diff options
| author | Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> | 2023-08-31 12:20:12 -0700 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> | 2023-08-31 12:20:12 -0700 |
| commit | df57721f9a63e8a1fb9b9b2e70de4aa4c7e0cd2e (patch) | |
| tree | b77ba91405ebc69c36ccbb55476ed0d018d7fba4 /fs/proc | |
| parent | b97d64c722598ffed42ece814a2cb791336c6679 (diff) | |
| parent | 1fe428d3692fb10a0e8d85fafe719b154e43ad4e (diff) | |
Merge tag 'x86_shstk_for_6.6-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip
Pull x86 shadow stack support from Dave Hansen:
"This is the long awaited x86 shadow stack support, part of Intel's
Control-flow Enforcement Technology (CET).
CET consists of two related security features: shadow stacks and
indirect branch tracking. This series implements just the shadow stack
part of this feature, and just for userspace.
The main use case for shadow stack is providing protection against
return oriented programming attacks. It works by maintaining a
secondary (shadow) stack using a special memory type that has
protections against modification. When executing a CALL instruction,
the processor pushes the return address to both the normal stack and
to the special permission shadow stack. Upon RET, the processor pops
the shadow stack copy and compares it to the normal stack copy.
For more information, refer to the links below for the earlier
versions of this patch set"
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20220130211838.8382-1-rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com/
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20230613001108.3040476-1-rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com/
* tag 'x86_shstk_for_6.6-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip: (47 commits)
x86/shstk: Change order of __user in type
x86/ibt: Convert IBT selftest to asm
x86/shstk: Don't retry vm_munmap() on -EINTR
x86/kbuild: Fix Documentation/ reference
x86/shstk: Move arch detail comment out of core mm
x86/shstk: Add ARCH_SHSTK_STATUS
x86/shstk: Add ARCH_SHSTK_UNLOCK
x86: Add PTRACE interface for shadow stack
selftests/x86: Add shadow stack test
x86/cpufeatures: Enable CET CR4 bit for shadow stack
x86/shstk: Wire in shadow stack interface
x86: Expose thread features in /proc/$PID/status
x86/shstk: Support WRSS for userspace
x86/shstk: Introduce map_shadow_stack syscall
x86/shstk: Check that signal frame is shadow stack mem
x86/shstk: Check that SSP is aligned on sigreturn
x86/shstk: Handle signals for shadow stack
x86/shstk: Introduce routines modifying shstk
x86/shstk: Handle thread shadow stack
x86/shstk: Add user-mode shadow stack support
...
Diffstat (limited to 'fs/proc')
| -rw-r--r-- | fs/proc/array.c | 6 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | fs/proc/task_mmu.c | 3 |
2 files changed, 9 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/fs/proc/array.c b/fs/proc/array.c index d35bbf35a874..2c2efbe685d8 100644 --- a/fs/proc/array.c +++ b/fs/proc/array.c @@ -431,6 +431,11 @@ static inline void task_untag_mask(struct seq_file *m, struct mm_struct *mm) seq_printf(m, "untag_mask:\t%#lx\n", mm_untag_mask(mm)); } +__weak void arch_proc_pid_thread_features(struct seq_file *m, + struct task_struct *task) +{ +} + int proc_pid_status(struct seq_file *m, struct pid_namespace *ns, struct pid *pid, struct task_struct *task) { @@ -455,6 +460,7 @@ int proc_pid_status(struct seq_file *m, struct pid_namespace *ns, task_cpus_allowed(m, task); cpuset_task_status_allowed(m, task); task_context_switch_counts(m, task); + arch_proc_pid_thread_features(m, task); return 0; } diff --git a/fs/proc/task_mmu.c b/fs/proc/task_mmu.c index 15ddf4653a19..0f2aa36a9913 100644 --- a/fs/proc/task_mmu.c +++ b/fs/proc/task_mmu.c @@ -692,6 +692,9 @@ static void show_smap_vma_flags(struct seq_file *m, struct vm_area_struct *vma) #ifdef CONFIG_HAVE_ARCH_USERFAULTFD_MINOR [ilog2(VM_UFFD_MINOR)] = "ui", #endif /* CONFIG_HAVE_ARCH_USERFAULTFD_MINOR */ +#ifdef CONFIG_X86_USER_SHADOW_STACK + [ilog2(VM_SHADOW_STACK)] = "ss", +#endif }; size_t i; |