virt: Add efi_secret module to expose confidential computing secrets

The new efi_secret module exposes the confidential computing (coco)
EFI secret area via securityfs interface.

When the module is loaded (and securityfs is mounted, typically under
/sys/kernel/security), a "secrets/coco" directory is created in
securityfs.  In it, a file is created for each secret entry.  The name
of each such file is the GUID of the secret entry, and its content is
the secret data.

This allows applications running in a confidential computing setting to
read secrets provided by the guest owner via a secure secret injection
mechanism (such as AMD SEV's LAUNCH_SECRET command).

Removing (unlinking) files in the "secrets/coco" directory will zero out
the secret in memory, and remove the filesystem entry.  If the module is
removed and loaded again, that secret will not appear in the filesystem.

Signed-off-by: Dov Murik <dovmurik@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220412212127.154182-3-dovmurik@linux.ibm.com
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>

3 files changed, 367 insertions, 0 deletions

diff --git a/drivers/virt/coco/efi_secret/Kconfig b/drivers/virt/coco/efi_secret/Kconfig
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..4404d198f3b2
--- /dev/null
+++ b/drivers/virt/coco/efi_secret/Kconfig
@@ -0,0 +1,16 @@
+# SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only
+config EFI_SECRET
+	tristate "EFI secret area securityfs support"
+	depends on EFI && X86_64
+	select EFI_COCO_SECRET
+	select SECURITYFS
+	help
+	  This is a driver for accessing the EFI secret area via securityfs.
+	  The EFI secret area is a memory area designated by the firmware for
+	  confidential computing secret injection (for example for AMD SEV
+	  guests).  The driver exposes the secrets as files in
+	  <securityfs>/secrets/coco.  Files can be read and deleted (deleting
+	  a file wipes the secret from memory).
+
+	  To compile this driver as a module, choose M here.
+	  The module will be called efi_secret.
diff --git a/drivers/virt/coco/efi_secret/Makefile b/drivers/virt/coco/efi_secret/Makefile
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..c7047ce804f7
--- /dev/null
+++ b/drivers/virt/coco/efi_secret/Makefile
@@ -0,0 +1,2 @@
+# SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only
+obj-$(CONFIG_EFI_SECRET) += efi_secret.o
diff --git a/drivers/virt/coco/efi_secret/efi_secret.c b/drivers/virt/coco/efi_secret/efi_secret.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..e700a5ef7043
--- /dev/null
+++ b/drivers/virt/coco/efi_secret/efi_secret.c
@@ -0,0 +1,349 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+/*
+ * efi_secret module
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2022 IBM Corporation
+ * Author: Dov Murik <dovmurik@linux.ibm.com>
+ */
+
+/**
+ * DOC: efi_secret: Allow reading EFI confidential computing (coco) secret area
+ * via securityfs interface.
+ *
+ * When the module is loaded (and securityfs is mounted, typically under
+ * /sys/kernel/security), a "secrets/coco" directory is created in securityfs.
+ * In it, a file is created for each secret entry.  The name of each such file
+ * is the GUID of the secret entry, and its content is the secret data.
+ */
+
+#include <linux/platform_device.h>
+#include <linux/seq_file.h>
+#include <linux/fs.h>
+#include <linux/kernel.h>
+#include <linux/init.h>
+#include <linux/module.h>
+#include <linux/io.h>
+#include <linux/security.h>
+#include <linux/efi.h>
+#include <linux/cacheflush.h>
+
+#define EFI_SECRET_NUM_FILES 64
+
+struct efi_secret {
+	struct dentry *secrets_dir;
+	struct dentry *fs_dir;
+	struct dentry *fs_files[EFI_SECRET_NUM_FILES];
+	void __iomem *secret_data;
+	u64 secret_data_len;
+};
+
+/*
+ * Structure of the EFI secret area
+ *
+ * Offset   Length
+ * (bytes)  (bytes)  Usage
+ * -------  -------  -----
+ *       0       16  Secret table header GUID (must be 1e74f542-71dd-4d66-963e-ef4287ff173b)
