KVM: x86: Disallow read-only memslots for SEV-ES and SEV-SNP (and TDX)

Disallow read-only memslots for SEV-{ES,SNP} VM types, as KVM can't
directly emulate instructions for ES/SNP, and instead the guest must
explicitly request emulation.  Unless the guest explicitly requests
emulation without accessing memory, ES/SNP relies on KVM creating an MMIO
SPTE, with the subsequent #NPF being reflected into the guest as a #VC.

But for read-only memslots, KVM deliberately doesn't create MMIO SPTEs,
because except for ES/SNP, doing so requires setting reserved bits in the
SPTE, i.e. the SPTE can't be readable while also generating a #VC on
writes.  Because KVM never creates MMIO SPTEs and jumps directly to
emulation, the guest never gets a #VC.  And since KVM simply resumes the
guest if ES/SNP guests trigger emulation, KVM effectively puts the vCPU
into an infinite #NPF loop if the vCPU attempts to write read-only memory.

Disallow read-only memory for all VMs with protected state, i.e. for
upcoming TDX VMs as well as ES/SNP VMs.  For TDX, it's actually possible
to support read-only memory, as TDX uses EPT Violation #VE to reflect the
fault into the guest, e.g. KVM could configure read-only SPTEs with RX
protections and SUPPRESS_VE=0.  But there is no strong use case for
supporting read-only memslots on TDX, e.g. the main historical usage is
to emulate option ROMs, but TDX disallows executing from shared memory.
And if someone comes along with a legitimate, strong use case, the
restriction can always be lifted for TDX.

Don't bother trying to retroactively apply the restriction to SEV-ES
VMs that are created as type KVM_X86_DEFAULT_VM.  Read-only memslots can't
possibly work for SEV-ES, i.e. disallowing such memslots is really just
means reporting an error to userspace instead of silently hanging vCPUs.
Trying to deal with the ordering between KVM_SEV_INIT and memslot creation
isn't worth the marginal benefit it would provide userspace.

Fixes: 26c44aa9e076 ("KVM: SEV: define VM types for SEV and SEV-ES")
Fixes: 1dfe571c12cf ("KVM: SEV: Add initial SEV-SNP support")
Cc: Peter Gonda <pgonda@google.com>
Cc: Michael Roth <michael.roth@amd.com>
Cc: Vishal Annapurve <vannapurve@google.com>
Cc: Ackerly Tng <ackerleytng@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Message-ID: <20240809190319.1710470-2-seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>

1 files changed, 2 insertions, 3 deletions

diff --git a/virt/kvm/kvm_main.c b/virt/kvm/kvm_main.c
index 92901656a0d4..cb2b78e92910 100644
--- a/virt/kvm/kvm_main.c
+++ b/virt/kvm/kvm_main.c
@@ -1578,15 +1578,14 @@ static int check_memory_region_flags(struct kvm *kvm,
 	if (mem->flags & KVM_MEM_GUEST_MEMFD)
 		valid_flags &= ~KVM_MEM_LOG_DIRTY_PAGES;
 
-#ifdef CONFIG_HAVE_KVM_READONLY_MEM
 	/*
 	 * GUEST_MEMFD is incompatible with read-only memslots, as writes to
 	 * read-only memslots have emulated MMIO, not page fault, semantics,
 	 * and KVM doesn't allow emulated MMIO for private memory.
 	 */
-	if (!(mem->flags & KVM_MEM_GUEST_MEMFD))
+	if (kvm_arch_has_readonly_mem(kvm) &&
+	    !(mem->flags & KVM_MEM_GUEST_MEMFD))
 		valid_flags |= KVM_MEM_READONLY;
-#endif
 
 	if (mem->flags & ~valid_flags)
 		return -EINVAL;