diff options
| author | Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de> | 2016-03-10 01:56:23 +0100 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org> | 2016-03-12 11:55:01 +0100 |
| commit | d157bd761585605b7882935ffb86286919f62ea1 (patch) | |
| tree | 993900c74587138194c1689aed4e1bed6c97958b /net | |
| parent | f0716cd6eb89f769bff3b37120219720c994bb7e (diff) | |
netfilter: x_tables: check for size overflow
Ben Hawkes says:
integer overflow in xt_alloc_table_info, which on 32-bit systems can
lead to small structure allocation and a copy_from_user based heap
corruption.
Reported-by: Ben Hawkes <hawkes@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'net')
| -rw-r--r-- | net/netfilter/x_tables.c | 3 |
1 files changed, 3 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/net/netfilter/x_tables.c b/net/netfilter/x_tables.c index d0cd2b9bf844..582c9cfd6567 100644 --- a/net/netfilter/x_tables.c +++ b/net/netfilter/x_tables.c @@ -659,6 +659,9 @@ struct xt_table_info *xt_alloc_table_info(unsigned int size) struct xt_table_info *info = NULL; size_t sz = sizeof(*info) + size; + if (sz < sizeof(*info)) + return NULL; + /* Pedantry: prevent them from hitting BUG() in vmalloc.c --RR */ if ((SMP_ALIGN(size) >> PAGE_SHIFT) + 2 > totalram_pages) return NULL; |