+ *      16        4  Length of bytes of the entire secret area
+ *
+ *      20       16  First secret entry's GUID
+ *      36        4  First secret entry's length in bytes (= 16 + 4 + x)
+ *      40        x  First secret entry's data
+ *
+ *    40+x       16  Second secret entry's GUID
+ *    56+x        4  Second secret entry's length in bytes (= 16 + 4 + y)
+ *    60+x        y  Second secret entry's data
+ *
+ * (... and so on for additional entries)
+ *
+ * The GUID of each secret entry designates the usage of the secret data.
+ */
+
+/**
+ * struct secret_header - Header of entire secret area; this should be followed
+ * by instances of struct secret_entry.
+ * @guid:	Must be EFI_SECRET_TABLE_HEADER_GUID
+ * @len:	Length in bytes of entire secret area, including header
+ */
+struct secret_header {
+	efi_guid_t guid;
+	u32 len;
+} __attribute((packed));
+
+/**
+ * struct secret_entry - Holds one secret entry
+ * @guid:	Secret-specific GUID (or NULL_GUID if this secret entry was deleted)
+ * @len:	Length of secret entry, including its guid and len fields
+ * @data:	The secret data (full of zeros if this secret entry was deleted)
+ */
+struct secret_entry {
+	efi_guid_t guid;
+	u32 len;
+	u8 data[];
+} __attribute((packed));
+
+static size_t secret_entry_data_len(struct secret_entry *e)
+{
+	return e->len - sizeof(*e);
+}
+
+static struct efi_secret the_efi_secret;
+
+static inline struct efi_secret *efi_secret_get(void)
+{
+	return &the_efi_secret;
+}
+
+static int efi_secret_bin_file_show(struct seq_file *file, void *data)
+{
+	struct secret_entry *e = file->private;
+
+	if (e)
+		seq_write(file, e->data, secret_entry_data_len(e));
+
+	return 0;
+}
+DEFINE_SHOW_ATTRIBUTE(efi_secret_bin_file);
+
+/*
+ * Overwrite memory content with zeroes, and ensure that dirty cache lines are
+ * actually written back to memory, to clear out the secret.
+ */
+static void wipe_memory(void *addr, size_t size)
+{
+	memzero_explicit(addr, size);
+#ifdef CONFIG_X86
+	clflush_cache_range(addr, size);
+#endif
+}
+
+static int efi_secret_unlink(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry)
+{
+	struct efi_secret *s = efi_secret_get();
+	struct inode *inode = d_inode(dentry);
+	struct secret_entry *e = (struct secret_entry *)inode->i_private;
+	int i;
+
+	if (e) {
+		/* Zero out the secret data */
+		wipe_memory(e->data, secret_entry_data_len(e));
+		e->guid = NULL_GUID;
+	}
+
+	inode->i_private = NULL;
+
+	for (i = 0; i < EFI_SECRET_NUM_FILES; i++)
+		if (s->fs_files[i] == dentry)
+			s->fs_files[i] = NULL;
+
+	/*
+	 * securityfs_remove tries to lock the directory's inode, but we reach
+	 * the unlink callback when it's already locked
+	 */
+	inode_unlock(dir);
+	securityfs_remove(dentry);
+	inode_lock(dir);
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static const struct inode_operations efi_secret_dir_inode_operations = {
+	.lookup         = simple_lookup,
+	.unlink         = efi_secret_unlink,
+};
+
+static int efi_secret_map_area(struct platform_device *dev)
+{
+	int ret;
+	struct efi_secret *s = efi_secret_get();
+	struct linux_efi_coco_secret_area *secret_area;
+
+	if (efi.coco_secret == EFI_INVALID_TABLE_ADDR) {
+		dev_err(&dev->dev, "Secret area address is not available\n");
+		return -EINVAL;
+	}
+
+	secret_area = memremap(efi.coco_secret, sizeof(*secret_area), MEMREMAP_WB);
+	if (secret_area == NULL) {
+		dev_err(&dev->dev, "Could not map secret area EFI config entry\n");
+		return -ENOMEM;
+	}
+	if (!secret_area->base_pa || secret_area->size < sizeof(struct secret_header)) {
+		dev_err(&dev->dev,
+			"Invalid secret area memory location (base_pa=0x%llx size=0x%llx)\n",
+			secret_area->base_pa, secret_area->size);
+		ret = -EINVAL;
+		goto unmap;
+	}
+
+	s->secret_data = ioremap_encrypted(secret_area->base_pa, secret_area->size);
+	if (s->secret_data == NULL) {
+		dev_err(&dev->dev, "Could not map secret area\n");
+		ret = -ENOMEM;
+		goto unmap;
+	}
+
+	s->secret_data_len = secret_area->size;
+	ret = 0;
+
+unmap:
+	memunmap(secret_area);
