diff options
author | Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> | 2024-11-19 12:21:35 -0800 |
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committer | Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> | 2024-11-19 12:21:35 -0800 |
commit | 55db8eb4565f943dc0ebd1327cbe3d9d684f74e8 (patch) | |
tree | 2c51b8d22b3ba379889c50137595b18f38acd93a /arch/x86/include | |
parent | 9db8b240704cf66b8c9caaad586034399ac39641 (diff) | |
parent | 8bca85cc1eb72e21a3544ab32e546a819d8674ca (diff) |
Merge tag 'x86_sev_for_v6.13' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip
Pull x86 SEV updates from Borislav Petkov:
- Do the proper memory conversion of guest memory in order to be able
to kexec kernels in SNP guests along with other adjustments and
cleanups to that effect
- Start converting and moving functionality from the sev-guest driver
into core code with the purpose of supporting the secure TSC SNP
feature where the hypervisor cannot influence the TSC exposed to the
guest anymore
- Add a "nosnp" cmdline option in order to be able to disable SNP
support in the hypervisor and thus free-up resources which are not
going to be used
- Cleanups
[ Reminding myself about the endless TLA's again: SEV is the AMD Secure
Encrypted Virtualization - Linus ]
* tag 'x86_sev_for_v6.13' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip:
x86/sev: Cleanup vc_handle_msr()
x86/sev: Convert shared memory back to private on kexec
x86/mm: Refactor __set_clr_pte_enc()
x86/boot: Skip video memory access in the decompressor for SEV-ES/SNP
virt: sev-guest: Carve out SNP message context structure
virt: sev-guest: Reduce the scope of SNP command mutex
virt: sev-guest: Consolidate SNP guest messaging parameters to a struct
x86/sev: Cache the secrets page address
x86/sev: Handle failures from snp_init()
virt: sev-guest: Use AES GCM crypto library
x86/virt: Provide "nosnp" boot option for sev kernel command line
x86/virt: Move SEV-specific parsing into arch/x86/virt/svm
Diffstat (limited to 'arch/x86/include')
-rw-r--r-- | arch/x86/include/asm/sev-common.h | 27 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | arch/x86/include/asm/sev.h | 67 |
2 files changed, 92 insertions, 2 deletions
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/sev-common.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/sev-common.h index 98726c2b04f8..50f5666938c0 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/sev-common.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/sev-common.h @@ -220,4 +220,31 @@ struct snp_psc_desc { #define GHCB_ERR_INVALID_INPUT 5 #define GHCB_ERR_INVALID_EVENT 6 +struct sev_config { + __u64 debug : 1, + + /* + * Indicates when the per-CPU GHCB has been created and registered + * and thus can be used by the BSP instead of the early boot GHCB. + * + * For APs, the per-CPU GHCB is created before they are started + * and registered upon startup, so this flag can be used globally + * for the BSP and APs. + */ + ghcbs_initialized : 1, + + /* + * Indicates when the per-CPU SVSM CA is to be used instead of the + * boot SVSM CA. + * + * For APs, the per-CPU SVSM CA is created as part of the AP + * bringup, so this flag can be used globally for the BSP and APs. + */ + use_cas : 1, + + __reserved : 61; +}; + +extern struct sev_config sev_cfg; + #endif diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/sev.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/sev.h index ee34ab00a8d6..91f08af31078 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/sev.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/sev.h @@ -120,6 +120,9 @@ struct snp_req_data { }; #define MAX_AUTHTAG_LEN 32 +#define AUTHTAG_LEN 16 +#define AAD_LEN 48 +#define MSG_HDR_VER 1 /* See SNP spec SNP_GUEST_REQUEST section for the structure */ enum msg_type { @@ -171,6 +174,19 @@ struct sev_guest_platform_data { u64 secrets_gpa; }; +struct snp_guest_req { + void *req_buf; + size_t req_sz; + + void *resp_buf; + size_t resp_sz; + + u64 exit_code; + unsigned int vmpck_id; + u8 msg_version; + u8 msg_type; +}; + /* * The secrets page contains 96-bytes of reserved field that can be used by * the guest OS. The guest OS uses the area to save the message sequence @@ -218,6 +234,27 @@ struct snp_secrets_page { u8 rsvd4[3744]; } __packed; +struct snp_msg_desc { + /* request and response are in unencrypted memory */ + struct snp_guest_msg *request, *response; + + /* + * Avoid information leakage by double-buffering shared messages + * in fields that are in regular encrypted memory. + */ + struct snp_guest_msg secret_request, secret_response; + + struct snp_secrets_page *secrets; + struct snp_req_data input; + + void *certs_data; + + struct aesgcm_ctx *ctx; + + u32 *os_area_msg_seqno; + u8 *vmpck; +}; + /* * The SVSM Calling Area (CA) related structures. */ @@ -285,6 +322,22 @@ struct svsm_attest_call { u8 rsvd[4]; }; +/* PTE descriptor used for the prepare_pte_enc() operations. */ +struct pte_enc_desc { + pte_t *kpte; + int pte_level; + bool encrypt; + /* pfn of the kpte above */ + unsigned long pfn; + /* physical address of @pfn */ + unsigned long pa; + /* virtual address of @pfn */ + void *va; + /* memory covered by the pte */ + unsigned long size; + pgprot_t new_pgprot; +}; + /* * SVSM protocol structure */ @@ -392,13 +445,18 @@ void snp_set_wakeup_secondary_cpu(void); bool snp_init(struct boot_params *bp); void __noreturn snp_abort(void); void snp_dmi_setup(void); -int snp_issue_guest_request(u64 exit_code, struct snp_req_data *input, struct snp_guest_request_ioctl *rio); +int snp_issue_guest_request(struct snp_guest_req *req, struct snp_req_data *input, + struct snp_guest_request_ioctl *rio); int snp_issue_svsm_attest_req(u64 call_id, struct svsm_call *call, struct svsm_attest_call *input); void snp_accept_memory(phys_addr_t start, phys_addr_t end); u64 snp_get_unsupported_features(u64 status); u64 sev_get_status(void); void sev_show_status(void); void snp_update_svsm_ca(void); +int prepare_pte_enc(struct pte_enc_desc *d); +void set_pte_enc_mask(pte_t *kpte, unsigned long pfn, pgprot_t new_prot); +void snp_kexec_finish(void); +void snp_kexec_begin(void); #else /* !CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT */ @@ -422,7 +480,8 @@ static inline void snp_set_wakeup_secondary_cpu(void) { } static inline bool snp_init(struct boot_params *bp) { return false; } static inline void snp_abort(void) { } static inline void snp_dmi_setup(void) { } -static inline int snp_issue_guest_request(u64 exit_code, struct snp_req_data *input, struct snp_guest_request_ioctl *rio) +static inline int snp_issue_guest_request(struct snp_guest_req *req, struct snp_req_data *input, + struct snp_guest_request_ioctl *rio) { return -ENOTTY; } @@ -435,6 +494,10 @@ static inline u64 snp_get_unsupported_features(u64 status) { return 0; } static inline u64 sev_get_status(void) { return 0; } static inline void sev_show_status(void) { } static inline void snp_update_svsm_ca(void) { } +static inline int prepare_pte_enc(struct pte_enc_desc *d) { return 0; } +static inline void set_pte_enc_mask(pte_t *kpte, unsigned long pfn, pgprot_t new_prot) { } +static inline void snp_kexec_finish(void) { } +static inline void snp_kexec_begin(void) { } #endif /* CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT */ |