diff options
author | Marco Elver <elver@google.com> | 2023-08-11 17:18:40 +0200 |
---|---|---|
committer | Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> | 2023-08-15 14:57:25 -0700 |
commit | aebc7b0d8d91bbc69e976909963046bc48bca4fd (patch) | |
tree | d9a2b25f46793d9bfd8e64cc5dd8570e4cc5f27d /security/Kconfig.hardening | |
parent | b16c42c8fde808b4f047d94f1f2aeda93487670d (diff) |
list: Introduce CONFIG_LIST_HARDENED
Numerous production kernel configs (see [1, 2]) are choosing to enable
CONFIG_DEBUG_LIST, which is also being recommended by KSPP for hardened
configs [3]. The motivation behind this is that the option can be used
as a security hardening feature (e.g. CVE-2019-2215 and CVE-2019-2025
are mitigated by the option [4]).
The feature has never been designed with performance in mind, yet common
list manipulation is happening across hot paths all over the kernel.
Introduce CONFIG_LIST_HARDENED, which performs list pointer checking
inline, and only upon list corruption calls the reporting slow path.
To generate optimal machine code with CONFIG_LIST_HARDENED:
1. Elide checking for pointer values which upon dereference would
result in an immediate access fault (i.e. minimal hardening
checks). The trade-off is lower-quality error reports.
2. Use the __preserve_most function attribute (available with Clang,
but not yet with GCC) to minimize the code footprint for calling
the reporting slow path. As a result, function size of callers is
reduced by avoiding saving registers before calling the rarely
called reporting slow path.
Note that all TUs in lib/Makefile already disable function tracing,
including list_debug.c, and __preserve_most's implied notrace has
no effect in this case.
3. Because the inline checks are a subset of the full set of checks in
__list_*_valid_or_report(), always return false if the inline
checks failed. This avoids redundant compare and conditional
branch right after return from the slow path.
As a side-effect of the checks being inline, if the compiler can prove
some condition to always be true, it can completely elide some checks.
Since DEBUG_LIST is functionally a superset of LIST_HARDENED, the
Kconfig variables are changed to reflect that: DEBUG_LIST selects
LIST_HARDENED, whereas LIST_HARDENED itself has no dependency on
DEBUG_LIST.
Running netperf with CONFIG_LIST_HARDENED (using a Clang compiler with
"preserve_most") shows throughput improvements, in my case of ~7% on
average (up to 20-30% on some test cases).
Link: https://r.android.com/1266735 [1]
Link: https://gitlab.archlinux.org/archlinux/packaging/packages/linux/-/blob/main/config [2]
Link: https://kernsec.org/wiki/index.php/Kernel_Self_Protection_Project/Recommended_Settings [3]
Link: https://googleprojectzero.blogspot.com/2019/11/bad-binder-android-in-wild-exploit.html [4]
Signed-off-by: Marco Elver <elver@google.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230811151847.1594958-3-elver@google.com
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'security/Kconfig.hardening')
-rw-r--r-- | security/Kconfig.hardening | 13 |
1 files changed, 13 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/security/Kconfig.hardening b/security/Kconfig.hardening index 0f295961e773..ffc3c702b461 100644 --- a/security/Kconfig.hardening +++ b/security/Kconfig.hardening @@ -279,6 +279,19 @@ config ZERO_CALL_USED_REGS endmenu +menu "Hardening of kernel data structures" + +config LIST_HARDENED + bool "Check integrity of linked list manipulation" + help + Minimal integrity checking in the linked-list manipulation routines + to catch memory corruptions that are not guaranteed to result in an + immediate access fault. + + If unsure, say N. + +endmenu + config CC_HAS_RANDSTRUCT def_bool $(cc-option,-frandomize-layout-seed-file=/dev/null) # Randstruct was first added in Clang 15, but it isn't safe to use until |