diff options
author | Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> | 2020-06-04 13:54:34 -0700 |
---|---|---|
committer | Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> | 2020-06-04 13:54:34 -0700 |
commit | 9ff7258575d5fee011649d20cc56de720a395191 (patch) | |
tree | 421f116b2c065dbcd3ad0763a19576b3e1d24cef /fs/proc | |
parent | 051c3556e3d6cc43bca71a624081de9c599df944 (diff) | |
parent | 9d78edeaec759f997c303f286ecd39daee166f2a (diff) |
Merge branch 'proc-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/ebiederm/user-namespace
Pull proc updates from Eric Biederman:
"This has four sets of changes:
- modernize proc to support multiple private instances
- ensure we see the exit of each process tid exactly
- remove has_group_leader_pid
- use pids not tasks in posix-cpu-timers lookup
Alexey updated proc so each mount of proc uses a new superblock. This
allows people to actually use mount options with proc with no fear of
messing up another mount of proc. Given the kernel's internal mounts
of proc for things like uml this was a real problem, and resulted in
Android's hidepid mount options being ignored and introducing security
issues.
The rest of the changes are small cleanups and fixes that came out of
my work to allow this change to proc. In essence it is swapping the
pids in de_thread during exec which removes a special case the code
had to handle. Then updating the code to stop handling that special
case"
* 'proc-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/ebiederm/user-namespace:
proc: proc_pid_ns takes super_block as an argument
remove the no longer needed pid_alive() check in __task_pid_nr_ns()
posix-cpu-timers: Replace __get_task_for_clock with pid_for_clock
posix-cpu-timers: Replace cpu_timer_pid_type with clock_pid_type
posix-cpu-timers: Extend rcu_read_lock removing task_struct references
signal: Remove has_group_leader_pid
exec: Remove BUG_ON(has_group_leader_pid)
posix-cpu-timer: Unify the now redundant code in lookup_task
posix-cpu-timer: Tidy up group_leader logic in lookup_task
proc: Ensure we see the exit of each process tid exactly once
rculist: Add hlists_swap_heads_rcu
proc: Use PIDTYPE_TGID in next_tgid
Use proc_pid_ns() to get pid_namespace from the proc superblock
proc: use named enums for better readability
proc: use human-readable values for hidepid
docs: proc: add documentation for "hidepid=4" and "subset=pid" options and new mount behavior
proc: add option to mount only a pids subset
proc: instantiate only pids that we can ptrace on 'hidepid=4' mount option
proc: allow to mount many instances of proc in one pid namespace
proc: rename struct proc_fs_info to proc_fs_opts
Diffstat (limited to 'fs/proc')
-rw-r--r-- | fs/proc/array.c | 2 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | fs/proc/base.c | 74 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | fs/proc/generic.c | 9 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | fs/proc/inode.c | 30 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | fs/proc/root.c | 131 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | fs/proc/self.c | 8 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | fs/proc/thread_self.c | 8 |
7 files changed, 183 insertions, 79 deletions
