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authorRoberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com>2024-04-03 09:57:29 +0200
committerLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>2024-04-03 10:21:32 -0700
commit701b38995e5bdd2a293936c55782140423827fb1 (patch)
tree77973f752aeb407fdb5a431f28582492065d692f /drivers/hid/hid-a4tech.c
parent0e110732473e14d6520e49d75d2c88ef7d46fe67 (diff)
security: Place security_path_post_mknod() where the original IMA call was
Commit 08abce60d63f ("security: Introduce path_post_mknod hook") introduced security_path_post_mknod(), to replace the IMA-specific call to ima_post_path_mknod(). For symmetry with security_path_mknod(), security_path_post_mknod() was called after a successful mknod operation, for any file type, rather than only for regular files at the time there was the IMA call. However, as reported by VFS maintainers, successful mknod operation does not mean that the dentry always has an inode attached to it (for example, not for FIFOs on a SAMBA mount). If that condition happens, the kernel crashes when security_path_post_mknod() attempts to verify if the inode associated to the dentry is private. Move security_path_post_mknod() where the ima_post_path_mknod() call was, which is obviously correct from IMA/EVM perspective. IMA/EVM are the only in-kernel users, and only need to inspect regular files. Reported-by: Steve French <smfrench@gmail.com> Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-kernel/CAH2r5msAVzxCUHHG8VKrMPUKQHmBpE6K9_vjhgDa1uAvwx4ppw@mail.gmail.com/ Suggested-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Fixes: 08abce60d63f ("security: Introduce path_post_mknod hook") Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com> Reviewed-by: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org> Reviewed-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com> Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'drivers/hid/hid-a4tech.c')
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