diff options
author | Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> | 2017-07-15 12:44:02 -0700 |
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committer | Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> | 2017-07-15 12:44:02 -0700 |
commit | 52f6c588c77b76d548201470c2a28263a41b462b (patch) | |
tree | cbb4207714e82f10932a546469bfb3db84051c33 /drivers/target/iscsi | |
parent | 78dcf73421a879d22319d3889119945b85954a68 (diff) | |
parent | 72e5c740f6335e27253b8ff64d23d00337091535 (diff) |
Merge tag 'random_for_linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tytso/random
Pull random updates from Ted Ts'o:
"Add wait_for_random_bytes() and get_random_*_wait() functions so that
callers can more safely get random bytes if they can block until the
CRNG is initialized.
Also print a warning if get_random_*() is called before the CRNG is
initialized. By default, only one single-line warning will be printed
per boot. If CONFIG_WARN_ALL_UNSEEDED_RANDOM is defined, then a
warning will be printed for each function which tries to get random
bytes before the CRNG is initialized. This can get spammy for certain
architecture types, so it is not enabled by default"
* tag 'random_for_linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tytso/random:
random: reorder READ_ONCE() in get_random_uXX
random: suppress spammy warnings about unseeded randomness
random: warn when kernel uses unseeded randomness
net/route: use get_random_int for random counter
net/neighbor: use get_random_u32 for 32-bit hash random
rhashtable: use get_random_u32 for hash_rnd
ceph: ensure RNG is seeded before using
iscsi: ensure RNG is seeded before use
cifs: use get_random_u32 for 32-bit lock random
random: add get_random_{bytes,u32,u64,int,long,once}_wait family
random: add wait_for_random_bytes() API
Diffstat (limited to 'drivers/target/iscsi')
-rw-r--r-- | drivers/target/iscsi/iscsi_target_auth.c | 14 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | drivers/target/iscsi/iscsi_target_login.c | 22 |
2 files changed, 25 insertions, 11 deletions
diff --git a/drivers/target/iscsi/iscsi_target_auth.c b/drivers/target/iscsi/iscsi_target_auth.c index 903b667f8e01..f9bc8ec6fb6b 100644 --- a/drivers/target/iscsi/iscsi_target_auth.c +++ b/drivers/target/iscsi/iscsi_target_auth.c @@ -47,18 +47,21 @@ static void chap_binaryhex_to_asciihex(char *dst, char *src, int src_len) } } -static void chap_gen_challenge( +static int chap_gen_challenge( struct iscsi_conn *conn, int caller, char *c_str, unsigned int *c_len) { + int ret; unsigned char challenge_asciihex[CHAP_CHALLENGE_LENGTH * 2 + 1]; struct iscsi_chap *chap = conn->auth_protocol; memset(challenge_asciihex, 0, CHAP_CHALLENGE_LENGTH * 2 + 1); - get_random_bytes(chap->challenge, CHAP_CHALLENGE_LENGTH); + ret = get_random_bytes_wait(chap->challenge, CHAP_CHALLENGE_LENGTH); + if (unlikely(ret)) + return ret; chap_binaryhex_to_asciihex(challenge_asciihex, chap->challenge, CHAP_CHALLENGE_LENGTH); /* @@ -69,6 +72,7 @@ static void chap_gen_challenge( pr_debug("[%s] Sending CHAP_C=0x%s\n\n", (caller) ? "server" : "client", challenge_asciihex); + return 0; } static int chap_check_algorithm(const char *a_str) @@ -143,6 +147,7 @@ static struct iscsi_chap *chap_server_open( case CHAP_DIGEST_UNKNOWN: default: pr_err("Unsupported CHAP_A value\n"); + kfree(conn->auth_protocol); return NULL; } @@ -156,7 +161,10 @@ static struct iscsi_chap *chap_server_open( /* * Generate Challenge. */ - chap_gen_challenge(conn, 1, aic_str, aic_len); + if (chap_gen_challenge(conn, 1, aic_str, aic_len) < 0) { + kfree(conn->auth_protocol); + return NULL; + } return chap; } diff --git a/drivers/target/iscsi/iscsi_target_login.c b/drivers/target/iscsi/iscsi_target_login.c index 92b96b51d506..e9bdc8b86e7d 100644 --- a/drivers/target/iscsi/iscsi_target_login.c +++ b/drivers/target/iscsi/iscsi_target_login.c @@ -245,22 +245,26 @@ int iscsi_check_for_session_reinstatement(struct iscsi_conn *conn) return 0; } -static void iscsi_login_set_conn_values( +static int iscsi_login_set_conn_values( struct iscsi_session *sess, struct iscsi_conn *conn, __be16 cid) { + int ret; conn->sess = sess; conn->cid = be16_to_cpu(cid); /* * Generate a random Status sequence number (statsn) for the new * iSCSI connection. */ - get_random_bytes(&conn->stat_sn, sizeof(u32)); + ret = get_random_bytes_wait(&conn->stat_sn, sizeof(u32)); + if (unlikely(ret)) + return ret; mutex_lock(&auth_id_lock); conn->auth_id = iscsit_global->auth_id++; mutex_unlock(&auth_id_lock); + return 0; } __printf(2, 3) int iscsi_change_param_sprintf( @@ -306,7 +310,11 @@ static int iscsi_login_zero_tsih_s1( return -ENOMEM; } - iscsi_login_set_conn_values(sess, conn, pdu->cid); + ret = iscsi_login_set_conn_values(sess, conn, pdu->cid); + if (unlikely(ret)) { + kfree(sess); + return ret; + } sess->init_task_tag = pdu->itt; memcpy(&sess->isid, pdu->isid, 6); sess->exp_cmd_sn = be32_to_cpu(pdu->cmdsn); @@ -497,8 +505,7 @@ static int iscsi_login_non_zero_tsih_s1( { struct iscsi_login_req *pdu = (struct iscsi_login_req *)buf; - iscsi_login_set_conn_values(NULL, conn, pdu->cid); - return 0; + return iscsi_login_set_conn_values(NULL, conn, pdu->cid); } /* @@ -554,9 +561,8 @@ static int iscsi_login_non_zero_tsih_s2( atomic_set(&sess->session_continuation, 1); spin_unlock_bh(&sess->conn_lock); - iscsi_login_set_conn_values(sess, conn, pdu->cid); - - if (iscsi_copy_param_list(&conn->param_list, + if (iscsi_login_set_conn_values(sess, conn, pdu->cid) < 0 || + iscsi_copy_param_list(&conn->param_list, conn->tpg->param_list, 0) < 0) { iscsit_tx_login_rsp(conn, ISCSI_STATUS_CLS_TARGET_ERR, ISCSI_LOGIN_STATUS_NO_RESOURCES); |