diff options
author | Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org> | 2022-04-08 17:07:29 -0700 |
---|---|---|
committer | Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org> | 2022-04-08 17:07:29 -0700 |
commit | 34ba23b44c664792a4308ec37b5788a3162944ec (patch) | |
tree | 0ada9ba195a3dd5b1a3cf5f7c242c69734a7d616 /kernel | |
parent | bd4a2697e5e27a33d345827dfbdebb8f28f4aa87 (diff) | |
parent | b45043192b3e481304062938a6561da2ceea46a6 (diff) |
Merge https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/bpf/bpf-next
Daniel Borkmann says:
====================
pull-request: bpf-next 2022-04-09
We've added 63 non-merge commits during the last 9 day(s) which contain
a total of 68 files changed, 4852 insertions(+), 619 deletions(-).
The main changes are:
1) Add libbpf support for USDT (User Statically-Defined Tracing) probes.
USDTs are an abstraction built on top of uprobes, critical for tracing
and BPF, and widely used in production applications, from Andrii Nakryiko.
2) While Andrii was adding support for x86{-64}-specific logic of parsing
USDT argument specification, Ilya followed-up with USDT support for s390
architecture, from Ilya Leoshkevich.
3) Support name-based attaching for uprobe BPF programs in libbpf. The format
supported is `u[ret]probe/binary_path:[raw_offset|function[+offset]]`, e.g.
attaching to libc malloc can be done in BPF via SEC("uprobe/libc.so.6:malloc")
now, from Alan Maguire.
4) Various load/store optimizations for the arm64 JIT to shrink the image
size by using arm64 str/ldr immediate instructions. Also enable pointer
authentication to verify return address for JITed code, from Xu Kuohai.
5) BPF verifier fixes for write access checks to helper functions, e.g.
rd-only memory from bpf_*_cpu_ptr() must not be passed to helpers that
write into passed buffers, from Kumar Kartikeya Dwivedi.
6) Fix overly excessive stack map allocation for its base map structure and
buckets which slipped-in from cleanups during the rlimit accounting removal
back then, from Yuntao Wang.
7) Extend the unstable CT lookup helpers for XDP and tc/BPF to report netfilter
connection tracking tuple direction, from Lorenzo Bianconi.
8) Improve bpftool dump to show BPF program/link type names, Milan Landaverde.
9) Minor cleanups all over the place from various others.
* https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/bpf/bpf-next: (63 commits)
bpf: Fix excessive memory allocation in stack_map_alloc()
selftests/bpf: Fix return value checks in perf_event_stackmap test
selftests/bpf: Add CO-RE relos into linked_funcs selftests
libbpf: Use weak hidden modifier for USDT BPF-side API functions
libbpf: Don't error out on CO-RE relos for overriden weak subprogs
samples, bpf: Move routes monitor in xdp_router_ipv4 in a dedicated thread
libbpf: Allow WEAK and GLOBAL bindings during BTF fixup
libbpf: Use strlcpy() in path resolution fallback logic
libbpf: Add s390-specific USDT arg spec parsing logic
libbpf: Make BPF-side of USDT support work on big-endian machines
libbpf: Minor style improvements in USDT code
libbpf: Fix use #ifdef instead of #if to avoid compiler warning
libbpf: Potential NULL dereference in usdt_manager_attach_usdt()
selftests/bpf: Uprobe tests should verify param/return values
libbpf: Improve string parsing for uprobe auto-attach
libbpf: Improve library identification for uprobe binary path resolution
selftests/bpf: Test for writes to map key from BPF helpers
selftests/bpf: Test passing rdonly mem to global func
bpf: Reject writes for PTR_TO_MAP_KEY in check_helper_mem_access
bpf: Check PTR_TO_MEM | MEM_RDONLY in check_helper_mem_access
...
====================
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220408231741.19116-1-daniel@iogearbox.net
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'kernel')
-rw-r--r-- | kernel/bpf/bpf_iter.c | 30 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | kernel/bpf/stackmap.c | 2 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | kernel/bpf/verifier.c | 61 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | kernel/trace/bpf_trace.c | 6 |
4 files changed, 61 insertions, 38 deletions
diff --git a/kernel/bpf/bpf_iter.c b/kernel/bpf/bpf_iter.c index 110029ede71e..dea920b3b840 100644 --- a/kernel/bpf/bpf_iter.c +++ b/kernel/bpf/bpf_iter.c @@ -330,35 +330,34 @@ static void cache_btf_id(struct bpf_iter_target_info *tinfo, bool bpf_iter_prog_supported(struct bpf_prog *prog) { const char *attach_fname = prog->aux->attach_func_name; + struct bpf_iter_target_info *tinfo = NULL, *iter; u32 prog_btf_id = prog->aux->attach_btf_id; const char *prefix = BPF_ITER_FUNC_PREFIX; - struct bpf_iter_target_info *tinfo; int prefix_len = strlen(prefix); - bool supported = false; if (strncmp(attach_fname, prefix, prefix_len)) return false; mutex_lock(&targets_mutex); - list_for_each_entry(tinfo, &targets, list) { - if (tinfo->btf_id && tinfo->btf_id == prog_btf_id) { - supported = true; + list_for_each_entry(iter, &targets, list) { + if (iter->btf_id && iter->btf_id == prog_btf_id) { + tinfo = iter; break; } - if (!strcmp(attach_fname + prefix_len, tinfo->reg_info->target)) { - cache_btf_id(tinfo, prog); - supported = true; + if (!strcmp(attach_fname + prefix_len, iter->reg_info->target)) { + cache_btf_id(iter, prog); + tinfo = iter; break; } } mutex_unlock(&targets_mutex); - if (supported) { + if (tinfo) { prog->aux->ctx_arg_info_size = tinfo->reg_info->ctx_arg_info_size; prog->aux->ctx_arg_info = tinfo->reg_info->ctx_arg_info; } - return supported; + return tinfo != NULL; } const struct bpf_func_proto * @@ -499,12 +498,11 @@ bool bpf_link_is_iter(struct bpf_link *link) int bpf_iter_link_attach(const union bpf_attr *attr, bpfptr_t uattr, struct bpf_prog *prog) { + struct bpf_iter_target_info *tinfo = NULL, *iter; struct bpf_link_primer link_primer; - struct bpf_iter_target_info *tinfo; union bpf_iter_link_info linfo; struct bpf_iter_link *link; u32 prog_btf_id, linfo_len; - bool existed = false; bpfptr_t ulinfo; int err; @@ -530,14 +528,14 @@ int bpf_iter_link_attach(const union bpf_attr *attr, bpfptr_t uattr, prog_btf_id = prog->aux->attach_btf_id; mutex_lock(&targets_mutex); - list_for_each_entry(tinfo, &targets, list) { - if (tinfo->btf_id == prog_btf_id) { - existed = true; + list_for_each_entry(iter, &targets, list) { + if (iter->btf_id == prog_btf_id) { + tinfo = iter; break; } } mutex_unlock(&targets_mutex); - if (!existed) + if (!tinfo) return -ENOENT; link = kzalloc(sizeof(*link), GFP_USER | __GFP_NOWARN); diff --git a/kernel/bpf/stackmap.c b/kernel/bpf/stackmap.c index 34725bfa1e97..1dd5266fbebb 100644 --- a/kernel/bpf/stackmap.c +++ b/kernel/bpf/stackmap.c @@ -100,13 +100,11 @@ static struct bpf_map *stack_map_alloc(union bpf_attr *attr) return ERR_PTR(-E2BIG); cost = n_buckets * sizeof(struct stack_map_bucket *) + sizeof(*smap); - cost += n_buckets * (value_size + sizeof(struct stack_map_bucket)); smap = bpf_map_area_alloc(cost, bpf_map_attr_numa_node(attr)); if (!smap) return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM); bpf_map_init_from_attr(&smap->map, attr); - smap->map.value_size = value_size; smap->n_buckets = n_buckets; err = get_callchain_buffers(sysctl_perf_event_max_stack); diff --git a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c index d175b70067b3..9c1a02b82ecd 100644 --- a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c +++ b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c @@ -4861,6 +4861,11 @@ static int check_helper_mem_access(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int regno, return check_packet_access(env, regno, reg->off, access_size, zero_size_allowed); case PTR_TO_MAP_KEY: + if (meta && meta->raw_mode) { + verbose(env, "R%d cannot write into %s\n", regno, + reg_type_str(env, reg->type)); + return -EACCES; + } return check_mem_region_access(env, regno, reg->off, access_size, reg->map_ptr->key_size, false); case PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE: @@ -4871,13 +4876,23 @@ static int check_helper_mem_access(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int regno, return check_map_access(env, regno, reg->off, access_size, zero_size_allowed); case PTR_TO_MEM: + if (type_is_rdonly_mem(reg->type)) { + if (meta && meta->raw_mode) { + verbose(env, "R%d cannot write into %s\n", regno, + reg_type_str(env, reg->type)); + return -EACCES; + } + } return check_mem_region_access(env, regno, reg->off, access_size, reg->mem_size, zero_size_allowed); case PTR_TO_BUF: if (type_is_rdonly_mem(reg->type)) { - if (meta && meta->raw_mode) + if (meta && meta->raw_mode) { + verbose(env, "R%d cannot write into %s\n", regno, + reg_type_str(env, reg->type)); return -EACCES; + } max_access = &env->prog->aux->max_rdonly_access; } else { @@ -4919,8 +4934,7 @@ static int check_mem_size_reg(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, * out. Only upper bounds can be learned because retval is an * int type and negative retvals are allowed. */ - if (meta) - meta->msize_max_value = reg->umax_value; + meta->msize_max_value = reg->umax_value; /* The register is SCALAR_VALUE; the access check * happens using its boundaries. @@ -4963,24 +4977,33 @@ static int check_mem_size_reg(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int check_mem_reg(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_reg_state *reg, u32 regno, u32 mem_size) { + bool may_be_null = type_may_be_null(reg->type); + struct bpf_reg_state saved_reg; + struct bpf_call_arg_meta meta; + int err; + if (register_is_null(reg)) return 0; - if (type_may_be_null(reg->type)) { - /* Assuming that the register contains a value check if the memory - * access is safe. Temporarily save and restore the register's state as - * the conversion shouldn't be visible to a caller. - */ - const struct bpf_reg_state saved_reg = *reg; - int rv; - + memset(&meta, 0, sizeof(meta)); + /* Assuming that the register contains a value check if the memory + * access is safe. Temporarily save and restore the register's state as + * the conversion shouldn't be visible to a caller. + */ + if (may_be_null) { + saved_reg = *reg; mark_ptr_not_null_reg(reg); - rv = check_helper_mem_access(env, regno, mem_size, true, NULL); - *reg = saved_reg; - return rv; } - return check_helper_mem_access(env, regno, mem_size, true, NULL); + err = check_helper_mem_access(env, regno, mem_size, true, &meta); + /* Check access for BPF_WRITE */ + meta.raw_mode = true; + err = err ?: check_helper_mem_access(env, regno, mem_size, true, &meta); + + if (may_be_null) + *reg = saved_reg; + + return err; } int check_kfunc_mem_size_reg(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_reg_state *reg, @@ -4989,16 +5012,22 @@ int check_kfunc_mem_size_reg(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_reg_state struct bpf_reg_state *mem_reg = &cur_regs(env)[regno - 1]; bool may_be_null = type_may_be_null(mem_reg->type); struct bpf_reg_state saved_reg; + struct bpf_call_arg_meta meta; int err; WARN_ON_ONCE(regno < BPF_REG_2 || regno > BPF_REG_5); + memset(&meta, 0, sizeof(meta)); + if (may_be_null) { saved_reg = *mem_reg; mark_ptr_not_null_reg(mem_reg); } - err = check_mem_size_reg(env, reg, regno, true, NULL); + err = check_mem_size_reg(env, reg, regno, true, &meta); + /* Check access for BPF_WRITE */ + meta.raw_mode = true; + err = err ?: check_mem_size_reg(env, reg, regno, true, &meta); if (may_be_null) *mem_reg = saved_reg; diff --git a/kernel/trace/bpf_trace.c b/kernel/trace/bpf_trace.c index d8553f46caa2..b26f3da943de 100644 --- a/kernel/trace/bpf_trace.c +++ b/kernel/trace/bpf_trace.c @@ -2254,15 +2254,13 @@ static void bpf_kprobe_multi_cookie_swap(void *a, void *b, int size, const void const struct bpf_kprobe_multi_link *link = priv; unsigned long *addr_a = a, *addr_b = b; u64 *cookie_a, *cookie_b; - unsigned long tmp1; - u64 tmp2; cookie_a = link->cookies + (addr_a - link->addrs); cookie_b = link->cookies + (addr_b - link->addrs); /* swap addr_a/addr_b and cookie_a/cookie_b values */ - tmp1 = *addr_a; *addr_a = *addr_b; *addr_b = tmp1; - tmp2 = *cookie_a; *cookie_a = *cookie_b; *cookie_b = tmp2; + swap(*addr_a, *addr_b); + swap(*cookie_a, *cookie_b); } static int __bpf_kprobe_multi_cookie_cmp(const void *a, const void *b) |