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authorTetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>2020-07-15 10:51:02 +0900
committerGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>2020-07-23 16:22:25 +0200
commit033724d6864245a11f8e04c066002e6ad22b3fd0 (patch)
tree0758ab32ef359e98882b46201f7237ca7a4c06ee /drivers/video/fbdev/core/fbcon_ccw.c
parent551e553f0d4ab623e2a6f424ab5834f9c7b5229c (diff)
fbdev: Detect integer underflow at "struct fbcon_ops"->clear_margins.
syzbot is reporting general protection fault in bitfill_aligned() [1] caused by integer underflow in bit_clear_margins(). The cause of this problem is when and how do_vc_resize() updates vc->vc_{cols,rows}. If vc_do_resize() fails (e.g. kzalloc() fails) when var.xres or var.yres is going to shrink, vc->vc_{cols,rows} will not be updated. This allows bit_clear_margins() to see info->var.xres < (vc->vc_cols * cw) or info->var.yres < (vc->vc_rows * ch). Unexpectedly large rw or bh will try to overrun the __iomem region and causes general protection fault. Also, vc_resize(vc, 0, 0) does not set vc->vc_{cols,rows} = 0 due to new_cols = (cols ? cols : vc->vc_cols); new_rows = (lines ? lines : vc->vc_rows); exception. Since cols and lines are calculated as cols = FBCON_SWAP(ops->rotate, info->var.xres, info->var.yres); rows = FBCON_SWAP(ops->rotate, info->var.yres, info->var.xres); cols /= vc->vc_font.width; rows /= vc->vc_font.height; vc_resize(vc, cols, rows); in fbcon_modechanged(), var.xres < vc->vc_font.width makes cols = 0 and var.yres < vc->vc_font.height makes rows = 0. This means that const int fd = open("/dev/fb0", O_ACCMODE); struct fb_var_screeninfo var = { }; ioctl(fd, FBIOGET_VSCREENINFO, &var); var.xres = var.yres = 1; ioctl(fd, FBIOPUT_VSCREENINFO, &var); easily reproduces integer underflow bug explained above. Of course, callers of vc_resize() are not handling vc_do_resize() failure is bad. But we can't avoid vc_resize(vc, 0, 0) which returns 0. Therefore, as a band-aid workaround, this patch checks integer underflow in "struct fbcon_ops"->clear_margins call, assuming that vc->vc_cols * vc->vc_font.width and vc->vc_rows * vc->vc_font.heigh do not cause integer overflow. [1] https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?id=a565882df74fa76f10d3a6fec4be31098dbb37c6 Reported-and-tested-by: syzbot <syzbot+e5fd3e65515b48c02a30@syzkaller.appspotmail.com> Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp> Acked-by: Daniel Vetter <daniel.vetter@ffwll.ch> Cc: stable <stable@vger.kernel.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200715015102.3814-1-penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'drivers/video/fbdev/core/fbcon_ccw.c')
-rw-r--r--drivers/video/fbdev/core/fbcon_ccw.c4
1 files changed, 2 insertions, 2 deletions
diff --git a/drivers/video/fbdev/core/fbcon_ccw.c b/drivers/video/fbdev/core/fbcon_ccw.c
index dfa9a8aa4509..78f3a5621478 100644
--- a/drivers/video/fbdev/core/fbcon_ccw.c
+++ b/drivers/video/fbdev/core/fbcon_ccw.c
@@ -201,7 +201,7 @@ static void ccw_clear_margins(struct vc_data *vc, struct fb_info *info,
region.color = color;
region.rop = ROP_COPY;
- if (rw && !bottom_only) {
+ if ((int) rw > 0 && !bottom_only) {
region.dx = 0;
region.dy = info->var.yoffset;
region.height = rw;
@@ -209,7 +209,7 @@ static void ccw_clear_margins(struct vc_data *vc, struct fb_info *info,
info->fbops->fb_fillrect(info, &region);
}
- if (bh) {
+ if ((int) bh > 0) {
region.dx = info->var.xoffset + bs;
region.dy = 0;
region.height = info->var.yres_virtual;