diff options
author | Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com> | 2018-04-25 22:04:19 -0400 |
---|---|---|
committer | Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> | 2018-05-03 13:55:47 +0200 |
commit | 5cf687548705412da47c9cec342fd952d71ed3d5 (patch) | |
tree | 5b868ec35064f655e390b04a8ff520af0a660e7e /arch | |
parent | 1b86883ccb8d5d9506529d42dbe1a5257cb30b18 (diff) |
x86/bugs, KVM: Support the combination of guest and host IBRS
A guest may modify the SPEC_CTRL MSR from the value used by the
kernel. Since the kernel doesn't use IBRS, this means a value of zero is
what is needed in the host.
But the 336996-Speculative-Execution-Side-Channel-Mitigations.pdf refers to
the other bits as reserved so the kernel should respect the boot time
SPEC_CTRL value and use that.
This allows to deal with future extensions to the SPEC_CTRL interface if
any at all.
Note: This uses wrmsrl() instead of native_wrmsl(). I does not make any
difference as paravirt will over-write the callq *0xfff.. with the wrmsrl
assembler code.
Signed-off-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Reviewed-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'arch')
-rw-r--r-- | arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h | 10 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c | 18 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | arch/x86/kvm/svm.c | 6 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c | 6 |
4 files changed, 32 insertions, 8 deletions
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h index 9ec3d4d448cd..d1c2630922da 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h @@ -228,6 +228,16 @@ enum spectre_v2_mitigation { extern void x86_spec_ctrl_set(u64); extern u64 x86_spec_ctrl_get_default(void); +/* + * On VMENTER we must preserve whatever view of the SPEC_CTRL MSR + * the guest has, while on VMEXIT we restore the host view. This + * would be easier if SPEC_CTRL were architecturally maskable or + * shadowable for guests but this is not (currently) the case. + * Takes the guest view of SPEC_CTRL MSR as a parameter. + */ +extern void x86_spec_ctrl_set_guest(u64); +extern void x86_spec_ctrl_restore_host(u64); + extern char __indirect_thunk_start[]; extern char __indirect_thunk_end[]; diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c index 6ed84f50d74a..38a8626c894c 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c @@ -123,6 +123,24 @@ u64 x86_spec_ctrl_get_default(void) } EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(x86_spec_ctrl_get_default); +void x86_spec_ctrl_set_guest(u64 guest_spec_ctrl) +{ + if (!boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_IBRS)) + return; + if (x86_spec_ctrl_base != guest_spec_ctrl) + wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL, guest_spec_ctrl); +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(x86_spec_ctrl_set_guest); + +void x86_spec_ctrl_restore_host(u64 guest_spec_ctrl) +{ + if (!boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_IBRS)) + return; + if (x86_spec_ctrl_base != guest_spec_ctrl) + wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL, x86_spec_ctrl_base); +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(x86_spec_ctrl_restore_host); + #ifdef RETPOLINE static bool spectre_v2_bad_module; diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm.c b/arch/x86/kvm/svm.c index 1fc05e428aba..8bfc8fe26851 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm.c +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm.c @@ -5557,8 +5557,7 @@ static void svm_vcpu_run(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) * is no need to worry about the conditional branch over the wrmsr * being speculatively taken. */ - if (svm->spec_ctrl) - native_wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL, svm->spec_ctrl); + x86_spec_ctrl_set_guest(svm->spec_ctrl); asm volatile ( "push %%" _ASM_BP "; \n\t" @@ -5670,8 +5669,7 @@ static void svm_vcpu_run(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) if (unlikely(!msr_write_intercepted(vcpu, MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL))) svm->spec_ctrl = native_read_msr(MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL); - if (svm->spec_ctrl) - native_wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL, 0); + x86_spec_ctrl_restore_host(svm->spec_ctrl); /* Eliminate branch target predictions from guest mode */ vmexit_fill_RSB(); diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c index c7668806163f..3091dc98a451 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c @@ -9720,8 +9720,7 @@ static void __noclone vmx_vcpu_run(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) * is no need to worry about the conditional branch over the wrmsr * being speculatively taken. */ - if (vmx->spec_ctrl) - native_wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL, vmx->spec_ctrl); + x86_spec_ctrl_set_guest(vmx->spec_ctrl); vmx->__launched = vmx->loaded_vmcs->launched; @@ -9869,8 +9868,7 @@ static void __noclone vmx_vcpu_run(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) if (unlikely(!msr_write_intercepted(vcpu, MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL))) vmx->spec_ctrl = native_read_msr(MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL); - if (vmx->spec_ctrl) - native_wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL, 0); + x86_spec_ctrl_restore_host(vmx->spec_ctrl); /* Eliminate branch target predictions from guest mode */ vmexit_fill_RSB(); |