diff options
author | Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> | 2023-09-06 12:10:15 -0700 |
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committer | Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> | 2023-09-06 12:10:15 -0700 |
commit | 7ba2090ca64ea1aa435744884124387db1fac70f (patch) | |
tree | ed4ea24f4cfed5f28b9c8cdf99dbdf7df6a221ae /fs/ceph/caps.c | |
parent | 744a759492b5c57ff24a6e8aabe47b17ad8ee964 (diff) | |
parent | ce0d5bd3a6c176f9a3bf867624a07119dd4d0878 (diff) |
Merge tag 'ceph-for-6.6-rc1' of https://github.com/ceph/ceph-client
Pull ceph updates from Ilya Dryomov:
"Mixed with some fixes and cleanups, this brings in reasonably complete
fscrypt support to CephFS! The list of things which don't work with
encryption should be fairly short, mostly around the edges: fallocate
(not supported well in CephFS to begin with), copy_file_range
(requires re-encryption), non-default striping patterns.
This was a multi-year effort principally by Jeff Layton with
assistance from Xiubo Li, Luís Henriques and others, including several
dependant changes in the MDS, netfs helper library and fscrypt
framework itself"
* tag 'ceph-for-6.6-rc1' of https://github.com/ceph/ceph-client: (53 commits)
ceph: make num_fwd and num_retry to __u32
ceph: make members in struct ceph_mds_request_args_ext a union
rbd: use list_for_each_entry() helper
libceph: do not include crypto/algapi.h
ceph: switch ceph_lookup/atomic_open() to use new fscrypt helper
ceph: fix updating i_truncate_pagecache_size for fscrypt
ceph: wait for OSD requests' callbacks to finish when unmounting
ceph: drop messages from MDS when unmounting
ceph: update documentation regarding snapshot naming limitations
ceph: prevent snapshot creation in encrypted locked directories
ceph: add support for encrypted snapshot names
ceph: invalidate pages when doing direct/sync writes
ceph: plumb in decryption during reads
ceph: add encryption support to writepage and writepages
ceph: add read/modify/write to ceph_sync_write
ceph: align data in pages in ceph_sync_write
ceph: don't use special DIO path for encrypted inodes
ceph: add truncate size handling support for fscrypt
ceph: add object version support for sync read
libceph: allow ceph_osdc_new_request to accept a multi-op read
...
Diffstat (limited to 'fs/ceph/caps.c')
-rw-r--r-- | fs/ceph/caps.c | 235 |
1 files changed, 206 insertions, 29 deletions
diff --git a/fs/ceph/caps.c b/fs/ceph/caps.c index 09cd6d334604..14215ec646f7 100644 --- a/fs/ceph/caps.c +++ b/fs/ceph/caps.c @@ -14,6 +14,7 @@ #include "super.h" #include "mds_client.h" #include "cache.h" +#include "crypto.h" #include <linux/ceph/decode.h> #include <linux/ceph/messenger.h> @@ -1216,15 +1217,11 @@ struct cap_msg_args { umode_t mode; bool inline_data; bool wake; + bool encrypted; + u32 fscrypt_auth_len; + u8 fscrypt_auth[sizeof(struct ceph_fscrypt_auth)]; // for context }; -/* - * cap struct size + flock buffer size + inline version + inline data size + - * osd_epoch_barrier + oldest_flush_tid - */ -#define CAP_MSG_SIZE (sizeof(struct ceph_mds_caps) + \ - 4 + 8 + 4 + 4 + 8 + 4 + 4 + 4 + 8 + 8 + 4) - /* Marshal up the cap msg to the MDS */ static void encode_cap_msg(struct ceph_msg *msg, struct cap_msg_args *arg) { @@ -1240,7 +1237,7 @@ static void encode_cap_msg(struct ceph_msg *msg, struct cap_msg_args *arg) arg->size, arg->max_size, arg->xattr_version, arg->xattr_buf ? (int)arg->xattr_buf->vec.iov_len : 0); - msg->hdr.version = cpu_to_le16(10); + msg->hdr.version = cpu_to_le16(12); msg->hdr.tid = cpu_to_le64(arg->flush_tid); fc = msg->front.iov_base; @@ -1257,7 +1254,13 @@ static void encode_cap_msg(struct ceph_msg *msg, struct cap_msg_args *arg) fc->ino = cpu_to_le64(arg->ino); fc->snap_follows = cpu_to_le64(arg->follows); - fc->size = cpu_to_le64(arg->size); +#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_FS_ENCRYPTION) + if (arg->encrypted) + fc->size = cpu_to_le64(round_up(arg->size, + CEPH_FSCRYPT_BLOCK_SIZE)); + else +#endif + fc->size = cpu_to_le64(arg->size); fc->max_size = cpu_to_le64(arg->max_size); ceph_encode_timespec64(&fc->mtime, &arg->mtime); ceph_encode_timespec64(&fc->atime, &arg->atime); @@ -1311,6 +1314,27 @@ static void encode_cap_msg(struct ceph_msg *msg, struct cap_msg_args *arg) /* Advisory flags (version 10) */ ceph_encode_32(&p, arg->flags); + + /* dirstats (version 11) - these are r/o on the client */ + ceph_encode_64(&p, 0); + ceph_encode_64(&p, 0); + +#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_FS_ENCRYPTION) + /* + * fscrypt_auth and fscrypt_file (version 12) + * + * fscrypt_auth holds the crypto context (if any). fscrypt_file + * tracks the real i_size as an __le64 field (and we use a rounded-up + * i_size in the traditional size field). + */ + ceph_encode_32(&p, arg->fscrypt_auth_len); + ceph_encode_copy(&p, arg->fscrypt_auth, arg->fscrypt_auth_len); + ceph_encode_32(&p, sizeof(__le64)); + ceph_encode_64(&p, arg->size); +#else /* CONFIG_FS_ENCRYPTION */ + ceph_encode_32(&p, 0); + ceph_encode_32(&p, 0); +#endif /* CONFIG_FS_ENCRYPTION */ } /* @@ -1378,7 +1402,6 @@ static void __prep_cap(struct cap_msg_args *arg, struct ceph_cap *cap, arg->follows = flushing ? ci->i_head_snapc->seq : 0; arg->flush_tid = flush_tid; arg->oldest_flush_tid = oldest_flush_tid; - arg->size = i_size_read(inode); ci->i_reported_size = arg->size; arg->max_size = ci->i_wanted_max_size; @@ -1432,8 +1455,39 @@ static void __prep_cap(struct cap_msg_args *arg, struct ceph_cap *cap, } } arg->flags = flags; + arg->encrypted = IS_ENCRYPTED(inode); +#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_FS_ENCRYPTION) + if (ci->fscrypt_auth_len && + WARN_ON_ONCE(ci->fscrypt_auth_len > sizeof(struct ceph_fscrypt_auth))) { + /* Don't set this if it's too big */ + arg->fscrypt_auth_len = 0; + } else { + arg->fscrypt_auth_len = ci->fscrypt_auth_len; + memcpy(arg->fscrypt_auth, ci->fscrypt_auth, + min_t(size_t, ci->fscrypt_auth_len, + sizeof(arg->fscrypt_auth))); + } +#endif /* CONFIG_FS_ENCRYPTION */ } +#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_FS_ENCRYPTION) +#define CAP_MSG_FIXED_FIELDS (sizeof(struct ceph_mds_caps) + \ + 4 + 8 + 4 + 4 + 8 + 4 + 4 + 4 + 8 + 8 + 4 + 8 + 8 + 4 + 4 + 8) + +static inline int cap_msg_size(struct cap_msg_args *arg) +{ + return CAP_MSG_FIXED_FIELDS + arg->fscrypt_auth_len; +} +#else +#define CAP_MSG_FIXED_FIELDS (sizeof(struct ceph_mds_caps) + \ + 4 + 8 + 4 + 4 + 8 + 4 + 4 + 4 + 8 + 8 + 4 + 8 + 8 + 4 + 4) + +static inline int cap_msg_size(struct cap_msg_args *arg) +{ + return CAP_MSG_FIXED_FIELDS; +} +#endif /* CONFIG_FS_ENCRYPTION */ + /* * Send a cap msg on the given inode. * @@ -1444,7 +1498,8 @@ static void __send_cap(struct cap_msg_args *arg, struct ceph_inode_info *ci) struct ceph_msg *msg; struct inode *inode = &ci->netfs.inode; - msg = ceph_msg_new(CEPH_MSG_CLIENT_CAPS, CAP_MSG_SIZE, GFP_NOFS, false); + msg = ceph_msg_new(CEPH_MSG_CLIENT_CAPS, cap_msg_size(arg), GFP_NOFS, + false); if (!msg) { pr_err("error allocating cap msg: ino (%llx.