diff --git a/fs/proc/array.c b/fs/proc/array.c index 8e16f14bb05a..043311014db2 100644 --- a/fs/proc/array.c +++ b/fs/proc/array.c @@ -728,7 +728,7 @@ static int children_seq_show(struct seq_file *seq, void *v) { struct inode *inode = file_inode(seq->file); - seq_printf(seq, "%d ", pid_nr_ns(v, proc_pid_ns(inode))); + seq_printf(seq, "%d ", pid_nr_ns(v, proc_pid_ns(inode->i_sb))); return 0; } diff --git a/fs/proc/base.c b/fs/proc/base.c index eb2255e95f62..b1d94d14ed5a 100644 --- a/fs/proc/base.c +++ b/fs/proc/base.c @@ -697,13 +697,21 @@ int proc_setattr(struct dentry *dentry, struct iattr *attr) * May current process learn task's sched/cmdline info (for hide_pid_min=1) * or euid/egid (for hide_pid_min=2)? */ -static bool has_pid_permissions(struct pid_namespace *pid, +static bool has_pid_permissions(struct proc_fs_info *fs_info, struct task_struct *task, - int hide_pid_min) + enum proc_hidepid hide_pid_min) { - if (pid->hide_pid < hide_pid_min) + /* + * If 'hidpid' mount option is set force a ptrace check, + * we indicate that we are using a filesystem syscall + * by passing PTRACE_MODE_READ_FSCREDS + */ + if (fs_info->hide_pid == HIDEPID_NOT_PTRACEABLE) + return ptrace_may_access(task, PTRACE_MODE_READ_FSCREDS); + + if (fs_info->hide_pid < hide_pid_min) return true; - if (in_group_p(pid->pid_gid)) + if (in_group_p(fs_info->pid_gid)) return true; return ptrace_may_access(task, PTRACE_MODE_READ_FSCREDS); } @@ -711,18 +719,18 @@ static bool has_pid_permissions(struct pid_namespace *pid, static int proc_pid_permission(struct inode *inode, int mask) { - struct pid_namespace *pid = proc_pid_ns(inode); + struct proc_fs_info *fs_info = proc_sb_info(inode->i_sb); struct task_struct *task; bool has_perms; task = get_proc_task(inode); if (!task) return -ESRCH; - has_perms = has_pid_permissions(pid, task, HIDEPID_NO_ACCESS); + has_perms = has_pid_permissions(fs_info, task, HIDEPID_NO_ACCESS); put_task_struct(task); if (!has_perms) { - if (pid->hide_pid == HIDEPID_INVISIBLE) { + if (fs_info->hide_pid == HIDEPID_INVISIBLE) { /* * Let's make getdents(), stat(), and open() * consistent with each other. If a process @@ -746,7 +754,7 @@ static const struct inode_operations proc_def_inode_operations = { static int proc_single_show(struct seq_file *m, void *v) { struct inode *inode = m->private; - struct pid_namespace *ns = proc_pid_ns(inode); + struct pid_namespace *ns = proc_pid_ns(inode->i_sb); struct pid *pid = proc_pid(inode); struct task_struct *task; int ret; @@ -1415,7 +1423,7 @@ static const struct file_operations proc_fail_nth_operations = { static int sched_show(struct seq_file *m, void *v) { struct inode *inode = m->private; - struct pid_namespace *ns = proc_pid_ns(inode); + struct pid_namespace *ns = proc_pid_ns(inode->i_sb); struct task_struct *p; p = get_proc_task(inode); @@ -1909,7 +1917,7 @@ int pid_getattr(const struct path *path, struct kstat *stat, u32 request_mask, unsigned int query_flags) { struct inode *inode = d_inode(path->dentry); - struct pid_namespace *pid = proc_pid_ns(inode); + struct proc_fs_info *fs_info = proc_sb_info(inode->i_sb); struct task_struct *task; generic_fillattr(inode, stat); @@ -1919,7 +1927,7 @@ int pid_getattr(const struct path *path, struct kstat *stat, rcu_read_lock(); task = pid_task(proc_pid(inode), PIDTYPE_PID); if (task) { - if (!has_pid_permissions(pid, task, HIDEPID_INVISIBLE)) { + if (!has_pid_permissions(fs_info, task, HIDEPID_INVISIBLE)) { rcu_read_unlock(); /* * This doesn't prevent learning whether PID exists, @@ -2470,7 +2478,7 @@ static int proc_timers_open(struct inode *inode, struct file *file) return -ENOMEM; tp->pid = proc_pid(inode); - tp->ns = proc_pid_ns(inode); + tp->ns = proc_pid_ns(inode->i_sb); return 0; } @@ -3312,6 +3320,7 @@ struct dentry *proc_pid_lookup(struct dentry *dentry, unsigned int flags) { struct task_struct *task; unsigned tgid; + struct proc_fs_info *fs_info; struct pid_namespace *ns; struct dentry *result = ERR_PTR(-ENOENT); @@ -3319,7 +3328,8 @@ struct dentry *proc_pid_lookup(struct dentry *dentry, unsigned int flags) if (tgid == ~0U) goto out; - ns = dentry->d_sb->s_fs_info; + fs_info = proc_sb_info(dentry->d_sb); + ns = fs_info->pid_ns; rcu_read_lock(); task = find_task_by_pid_ns(tgid, ns); if (task) @@ -3328,7 +3338,14 @@ struct dentry *proc_pid_lookup(struct dentry *dentry, unsigned int flags) if (!task) goto out; + /* Limit procfs to only ptraceable tasks */ + if (fs_info->hide_pid == HIDEPID_NOT_PTRACEABLE) { + if (!has_pid_permissions(fs_info, task, HIDEPID_NO_ACCESS)) + goto out_put_task; + } + result = proc_pid_instantiate(dentry, task, NULL); +out_put_task: put_task_struct(task); out: return result; @@ -3354,20 +3371,8 @@ retry: pid = find_ge_pid(iter.tgid, ns); if (pid) { iter.tgid = pid_nr_ns(pid, ns); - iter.task = pid_task(pid, PIDTYPE_PID); - /* What we to know is if the pid we have find is the - * pid of a thread_group_leader. Testing for task - * being a thread_group_leader is the obvious thing - * todo but there is a window when it fails, due to - * the pid transfer logic in de_thread. - * - * So we perform the straight forward test of seeing - * if the pid we have found is the pid of a thread - * group leader, and don't worry if the task we have - * found doesn't happen to be a thread group leader. - * As we don't care in the case of readdir. - */ - if (!iter.task || !has_group_leader_pid(iter.task)) { + iter.task = pid_task(pid, PIDTYPE_TGID); + if (!iter.task) { iter.tgid += 1; goto retry; } @@ -3383,20 +3388,21 @@ retry: int proc_pid_readdir(struct file *file, struct dir_context *ctx) { struct tgid_iter iter; - struct pid_namespace *ns = proc_pid_ns(file_inode(file)); + struct proc_fs_info *fs_info = proc_sb_info(file_inode(file)->i_sb); + struct pid_namespace *ns = proc_pid_ns(file_inode(file)->i_sb); loff_t pos = ctx->pos; if (pos >= PID_MAX_LIMIT + TGID_OFFSET) return 0; if (pos == TGID_OFFSET - 2) { - struct inode *inode = d_inode(ns->proc_self); + struct inode *inode = d_inode(fs_info->proc_self); if (!dir_emit(ctx, "self", 4, inode->i_ino, DT_LNK)) return 0; ctx->pos = pos = pos + 1; } if (pos == TGID_OFFSET - 1) { - struct inode *inode = d_inode(ns->proc_thread_self); + struct inode *inode = d_inode(fs_info->proc_thread_self); if (!dir_emit(ctx, "thread-self", 11, inode->i_ino, DT_LNK)) return 0; ctx->pos = pos = pos + 1; @@ -3410,7 +3416,7 @@ int proc_pid_readdir(struct file *file, struct dir_context *ctx) unsigned int len; cond_resched(); - if (!has_pid_permissions(ns, iter.task, HIDEPID_INVISIBLE)) + if (!has_pid_permissions(fs_info, iter.task, HIDEPID_INVISIBLE)) continue; len = snprintf(name, sizeof(name), "%u", iter.tgid); @@ -3610,6 +3616,7 @@ static struct dentry *proc_task_lookup(struct inode *dir, struct dentry * dentry struct task_struct *task; struct task_struct *leader = get_proc_task(dir); unsigned tid; + struct proc_fs_info *fs_info; struct pid_namespace *ns; struct dentry *result = ERR_PTR(-ENOENT); @@ -3620,7 +3627,8 @@ static struct dentry *proc_task_lookup(struct inode *dir, struct dentry * dentry if (tid == ~0U) goto out; - ns = dentry->d_sb->s_fs_info; + fs_info = proc_sb_info(dentry->d_sb); + ns = fs_info->pid_ns; rcu_read_lock(); task = find_task_by_pid_ns(tid, ns); if (task) @@ -3734,7 +3742,7 @@ static int proc_task_readdir(struct file *file, struct dir_context *ctx) /* f_version caches the tgid value that the last readdir call couldn't * return. lseek aka telldir automagically resets f_version to 0. */ - ns = proc_pid_ns(inode); + ns = proc_pid_ns(inode->i_sb); tid = (int)file->f_version; file->f_version = 0; for (task = first_tid(proc_pid(inode), tid, ctx->pos - 2, ns); diff --git a/fs/proc/generic.c b/fs/proc/generic.c index 4ed6dabdf6ff..2f9fa179194d 100644 --- a/fs/proc/generic.c +++ b/fs/proc/generic.c @@ -269,6 +269,11 @@ struct dentry *proc_lookup_de(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, struct dentry *proc_lookup(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, unsigned int flags) { + struct proc_fs_info *fs_info = proc_sb_info(dir->i_sb); + + if (fs_info->pidonly == PROC_PIDONLY_ON) + return ERR_PTR(-ENOENT); + return proc_lookup_de(dir, dentry, PDE(dir)); } @@ -325,6 +330,10 @@ int proc_readdir_de(struct file *file, struct dir_context *ctx, int proc_readdir(struct file *file, struct dir_context *ctx) { struct inode *inode = file_inode(file); + struct proc_fs_info *fs_info = proc_sb_info(inode->i_sb); + + if (fs_info->pidonly == PROC_PIDONLY_ON) + return 1; return proc_readdir_de(file, ctx, PDE(inode)); } diff --git a/fs/proc/inode.c b/fs/proc/inode.c index fb4cace9ea41..f40c2532c057 100644 --- a/fs/proc/inode.c +++ b/fs/proc/inode.c @@ -24,6 +24,7 @@ #include <linux/seq_file.h> #include <linux/slab.h> #include <linux/mount.h> +#include <linux/bug.h> #include <linux/uaccess.h> @@ -165,15 +166,28 @@ void proc_invalidate_siblings_dcache(struct hlist_head *inodes, spinlock_t *lock deactivate_super(old_sb); } +static inline const char *hidepid2str(enum proc_hidepid v) +{ + switch (v) { + case HIDEPID_OFF: return "off"; + case HIDEPID_NO_ACCESS: return "noaccess"; + case HIDEPID_INVISIBLE: return "invisible"; + case HIDEPID_NOT_PTRACEABLE: return "ptraceable"; + } + WARN_ONCE(1, "bad hide_pid value: %d\n", v); + return "unknown"; +} + static int proc_show_options(struct seq_file *seq, struct dentry *root) { - struct super_block *sb = root->d_sb; - struct pid_namespace *pid = sb->s_fs_info; + struct proc_fs_info *fs_info = proc_sb_info(root->d_sb); - if (!gid_eq(pid->pid_gid, GLOBAL_ROOT_GID)) - seq_printf(seq, ",gid=%u", from_kgid_munged(&init_user_ns, pid->pid_gid)); - if (pid->hide_pid != HIDEPID_OFF) - seq_printf(seq, ",hidepid=%u", pid->hide_pid); + if (!gid_eq(fs_info->pid_gid, GLOBAL_ROOT_GID)) + seq_printf(seq, ",gid=%u", from_kgid_munged(&init_user_ns, fs_info->pid_gid)); + if (fs_info->hide_pid != HIDEPID_OFF) + seq_printf(seq, ",hidepid=%s", hidepid2str(fs_info->hide_pid)); + if (fs_info->pidonly != PROC_PIDONLY_OFF) + seq_printf(seq, ",subset=pid"); return 0; } @@ -464,6 +478,7 @@ proc_reg_get_unmapped_area(struct file *file, unsigned long orig_addr, static int proc_reg_open(struct inode *inode, struct file *file) { + struct proc_fs_info *fs_info = proc_sb_info(inode->i_sb); struct proc_dir_entry *pde = PDE(inode); int rv = 0; typeof_member(struct proc_ops, proc_open) open; @@ -477,6 +492,9 @@ static int proc_reg_open(struct inode *inode, struct file *file) return rv; } + if (fs_info->pidonly == PROC_PIDONLY_ON) + return -ENOENT; + /* * Ensure that * 1) PDE's ->release hook will be called no matter what diff --git a/fs/proc/root.c b/fs/proc/root.c index cdbe9293ea55..ffebed1999e5 100644 --- a/fs/proc/root.c +++ b/fs/proc/root.c @@ -32,21 +32,86 @@ struct proc_fs_context { struct pid_namespace *pid_ns; unsigned int mask; - int hidepid; + enum proc_hidepid hidepid; int gid; + enum proc_pidonly pidonly; }; enum proc_param { Opt_gid, Opt_hidepid, + Opt_subset, }; static const struct fs_parameter_spec proc_fs_parameters[] = { fsparam_u32("gid", Opt_gid), - fsparam_u32("hidepid", Opt_hidepid), + fsparam_string("hidepid", Opt_hidepid), + fsparam_string("subset", Opt_subset), {} }; +static inline int valid_hidepid(unsigned int value) +{ + return (value == HIDEPID_OFF || + value == HIDEPID_NO_ACCESS || + value == HIDEPID_INVISIBLE || + value == HIDEPID_NOT_PTRACEABLE); +} + +static int proc_parse_hidepid_param(struct fs_context *fc, struct fs_parameter *param) +{ + struct proc_fs_context *ctx = fc->fs_private; + struct fs_parameter_spec