diff options
| author | Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> | 2018-04-13 15:38:53 -0700 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> | 2018-04-13 15:38:53 -0700 |
| commit | 80a17a5f501ea048d86f81d629c94062b76610d4 (patch) | |
| tree | 55dd0a1490d1e6631ca319a1205f974f041b494f | |
| parent | edda415314804c29fa07e538938fa07947012d8f (diff) | |
| parent | 588558eb6d0e0b6edfa65a67e906c2ffeba63ff1 (diff) | |
Merge tag 'apparmor-pr-2018-04-10' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jj/linux-apparmor
Pull apparmor updates from John Johansen:
"Features:
- add base infrastructure for socket mediation. ABI bump and
additional checks to ensure only v8 compliant policy uses socket af
mediation.
- improve and cleanup dfa verification
- improve profile attachment logic
- improve overlapping expression handling
- add the xattr matching to the attachment logic
- improve signal mediation handling with stacked labels
- improve handling of no_new_privs in a label stack
Cleanups and changes:
- use dfa to parse string split
- bounded version of label_parse
- proper line wrap nulldfa.in
- split context out into task and cred naming to better match usage
- simplify code in aafs
Bug fixes:
- fix display of .ns_name for containers
- fix resource audit messages when auditing peer
- fix logging of the existence test for signals
- fix resource audit messages when auditing peer
- fix display of .ns_name for containers
- fix an error code in verify_table_headers()
- fix memory leak on buffer on error exit path
- fix error returns checks by making size a ssize_t"
* tag 'apparmor-pr-2018-04-10' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jj/linux-apparmor: (36 commits)
apparmor: fix memory leak on buffer on error exit path
apparmor: fix dangling symlinks to policy rawdata after replacement
apparmor: Fix an error code in verify_table_headers()
apparmor: fix error returns checks by making size a ssize_t
apparmor: update MAINTAINERS file git and wiki locations
apparmor: remove POLICY_MEDIATES_SAFE
apparmor: add base infastructure for socket mediation
apparmor: improve overlapping domain attachment resolution
apparmor: convert attaching profiles via xattrs to use dfa matching
apparmor: Add support for attaching profiles via xattr, presence and value
apparmor: cleanup: simplify code to get ns symlink name
apparmor: cleanup create_aafs() error path
apparmor: dfa split verification of table headers
apparmor: dfa add support for state differential encoding
apparmor: dfa move character match into a macro
apparmor: update domain transitions that are subsets of confinement at nnp
apparmor: move context.h to cred.h
apparmor: move task related defines and fns to task.X files
apparmor: cleanup, drop unused fn __aa_task_is_confined()
apparmor: cleanup fixup description of aa_replace_profiles
...
33 files changed, 2119 insertions, 525 deletions
diff --git a/MAINTAINERS b/MAINTAINERS index f79952e6f627..9b091ef6579b 100644 --- a/MAINTAINERS +++ b/MAINTAINERS @@ -934,8 +934,8 @@ F: drivers/char/apm-emulation.c APPARMOR SECURITY MODULE M: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com> L: apparmor@lists.ubuntu.com (subscribers-only, general discussion) -W: apparmor.wiki.kernel.org -T: git git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jj/apparmor-dev.git +W: wiki.apparmor.net +T: git git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jj/linux-apparmor S: Supported F: security/apparmor/ F: Documentation/admin-guide/LSM/apparmor.rst diff --git a/security/apparmor/.gitignore b/security/apparmor/.gitignore index 9cdec70d72b8..d5b291e94264 100644 --- a/security/apparmor/.gitignore +++ b/security/apparmor/.gitignore @@ -1,5 +1,6 @@ # # Generated include files # +net_names.h capability_names.h rlim_names.h diff --git a/security/apparmor/Makefile b/security/apparmor/Makefile index 9a6b4033d52b..ff23fcfefe19 100644 --- a/security/apparmor/Makefile +++ b/security/apparmor/Makefile @@ -3,13 +3,46 @@ # obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_APPARMOR) += apparmor.o -apparmor-y := apparmorfs.o audit.o capability.o context.o ipc.o lib.o match.o \ +apparmor-y := apparmorfs.o audit.o capability.o task.o ipc.o lib.o match.o \ path.o domain.o policy.o policy_unpack.o procattr.o lsm.o \ - resource.o secid.o file.o policy_ns.o label.o mount.o + resource.o secid.o file.o policy_ns.o label.o mount.o net.o apparmor-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_APPARMOR_HASH) += crypto.o -clean-files := capability_names.h rlim_names.h +clean-files := capability_names.h rlim_names.h net_names.h +# Build a lower case string table of address family names +# Transform lines from +# #define AF_LOCAL 1 /* POSIX name for AF_UNIX */ +# #define AF_INET 2 /* Internet IP Protocol */ +# to +# [1] = "local", +# [2] = "inet", +# +# and build the securityfs entries for the mapping. +# Transforms lines from +# #define AF_INET 2 /* Internet IP Protocol */ +# to +# #define AA_SFS_AF_MASK "local inet" +quiet_cmd_make-af = GEN $@ +cmd_make-af = echo "static const char *address_family_names[] = {" > $@ ;\ + sed $< >>$@ -r -n -e "/AF_MAX/d" -e "/AF_LOCAL/d" -e "/AF_ROUTE/d" -e \ + 's/^\#define[ \t]+AF_([A-Z0-9_]+)[ \t]+([0-9]+)(.*)/[\2] = "\L\1",/p';\ + echo "};" >> $@ ;\ + printf '%s' '\#define AA_SFS_AF_MASK "' >> $@ ;\ + sed -r -n -e "/AF_MAX/d" -e "/AF_LOCAL/d" -e "/AF_ROUTE/d" -e \ + 's/^\#define[ \t]+AF_([A-Z0-9_]+)[ \t]+([0-9]+)(.*)/\L\1/p'\ + $< | tr '\n' ' ' | sed -e 's/ $$/"\n/' >> $@ + +# Build a lower case string table of sock type names +# Transform lines from +# SOCK_STREAM = 1, +# to +# [1] = "stream", +quiet_cmd_make-sock = GEN $@ +cmd_make-sock = echo "static const char *sock_type_names[] = {" >> $@ ;\ + sed $^ >>$@ -r -n \ + -e 's/^\tSOCK_([A-Z0-9_]+)[\t]+=[ \t]+([0-9]+)(.*)/[\2] = "\L\1",/p';\ + echo "};" >> $@ # Build a lower case string table of capability names # Transforms lines from @@ -62,6 +95,7 @@ cmd_make-rlim = echo "static const char *const rlim_names[RLIM_NLIMITS] = {" \ tr '\n' ' ' | sed -e 's/ $$/"\n/' >> $@ $(obj)/capability.o : $(obj)/capability_names.h +$(obj)/net.o : $(obj)/net_names.h $(obj)/resource.o : $(obj)/rlim_names.h $(obj)/capability_names.h : $(srctree)/include/uapi/linux/capability.h \ $(src)/Makefile @@ -69,3 +103,8 @@ $(obj)/capability_names.h : $(srctree)/include/uapi/linux/capability.h \ $(obj)/rlim_names.h : $(srctree)/include/uapi/asm-generic/resource.h \ $(src)/Makefile $(call cmd,make-rlim) +$(obj)/net_names.h : $(srctree)/include/linux/socket.h \ + $(srctree)/include/linux/net.h \ + $(src)/Makefile + $(call cmd,make-af) + $(call cmd,make-sock) diff --git a/security/apparmor/apparmorfs.c b/security/apparmor/apparmorfs.c index a9428daa69f3..949dd8a48164 100644 --- a/security/apparmor/apparmorfs.c +++ b/security/apparmor/apparmorfs.c @@ -30,10 +30,9 @@ #include "include/apparmor.h" #include "include/apparmorfs.h" #include "include/audit.h" -#include "include/context.h" +#include "include/cred.h" #include "include/crypto.h" #include "include/ipc.h" -#include "include/policy_ns.h" #include "include/label.h" #include "include/policy.h" #include "include/policy_ns.h" @@ -120,9 +119,7 @@ static int aafs_count; static int aafs_show_path(struct seq_file *seq, struct dentry *dentry) { - struct inode *inode = d_inode(dentry); - - seq_printf(seq, "%s:[%lu]", AAFS_NAME, inode->i_ino); + seq_printf(seq, "%s:[%lu]", AAFS_NAME, d_inode(dentry)->i_ino); return 0; } @@ -313,6 +310,7 @@ static struct dentry *aafs_create_dir(const char *name, struct dentry *parent) * @name: name of dentry to create * @parent: parent directory for this dentry * @target: if symlink, symlink target string + * @private: private data * @iops: struct of inode_operations that should be used * * If @target parameter is %NULL, then the @iops parameter needs to be @@ -321,17 +319,17 @@ static struct dentry *aafs_create_dir(const char *name, struct dentry *parent) static struct dentry *aafs_create_symlink(const char *name, struct dentry *parent, const char *target, + void *private, const struct inode_operations *iops) { struct dentry *dent; char *link = NULL; if (target) { - link = kstrdup(target, GFP_KERNEL); if (!link) return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM); } - dent = aafs_create(name, S_IFLNK | 0444, parent, NULL, link, NULL, + dent = aafs_create(name, S_IFLNK | 0444, parent, private, link, NULL, iops); if (IS_ERR(dent)) kfree(link); @@ -622,7 +620,7 @@ static void profile_query_cb(struct aa_profile *profile, struct aa_perms *perms, tmp = aa_compute_fperms(dfa, state, &cond); } } else if (profile->policy.dfa) { - if (!PROFILE_MEDIATES_SAFE(profile, *match_str)) + if (!PROFILE_MEDIATES(profile, *match_str)) return; /* no change to current perms */ dfa = profile->policy.dfa; state = aa_dfa_match_len(dfa, profile->policy.start[0], @@ -1189,9 +1187,7 @@ static int seq_ns_level_show(struct seq_file *seq, void *v) static int seq_ns_name_show(struct seq_file *seq, void *v) { struct aa_label *label = begin_current_label_crit_section(); - - seq_printf(seq, "%s\n", aa_ns_name(labels_ns(label), - labels_ns(label), true)); + seq_printf(seq, "%s\n", labels_ns(label)->base.name); end_current_label_crit_section(label); return 0; @@ -1484,26 +1480,97 @@ static int profile_depth(struct aa_profile *profile) return depth; } -static int gen_symlink_name(char *buffer, size_t bsize, int depth, - const char *dirname, const char *fname) +static char *gen_symlink_name(int depth, const char *dirname, const char *fname) { + char *buffer, *s; int error; + int size = depth * 6 + strlen(dirname) + strlen(fname) + 11; + + s = buffer = kmalloc(size, GFP_KERNEL); + if (!buffer) + return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM); for (; depth > 0; depth--) { - if (bsize < 7) - return -ENAMETOOLONG; - strcpy(buffer, "../../"); - buffer += 6; - bsize -= 6; + strcpy(s, "../../"); + s += 6; + size -= 6; } - error = snprintf(buffer, bsize, "raw_data/%s/%s", dirname, fname); - if (error >= bsize || error < 0) - return -ENAMETOOLONG; + error = snprintf(s, size, "raw_data/%s/%s", dirname, fname); + if (error >= size || error < 0) { + kfree(buffer); + return ERR_PTR(-ENAMETOOLONG); + } - return 0; + return buffer; +} + +static void rawdata_link_cb(void *arg) +{ + kfree(arg); +} + +static const char *rawdata_get_link_base(struct dentry *dentry, + struct inode *inode, + struct delayed_call *done, + const char *name) +{ + struct aa_proxy *proxy = inode->i_private; + struct aa_label *label; + struct aa_profile *profile; + char *target; + int depth; + + if (!dentry) + return ERR_PTR(-ECHILD); + + label = aa_get_label_rcu(&proxy->label); + profile = labels_profile(label); + depth = profile_depth(profile); + target = gen_symlink_name(depth, profile->rawdata->name, name); + aa_put_label(label); + + if (IS_ERR(target)) + return target; + + set_delayed_call(done, rawdata_link_cb, target); + + return target; +} + +static const char *rawdata_get_link_sha1(struct dentry *dentry, + struct inode *inode, + struct delayed_call *done) +{ + return rawdata_get_link_base(dentry, inode, done, "sha1"); +} + +static const char *rawdata_get_link_abi(struct dentry *dentry, + struct inode *inode, + struct delayed_call *done) +{ + return rawdata_get_link_base(dentry, inode, done, "abi"); +} + +static const char *rawdata_get_link_data(struct dentry *dentry, + struct inode *inode, + struct delayed_call *done) +{ + return rawdata_get_link_base(dentry, inode, done, "raw_data"); } +static const struct inode_operations rawdata_link_sha1_iops = { + .get_link = rawdata_get_link_sha1, +}; + +static const struct inode_operations rawdata_link_abi_iops = { + .get_link = rawdata_get_link_abi, +}; +static const struct inode_operations rawdata_link_data_iops = { + .get_link = rawdata_get_link_data, +}; + + /* * Requires: @profile->ns->lock held */ @@ -1574,34 +1641,28 @@ int __aafs_profile_mkdir(struct aa_profile *profile, struct dentry *parent) } if (profile->rawdata) { - char target[64]; - int depth = profile_depth(profile); - - error = gen_symlink_name(target, sizeof(target), depth, - profile->rawdata->name, "sha1"); - if (error < 0) - goto fail2; - dent = aafs_create_symlink("raw_sha1", dir, target, NULL); + dent = aafs_create_symlink("raw_sha1", dir, NULL, + profile->label.proxy, + &rawdata_link_sha1_iops); if (IS_ERR(dent)) goto fail; + aa_get_proxy(profile->label.proxy); profile->dents[AAFS_PROF_RAW_HASH] = dent; - error = gen_symlink_name(target, sizeof(target), depth, - profile->rawdata->name, "abi"); - if (error < 0) - goto fail2; - dent = aafs_create_symlink("raw_abi", dir, target, NULL); + dent = aafs_create_symlink("raw_abi", dir, NULL, + profile->label.proxy, + &rawdata_link_abi_iops); if (IS_ERR(dent)) goto fail; + aa_get_proxy(profile->label.proxy); profile->dents[AAFS_PROF_RAW_ABI] = dent; - error = gen_symlink_name(target, sizeof(target), depth, - profile->rawdata->name, "raw_data"); - if (error < 0) - goto fail2; - dent = aafs_create_symlink("raw_data", dir, target, NULL); + dent = aafs_create_symlink("raw_data", dir, NULL, + profile->label.proxy, + &rawdata_link_data_iops); if (IS_ERR(dent)) goto fail; + aa_get_proxy(profile->label.proxy); profile->dents[AAFS_PROF_RAW_DATA] = dent; } @@ -2152,6 +2213,10 @@ static struct aa_sfs_entry aa_sfs_entry_signal[] = { { } }; +static struct aa_sfs_entry aa_sfs_entry_attach[] = { + AA_SFS_FILE_BOOLEAN("xattr", 1), + { } +}; static struct aa_sfs_entry aa_sfs_entry_domain[] = { AA_SFS_FILE_BOOLEAN("change_hat", 1), AA_SFS_FILE_BOOLEAN("change_hatv", 1), @@ -2159,6 +2224,9 @@ static struct aa_sfs_entry aa_sfs_entry_domain[] = { AA_SFS_FILE_BOOLEAN("change_profile", 1), AA_SFS_FILE_BOOLEAN("stack", 1), AA_SFS_FILE_BOOLEAN("fix_binfmt_elf_mmap", 1), + AA_SFS_FILE_BOOLEAN("post_nnp_subset", 1), + AA_SFS_FILE_BOOLEAN("computed_longest_left", 1), + AA_SFS_DIR("attach_conditions", aa_sfs_entry_attach), AA_SFS_FILE_STRING("version", "1.2"), { } }; @@ -2167,6 +2235,7 @@ static struct aa_sfs_entry aa_sfs_entry_versions[] = { AA_SFS_FILE_BOOLEAN("v5", 1), AA_SFS_FILE_BOOLEAN("v6", 1), AA_SFS_FILE_BOOLEAN("v7", 1), + AA_SFS_FILE_BOOLEAN("v8", 1), { } }; @@ -2202,6 +2271,7 @@ static struct aa_sfs_entry