+	return ret;
+}
+
+static void efi_secret_securityfs_teardown(struct platform_device *dev)
+{
+	struct efi_secret *s = efi_secret_get();
+	int i;
+
+	for (i = (EFI_SECRET_NUM_FILES - 1); i >= 0; i--) {
+		securityfs_remove(s->fs_files[i]);
+		s->fs_files[i] = NULL;
+	}
+
+	securityfs_remove(s->fs_dir);
+	s->fs_dir = NULL;
+
+	securityfs_remove(s->secrets_dir);
+	s->secrets_dir = NULL;
+
+	dev_dbg(&dev->dev, "Removed securityfs entries\n");
+}
+
+static int efi_secret_securityfs_setup(struct platform_device *dev)
+{
+	struct efi_secret *s = efi_secret_get();
+	int ret = 0, i = 0, bytes_left;
+	unsigned char *ptr;
+	struct secret_header *h;
+	struct secret_entry *e;
+	struct dentry *dent;
+	char guid_str[EFI_VARIABLE_GUID_LEN + 1];
+
+	ptr = (void __force *)s->secret_data;
+	h = (struct secret_header *)ptr;
+	if (efi_guidcmp(h->guid, EFI_SECRET_TABLE_HEADER_GUID)) {
+		/*
+		 * This is not an error: it just means that EFI defines secret
+		 * area but it was not populated by the Guest Owner.
+		 */
+		dev_dbg(&dev->dev, "EFI secret area does not start with correct GUID\n");
+		return -ENODEV;
+	}
+	if (h->len < sizeof(*h)) {
+		dev_err(&dev->dev, "EFI secret area reported length is too small\n");
+		return -EINVAL;
+	}
+	if (h->len > s->secret_data_len) {
+		dev_err(&dev->dev, "EFI secret area reported length is too big\n");
+		return -EINVAL;
+	}
+
+	s->secrets_dir = NULL;
+	s->fs_dir = NULL;
+	memset(s->fs_files, 0, sizeof(s->fs_files));
+
+	dent = securityfs_create_dir("secrets", NULL);
+	if (IS_ERR(dent)) {
+		dev_err(&dev->dev, "Error creating secrets securityfs directory entry err=%ld\n",
+			PTR_ERR(dent));
+		return PTR_ERR(dent);
+	}
+	s->secrets_dir = dent;
+
+	dent = securityfs_create_dir("coco", s->secrets_dir);
+	if (IS_ERR(dent)) {
+		dev_err(&dev->dev, "Error creating coco securityfs directory entry err=%ld\n",
+			PTR_ERR(dent));
+		return PTR_ERR(dent);
+	}
+	d_inode(dent)->i_op = &efi_secret_dir_inode_operations;
+	s->fs_dir = dent;
+
+	bytes_left = h->len - sizeof(*h);
+	ptr += sizeof(*h);
+	while (bytes_left >= (int)sizeof(*e) && i < EFI_SECRET_NUM_FILES) {
+		e = (struct secret_entry *)ptr;
+		if (e->len < sizeof(*e) || e->len > (unsigned int)bytes_left) {
+			dev_err(&dev->dev, "EFI secret area is corrupted\n");
+			ret = -EINVAL;
+			goto err_cleanup;
+		}
+
+		/* Skip deleted entries (which will have NULL_GUID) */
+		if (efi_guidcmp(e->guid, NULL_GUID)) {
+			efi_guid_to_str(&e->guid, guid_str);
+
+			dent = securityfs_create_file(guid_str, 0440, s->fs_dir, (void *)e,
+						      &efi_secret_bin_file_fops);
+			if (IS_ERR(dent)) {
+				dev_err(&dev->dev, "Error creating efi_secret securityfs entry\n");
+				ret = PTR_ERR(dent);
+				goto err_cleanup;
+			}
+
+			s->fs_files[i++] = dent;
+		}
+		ptr += e->len;
+		bytes_left -= e->len;
+	}
+
+	dev_info(&dev->dev, "Created %d entries in securityfs secrets/coco\n", i);
+	return 0;
+
+err_cleanup:
+	efi_secret_securityfs_teardown(dev);
+	return ret;
+}
+
+static void efi_secret_unmap_area(void)
+{
+	struct efi_secret *s = efi_secret_get();
+
+	if (s->secret_data) {
+		iounmap(s->secret_data);
+		s->secret_data = NULL;
+		s->secret_data_len = 0;
+	}
+}
+
+static int efi_secret_probe(struct platform_device *dev)
+{
+	int ret;
+
+	ret = efi_secret_map_area(dev);
+	if (ret)
+		return ret;
+
+	ret = efi_secret_securityfs_setup(dev);
+	if (ret)
+		goto err_unmap;
+
+	return ret;
+
+err_unmap:
+	efi_secret_unmap_area();
+	return ret;
+}
+
+static int efi_secret_remove(struct platform_device *dev)
+{
+	efi_secret_securityfs_teardown(dev);
+	efi_secret_unmap_area();
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static struct platform_driver efi_secret_driver = {
+	.probe = efi_secret_probe,
+	.remove = efi_secret_remove,
+	.driver = {
+		.name = "efi_secret",
+	},
+};
+
+module_platform_driver(efi_secret_driver);
+
+MODULE_DESCRIPTION("Confidential computing EFI secret area access");
+MODULE_AUTHOR("IBM");
+MODULE_LICENSE("GPL");
+MODULE_ALIAS("platform:efi_secret");