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path: root/drivers/net/ethernet/intel/ice/ice_virtchnl.c
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Diffstat (limited to 'drivers/net/ethernet/intel/ice/ice_virtchnl.c')
-rw-r--r--drivers/net/ethernet/intel/ice/ice_virtchnl.c49
1 files changed, 48 insertions, 1 deletions
diff --git a/drivers/net/ethernet/intel/ice/ice_virtchnl.c b/drivers/net/ethernet/intel/ice/ice_virtchnl.c
index e24e3f5017ca..97243c616d5d 100644
--- a/drivers/net/ethernet/intel/ice/ice_virtchnl.c
+++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/intel/ice/ice_virtchnl.c
@@ -3834,14 +3834,57 @@ void ice_virtchnl_set_repr_ops(struct ice_vf *vf)
}
/**
+ * ice_is_malicious_vf - check if this vf might be overflowing mailbox
+ * @vf: the VF to check
+ * @mbxdata: data about the state of the mailbox
+ *
+ * Detect if a given VF might be malicious and attempting to overflow the PF
+ * mailbox. If so, log a warning message and ignore this event.
+ */
+static bool
+ice_is_malicious_vf(struct ice_vf *vf, struct ice_mbx_data *mbxdata)
+{
+ bool report_malvf = false;
+ struct device *dev;
+ struct ice_pf *pf;
+ int status;
+
+ pf = vf->pf;
+ dev = ice_pf_to_dev(pf);
+
+ if (test_bit(ICE_VF_STATE_DIS, vf->vf_states))
+ return vf->mbx_info.malicious;
+
+ /* check to see if we have a newly malicious VF */
+ status = ice_mbx_vf_state_handler(&pf->hw, mbxdata, &vf->mbx_info,
+ &report_malvf);
+ if (status)
+ dev_warn_ratelimited(dev, "Unable to check status of mailbox overflow for VF %u MAC %pM, status %d\n",
+ vf->vf_id, vf->dev_lan_addr, status);
+
+ if (report_malvf) {
+ struct ice_vsi *pf_vsi = ice_get_main_vsi(pf);
+ u8 zero_addr[ETH_ALEN] = {};
+
+ dev_warn(dev, "VF MAC %pM on PF MAC %pM is generating asynchronous messages and may be overflowing the PF message queue. Please see the Adapter User Guide for more information\n",
+ vf->dev_lan_addr,
+ pf_vsi ? pf_vsi->netdev->dev_addr : zero_addr);
+ }
+
+ return vf->mbx_info.malicious;
+}
+
+/**
* ice_vc_process_vf_msg - Process request from VF
* @pf: pointer to the PF structure
* @event: pointer to the AQ event
+ * @mbxdata: information used to detect VF attempting mailbox overflow
*
* called from the common asq/arq handler to
* process request from VF
*/
-void ice_vc_process_vf_msg(struct ice_pf *pf, struct ice_rq_event_info *event)
+void ice_vc_process_vf_msg(struct ice_pf *pf, struct ice_rq_event_info *event,
+ struct ice_mbx_data *mbxdata)
{
u32 v_opcode = le32_to_cpu(event->desc.cookie_high);
s16 vf_id = le16_to_cpu(event->desc.retval);
@@ -3863,6 +3906,10 @@ void ice_vc_process_vf_msg(struct ice_pf *pf, struct ice_rq_event_info *event)
mutex_lock(&vf->cfg_lock);
+ /* Check if the VF is trying to overflow the mailbox */
+ if (ice_is_malicious_vf(vf, mbxdata))
+ goto finish;
+
/* Check if VF is disabled. */
if (test_bit(ICE_VF_STATE_DIS, vf->vf_states)) {
err = -EPERM;