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authorLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>2022-01-11 13:11:10 -0800
committerLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>2022-01-11 13:11:10 -0800
commit84bfcc0b6994057905cf98d2c5cedef48b3322b5 (patch)
tree8e2d4095dc6ee28bf08ec6d7e2c15fa2f9db850c /security
parent5d7e52237c59e37a25da854196fc70e9b09704d9 (diff)
parent65e38e32a959dbbb0bf5cf1ae699789f81759be6 (diff)
Merge tag 'integrity-v5.17' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/zohar/linux-integrity
Pull integrity subsystem updates from Mimi Zohar: "The few changes are all kexec related: - The MOK keys are loaded onto the .platform keyring in order to verify the kexec kernel image signature. However, the MOK keys should only be trusted when secure boot is enabled. Before loading the MOK keys onto the .platform keyring, make sure the system is booted in secure boot mode. - When carrying the IMA measurement list across kexec, limit dumping the measurement list to when dynamic debug or CONFIG_DEBUG is enabled. - kselftest: add kexec_file_load selftest support for PowerNV and other cleanup" * tag 'integrity-v5.17' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/zohar/linux-integrity: selftests/kexec: Enable secureboot tests for PowerPC ima: silence measurement list hexdump during kexec selftests/kexec: update searching for the Kconfig selftest/kexec: fix "ignored null byte in input" warning integrity: Do not load MOK and MOKx when secure boot be disabled ima: Fix undefined arch_ima_get_secureboot() and co
Diffstat (limited to 'security')
-rw-r--r--security/integrity/ima/ima_kexec.c6
-rw-r--r--security/integrity/platform_certs/load_uefi.c5
2 files changed, 8 insertions, 3 deletions
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_kexec.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_kexec.c
index f799cc278a9a..13753136f03f 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_kexec.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_kexec.c
@@ -61,9 +61,9 @@ static int ima_dump_measurement_list(unsigned long *buffer_size, void **buffer,
}
memcpy(file.buf, &khdr, sizeof(khdr));
- print_hex_dump(KERN_DEBUG, "ima dump: ", DUMP_PREFIX_NONE,
- 16, 1, file.buf,
- file.count < 100 ? file.count : 100, true);
+ print_hex_dump_debug("ima dump: ", DUMP_PREFIX_NONE, 16, 1,
+ file.buf, file.count < 100 ? file.count : 100,
+ true);
*buffer_size = file.count;
*buffer = file.buf;
diff --git a/security/integrity/platform_certs/load_uefi.c b/security/integrity/platform_certs/load_uefi.c
index f290f78c3f30..08b6d12f99b4 100644
--- a/security/integrity/platform_certs/load_uefi.c
+++ b/security/integrity/platform_certs/load_uefi.c
@@ -6,6 +6,7 @@
#include <linux/err.h>
#include <linux/efi.h>
#include <linux/slab.h>
+#include <linux/ima.h>
#include <keys/asymmetric-type.h>
#include <keys/system_keyring.h>
#include "../integrity.h"
@@ -176,6 +177,10 @@ static int __init load_uefi_certs(void)
kfree(dbx);
}
+ /* the MOK/MOKx can not be trusted when secure boot is disabled */
+ if (!arch_ima_get_secureboot())
+ return 0;
+
mokx = get_cert_list(L"MokListXRT", &mok_var, &mokxsize, &status);
if (!mokx) {
if (status == EFI_NOT_FOUND)