diff options
author | Kevin Brodsky <kevin.brodsky@arm.com> | 2024-10-29 14:45:35 +0000 |
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committer | Will Deacon <will@kernel.org> | 2024-10-29 17:59:12 +0000 |
commit | 2e8a1acea8597ff42189ea94f0a63fa58640223d (patch) | |
tree | dd77806fb9cdf2296e8045d5590eb893b56b2bf6 /lib/fw_table.c | |
parent | c83212d79be2c9886d3e6039759ecd388fd5fed1 (diff) |
arm64: signal: Improve POR_EL0 handling to avoid uaccess failures
Reset POR_EL0 to "allow all" before writing the signal frame, preventing
spurious uaccess failures.
When POE is supported, the POR_EL0 register constrains memory
accesses based on the target page's POIndex (pkey). This raises the
question: what constraints should apply to a signal handler? The
current answer is that POR_EL0 is reset to POR_EL0_INIT when
invoking the handler, giving it full access to POIndex 0. This is in
line with x86's MPK support and remains unchanged.
This is only part of the story, though. POR_EL0 constrains all
unprivileged memory accesses, meaning that uaccess routines such as
put_user() are also impacted. As a result POR_EL0 may prevent the
signal frame from being written to the signal stack (ultimately
causing a SIGSEGV). This is especially concerning when an alternate
signal stack is used, because userspace may want to prevent access
to it outside of signal handlers. There is currently no provision
for that: POR_EL0 is reset after writing to the stack, and
POR_EL0_INIT only enables access to POIndex 0.
This patch ensures that POR_EL0 is reset to its most permissive
state before the signal stack is accessed. Once the signal frame has
been fully written, POR_EL0 is still set to POR_EL0_INIT - it is up
to the signal handler to enable access to additional pkeys if
needed. As to sigreturn(), it expects having access to the stack
like any other syscall; we only need to ensure that POR_EL0 is
restored from the signal frame after all uaccess calls. This
approach is in line with the recent x86/pkeys series [1].
Resetting POR_EL0 early introduces some complications, in that we
can no longer read the register directly in preserve_poe_context().
This is addressed by introducing a struct (user_access_state)
and helpers to manage any such register impacting user accesses
(uaccess and accesses in userspace). Things look like this on signal
delivery:
1. Save original POR_EL0 into struct [save_reset_user_access_state()]
2. Set POR_EL0 to "allow all" [save_reset_user_access_state()]
3. Create signal frame
4. Write saved POR_EL0 value to the signal frame [preserve_poe_context()]
5. Finalise signal frame
6. If all operations succeeded:
a. Set POR_EL0 to POR_EL0_INIT [set_handler_user_access_state()]
b. Else reset POR_EL0 to its original value [restore_user_access_state()]
If any step fails when setting up the signal frame, the process will
be sent a SIGSEGV, which it may be able to handle. Step 6.b ensures
that the original POR_EL0 is saved in the signal frame when
delivering that SIGSEGV (so that the original value is restored by
sigreturn).
The return path (sys_rt_sigreturn) doesn't strictly require any change
since restore_poe_context() is already called last. However, to
avoid uaccess calls being accidentally added after that point, we
use the same approach as in the delivery path, i.e. separating
uaccess from writing to the register:
1. Read saved POR_EL0 value from the signal frame [restore_poe_context()]
2. Set POR_EL0 to the saved value [restore_user_access_state()]
[1] https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20240802061318.2140081-1-aruna.ramakrishna@oracle.com/
Fixes: 9160f7e909e1 ("arm64: add POE signal support")
Reviewed-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Kevin Brodsky <kevin.brodsky@arm.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20241029144539.111155-2-kevin.brodsky@arm.com
Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'lib/fw_table.c')
0 files changed, 0 insertions, 0 deletions