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authorStefano Stabellini <stefano.stabellini@eu.citrix.com>2016-01-13 14:59:09 +0000
committerMichael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com>2016-02-06 20:44:10 +0200
commit428c3ece97179557f2753071fb0ca97a03437267 (patch)
tree6aa26f91ad4b268c0d51e8b3819bb4381a446fda /hw
parentd66b969b0d9c8eefdcbff4b48535b0fe1501d139 (diff)
fix MSI injection on Xen
On Xen MSIs can be remapped into pirqs, which are a type of event channels. It's mostly for the benefit of PCI passthrough devices, to avoid the overhead of interacting with the emulated lapic. However remapping interrupts and MSIs is also supported for emulated devices, such as the e1000 and virtio-net. When an interrupt or an MSI is remapped into a pirq, masking and unmasking is done by masking and unmasking the event channel. The masking bit on the PCI config space or MSI-X table should be ignored, but it isn't at the moment. As a consequence emulated devices which use MSI or MSI-X, such as virtio-net, don't work properly (the guest doesn't receive any notifications). The mechanism was working properly when xen_apic was introduced, but I haven't narrowed down which commit in particular is causing the regression. Fix the issue by ignoring the masking bit for MSI and MSI-X which have been remapped into pirqs. Signed-off-by: Stefano Stabellini <stefano.stabellini@eu.citrix.com> Reviewed-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com>
Diffstat (limited to 'hw')
-rw-r--r--hw/pci/msi.c9
-rw-r--r--hw/pci/msix.c12
-rw-r--r--hw/xen/xen_pt_msi.c4
3 files changed, 19 insertions, 6 deletions
diff --git a/hw/pci/msi.c b/hw/pci/msi.c
index 8efa23d376..85f21b8c4b 100644
--- a/hw/pci/msi.c
+++ b/hw/pci/msi.c
@@ -20,6 +20,7 @@
#include "qemu/osdep.h"
#include "hw/pci/msi.h"
+#include "hw/xen/xen.h"
#include "qemu/range.h"
/* PCI_MSI_ADDRESS_LO */
@@ -254,13 +255,19 @@ void msi_reset(PCIDevice *dev)
static bool msi_is_masked(const PCIDevice *dev, unsigned int vector)
{
uint16_t flags = pci_get_word(dev->config + msi_flags_off(dev));
- uint32_t mask;
+ uint32_t mask, data;
+ bool msi64bit = flags & PCI_MSI_FLAGS_64BIT;
assert(vector < PCI_MSI_VECTORS_MAX);
if (!(flags & PCI_MSI_FLAGS_MASKBIT)) {
return false;
}
+ data = pci_get_word(dev->config + msi_data_off(dev, msi64bit));
+ if (xen_is_pirq_msi(data)) {
+ return false;
+ }
+
mask = pci_get_long(dev->config +
msi_mask_off(dev, flags & PCI_MSI_FLAGS_64BIT));
return mask & (1U << vector);
diff --git a/hw/pci/msix.c b/hw/pci/msix.c
index 4fea7edc89..eb4ef113d1 100644
--- a/hw/pci/msix.c
+++ b/hw/pci/msix.c
@@ -19,6 +19,7 @@
#include "hw/pci/msi.h"
#include "hw/pci/msix.h"
#include "hw/pci/pci.h"
+#include "hw/xen/xen.h"
#include "qemu/range.h"
#define MSIX_CAP_LENGTH 12
@@ -78,8 +79,15 @@ static void msix_clr_pending(PCIDevice *dev, int vector)
static bool msix_vector_masked(PCIDevice *dev, unsigned int vector, bool fmask)
{
- unsigned offset = vector * PCI_MSIX_ENTRY_SIZE + PCI_MSIX_ENTRY_VECTOR_CTRL;
- return fmask || dev->msix_table[offset] & PCI_MSIX_ENTRY_CTRL_MASKBIT;
+ unsigned offset = vector * PCI_MSIX_ENTRY_SIZE;
+ uint32_t *data = (uint32_t *)&dev->msix_table[offset + PCI_MSIX_ENTRY_DATA];
+ /* MSIs on Xen can be remapped into pirqs. In those cases, masking
+ * and unmasking go through the PV evtchn path. */
+ if (xen_is_pirq_msi(*data)) {
+ return false;
+ }
+ return fmask || dev->msix_table[offset + PCI_MSIX_ENTRY_VECTOR_CTRL] &
+ PCI_MSIX_ENTRY_CTRL_MASKBIT;
}
bool msix_is_masked(PCIDevice *dev, unsigned int vector)
diff --git a/hw/xen/xen_pt_msi.c b/hw/xen/xen_pt_msi.c
index 5624685b20..9a16f2bff1 100644
--- a/hw/xen/xen_pt_msi.c
+++ b/hw/xen/xen_pt_msi.c
@@ -115,9 +115,7 @@ static int msi_msix_setup(XenPCIPassthroughState *s,
assert((!is_msix && msix_entry == 0) || is_msix);
- if (gvec == 0) {
- /* if gvec is 0, the guest is asking for a particular pirq that
- * is passed as dest_id */
+ if (xen_is_pirq_msi(data)) {
*ppirq = msi_ext_dest_id(addr >> 32) | msi_dest_id(addr);
if (!*ppirq) {
/* this probably identifies an misconfiguration of the guest,