diff options
author | Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org> | 2024-10-08 10:39:27 +0100 |
---|---|---|
committer | Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org> | 2024-10-08 10:40:04 +0100 |
commit | 9b7c3dd5964b252f187f1982996fb9c0c2159da9 (patch) | |
tree | 7d2015301ade613008594e393a812061399470c0 | |
parent | a1d402abf8e3ff1d821e88993fc5331784fac0da (diff) | |
parent | dc9b5d7e0bd40e68a94013766b27be3dda10c006 (diff) |
Merge branch kvm-arm64/idregs-6.12 into kvmarm/fixes
* kvm-arm64/idregs-6.12:
: .
: Make some fields of ID_AA64DFR0_EL1 and ID_AA64PFR1_EL1
: writable from userspace, so that a VMM can influence the
: set of guest-visible features.
:
: - for ID_AA64DFR0_EL1: DoubleLock, WRPs, PMUVer and DebugVer
: are writable (courtesy of Shameer Kolothum)
:
: - for ID_AA64PFR1_EL1: BT, SSBS, CVS2_frac are writable
: (courtesy of Shaoqin Huang)
: .
KVM: selftests: aarch64: Add writable test for ID_AA64PFR1_EL1
KVM: arm64: Allow userspace to change ID_AA64PFR1_EL1
KVM: arm64: Use kvm_has_feat() to check if FEAT_SSBS is advertised to the guest
KVM: arm64: Disable fields that KVM doesn't know how to handle in ID_AA64PFR1_EL1
KVM: arm64: Make the exposed feature bits in AA64DFR0_EL1 writable from userspace
Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>
-rw-r--r-- | arch/arm64/kvm/hypercalls.c | 12 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | arch/arm64/kvm/sys_regs.c | 38 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | tools/testing/selftests/kvm/aarch64/set_id_regs.c | 16 |
3 files changed, 55 insertions, 11 deletions
diff --git a/arch/arm64/kvm/hypercalls.c b/arch/arm64/kvm/hypercalls.c index 5763d979d8ca..ee6573befb81 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/kvm/hypercalls.c +++ b/arch/arm64/kvm/hypercalls.c @@ -317,7 +317,7 @@ int kvm_smccc_call_handler(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) * to the guest, and hide SSBS so that the * guest stays protected. */ - if (cpus_have_final_cap(ARM64_SSBS)) + if (kvm_has_feat(vcpu->kvm, ID_AA64PFR1_EL1, SSBS, IMP)) break; fallthrough; case SPECTRE_UNAFFECTED: @@ -428,7 +428,7 @@ int kvm_arm_copy_fw_reg_indices(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u64 __user *uindices) * Convert the workaround level into an easy-to-compare number, where higher * values mean better protection. */ -static int get_kernel_wa_level(u64 regid) +static int get_kernel_wa_level(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u64 regid) { switch (regid) { case KVM_REG_ARM_SMCCC_ARCH_WORKAROUND_1: @@ -449,7 +449,7 @@ static int get_kernel_wa_level(u64 regid) * don't have any FW mitigation if SSBS is there at * all times. */ - if (cpus_have_final_cap(ARM64_SSBS)) + if (kvm_has_feat(vcpu->kvm, ID_AA64PFR1_EL1, SSBS, IMP)) return KVM_REG_ARM_SMCCC_ARCH_WORKAROUND_2_NOT_AVAIL; fallthrough; case SPECTRE_UNAFFECTED: @@ -486,7 +486,7 @@ int kvm_arm_get_fw_reg(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, const