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authorPeter Hutterer <peter.hutterer@who-t.net>2023-11-28 15:19:04 +1000
committerPeter Hutterer <peter.hutterer@who-t.net>2023-12-13 10:44:49 +1000
commit0c1a93d319558fe3ab2d94f51d174b4f93810afd (patch)
treeece996df4ccbd99d8e6ef2d0e2fec0a468d921b4 /Xi
parent14f480010a93ff962fef66a16412fafff81ad632 (diff)
Xi: allocate enough XkbActions for our buttons
button->xkb_acts is supposed to be an array sufficiently large for all our buttons, not just a single XkbActions struct. Allocating insufficient memory here means when we memcpy() later in XkbSetDeviceInfo we write into memory that wasn't ours to begin with, leading to the usual security ooopsiedaisies. CVE-2023-6377, ZDI-CAN-22412, ZDI-CAN-22413 This vulnerability was discovered by: Jan-Niklas Sohn working with Trend Micro Zero Day Initiative
Diffstat (limited to 'Xi')
-rw-r--r--Xi/exevents.c12
1 files changed, 6 insertions, 6 deletions
diff --git a/Xi/exevents.c b/Xi/exevents.c
index dcd4efb3b..54ea11a93 100644
--- a/Xi/exevents.c
+++ b/Xi/exevents.c
@@ -611,13 +611,13 @@ DeepCopyPointerClasses(DeviceIntPtr from, DeviceIntPtr to)
}
if (from->button->xkb_acts) {
- if (!to->button->xkb_acts) {
- to->button->xkb_acts = calloc(1, sizeof(XkbAction));
- if (!to->button->xkb_acts)
- FatalError("[Xi] not enough memory for xkb_acts.\n");
- }
+ size_t maxbuttons = max(to->button->numButtons, from->button->numButtons);
+ to->button->xkb_acts = xnfreallocarray(to->button->xkb_acts,
+ maxbuttons,
+ sizeof(XkbAction));
+ memset(to->button->xkb_acts, 0, maxbuttons * sizeof(XkbAction));
memcpy(to->button->xkb_acts, from->button->xkb_acts,
- sizeof(XkbAction));
+ from->button->numButtons * sizeof(XkbAction));
}
else {
free(to->button->xkb_acts);