aa_sfs_entry_features[] = { AA_SFS_DIR("policy", aa_sfs_entry_policy), AA_SFS_DIR("domain", aa_sfs_entry_domain), AA_SFS_DIR("file", aa_sfs_entry_file), + AA_SFS_DIR("network_v8", aa_sfs_entry_network), AA_SFS_DIR("mount", aa_sfs_entry_mount), AA_SFS_DIR("namespaces", aa_sfs_entry_ns), AA_SFS_FILE_U64("capability", VFS_CAP_FLAGS_MASK), @@ -2394,29 +2464,18 @@ static const char *policy_get_link(struct dentry *dentry, return NULL; } -static int ns_get_name(char *buf, size_t size, struct aa_ns *ns, - struct inode *inode) -{ - int res = snprintf(buf, size, "%s:[%lu]", AAFS_NAME, inode->i_ino); - - if (res < 0 || res >= size) - res = -ENOENT; - - return res; -} - static int policy_readlink(struct dentry *dentry, char __user *buffer, int buflen) { - struct aa_ns *ns; char name[32]; int res; - ns = aa_get_current_ns(); - res = ns_get_name(name, sizeof(name), ns, d_inode(dentry)); - if (res >= 0) + res = snprintf(name, sizeof(name), "%s:[%lu]", AAFS_NAME, + d_inode(dentry)->i_ino); + if (res > 0 && res < sizeof(name)) res = readlink_copy(buffer, buflen, name); - aa_put_ns(ns); + else + res = -ENOENT; return res; } @@ -2460,34 +2519,26 @@ static int __init aa_create_aafs(void) dent = securityfs_create_file(".load", 0666, aa_sfs_entry.dentry, NULL, &aa_fs_profile_load); - if (IS_ERR(dent)) { - error = PTR_ERR(dent); - goto error; - } + if (IS_ERR(dent)) + goto dent_error; ns_subload(root_ns) = dent; dent = securityfs_create_file(".replace", 0666, aa_sfs_entry.dentry, NULL, &aa_fs_profile_replace); - if (IS_ERR(dent)) { - error = PTR_ERR(dent); - goto error; - } + if (IS_ERR(dent)) + goto dent_error; ns_subreplace(root_ns) = dent; dent = securityfs_create_file(".remove", 0666, aa_sfs_entry.dentry, NULL, &aa_fs_profile_remove); - if (IS_ERR(dent)) { - error = PTR_ERR(dent); - goto error; - } + if (IS_ERR(dent)) + goto dent_error; ns_subremove(root_ns) = dent; dent = securityfs_create_file("revision", 0444, aa_sfs_entry.dentry, NULL, &aa_fs_ns_revision_fops); - if (IS_ERR(dent)) { - error = PTR_ERR(dent); - goto error; - } + if (IS_ERR(dent)) + goto dent_error; ns_subrevision(root_ns) = dent; /* policy tree referenced by magic policy symlink */ @@ -2501,10 +2552,8 @@ static int __init aa_create_aafs(void) /* magic symlink similar to nsfs redirects based on task policy */ dent = securityfs_create_symlink("policy", aa_sfs_entry.dentry, NULL, &policy_link_iops); - if (IS_ERR(dent)) { - error = PTR_ERR(dent); - goto error; - } + if (IS_ERR(dent)) + goto dent_error; error = aa_mk_null_file(aa_sfs_entry.dentry); if (error) @@ -2516,6 +2565,8 @@ static int __init aa_create_aafs(void) aa_info_message("AppArmor Filesystem Enabled"); return 0; +dent_error: + error = PTR_ERR(dent); error: aa_destroy_aafs(); AA_ERROR("Error creating AppArmor securityfs\n"); diff --git a/security/apparmor/capability.c b/security/apparmor/capability.c index 67e347192a55..253ef6e9d445 100644 --- a/security/apparmor/capability.c +++ b/security/apparmor/capability.c @@ -19,7 +19,7 @@ #include "include/apparmor.h" #include "include/capability.h" -#include "include/context.h" +#include "include/cred.h" #include "include/policy.h" #include "include/audit.h" diff --git a/security/apparmor/domain.c b/security/apparmor/domain.c index 6a54d2ffa840..590b7e8cd21c 100644 --- a/security/apparmor/domain.c +++ b/security/apparmor/domain.c @@ -19,10 +19,11 @@ #include <linux/syscalls.h> #include <linux/tracehook.h> #include <linux/personality.h> +#include <linux/xattr.h> #include "include/audit.h" #include "include/apparmorfs.h" -#include "include/context.h" +#include "include/cred.h" #include "include/domain.h" #include "include/file.h" #include "include/ipc.h" @@ -302,7 +303,70 @@ static int change_profile_perms(struct aa_profile *profile, } /** + * aa_xattrs_match - check whether a file matches the xattrs defined in profile + * @bprm: binprm struct for the process to validate + * @profile: profile to match against (NOT NULL) + * @state: state to start match in + * + * Returns: number of extended attributes that matched, or < 0 on error + */ +static int aa_xattrs_match(const struct linux_binprm *bprm, + struct aa_profile *profile, unsigned int state) +{ + int i; + ssize_t size; + struct dentry *d; + char *value = NULL; + int value_size = 0, ret = profile->xattr_count; + + if (!bprm || !profile->xattr_count) + return 0; + + /* transition from exec match to xattr set */ + state = aa_dfa_null_transition(profile->xmatch, state); + + d = bprm->file->f_path.dentry; + + for (i = 0; i < profile->xattr_count; i++) { + size = vfs_getxattr_alloc(d, profile->xattrs[i], &value, + value_size, GFP_KERNEL); + if (size >= 0) { + u32 perm; + + /* Check the xattr value, not just presence */ + state = aa_dfa_match_len(profile->xmatch, state, value, + size); + perm = dfa_user_allow(profile->xmatch, state); + if (!(perm & MAY_EXEC)) { + ret = -EINVAL; + goto out; + } + } + /* transition to next element */ + state = aa_dfa_null_transition(profile->xmatch, state); + if (size < 0) { + /* + * No xattr match, so verify if transition to + * next element was valid. IFF so the xattr + * was optional. + */ + if (!state) { + ret = -EINVAL; + goto out; + } + /* don't count missing optional xattr as matched */ + ret--; + } + } + +out: + kfree(value); + return ret; +} + +/** * __attach_match_ - find an attachment match + * @bprm - binprm structure of transitioning task * @name - to match against (NOT NULL) * @head - profile list to walk (NOT NULL) * @info - info message if there was an error (NOT NULL) @@ -316,40 +380,80 @@ static int change_profile_perms(struct aa_profile *profile, * * Returns: profile or NULL if no match found */ -static struct aa_profile *__attach_match(const char *name, +static struct aa_profile *__attach_match(const struct linux_binprm *bprm, + const char *name, struct list_head *head, const char **info) { - int len = 0; + int candidate_len = 0, candidate_xattrs = 0; bool conflict = false; struct aa_profile *profile, *candidate = NULL; + AA_BUG(!name); + AA_BUG(!head); + list_for_each_entry_rcu(profile, head, base.list) { if (profile->label.flags & FLAG_NULL && &profile->label == ns_unconfined(profile->ns)) continue; + /* Find the "best" matching profile. Profiles must + * match the path and extended attributes (if any) + * associated with the file. A more specific path + * match will be preferred over a less specific one, + * and a match with more matching extended attributes + * will be preferred over one with fewer. If the best + * match has both the same level of path specificity + * and the same number of matching extended attributes + * as another profile, signal a conflict and refuse to + * match. + */ if (profile->xmatch) { - if (profile->xmatch_len >= len) { - unsigned int state; - u32 perm; - - state = aa_dfa_match(profile->xmatch, - DFA_START, name); - perm = dfa_user_allow(profile->xmatch, state); - /* any accepting state means a valid match. */ - if (perm & MAY_EXEC) { - if (profile->xmatch_len == len) { + unsigned int state, count; + u32 perm; + + state = aa_dfa_leftmatch(profile->xmatch, DFA_START, + name, &count); + perm = dfa_user_allow(profile->xmatch, state); + /* any accepting state means a valid match. */ + if (perm & MAY_EXEC) { + int ret; + + if (count < candidate_len) + continue; + + ret = aa_xattrs_match(bprm, profile, state); + /* Fail matching if the xattrs don't match */ + if (ret < 0) + continue; + + /* + * TODO: allow for more flexible best match + * + * The new match isn't more specific + * than the current best match + */ + if (count == candidate_len && + ret <= candidate_xattrs) { + /* Match is equivalent, so conflict */ + if (ret == candidate_xattrs) conflict = true; - continue; - } - candidate = profile; - len = profile->xmatch_len; - conflict = false; + continue; } + + /* Either the same length with more matching + * xattrs, or a longer match + */ + candidate = profile; + candidate_len = profile->xmatch_len; + candidate_xattrs = ret; + conflict = false; } } else if (!strcmp(profile->base.name, name)) - /* exact non-re match, no more searching required */ + /* + * old exact non-re match, without conditionals such + * as xattrs. no more searching required + */ return profile; } @@ -363,6 +467,7 @@ static struct aa_profile *__attach_match(const char *name, /** * find_attach - do attachment search for unconfined processes + * @bprm - binprm structure of transitioning task * @ns: the current namespace (NOT NULL) * @list: list to search (NOT NULL) * @name: the executable name to match against (NOT NULL) @@ -370,13 +475,14 @@ static struct aa_profile *__attach_match(const char *name, * * Returns: label or NULL if no match found */ -static struct aa_label *find_attach(struct aa_ns *ns, struct list_head *list, +static struct aa_label *find_attach(const struct linux_binprm *bprm, + struct aa_ns *ns, struct list_head *list, const char *name, const char **info) { struct aa_profile *profile; rcu_read_lock(); - profile = aa_get_profile(__attach_match(name, list, info)); + profile = aa_get_profile(__attach_match(bprm, name, list, info)); rcu_read_unlock(); return profile ? &profile->label : NULL; @@ -432,6 +538,7 @@ struct aa_label *x_table_lookup(struct aa_profile *profile, u32 xindex, /** * x_to_label - get target label for a given xindex * @profile: current profile (NOT NULL) + * @bprm: binprm structure of transitioning task * @name: name to lookup (NOT NULL) * @xindex: index into x transition table * @lookupname: returns: name used in lookup if one was specified (NOT NULL) @@ -441,6 +548,7 @@ struct aa_label *x_table_lookup(struct aa_profile *profile, u32 xindex, * Returns: refcounted label or NULL if not found available */ static struct aa_label *x_to_label(struct aa_profile *profile, + const struct linux_binprm *bprm, const char *name, u32 xindex, const char **lookupname, const char **info) @@ -468,11 +576,11 @@ static struct aa_label *x_to_label(struct aa_profile *profile, case AA_X_NAME: if (xindex & AA_X_CHILD) /* released by caller */ - new = find_attach(ns, &profile->base.profiles, + new = find_attach(bprm, ns, &profile->base.profiles, name, info); else /* released by caller */ - new = find_attach(ns, &ns->base.profiles, + new = find_attach(bprm, ns, &ns->base.profiles, name, info); *lookupname = name; break; @@ -512,6 +620,8 @@ static struct aa_label *profile_transition(struct aa_profile *profile, bool *secure_exec) { struct aa_label *new = NULL; + struct aa_profile *component; + struct label_it i; const char *info = NULL, *name = NULL, *target = NULL; unsigned int state = profile->file.start; struct aa_perms perms = {}; @@ -536,8 +646,8 @@ static struct aa_label *profile_transition(struct aa_profile *profile, } if (profile_unconfined(profile)) { - new = find_attach(profile->ns, &profile->ns->base.profiles, - name, &info); + new = find_attach(bprm, profile->ns, + &profile->ns->base.profiles, name, &info); if (new) { AA_DEBUG("unconfined attached to new label"); return new; @@ -550,7 +660,8 @@ static struct aa_label *profile_transition(struct aa_profile *profile, state = aa_str_perms(profile->file.dfa, state, name, cond, &perms); if (perms.allow & MAY_EXEC) { /* exec permission determine how to transition */ - new = x_to_label(profile, name, perms.xindex, &target, &info); + new = x_to_label(profile, bprm, name, perms.xindex, &target, + &info); if (new && new->proxy == profile->label.proxy && info) { /* hack ix fallback - improve how this is detected */ goto audit; @@ -559,6 +670,21 @@ static struct aa_label *profile_transition(struct aa_profile *profile, info = "profile transition not found"; /* remove MAY_EXEC to audit as failure */ perms.allow &= ~MAY_EXEC; + } else { + /* verify that each component's xattr requirements are + * met, and fail execution otherwise + */ + label_for_each(i, new, component) { + if (aa_xattrs_match(bprm, component, state) < + 0) { + error = -EACCES; + info = "required xattrs not present"; + perms.allow &= ~MAY_EXEC; + aa_put_label(new); + new = NULL; + goto audit; + } + } } } else if (COMPLAIN_MODE(profile)) { /* no exec permission - learning mode */ @@ -592,22 +718,6 @@ static struct aa_label *profile_transition(struct aa_profile *profile, if (!new) goto audit; - /* Policy has specified a domain transitions. if no_new_privs and - * confined and not transitioning to the current domain fail. - * - * NOTE: Domain transitions from unconfined and to stritly stacked - * subsets are allowed even when no_new_privs is set because this - * aways results in a further reduction of permissions. - */ - if ((bprm->unsafe & LSM_UNSAFE_NO_NEW_PRIVS) && - !profile_unconfined(profile) && - !aa_label_is_subset(new, &profile->label)) { - error = -EPERM; - info = "no new privs"; - nonewprivs = true; - perms.allow &= ~MAY_EXEC; - goto audit; - } if (!(perms.xindex & AA_X_UNSAFE)) { if (DEBUG_ON) { @@ -684,21 +794,6 @@ static int profile_onexec(struct aa_profile *profile, struct aa_label *onexec, perms.allow &= ~AA_MAY_ONEXEC; goto audit; } - /* Policy has specified a domain transitions. if no_new_privs and - * confined and not transitioning to the current domain fail. - * - * NOTE: Domain transitions from unconfined and to stritly stacked - * subsets are allowed even when no_new_privs is set because this - * aways results in a further reduction of permissions. - */ - if ((bprm->unsafe & LSM_UNSAFE_NO_NEW_PRIVS) && - !profile_unconfined(profile) && - !aa_label_is_subset(onexec, &profile->label)) { - error = -EPERM; - info = "no new privs"; - perms.allow &= ~AA_MAY_ONEXEC; - goto audit; - } if (!