new key. + * * Check the new certificate against the ones in the trust keyring. If one of * those is the signing key and validates the new certificate, then mark the * new certificate as being trusted. * - * Return 0 if the new certificate was successfully validated, 1 if we couldn't - * find a matching parent certificate in the trusted list and an error if there - * is a matching certificate but the signature check fails. + * Returns 0 if the new certificate was accepted, -ENOKEY if we couldn't find a + * matching parent certificate in the trusted list, -EKEYREJECTED if the + * signature check fails or the key is blacklisted and some other error if + * there is a matching certificate but the signature check cannot be performed. */ -int x509_validate_trust(struct x509_certificate *cert, - struct key *trust_keyring) +int restrict_link_by_signature(struct key *trust_keyring, + const struct key_type *type, + const union key_payload *payload) { - struct public_key_signature *sig = cert->sig; + const struct public_key_signature *sig; struct key *key; - int ret = 1; + int ret; - if (!sig->auth_ids[0] && !sig->auth_ids[1]) - return 1; + pr_devel("==>%s()\n", __func__); if (!trust_keyring) + return -ENOKEY; + + if (type != &key_type_asymmetric) return -EOPNOTSUPP; + + sig = payload->data[asym_auth]; + if (!sig->auth_ids[0] && !sig->auth_ids[1]) + return 0; + if (ca_keyid && !asymmetric_key_id_partial(sig->auth_ids[1], ca_keyid)) return -EPERM; - if (cert->unsupported_sig) - return -ENOPKG; + /* See if we have a key that signed this one. */ key = find_asymmetric_key(trust_keyring, sig->auth_ids[0], sig->auth_ids[1], false); if (IS_ERR(key)) - return PTR_ERR(key); + return -ENOKEY; - if (!use_builtin_keys || - test_bit(KEY_FLAG_BUILTIN, &key->flags)) { - ret = verify_signature(key, cert->sig); - if (ret == -ENOPKG) - cert->unsupported_sig = true; - } + if (use_builtin_keys && !test_bit(KEY_FLAG_BUILTIN, &key->flags)) + ret = -ENOKEY; + else + ret = verify_signature(key, sig); key_put(key); return ret; } -EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(x509_validate_trust); diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_parser.h b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_parser.h index 7a802b09a509..05eef1c68881 100644 --- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_parser.h +++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_parser.h @@ -58,9 +58,3 @@ extern int x509_decode_time(time64_t *_t, size_t hdrlen, */ extern int x509_get_sig_params(struct x509_certificate *cert); extern int x509_check_for_self_signed(struct x509_certificate *cert); - -/* - * public_key_trust.c - */ -extern int x509_validate_trust(struct x509_certificate *cert, - struct key *trust_keyring); diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_public_key.c b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_public_key.c index 6d7f42f0de9a..fb732296cd36 100644 --- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_public_key.c +++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_public_key.c @@ -178,31 +178,12 @@ static int x509_key_preparse(struct key_preparsed_payload *prep) cert->pub->id_type = "X509"; - /* See if we can derive the trustability of this certificate. - * - * When it comes to self-signed certificates, we cannot evaluate - * trustedness except by the fact that we obtained it from a trusted - * location. So we just rely on x509_validate_trust() failing in this - * case. - * - * Note that there's a possibility of a self-signed cert matching a - * cert that we have (most likely a duplicate that we already trust) - - * in which case it will be marked trusted. - */ - if (cert->unsupported_sig || cert->self_signed) { + if (cert->unsupported_sig) { public_key_signature_free(cert->sig); cert->sig = NULL; } else { pr_devel("Cert Signature: %s + %s\n", cert->sig->pkey_algo, cert->sig->hash_algo); - - ret = x509_validate_trust(cert, get_system_trusted_keyring()); - if (ret) - ret = x509_validate_trust(cert, get_ima_mok_keyring()); - if (ret == -EKEYREJECTED) - goto error_free_cert; - if (!ret) - prep->trusted = true; } /* Propose a description */ |