diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c')
| -rw-r--r-- | arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c | 17 |
1 files changed, 3 insertions, 14 deletions
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c index f081d26616ac..10499bcd4e39 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c @@ -2404,27 +2404,16 @@ early_param("spec_rstack_overflow", srso_parse_cmdline); static void __init srso_select_mitigation(void) { - bool has_microcode; + bool has_microcode = boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_IBPB_BRTYPE); if (!boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_SRSO) || cpu_mitigations_off()) goto pred_cmd; - /* - * The first check is for the kernel running as a guest in order - * for guests to verify whether IBPB is a viable mitigation. - */ - has_microcode = boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_IBPB_BRTYPE) || cpu_has_ibpb_brtype_microcode(); if (!has_microcode) { pr_warn("IBPB-extending microcode not applied!\n"); pr_warn(SRSO_NOTICE); } else { /* - * Enable the synthetic (even if in a real CPUID leaf) - * flags for guests. - */ - setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_IBPB_BRTYPE); - - /* * Zen1/2 with SMT off aren't vulnerable after the right * IBPB microcode has been applied. */ @@ -2444,7 +2433,7 @@ static void __init srso_select_mitigation(void) switch (srso_cmd) { case SRSO_CMD_OFF: - return; + goto pred_cmd; case SRSO_CMD_MICROCODE: if (has_microcode) { @@ -2717,7 +2706,7 @@ static ssize_t srso_show_state(char *buf) return sysfs_emit(buf, "%s%s\n", srso_strings[srso_mitigation], - (cpu_has_ibpb_brtype_microcode() ? "" : ", no microcode")); + boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_IBPB_BRTYPE) ? "" : ", no microcode"); } static ssize_t gds_show_state(char *buf) |