(perms.xindex & AA_X_UNSAFE)) { if (DEBUG_ON) { @@ -794,10 +889,22 @@ int apparmor_bprm_set_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm) if (bprm->called_set_creds) return 0; - ctx = cred_ctx(bprm->cred); + ctx = task_ctx(current); + AA_BUG(!cred_label(bprm->cred)); AA_BUG(!ctx); - label = aa_get_newest_label(ctx->label); + label = aa_get_newest_label(cred_label(bprm->cred)); + + /* + * Detect no new privs being set, and store the label it + * occurred under. Ideally this would happen when nnp + * is set but there isn't a good way to do that yet. + * + * Testing for unconfined must be done before the subset test + */ + if ((bprm->unsafe & LSM_UNSAFE_NO_NEW_PRIVS) && !unconfined(label) && + !ctx->nnp) + ctx->nnp = aa_get_label(label); /* buffer freed below, name is pointer into buffer */ get_buffers(buffer); @@ -819,7 +926,20 @@ int apparmor_bprm_set_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm) goto done; } - /* TODO: Add ns level no_new_privs subset test */ + /* Policy has specified a domain transitions. If no_new_privs and + * confined ensure the transition is to confinement that is subset + * of the confinement when the task entered no new privs. + * + * NOTE: Domain transitions from unconfined and to stacked + * subsets are allowed even when no_new_privs is set because this + * aways results in a further reduction of permissions. + */ + if ((bprm->unsafe & LSM_UNSAFE_NO_NEW_PRIVS) && + !unconfined(label) && !aa_label_is_subset(new, ctx->nnp)) { + error = -EPERM; + info = "no new privs"; + goto audit; + } if (bprm->unsafe & LSM_UNSAFE_SHARE) { /* FIXME: currently don't mediate shared state */ @@ -853,14 +973,11 @@ int apparmor_bprm_set_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm) } bprm->per_clear |= PER_CLEAR_ON_SETID; } - aa_put_label(ctx->label); - /* transfer reference, released when ctx is freed */ - ctx->label = new; + aa_put_label(cred_label(bprm->cred)); + /* transfer reference, released when cred is freed */ + cred_label(bprm->cred) = new; done: - /* clear out temporary/transitional state from the context */ - aa_clear_task_ctx_trans(ctx); - aa_put_label(label); put_buffers(buffer); @@ -1049,30 +1166,28 @@ build: int aa_change_hat(const char *hats[], int count, u64 token, int flags) { const struct cred *cred; - struct aa_task_ctx *ctx; + struct aa_task_ctx *ctx = task_ctx(current); struct aa_label *label, *previous, *new = NULL, *target = NULL; struct aa_profile *profile; struct aa_perms perms = {}; const char *info = NULL; int error = 0; - /* - * Fail explicitly requested domain transitions if no_new_privs. - * There is no exception for unconfined as change_hat is not - * available. - */ - if (task_no_new_privs(current)) { - /* not an apparmor denial per se, so don't log it */ - AA_DEBUG("no_new_privs - change_hat denied"); - return -EPERM; - } - /* released below */ cred = get_current_cred(); - ctx = cred_ctx(cred); label = aa_get_newest_cred_label(cred); previous = aa_get_newest_label(ctx->previous); + /* + * Detect no new privs being set, and store the label it + * occurred under. Ideally this would happen when nnp + * is set but there isn't a good way to do that yet. + * + * Testing for unconfined must be done before the subset test + */ + if (task_no_new_privs(current) && !unconfined(label) && !ctx->nnp) + ctx->nnp = aa_get_label(label); + if (unconfined(label)) { info = "unconfined can not change_hat"; error = -EPERM; @@ -1093,6 +1208,18 @@ int aa_change_hat(const char *hats[], int count, u64 token, int flags) if (error) goto fail; + /* + * no new privs prevents domain transitions that would + * reduce restrictions. + */ + if (task_no_new_privs(current) && !unconfined(label) && + !aa_label_is_subset(new, ctx->nnp)) { + /* not an apparmor denial per se, so don't log it */ + AA_DEBUG("no_new_privs - change_hat denied"); + error = -EPERM; + goto out; + } + if (flags & AA_CHANGE_TEST) goto out; @@ -1102,6 +1229,18 @@ int aa_change_hat(const char *hats[], int count, u64 token, int flags) /* kill task in case of brute force attacks */ goto kill; } else if (previous && !(flags & AA_CHANGE_TEST)) { + /* + * no new privs prevents domain transitions that would + * reduce restrictions. + */ + if (task_no_new_privs(current) && !unconfined(label) && + !aa_label_is_subset(previous, ctx->nnp)) { + /* not an apparmor denial per se, so don't log it */ + AA_DEBUG("no_new_privs - change_hat denied"); + error = -EPERM; + goto out; + } + /* Return to saved label. Kill task if restore fails * to avoid brute force attacks */ @@ -1144,21 +1283,6 @@ static int change_profile_perms_wrapper(const char *op, const char *name, const char *info = NULL; int error = 0; - /* - * Fail explicitly requested domain transitions when no_new_privs - * and not unconfined OR the transition results in a stack on - * the current label. - * Stacking domain transitions and transitions from unconfined are - * allowed even when no_new_privs is set because this aways results - * in a reduction of permissions. - */ - if (task_no_new_privs(current) && !stack && - !profile_unconfined(profile) && - !aa_label_is_subset(target, &profile->label)) { - info = "no new privs"; - error = -EPERM; - } - if (!error) error = change_profile_perms(profile, target, stack, request, profile->file.start, perms); @@ -1192,10 +1316,23 @@ int aa_change_profile(const char *fqname, int flags) const char *info = NULL; const char *auditname = fqname; /* retain leading & if stack */ bool stack = flags & AA_CHANGE_STACK; + struct aa_task_ctx *ctx = task_ctx(current); int error = 0; char *op; u32 request; + label = aa_get_current_label(); + + /* + * Detect no new privs being set, and store the label it + * occurred under. Ideally this would happen when nnp + * is set but there isn't a good way to do that yet. + * + * Testing for unconfined must be done before the subset test + */ + if (task_no_new_privs(current) && !unconfined(label) && !ctx->nnp) + ctx->nnp = aa_get_label(label); + if (!fqname || !*fqname) { AA_DEBUG("no profile name"); return -EINVAL; @@ -1283,14 +1420,28 @@ check: if (flags & AA_CHANGE_TEST) goto out; + /* stacking is always a subset, so only check the nonstack case */ + if (!stack) { + new = fn_label_build_in_ns(label, profile, GFP_KERNEL, + aa_get_label(target), + aa_get_label(&profile->label)); + /* + * no new privs prevents domain transitions that would + * reduce restrictions. + */ + if (task_no_new_privs(current) && !unconfined(label) && + !aa_label_is_subset(new, ctx->nnp)) { + /* not an apparmor denial per se, so don't log it */ + AA_DEBUG("no_new_privs - change_hat denied"); + error = -EPERM; + goto out; + } + } + if (!(flags & AA_CHANGE_ONEXEC)) { /* only transition profiles in the current ns */ if (stack) new = aa_label_merge(label, target, GFP_KERNEL); - else - new = fn_label_build_in_ns(label, profile, GFP_KERNEL, - aa_get_label(target), - aa_get_label(&profile->label)); if (IS_ERR_OR_NULL(new)) { info = "failed to build target label"; error = PTR_ERR(new); @@ -1299,9 +1450,15 @@ check: goto audit; } error = aa_replace_current_label(new); - } else + } else { + if (new) { + aa_put_label(new); + new = NULL; + } + /* full transition will be built in exec path */ error = aa_set_current_onexec(target, stack); + } audit: error = fn_for_each_in_ns(label, profile, diff --git a/security/apparmor/file.c b/security/apparmor/file.c index e79bf44396a3..224b2fef93ca 100644 --- a/security/apparmor/file.c +++ b/security/apparmor/file.c @@ -18,9 +18,10 @@ #include "include/apparmor.h" #include "include/audit.h" -#include "include/context.h" +#include "include/cred.h" #include "include/file.h" #include "include/match.h" +#include "include/net.h" #include "include/path.h" #include "include/policy.h" #include "include/label.h" @@ -560,6 +561,32 @@ static