diff options
-rw-r--r-- | crypto/ecc.c | 29 |
1 files changed, 17 insertions, 12 deletions
diff --git a/crypto/ecc.c b/crypto/ecc.c index f53fb4d6af99..3581027e9f92 100644 --- a/crypto/ecc.c +++ b/crypto/ecc.c @@ -1416,6 +1416,12 @@ void ecc_point_mult_shamir(const struct ecc_point *result, } EXPORT_SYMBOL(ecc_point_mult_shamir); +/* + * This function performs checks equivalent to Appendix A.4.2 of FIPS 186-5. + * Whereas A.4.2 results in an integer in the interval [1, n-1], this function + * ensures that the integer is in the range of [2, n-3]. We are slightly + * stricter because of the currently used scalar multiplication algorithm. + */ static int __ecc_is_key_valid(const struct ecc_curve *curve, const u64 *private_key, unsigned int ndigits) { @@ -1455,16 +1461,11 @@ int ecc_is_key_valid(unsigned int curve_id, unsigned int ndigits, EXPORT_SYMBOL(ecc_is_key_valid); /* - * ECC private keys are generated using the method of extra random bits, - * equivalent to that described in FIPS 186-4, Appendix B.4.1. - * - * d = (c mod(n–1)) + 1 where c is a string of random bits, 64 bits longer - * than requested - * 0 <= c mod(n-1) <= n-2 and implies that - * 1 <= d <= n-1 + * ECC private keys are generated using the method of rejection sampling, + * equivalent to that described in FIPS 186-5, Appendix A.2.2. * * This method generates a private key uniformly distributed in the range - * [1, n-1]. + * [2, n-3]. */ int ecc_gen_privkey(unsigned int curve_id, unsigned int ndigits, u64 *privkey) { @@ -1474,12 +1475,15 @@ int ecc_gen_privkey(unsigned int curve_id, unsigned int ndigits, u64 *privkey) unsigned int nbits = vli_num_bits(curve->n, ndigits); int err; - /* Check that N is included in Table 1 of FIPS 186-4, section 6.1.1 */ - if (nbits < 160 || ndigits > ARRAY_SIZE(priv)) + /* + * Step 1 & 2: check that N is included in Table 1 of FIPS 186-5, + * section 6.1.1. + */ + if (nbits < 224 || ndigits > ARRAY_SIZE(priv)) return -EINVAL; /* - * FIPS 186-4 recommends that the private key should be obtained from a + * FIPS 186-5 recommends that the private key should be obtained from a * RBG with a security strength equal to or greater than the security * strength associated with N. * @@ -1492,12 +1496,13 @@ int ecc_gen_privkey(unsigned int curve_id, unsigned int ndigits, u64 *privkey) if (crypto_get_default_rng()) return -EFAULT; + /* Step 3: obtain N returned_bits from the DRBG. */ err = crypto_rng_get_bytes(crypto_default_rng, (u8 *)priv, nbytes); crypto_put_default_rng(); if (err) return err; - /* Make sure the private key is in the valid range. */ + /* Step 4: make sure the private key is in the valid range. */ if (__ecc_is_key_valid(curve, priv, ndigits)) return -EINVAL; |