struct kvm_one_reg *reg) case KVM_REG_ARM_SMCCC_ARCH_WORKAROUND_1: case KVM_REG_ARM_SMCCC_ARCH_WORKAROUND_2: case KVM_REG_ARM_SMCCC_ARCH_WORKAROUND_3: - val = get_kernel_wa_level(reg->id) & KVM_REG_FEATURE_LEVEL_MASK; + val = get_kernel_wa_level(vcpu, reg->id) & KVM_REG_FEATURE_LEVEL_MASK; break; case KVM_REG_ARM_STD_BMAP: val = READ_ONCE(smccc_feat->std_bmap); @@ -588,7 +588,7 @@ int kvm_arm_set_fw_reg(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, const struct kvm_one_reg *reg) if (val & ~KVM_REG_FEATURE_LEVEL_MASK) return -EINVAL; - if (get_kernel_wa_level(reg->id) < val) + if (get_kernel_wa_level(vcpu, reg->id) < val) return -EINVAL; return 0; @@ -624,7 +624,7 @@ int kvm_arm_set_fw_reg(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, const struct kvm_one_reg *reg) * We can deal with NOT_AVAIL on NOT_REQUIRED, but not the * other way around. */ - if (get_kernel_wa_level(reg->id) < wa_level) + if (get_kernel_wa_level(vcpu, reg->id) < wa_level) return -EINVAL; return 0; diff --git a/arch/arm64/kvm/sys_regs.c b/arch/arm64/kvm/sys_regs.c index dad88e31f953..c75dfc702a5c 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/kvm/sys_regs.c +++ b/arch/arm64/kvm/sys_regs.c @@ -1527,6 +1527,14 @@ static u64 __kvm_read_sanitised_id_reg(const struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, val &= ~ARM64_FEATURE_MASK(ID_AA64PFR1_EL1_MTE); val &= ~ARM64_FEATURE_MASK(ID_AA64PFR1_EL1_SME); + val &= ~ARM64_FEATURE_MASK(ID_AA64PFR1_EL1_RNDR_trap); + val &= ~ARM64_FEATURE_MASK(ID_AA64PFR1_EL1_NMI); + val &= ~ARM64_FEATURE_MASK(ID_AA64PFR1_EL1_MTE_frac); + val &= ~ARM64_FEATURE_MASK(ID_AA64PFR1_EL1_GCS); + val &= ~ARM64_FEATURE_MASK(ID_AA64PFR1_EL1_THE); + val &= ~ARM64_FEATURE_MASK(ID_AA64PFR1_EL1_MTEX); + val &= ~ARM64_FEATURE_MASK(ID_AA64PFR1_EL1_DF2); + val &= ~ARM64_FEATURE_MASK(ID_AA64PFR1_EL1_PFAR); break; case SYS_ID_AA64PFR2_EL1: /* We only expose FPMR */ @@ -2376,7 +2384,19 @@ static const struct sys_reg_desc sys_reg_descs[] = { ID_AA64PFR0_EL1_RAS | ID_AA64PFR0_EL1_AdvSIMD | ID_AA64PFR0_EL1_FP), }, - ID_SANITISED(ID_AA64PFR1_EL1), + ID_WRITABLE(ID_AA64PFR1_EL1, ~(ID_AA64PFR1_EL1_PFAR | + ID_AA64PFR1_EL1_DF2 | + ID_AA64PFR1_EL1_MTEX | + ID_AA64PFR1_EL1_THE | + ID_AA64PFR1_EL1_GCS | + ID_AA64PFR1_EL1_MTE_frac | + ID_AA64PFR1_EL1_NMI | + ID_AA64PFR1_EL1_RNDR_trap | + ID_AA64PFR1_EL1_SME | + ID_AA64PFR1_EL1_RES0 | + ID_AA64PFR1_EL1_MPAM_frac | + ID_AA64PFR1_EL1_RAS_frac | + ID_AA64PFR1_EL1_MTE)), ID_WRITABLE(ID_AA64PFR2_EL1, ID_AA64PFR2_EL1_FPMR), ID_UNALLOCATED(4,3), ID_WRITABLE(ID_AA64ZFR0_EL1, ~ID_AA64ZFR0_EL1_RES0), @@ -2390,7 +2410,21 @@ static const struct sys_reg_desc sys_reg_descs[] = { .get_user = get_id_reg, .set_user = set_id_aa64dfr0_el1, .reset = read_sanitised_id_aa64dfr0_el1, - .val = ID_AA64DFR0_EL1_PMUVer_MASK | + /* + * Prior to FEAT_Debugv8.9, the architecture defines context-aware + * breakpoints (CTX_CMPs) as the highest numbered breakpoints (BRPs). + * KVM does not trap + emulate the breakpoint registers, and as such + * cannot support a layout that misaligns with the underlying hardware. + * While it may be possible to describe a subset that aligns with + * hardware, just prevent changes to BRPs and CTX_CMPs altogether for + * simplicity. + * + * See DDI0487K.a, section D2.8.3 Breakpoint types and linking + * of breakpoints for more details. + */ + .val = ID_AA64DFR0_EL1_DoubleLock_MASK | + ID_AA64DFR0_EL1_WRPs_MASK | + ID_AA64DFR0_EL1_PMUVer_MASK | ID_AA64DFR0_EL1_DebugVer_MASK, }, ID_SANITISED(ID_AA64DFR1_EL1), ID_UNALLOCATED(5,2), diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/aarch64/set_id_regs.c b/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/aarch64/set_id_regs.c index 2a3fe7914b72..b87e53580bfc 100644 --- a/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/aarch64/set_id_regs.c +++ b/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/aarch64/set_id_regs.c @@ -68,6 +68,8 @@ struct test_feature_reg { } static const struct reg_ftr_bits ftr_id_aa64dfr0_el1[] = { + S_REG_FTR_BITS(FTR_LOWER_SAFE, ID_AA64DFR0_EL1, DoubleLock, 0), + REG_FTR_BITS(FTR_LOWER_SAFE, ID_AA64DFR0_EL1, WRPs, 0), S_REG_FTR_BITS(FTR_LOWER_SAFE, ID_AA64DFR0_EL1, PMUVer, 0), REG_FTR_BITS(FTR_LOWER_SAFE, ID_AA64DFR0_EL1, DebugVer, ID_AA64DFR0_EL1_DebugVer_IMP), REG_FTR_END, @@ -134,6 +136,13 @@ static const struct reg_ftr_bits ftr_id_aa64pfr0_el1[] = { REG_FTR_END, }; +static const struct reg_ftr_bits ftr_id_aa64pfr1_el1[] = { + REG_FTR_BITS(FTR_LOWER_SAFE, ID_AA64PFR1_EL1, CSV2_frac, 0), + REG_FTR_BITS(FTR_LOWER_SAFE, ID_AA64PFR1_EL1, SSBS, ID_AA64PFR1_EL1_SSBS_NI), + REG_FTR_BITS(FTR_LOWER_SAFE, ID_AA64PFR1_EL1, BT, 0), + REG_FTR_END, +}; + static const struct reg_ftr_bits ftr_id_aa64mmfr0_el1[] = { REG_FTR_BITS(FTR_LOWER_SAFE, ID_AA64MMFR0_EL1, ECV, 0), REG_FTR_BITS(FTR_LOWER_SAFE, ID_AA64MMFR0_EL1, EXS, 0), @@ -200,6 +209,7 @@ static struct test_feature_reg test_regs[] = { TEST_REG(SYS_ID_AA64ISAR1_EL1, ftr_id_aa64isar1_el1), TEST_REG(SYS_ID_AA64ISAR2_EL1, ftr_id_aa64isar2_el1), TEST_REG(SYS_ID_AA64PFR0_EL1, ftr_id_aa64pfr0_el1), + TEST_REG(SYS_ID_AA64PFR1_EL1, ftr_id_aa64pfr1_el1), TEST_REG(SYS_ID_AA64MMFR0_EL1, ftr_id_aa64mmfr0_el1), TEST_REG(SYS_ID_AA64MMFR1_EL1, ftr_id_aa64mmfr1_el1), TEST_REG(SYS_ID_AA64MMFR2_EL1, ftr_id_aa64mmfr2_el1), @@ -569,9 +579,9 @@ int main(void) test_cnt = ARRAY_SIZE(ftr_id_aa64dfr0_el1) + ARRAY_SIZE(ftr_id_dfr0_el1) + ARRAY_SIZE(ftr_id_aa64isar0_el1) + ARRAY_SIZE(ftr_id_aa64isar1_el1) + ARRAY_SIZE(ftr_id_aa64isar2_el1) + ARRAY_SIZE(ftr_id_aa64pfr0_el1) + - ARRAY_SIZE(ftr_id_aa64mmfr0_el1) + ARRAY_SIZE(ftr_id_aa64mmfr1_el1) + - ARRAY_SIZE(ftr_id_aa64mmfr2_el1) + ARRAY_SIZE(ftr_id_aa64zfr0_el1) - - ARRAY_SIZE(test_regs) + 2; + ARRAY_SIZE(ftr_id_aa64pfr1_el1) + ARRAY_SIZE(ftr_id_aa64mmfr0_el1) + + ARRAY_SIZE(ftr_id_aa64mmfr1_el1) + ARRAY_SIZE(ftr_id_aa64mmfr2_el1) + + ARRAY_SIZE(ftr_id_aa64zfr0_el1) - ARRAY_SIZE(test_regs) + 2; ksft_set_plan(test_cnt); |