hidepid_u32_spec = fsparam_u32("hidepid", Opt_hidepid); + struct fs_parse_result result; + int base = (unsigned long)hidepid_u32_spec.data; + + if (param->type != fs_value_is_string) + return invalf(fc, "proc: unexpected type of hidepid value\n"); + + if (!kstrtouint(param->string, base, &result.uint_32)) { + if (!valid_hidepid(result.uint_32)) + return invalf(fc, "proc: unknown value of hidepid - %s\n", param->string); + ctx->hidepid = result.uint_32; + return 0; + } + + if (!strcmp(param->string, "off")) + ctx->hidepid = HIDEPID_OFF; + else if (!strcmp(param->string, "noaccess")) + ctx->hidepid = HIDEPID_NO_ACCESS; + else if (!strcmp(param->string, "invisible")) + ctx->hidepid = HIDEPID_INVISIBLE; + else if (!strcmp(param->string, "ptraceable")) + ctx->hidepid = HIDEPID_NOT_PTRACEABLE; + else + return invalf(fc, "proc: unknown value of hidepid - %s\n", param->string); + + return 0; +} + +static int proc_parse_subset_param(struct fs_context *fc, char *value) +{ + struct proc_fs_context *ctx = fc->fs_private; + + while (value) { + char *ptr = strchr(value, ','); + + if (ptr != NULL) + *ptr++ = '\0'; + + if (*value != '\0') { + if (!strcmp(value, "pid")) { + ctx->pidonly = PROC_PIDONLY_ON; + } else { + return invalf(fc, "proc: unsupported subset option - %s\n", value); + } + } + value = ptr; + } + + return 0; +} + static int proc_parse_param(struct fs_context *fc, struct fs_parameter *param) { struct proc_fs_context *ctx = fc->fs_private; @@ -63,10 +128,13 @@ static int proc_parse_param(struct fs_context *fc, struct fs_parameter *param) break; case Opt_hidepid: - ctx->hidepid = result.uint_32; - if (ctx->hidepid < HIDEPID_OFF || - ctx->hidepid > HIDEPID_INVISIBLE) - return invalfc(fc, "hidepid value must be between 0 and 2.\n"); + if (proc_parse_hidepid_param(fc, param)) + return -EINVAL; + break; + + case Opt_subset: + if (proc_parse_subset_param(fc, param->string) < 0) + return -EINVAL; break; default: @@ -77,26 +145,33 @@ static int proc_parse_param(struct fs_context *fc, struct fs_parameter *param) return 0; } -static void proc_apply_options(struct super_block *s, +static void proc_apply_options(struct proc_fs_info *fs_info, struct fs_context *fc, - struct pid_namespace *pid_ns, struct user_namespace *user_ns) { struct proc_fs_context *ctx = fc->fs_private; if (ctx->mask & (1 << Opt_gid)) - pid_ns->pid_gid = make_kgid(user_ns, ctx->gid); + fs_info->pid_gid = make_kgid(user_ns, ctx->gid); if (ctx->mask & (1 << Opt_hidepid)) - pid_ns->hide_pid = ctx->hidepid; + fs_info->hide_pid = ctx->hidepid; + if (ctx->mask & (1 << Opt_subset)) + fs_info->pidonly = ctx->pidonly; } static int proc_fill_super(struct super_block *s, struct fs_context *fc) { - struct pid_namespace *pid_ns = get_pid_ns(s->s_fs_info); + struct proc_fs_context *ctx = fc->fs_private; struct inode *root_inode; + struct proc_fs_info *fs_info; int ret; - proc_apply_options(s, fc, pid_ns, current_user_ns()); + fs_info = kzalloc(sizeof(*fs_info), GFP_KERNEL); + if (!fs_info) + return -ENOMEM; + + fs_info->pid_ns = get_pid_ns(ctx->pid_ns); + proc_apply_options(fs_info, fc, current_user_ns()); /* User space would break if executables or devices appear on proc */ s->s_iflags |= SB_I_USERNS_VISIBLE | SB_I_NOEXEC | SB_I_NODEV; @@ -106,6 +181,7 @@ static int proc_fill_super(struct super_block *s, struct fs_context *fc) s->s_magic = PROC_SUPER_MAGIC; s->s_op = &proc_sops; s->s_time_gran = 1; + s->s_fs_info = fs_info; /* * procfs isn't actually a stacking filesystem; however, there is @@ -113,7 +189,7 @@ static int proc_fill_super(struct super_block *s, struct fs_context *fc) * top of it */ s->s_stack_depth = FILESYSTEM_MAX_STACK_DEPTH; - + /* procfs dentries and inodes