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authorKevin Brodsky <kevin.brodsky@arm.com>2024-10-29 14:45:35 +0000
committerWill Deacon <will@kernel.org>2024-10-29 17:59:12 +0000
commit2e8a1acea8597ff42189ea94f0a63fa58640223d (patch)
treedd77806fb9cdf2296e8045d5590eb893b56b2bf6 /lib/dim/rdma_dim.c
parentc83212d79be2c9886d3e6039759ecd388fd5fed1 (diff)
arm64: signal: Improve POR_EL0 handling to avoid uaccess failures
Reset POR_EL0 to "allow all" before writing the signal frame, preventing spurious uaccess failures. When POE is supported, the POR_EL0 register constrains memory accesses based on the target page's POIndex (pkey). This raises the question: what constraints should apply to a signal handler? The current answer is that POR_EL0 is reset to POR_EL0_INIT when invoking the handler, giving it full access to POIndex 0. This is in line with x86's MPK support and remains unchanged. This is only part of the story, though. POR_EL0 constrains all unprivileged memory accesses, meaning that uaccess routines such as put_user() are also impacted. As a result POR_EL0 may prevent the signal frame from being written to the signal stack (ultimately causing a SIGSEGV). This is especially concerning when an alternate signal stack is used, because userspace may want to prevent access to it outside of signal handlers. There is currently no provision for that: POR_EL0 is reset after writing to the stack, and POR_EL0_INIT only enables access to POIndex 0. This patch ensures that POR_EL0 is reset to its most permissive state before the signal stack is accessed. Once the signal frame has been fully written, POR_EL0 is still set to POR_EL0_INIT - it is up to the signal handler to enable access to additional pkeys if needed. As to sigreturn(), it expects having access to the stack like any other syscall; we only need to ensure that POR_EL0 is restored from the signal frame after all uaccess calls. This approach is in line with the recent x86/pkeys series [1]. Resetting POR_EL0 early introduces some complications, in that we can no longer read the register directly in preserve_poe_context(). This is addressed by introducing a struct (user_access_state) and helpers to manage any such register impacting user accesses (uaccess and accesses in userspace). Things look like this on signal delivery: 1. Save original POR_EL0 into struct [save_reset_user_access_state()] 2. Set POR_EL0 to "allow all" [save_reset_user_access_state()] 3. Create signal frame 4. Write saved POR_EL0 value to the signal frame [preserve_poe_context()] 5. Finalise signal frame 6. If all operations succeeded: a. Set POR_EL0 to POR_EL0_INIT [set_handler_user_access_state()] b. Else reset POR_EL0 to its original value [restore_user_access_state()] If any step fails when setting up the signal frame, the process will be sent a SIGSEGV, which it may be able to handle. Step 6.b ensures that the original POR_EL0 is saved in the signal frame when delivering that SIGSEGV (so that the original value is restored by sigreturn). The return path (sys_rt_sigreturn) doesn't strictly require any change since restore_poe_context() is already called last. However, to avoid uaccess calls being accidentally added after that point, we use the same approach as in the delivery path, i.e. separating uaccess from writing to the register: 1. Read saved POR_EL0 value from the signal frame [restore_poe_context()] 2. Set POR_EL0 to the saved value [restore_user_access_state()] [1] https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20240802061318.2140081-1-aruna.ramakrishna@oracle.com/ Fixes: 9160f7e909e1 ("arm64: add POE signal support") Reviewed-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com> Signed-off-by: Kevin Brodsky <kevin.brodsky@arm.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20241029144539.111155-2-kevin.brodsky@arm.com Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'lib/dim/rdma_dim.c')
0 files changed, 0 insertions, 0 deletions