%llx) flushing %s tid %llu, requeuing cap.\n", ceph_vinop(inode), ceph_cap_string(arg->dirty), @@ -1470,10 +1525,6 @@ static inline int __send_flush_snap(struct inode *inode, struct cap_msg_args arg; struct ceph_msg *msg; - msg = ceph_msg_new(CEPH_MSG_CLIENT_CAPS, CAP_MSG_SIZE, GFP_NOFS, false); - if (!msg) - return -ENOMEM; - arg.session = session; arg.ino = ceph_vino(inode).ino; arg.cid = 0; @@ -1510,6 +1561,15 @@ static inline int __send_flush_snap(struct inode *inode, arg.inline_data = capsnap->inline_data; arg.flags = 0; arg.wake = false; + arg.encrypted = IS_ENCRYPTED(inode); + + /* No fscrypt_auth changes from a capsnap.*/ + arg.fscrypt_auth_len = 0; + + msg = ceph_msg_new(CEPH_MSG_CLIENT_CAPS, cap_msg_size(&arg), + GFP_NOFS, false); + if (!msg) + return -ENOMEM; encode_cap_msg(msg, &arg); ceph_con_send(&arg.session->s_con, msg); @@ -2900,10 +2960,9 @@ int ceph_try_get_caps(struct inode *inode, int need, int want, * due to a small max_size, make sure we check_max_size (and possibly * ask the mds) so we don't get hung up indefinitely. */ -int ceph_get_caps(struct file *filp, int need, int want, loff_t endoff, int *got) +int __ceph_get_caps(struct inode *inode, struct ceph_file_info *fi, int need, + int want, loff_t endoff, int *got) { - struct ceph_file_info *fi = filp->private_data; - struct inode *inode = file_inode(filp); struct ceph_inode_info *ci = ceph_inode(inode); struct ceph_fs_client *fsc = ceph_inode_to_client(inode); int ret, _got, flags; @@ -2912,7 +2971,7 @@ int ceph_get_caps(struct file *filp, int need, int want, loff_t endoff, int *got if (ret < 0) return ret; - if ((fi->fmode & CEPH_FILE_MODE_WR) && + if (fi && (fi->fmode & CEPH_FILE_MODE_WR) && fi->filp_gen != READ_ONCE(fsc->filp_gen)) return -EBADF; @@ -2965,7 +3024,7 @@ int ceph_get_caps(struct file *filp, int need, int want, loff_t endoff, int *got continue; } - if ((fi->fmode & CEPH_FILE_MODE_WR) && + if (fi && (fi->fmode & CEPH_FILE_MODE_WR) && fi->filp_gen != READ_ONCE(fsc->filp_gen)) { if (ret >= 0 && _got) ceph_put_cap_refs(ci, _got); @@ -3028,6 +3087,15 @@ int ceph_get_caps(struct file *filp, int need, int want, loff_t endoff, int *got return 0; } +int ceph_get_caps(struct file *filp, int need, int want, loff_t endoff, + int *got) +{ + struct ceph_file_info *fi = filp->private_data; + struct inode *inode = file_inode(filp); + + return __ceph_get_caps(inode, fi, need, want, endoff, got); +} + /* * Take cap refs. Caller must already know we hold at least one ref * on the caps in question or we don't know this is safe. @@ -3323,6 +3391,9 @@ struct cap_extra_info { /* currently issued */ int issued; struct timespec64 btime; + u8 *fscrypt_auth; + u32 fscrypt_auth_len; + u64 fscrypt_file_size; }; /* @@ -3355,6 +3426,14 @@ static void handle_cap_grant(struct inode *inode, bool deleted_inode = false; bool fill_inline = false; + /* + * If there is at least one crypto block then we'll trust + * fscrypt_file_size. If the real length of the file is 0, then + * ignore it (it has probably been truncated down to 0 by the MDS). + */ + if (IS_ENCRYPTED(inode) && size) + size = extra_info->fscrypt_file_size; + dout("handle_cap_grant inode %p cap %p mds%d seq %d %s\n", inode, cap, session->s_mds, seq, ceph_cap_string(newcaps)); dout(" size %llu max_size %llu, i_size %llu\n", size, max_size, @@ -3421,6 +3500,14 @@ static void handle_cap_grant(struct inode *inode, dout("%p mode 0%o uid.gid %d.%d\n", inode, inode->i_mode, from_kuid(&init_user_ns, inode->i_uid), from_kgid(&init_user_ns, inode->i_gid)); +#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_FS_ENCRYPTION) + if (ci->fscrypt_auth_len != extra_info->fscrypt_auth_len || + memcmp(ci->fscrypt_auth, extra_info->fscrypt_auth, + ci->fscrypt_auth_len)) + pr_warn_ratelimited("%s: cap grant attempt to change fscrypt_auth on non-I_NEW inode (old len %d new len %d)\n", + __func__, ci->fscrypt_auth_len, + extra_info->fscrypt_auth_len); +#endif } if ((newcaps & CEPH_CAP_LINK_SHARED) && @@ -3837,7 +3924,8 @@ static void handle_cap_flushsnap_ack(struct inode *inode, u64 flush_tid, */ static bool handle_cap_trunc(struct inode *inode, struct ceph_mds_caps *trunc, - struct ceph_mds_session *session) + struct ceph_mds_session *session, + struct cap_extra_info *extra_info) { struct ceph_inode_info *ci = ceph_inode(inode); int mds = session->s_mds; @@ -3854,8 +3942,16 @@ static bool handle_cap_trunc(struct inode *inode, issued |= implemented | dirty; - dout("handle_cap_trunc inode %p mds%d seq %d to %lld seq %d\n", - inode, mds, seq, truncate_size, truncate_seq); + /* + * If there is at least one crypto block then we'll trust + * fscrypt_file_size. If the real length of the file is 0, then + * ignore it (it has probably been truncated down to 0 by the MDS). + */ + if (IS_ENCRYPTED(inode) && size) + size = extra_info->fscrypt_file_size; + + dout("%s inode %p mds%d seq %d to %lld truncate seq %d\n", + __func__, inode, mds, seq, truncate_size, truncate_seq); queue_trunc = ceph_fill_file_size(inode, issued, truncate_seq, truncate_size, size); return queue_trunc; @@ -4075,6 +4171,52 @@ retry: *target_cap = cap; } +#ifdef CONFIG_FS_ENCRYPTION +static int parse_fscrypt_fields(void **p, void *end, + struct cap_extra_info *extra) +{ + u32 len; + + ceph_decode_32_safe(p, end, extra->fscrypt_auth_len, bad); + if (extra->fscrypt_auth_len) { + ceph_decode_need(p, end, extra->fscrypt_auth_len, bad); + extra->fscrypt_auth = kmalloc(extra->fscrypt_auth_len, + GFP_KERNEL); + if (!extra->fscrypt_auth) + return -ENOMEM; + ceph_decode_copy_safe(p, end, extra->fscrypt_auth, + extra->fscrypt_auth_len, bad); + } + + ceph_decode_32_safe(p, end, len, bad); + if (len >= sizeof(u64)) { + ceph_decode_64_safe(p, end, extra->fscrypt_file_size, bad); + len -= sizeof(u64); + } + ceph_decode_skip_n(p, end, len, bad); + return 0; +bad: + return -EIO; +} +#else +static int parse_fscrypt_fields(void **p, void *end, + struct cap_extra_info *extra) +{ + u32 len; + + /* Don't care about these fields unless we're encryption-capable */ + ceph_decode_32_safe(p, end, len, bad); + if (len) + ceph_decode_skip_n(p, end, len, bad); + ceph_decode_32_safe(p, end, len, bad); + if (len) + ceph_decode_skip_n(p, end, len, bad); + return 0; +bad: + return -EIO; +} +#endif + /* * Handle a caps message from the MDS. * @@ -4105,6 +4247,9 @@ void ceph_handle_caps(struct ceph_mds_session *session, dout("handle_caps from mds%d\n", session->s_mds); + if (!ceph_inc_mds_stopping_blocker(mdsc, session)) + return; + /* decode */ end = msg->front.iov_base + msg->front.iov_len; if (msg->front.iov_len < sizeof(*h)) @@ -4195,13 +4340,17 @@ void ceph_handle_caps(struct ceph_mds_session *session, ceph_decode_64_safe(&p, end, extra_info.nsubdirs, bad); } + if (msg_version >= 12) { + if (parse_fscrypt_fields(&p, end, &extra_info)) + goto bad; + } + /* lookup ino */ inode = ceph_find_inode(mdsc->fsc->sb, vino); dout(" op %s ino %llx.%llx inode %p\n", ceph_cap_op_name(op), vino.ino, vino.snap, inode); mutex_lock(&session->s_mutex); - inc_session_sequence(session); dout(" mds%d seq %lld cap seq %u\n", session->s_mds, session->s_seq, (unsigned)seq); @@ -4292,7 +4441,8 @@ void ceph_handle_caps(struct ceph_mds_session *session, break; case CEPH_CAP_OP_TRUNC: - queue_trunc = handle_cap_trunc(inode, h, session); + queue_trunc = handle_cap_trunc(inode, h, session, + &extra_info); spin_unlock(&ci->i_ceph_lock); if (queue_trunc) ceph_queue_vmtruncate(inode); @@ -4309,12 +4459,15 @@ done: done_unlocked: iput(inode); out: + ceph_dec_mds_stopping_blocker(mdsc); + ceph_put_string(extra_info.pool_ns); /* Defer closing the sessions after s_mutex lock being released */ if (close_sessions) ceph_mdsc_close_sessions(mdsc); + kfree(extra_info.fscrypt_auth); return; flush_cap_releases: @@ -4611,6 +4764,18 @@ int ceph_encode_inode_release(void **p, struct inode *inode, return ret; } +/** + * ceph_encode_dentry_release - encode a dentry release into an outgoing request + * @p: outgoing request buffer + * @dentry: dentry to release + * @dir: dir to release it from + * @mds: mds that we're speaking to + * @drop: caps being dropped + * @unless: unless we have these caps + * + * Encode a dentry release into an outgoing request buffer. Returns 1 if the + * thing was released, or a negative error code otherwise. + */ int ceph_encode_dentry_release(void **p, struct dentry *dentry, struct inode *dir, int mds, int drop, int unless) @@ -4643,13 +4808,25 @@ int ceph_encode_dentry_release(void **p, struct dentry *dentry, if (ret && di->lease_session && di->lease_session->s_mds == mds) { dout("encode_dentry_release %p mds%d seq %d\n", dentry, mds, (int)di->lease_seq); - rel->dname_len = cpu_to_le32(dentry->d_name.len); - memcpy(*p, dentry->d_name.name, dentry->d_name.len); - *p += dentry->d_name.len; rel->dname_seq = cpu_to_le32(di->lease_seq); __ceph_mdsc_drop_dentry_lease(dentry); + spin_unlock(&dentry->d_lock); + if (IS_ENCRYPTED(dir) && fscrypt_has_encryption_key(dir)) { + int ret2 = ceph_encode_encrypted_fname(dir, dentry, *p); + + if (ret2 < 0) + return ret2; + + rel->dname_len = cpu_to_le32(ret2); + *p += ret2; + } else { + rel->dname_len = cpu_to_le32(dentry->d_name.len); + memcpy(*p, dentry->d_name.name, dentry->d_name.len); + *p += dentry->d_name.len; + } + } else { + spin_unlock(&dentry->d_lock); } - spin_unlock(&dentry->d_lock); return ret; } |