don't require IO to create */ s->s_shrink.seeks = 0; @@ -140,19 +216,17 @@ static int proc_fill_super(struct super_block *s, struct fs_context *fc) static int proc_reconfigure(struct fs_context *fc) { struct super_block *sb = fc->root->d_sb; - struct pid_namespace *pid = sb->s_fs_info; + struct proc_fs_info *fs_info = proc_sb_info(sb); sync_filesystem(sb); - proc_apply_options(sb, fc, pid, current_user_ns()); + proc_apply_options(fs_info, fc, current_user_ns()); return 0; } static int proc_get_tree(struct fs_context *fc) { - struct proc_fs_context *ctx = fc->fs_private; - - return get_tree_keyed(fc, proc_fill_super, ctx->pid_ns); + return get_tree_nodev(fc, proc_fill_super); } static void proc_fs_context_free(struct fs_context *fc) @@ -188,22 +262,17 @@ static int proc_init_fs_context(struct fs_context *fc) static void proc_kill_sb(struct super_block *sb) { - struct pid_namespace *ns; + struct proc_fs_info *fs_info = proc_sb_info(sb); - ns = (struct pid_namespace *)sb->s_fs_info; - if (ns->proc_self) - dput(ns->proc_self); - if (ns->proc_thread_self) - dput(ns->proc_thread_self); - kill_anon_super(sb); + if (fs_info->proc_self) + dput(fs_info->proc_self); - /* Make the pid namespace safe for the next mount of proc */ - ns->proc_self = NULL; - ns->proc_thread_self = NULL; - ns->pid_gid = GLOBAL_ROOT_GID; - ns->hide_pid = 0; + if (fs_info->proc_thread_self) + dput(fs_info->proc_thread_self); - put_pid_ns(ns); + kill_anon_super(sb); + put_pid_ns(fs_info->pid_ns); + kfree(fs_info); } static struct file_system_type proc_fs_type = { diff --git a/fs/proc/self.c b/fs/proc/self.c index 57c0a1047250..ca5158fa561c 100644 --- a/fs/proc/self.c +++ b/fs/proc/self.c @@ -12,7 +12,7 @@ static const char *proc_self_get_link(struct dentry *dentry, struct inode *inode, struct delayed_call *done) { - struct pid_namespace *ns = proc_pid_ns(inode); + struct pid_namespace *ns = proc_pid_ns(inode->i_sb); pid_t tgid = task_tgid_nr_ns(current, ns); char *name; @@ -36,10 +36,10 @@ static unsigned self_inum __ro_after_init; int proc_setup_self(struct super_block *s) { struct inode *root_inode = d_inode(s->s_root); - struct pid_namespace *ns = proc_pid_ns(root_inode); + struct proc_fs_info *fs_info = proc_sb_info(s); struct dentry *self; int ret = -ENOMEM; - + inode_lock(root_inode); self = d_alloc_name(s->s_root, "self"); if (self) { @@ -62,7 +62,7 @@ int proc_setup_self(struct super_block *s) if (ret) pr_err("proc_fill_super: can't allocate /proc/self\n"); else - ns->proc_self = self; + fs_info->proc_self = self; return ret; } diff --git a/fs/proc/thread_self.c b/fs/proc/thread_self.c index f61ae53533f5..ac284f409568 100644 --- a/fs/proc/thread_self.c +++ b/fs/proc/thread_self.c @@ -12,7 +12,7 @@ static const char *proc_thread_self_get_link(struct dentry *dentry, struct inode *inode, struct delayed_call *done) { - struct pid_namespace *ns = proc_pid_ns(inode); + struct pid_namespace *ns = proc_pid_ns(inode->i_sb); pid_t tgid = task_tgid_nr_ns(current, ns); pid_t pid = task_pid_nr_ns(current, ns); char *name; @@ -36,7 +36,7 @@ static unsigned thread_self_inum __ro_after_init; int proc_setup_thread_self(struct super_block *s) { struct inode *root_inode = d_inode(s->s_root); - struct pid_namespace *ns = proc_pid_ns(root_inode); + struct proc_fs_info *fs_info = proc_sb_info(s); struct dentry *thread_self; int ret = -ENOMEM; @@ -60,9 +60,9 @@ int proc_setup_thread_self(struct super_block *s) inode_unlock(root_inode); if (ret) - pr_err("proc_fill_super: can't allocate /proc/thread_self\n"); + pr_err("proc_fill_super: can't allocate /proc/thread-self\n"); else - ns->proc_thread_self = thread_self; + fs_info->proc_thread_self = thread_self; return ret; } |