int __file_path_perm(const char *op, struct aa_label *label, return error; } +static int __file_sock_perm(const char *op, struct aa_label *label, + struct aa_label *flabel, struct file *file, + u32 request, u32 denied) +{ + struct socket *sock = (struct socket *) file->private_data; + int error; + + AA_BUG(!sock); + + /* revalidation due to label out of date. No revocation at this time */ + if (!denied && aa_label_is_subset(flabel, label)) + return 0; + + /* TODO: improve to skip profiles cached in flabel */ + error = aa_sock_file_perm(label, op, request, sock); + if (denied) { + /* TODO: improve to skip profiles checked above */ + /* check every profile in file label to is cached */ + last_error(error, aa_sock_file_perm(flabel, op, request, sock)); + } + if (!error) + update_file_ctx(file_ctx(file), label, request); + + return error; +} + /** * aa_file_perm - do permission revalidation check & audit for @file * @op: operation being checked @@ -604,6 +631,9 @@ int aa_file_perm(const char *op, struct aa_label *label, struct file *file, error = __file_path_perm(op, label, flabel, file, request, denied); + else if (S_ISSOCK(file_inode(file)->i_mode)) + error = __file_sock_perm(op, label, flabel, file, request, + denied); done: rcu_read_unlock(); diff --git a/security/apparmor/include/apparmor.h b/security/apparmor/include/apparmor.h index 829082c35faa..73d63b58d875 100644 --- a/security/apparmor/include/apparmor.h +++ b/security/apparmor/include/apparmor.h @@ -24,12 +24,13 @@ #define AA_CLASS_UNKNOWN 1 #define AA_CLASS_FILE 2 #define AA_CLASS_CAP 3 -#define AA_CLASS_NET 4 +#define AA_CLASS_DEPRECATED 4 #define AA_CLASS_RLIMITS 5 #define AA_CLASS_DOMAIN 6 #define AA_CLASS_MOUNT 7 #define AA_CLASS_PTRACE 9 #define AA_CLASS_SIGNAL 10 +#define AA_CLASS_NET 14 #define AA_CLASS_LABEL 16 #define AA_CLASS_LAST AA_CLASS_LABEL diff --git a/security/apparmor/include/audit.h b/security/apparmor/include/audit.h index 4ac095118717..9c9be9c98c15 100644 --- a/security/apparmor/include/audit.h +++ b/security/apparmor/include/audit.h @@ -126,7 +126,20 @@ struct apparmor_audit_data { const char *target; kuid_t ouid; } fs; - int signal; + struct { + int rlim; + unsigned long max; + } rlim; + struct { + int signal; + int unmappedsig; + }; + struct { + int type, protocol; + struct sock *peer_sk; + void *addr; + int addrlen; + } net; }; }; struct { @@ -135,10 +148,6 @@ struct apparmor_audit_data { long pos; } iface; struct { - int rlim; - unsigned long max; - } rlim; - struct { const char *src_name; const char *type; const char *trans; diff --git a/security/apparmor/include/context.h b/security/apparmor/include/cred.h index 6ae07e9aaa17..e287b7d0d4be 100644 --- a/security/apparmor/include/context.h +++ b/security/apparmor/include/cred.h @@ -21,38 +21,9 @@ #include "label.h" #include "policy_ns.h" +#include "task.h" -#define cred_ctx(X) ((X)->security) -#define current_ctx() cred_ctx(current_cred()) - -/** - * struct aa_task_ctx - primary label for confined tasks - * @label: the current label (NOT NULL) - * @exec: label to transition to on next exec (MAYBE NULL) - * @previous: label the task may return to (MAYBE NULL) - * @token: magic value the task must know for returning to @previous - * - * Contains the task's current label (which could change due to - * change_hat). Plus the hat_magic needed during change_hat. - * - * TODO: make so a task can be confined by a stack of contexts - */ -struct aa_task_ctx { - struct aa_label *label; - struct aa_label *onexec; - struct aa_label *previous; - u64 token; -}; - -struct aa_task_ctx *aa_alloc_task_context(gfp_t flags); -void aa_free_task_context(struct aa_task_ctx *ctx); -void aa_dup_task_context(struct aa_task_ctx *new, - const struct aa_task_ctx *old); -int aa_replace_current_label(struct aa_label *label); -int aa_set_current_onexec(struct aa_label *label, bool stack); -int aa_set_current_hat(struct aa_label *label, u64 token); -int aa_restore_previous_label(u64 cookie); -struct aa_label *aa_get_task_label(struct task_struct *task); +#define cred_label(X) ((X)->security) /** @@ -65,10 +36,10 @@ struct aa_label *aa_get_task_label(struct task_struct *task); */ static inline struct aa_label *aa_cred_raw_label(const struct cred *cred) { - struct aa_task_ctx *ctx = cred_ctx(cred); + struct aa_label *label = cred_label(cred); - AA_BUG(!ctx || !ctx->label); - return ctx->label; + AA_BUG(!label); + return label; } /** @@ -96,17 +67,6 @@ static inline struct aa_label *__aa_task_raw_label(struct task_struct *task) } /** - * __aa_task_is_confined - determine if @task has any confinement - * @task: task to check confinement of (NOT NULL) - * - * If @task != current needs to be called in RCU safe critical section - */ -static inline bool __aa_task_is_confined(struct task_struct *task) -{ - return !unconfined(__aa_task_raw_label(task)); -} - -/** * aa_current_raw_label - find the current tasks confining label * * Returns: up to date confining label or the ns unconfined label (NOT NULL) @@ -213,17 +173,4 @@ static inline struct aa_ns *aa_get_current_ns(void) return ns; } -/** - * aa_clear_task_ctx_trans - clear transition tracking info from the ctx - * @ctx: task context to clear (NOT NULL) - */ -static inline void aa_clear_task_ctx_trans(struct aa_task_ctx *ctx) -{ - aa_put_label(ctx->previous); - aa_put_label(ctx->onexec); - ctx->previous = NULL; - ctx->onexec = NULL; - ctx->token = 0; -} - #endif /* __AA_CONTEXT_H */ diff --git a/security/apparmor/include/label.h b/security/apparmor/include/label.h index af22dcbbcb8a..d871e7ff0952 100644 --- a/security/apparmor/include/label.h +++ b/security/apparmor/include/label.h @@ -327,9 +327,37 @@ void aa_label_audit(struct audit_buffer *ab, struct aa_label *label, gfp_t gfp); void aa_label_seq_print(struct seq_file *f, struct aa_label *label, gfp_t gfp); void aa_label_printk(struct aa_label *label, gfp_t gfp); +struct aa_label *aa_label_strn_parse(struct aa_label *base, const char *str, + size_t n, gfp_t gfp, bool create, + bool force_stack); struct aa_label *aa_label_parse(struct aa_label *base, const char *str, gfp_t gfp, bool create, bool force_stack); +static inline const char *aa_label_strn_split(const char *str, int n) +{ + const char *pos; + unsigned int state; + + state = aa_dfa_matchn_until(stacksplitdfa, DFA_START, str, n, &pos); + if (!ACCEPT_TABLE(stacksplitdfa)[state]) + return NULL; + + return pos - 3; +} + +static inline const char *aa_label_str_split(const char *str) +{ + const char *pos; + unsigned int state; + + state = aa_dfa_match_until(stacksplitdfa, DFA_START, str, &pos); + if (!ACCEPT_TABLE(stacksplitdfa)[state]) + return NULL; + + return pos - 3; +} + + struct aa_perms; int aa_label_match(struct aa_profile *profile, struct aa_label *label, diff --git a/security/apparmor/include/match.h b/security/apparmor/include/match.h index add4c6726558..958d2b52a7b7 100644 --- a/security/apparmor/include/match.h +++ b/security/apparmor/include/match.h @@ -40,6 +40,7 @@ */ #define YYTH_MAGIC 0x1B5E783D +#define YYTH_FLAG_DIFF_ENCODE 1 struct table_set_header { u32 th_magic; /* YYTH_MAGIC */ @@ -101,6 +102,7 @@ struct aa_dfa { }; extern struct aa_dfa *nulldfa; +extern struct aa_dfa *stacksplitdfa; #define byte_to_byte(X) (X) @@ -129,9 +131,32 @@ unsigned int aa_dfa_match(struct aa_dfa *dfa, unsigned int start, const char *str); unsigned int aa_dfa_next(struct aa_dfa *dfa, unsigned int state, const char c); +unsigned int aa_dfa_match_until(struct aa_dfa *dfa, unsigned int start, + const char *str, const char **retpos); +unsigned int aa_dfa_matchn_until(struct aa_dfa *dfa, unsigned int start, + const char *str, int n, const char **retpos); void aa_dfa_free_kref(struct kref *kref); +#define WB_HISTORY_SIZE 8 +struct match_workbuf { + unsigned int count; + unsigned int pos; + unsigned int len; + unsigned int size; /* power of 2, same as history size */ + unsigned int history[WB_HISTORY_SIZE]; +}; +#define DEFINE_MATCH_WB(N) \ +struct match_workbuf N = { \ + .count = 0, \ + .pos = 0, \ + .len = 0, \ + .size = WB_HISTORY_SIZE, \ +} + +unsigned int aa_dfa_leftmatch(struct aa_dfa *dfa, unsigned int start, + const char *str, unsigned int *count); + /** * aa_get_dfa - increment refcount on dfa @p * @dfa: dfa (MAYBE NULL) @@ -159,4 +184,7 @@ static inline void aa_put_dfa(struct aa_dfa *dfa) kref_put(&dfa->count, aa_dfa_free_kref); } +#define MATCH_FLAG_DIFF_ENCODE 0x80000000 +#define MARK_DIFF_ENCODE 0x40000000 + #endif /* __AA_MATCH_H */ diff --git a/security/apparmor/include/net.h b/security/apparmor/include/net.h new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..ec7228e857a9 --- /dev/null +++ b/security/apparmor/include/net.h @@ -0,0 +1,106 @@ +/* + * AppArmor security module + * + * This file contains AppArmor network mediation definitions. + * + * Copyright (C) 1998-2008 Novell/SUSE + * Copyright 2009-2017 Canonical Ltd. + * + * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or + * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as + * published by the Free Software Foundation, version 2 of the + * License. + */ + +#ifndef __AA_NET_H +#define __AA_NET_H + +#include <net/sock.h> +#include <linux/path.h> + +#include "apparmorfs.h" +#include "label.h" +#include "perms.h" +#include "policy.h" + +#define AA_MAY_SEND AA_MAY_WRITE +#define AA_MAY_RECEIVE AA_MAY_READ + +#define AA_MAY_SHUTDOWN AA_MAY_DELETE + +#define AA_MAY_CONNECT AA_MAY_OPEN +#define AA_MAY_ACCEPT 0x00100000 + +#define AA_MAY_BIND 0x00200000 +#define AA_MAY_LISTEN 0x00400000 + +#define AA_MAY_SETOPT 0x01000000 +#define AA_MAY_GETOPT 0x02000000 + +#define NET_PERMS_MASK (AA_MAY_SEND | AA_MAY_RECEIVE | AA_MAY_CREATE | \ + AA_MAY_SHUTDOWN | AA_MAY_BIND | AA_MAY_LISTEN | \ + AA_MAY_CONNECT | AA_MAY_ACCEPT | AA_MAY_SETATTR | \ + AA_MAY_GETATTR | AA_MAY_SETOPT | AA_MAY_GETOPT) + +#define NET_FS_PERMS (AA_MAY_SEND | AA_MAY_RECEIVE | AA_MAY_CREATE | \ + AA_MAY_SHUTDOWN | AA_MAY_CONNECT | AA_MAY_RENAME |\ + AA_MAY_SETATTR | AA_MAY_GETATTR | AA_MAY_CHMOD | \ + AA_MAY_CHOWN | AA_MAY_CHGRP | AA_MAY_LOCK | \ + AA_MAY_MPROT) + +#define NET_PEER_MASK (AA_MAY_SEND | AA_MAY_RECEIVE | AA_MAY_CONNECT | \ + AA_MAY_ACCEPT) +struct aa_sk_ctx { + struct aa_label *label; + struct aa_label *peer; +}; + +#define SK_CTX(X) ((X)->sk_security) +#define SOCK_ctx(X) SOCK_INODE(X)->i_security +#define DEFINE_AUDIT_NET(NAME, OP, SK, F, T, P) \ + struct lsm_network_audit NAME ## _net = { .sk = (SK), \ + .family = (F)}; \ + DEFINE_AUDIT_DATA(NAME, \ + ((SK) && (F) != AF_UNIX) ? LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET : \ + LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NONE, \ + OP); \ + NAME.u.net = &(NAME ## _net); \ + aad(&NAME)->net.type = (T); \ + aad(&NAME)->net.protocol = (P) + +#define DEFINE_AUDIT_SK(NAME, OP, SK) \ + DEFINE_AUDIT_NET(NAME, OP, SK, (SK)->sk_family, (SK)->sk_type, \ + (SK)->sk_protocol) + + +#define af_select(FAMILY, FN, DEF_FN) \ +({ \ + int __e; \ + switch ((FAMILY)) { \ + default: \ + __e = DEF_FN; \ + } \ + __e; \ +}) + +extern struct aa_sfs_entry aa_sfs_entry_network[]; + +void audit_net_cb(struct audit_buffer *ab, void *va); +int aa_profile_af_perm(struct aa_profile *profile, struct common_audit_data *sa, + u32 request, u16 family, int type); +int aa_af_perm(struct aa_label *label, const char *op, u32 request, u16 family, + int type, int protocol); +static inline int aa_profile_af_sk_perm(struct aa_profile *profile, + struct common_audit_data *sa, + u32 request, + struct sock *sk) +{ + return aa_profile_af_perm(profile, sa, request, sk->sk_family, + sk->sk_type); +} +int aa_sk_perm(const char *op, u32 request, struct sock *sk); + +int aa_sock_file_perm(struct aa_label *label, const char *op, u32 request, + struct socket *sock); + +#endif /* __AA_NET_H */ diff --git a/security/apparmor/include/perms.h b/security/apparmor/include/perms.h index d7b7e7115160..38aa6247d00f 100644 --- a/security/apparmor/include/perms.h +++ b/security/apparmor/include/perms.h @@ -138,9 +138,10 @@ extern struct aa_perms allperms; void aa_perm_mask_to_str(char *str, const char *chrs, u32 mask); -void aa_audit_perm_names(struct audit_buffer *ab, const char **names, u32 mask); +void aa_audit_perm_names(struct audit_buffer *ab, const char * const *names, + u32 mask); void aa_audit_perm_mask(struct audit_buffer *ab, u32 mask, const char *chrs, - u32 chrsmask, const char **names, u32 namesmask); + u32 chrsmask, const char * const *names, u32 namesmask); void aa_apply_modes_to_perms(struct aa_profile *profile, struct aa_perms *perms); void aa_compute_perms(struct aa_dfa *dfa, unsigned int state, diff --git a/security/apparmor/include/policy.h b/security/apparmor/include/policy.h index 17fe41a9cac3..ab64c6b5db5a 100644 --- a/security/apparmor/include/policy.h +++ b/security/apparmor/include/policy.h @@ -30,6 +30,7 @@ #include "file.h" #include "lib.h" #include "label.h" +#include "net.h" #include "perms.h" #include "resource.h" @@ -148,6 +149,10 @@ struct aa_profile { struct aa_policydb policy; struct aa_file_rules file; struct aa_caps caps; + + int xattr_count; + char **xattrs; + struct aa_rlimit rlimits; struct aa_loaddata *rawdata; @@ -209,15 +214,15 @@ static inline struct aa_profile *aa_get_newest_profile(struct aa_profile *p) return labels_profile(aa_get_newest_label(&p->label)); } -#define PROFILE_MEDIATES(P, T) ((P)->policy.start[(T)]) -/* safe version of POLICY_MEDIATES for full range input */ -static inline unsigned int PROFILE_MEDIATES_SAFE(struct aa_profile *profile, - unsigned char class) -{ - if (profile->policy.dfa) - return aa_dfa_match_len(profile->policy.dfa, - profile->policy.start[0], &class, 1); - return 0; +#define PROFILE_MEDIATES(P, T) ((P)->policy.start[(unsigned char) (T)]) +static inline unsigned int PROFILE_MEDIATES_AF(struct aa_profile *profile, + u16 AF) { + unsigned int state = PROFILE_MEDIATES(profile, AA_CLASS_NET); + __be16 be_af = cpu_to_be16(AF); + + if (!state) + return 0; + return aa_dfa_match_len(profile->policy.dfa, state, (char *) &be_af, 2); } /** diff --git a/security/apparmor/include/policy_unpack.h b/security/apparmor/include/policy_unpack.h index be6cd69ac319..8db4ab759e80 100644 --- a/security/apparmor/include/policy_unpack.h +++ b/security/apparmor/include/policy_unpack.h @@ -70,7 +70,7 @@ struct aa_loaddata { int abi; unsigned char *hash; - char data[]; + char *data; }; int aa_unpack(struct aa_loaddata *udata, struct list_head *lh, const char **ns); diff --git a/security/apparmor/include/sig_names.h b/security/apparmor/include/sig_names.h index 92e62fe95292..cbf7a997ed84 100644 --- a/security/apparmor/include/sig_names.h +++ b/security/apparmor/include/sig_names.h @@ -2,6 +2,9 @@ #define SIGUNKNOWN 0 #define MAXMAPPED_SIG 35 +#define MAXMAPPED_SIGNAME (MAXMAPPED_SIG + 1) +#define SIGRT_BASE 128 + /* provide a mapping of arch signal to internal signal # for mediation * those that are always an alias SIGCLD for SIGCLHD and SIGPOLL for SIGIO * map to the same entry those that may/or may not get a separate entry @@ -56,7 +59,7 @@ static const int sig_map[MAXMAPPED_SIG] = { }; /* this table is ordered post sig_map[sig] mapping */ -static const char *const sig_names[MAXMAPPED_SIG + 1] = { +static const char *const sig_names[MAXMAPPED_SIGNAME] = { "unknown", "hup", "int", diff --git a/security/apparmor/include/task.h b/security/apparmor/include/task.h new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..55edaa1d83f8 --- /dev/null +++ b/security/apparmor/include/task.h @@ -0,0 +1,94 @@ +/* + * AppArmor security module + * + * This file contains AppArmor task related definitions and mediation + * + * Copyright 2017 Canonical Ltd. + * + * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or + * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as + * published by the Free Software Foundation, version 2 of the + * License. + */ + +#ifndef __AA_TASK_H +#define __AA_TASK_H + +#define task_ctx(X) ((X)->security) + +/* + * struct aa_task_ctx - information for current task label change + * @nnp: snapshot of label at time of no_new_privs + * @onexec: profile to transition to on next exec (MAY BE NULL) + * @previous: profile the task may return to (MAY BE NULL) + * @token: magic value the task must know for returning to @previous_profile + */ +struct aa_task_ctx { + struct aa_label *nnp; + struct aa_label *onexec; + struct aa_label *previous; + u64 token; +}; + +int aa_replace_current_label(struct aa_label *label); +int aa_set_current_onexec(struct aa_label *label, bool stack); +int aa_set_current_hat(struct aa_label *label, u64 token); +int aa_restore_previous_label(u64 cookie); +struct aa_label *aa_get_task_label(struct task_struct *task); + +/** + * aa_alloc_task_ctx - allocate a new task_ctx + * @flags: gfp flags for allocation + * + * Returns: allocated buffer or NULL on failure + */ +static inline struct aa_task_ctx *aa_alloc_task_ctx(gfp_t flags) +{ + return kzalloc(sizeof(struct aa_task_ctx), flags); +} + +/** + * aa_free_task_ctx - free a task_ctx + * @ctx: task_ctx to free (MAYBE NULL) + */ +static inline void aa_free_task_ctx(struct aa_task_ctx *ctx) +{ + if (ctx) { + aa_put_label(ctx->nnp); + aa_put_label(ctx->previous); + aa_put_label(ctx->onexec); + + kzfree(ctx); + } +} + +/** + * aa_dup_task_ctx - duplicate a task context, incrementing reference counts + * @new: a blank task context (NOT NULL) + * @old: the task context to copy (NOT NULL) + */ +static inline void aa_dup_task_ctx(struct aa_task_ctx *new, + const struct aa_task_ctx *old) +{ + *new = *old; + aa_get_label(new->nnp); + aa_get_label(new->previous); + aa_get_label(new->onexec); +} + +/** + * aa_clear_task_ctx_trans - clear transition tracking info from the ctx + * @ctx: task context to clear (NOT NULL) + */ +static inline void aa_clear_task_ctx_trans(struct aa_task_ctx *ctx) +{ + AA_BUG(!ctx); + + aa_put_label(ctx->previous); + aa_put_label(ctx->onexec); + ctx->previous = NULL; + ctx->onexec = NULL; + ctx->token = 0; +} + +#endif /* __AA_TASK_H */ diff --git a/security/apparmor/ipc.c b/security/apparmor/ipc.c index b40678f3c1d5..527ea1557120 100644 --- a/security/apparmor/ipc.c +++ b/security/apparmor/ipc.c @@ -17,7 +17,7 @@ #include "include/audit.h" #include "include/capability.h" -#include "include/context.h" +#include "include/cred.h" #include "include/policy.h" #include "include/ipc.h" #include "include/sig_names.h" @@ -138,7 +138,7 @@ static inline int map_signal_num(int sig) if (sig > SIGRTMAX) return SIGUNKNOWN; else if (sig >= SIGRTMIN) - return sig - SIGRTMIN + 128; /* rt sigs mapped to 128 */ + return sig - SIGRTMIN + SIGRT_BASE; else if (sig < MAXMAPPED_SIG) return sig_map[sig]; return SIGUNKNOWN; @@ -174,60 +174,48 @@ static void audit_signal_cb(struct audit_buffer *ab, void *va) audit_signal_mask(ab, aad(sa)->denied); } } - if (aad(sa)->signal < MAXMAPPED_SIG) + if (aad(sa)->signal == SIGUNKNOWN) + audit_log_format(ab, "signal=unknown(%d)", + aad(sa)->unmappedsig); + else if (aad(sa)->signal < MAXMAPPED_SIGNAME) audit_log_format(ab, " signal=%s", sig_names[aad(sa)->signal]); else audit_log_format(ab, " signal=rtmin+%d", - aad(sa)->signal - 128); + aad(sa)->signal - SIGRT_BASE); audit_log_format(ab, " peer="); aa_label_xaudit(ab, labels_ns(aad(sa)->label), aad(sa)->peer, FLAGS_NONE, GFP_ATOMIC); } -/* TODO: update to handle compound name&name2, conditionals */ -static void profile_match_signal(struct aa_profile *profile, const char *label, - int signal, struct aa_perms *perms) -{ - unsigned int state; - - /* TODO: secondary cache check <profile, profile, perm> */ - state = aa_dfa_next(profile->policy.dfa, - profile->policy.start[AA_CLASS_SIGNAL], - signal); - state = aa_dfa_match(profile->policy.dfa, state, label); - aa_compute_perms(profile->policy.dfa, state, perms); -} - static int profile_signal_perm(struct aa_profile *profile, - struct aa_profile *peer, u32 request, + struct aa_label *peer, u32 request, struct common_audit_data *sa) { struct aa_perms perms; + unsigned int state; if (profile_unconfined(profile) || !PROFILE_MEDIATES(profile, AA_CLASS_SIGNAL)) return 0; - aad(sa)->peer = &peer->label; - profile_match_signal(profile, peer->base.hname, aad(sa)->signal, - &perms); + aad(sa)->peer = peer; + /* TODO: secondary cache check <profile, profile, perm> */ + state = aa_dfa_next(profile->policy.dfa, + profile->policy.start[AA_CLASS_SIGNAL], + aad(sa)->signal); + aa_label_match(profile, peer, state, false, request, &perms); aa_apply_modes_to_perms(profile, &perms); return aa_check_perms(profile, &perms, request, sa, audit_signal_cb); } -static int aa_signal_cross_perm(struct aa_profile *sender, - struct aa_profile *target, - struct common_audit_data *sa) -{ - return xcheck(profile_signal_perm(sender, target, MAY_WRITE, sa), - profile_signal_perm(target, sender, MAY_READ, sa)); -} - int aa_may_signal(struct aa_label *sender, struct aa_label *target, int sig) { + struct aa_profile *profile; DEFINE_AUDIT_DATA(sa, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NONE, OP_SIGNAL); aad(&sa)->signal = map_signal_num(sig); - return xcheck_labels_profiles(sender, target, aa_signal_cross_perm, - &sa); + aad(&sa)->unmappedsig = sig; + return xcheck_labels(sender, target, profile, + profile_signal_perm(profile, target, MAY_WRITE, &sa), + profile_signal_perm(profile, sender, MAY_READ, &sa)); } diff --git a/security/apparmor/label.c b/security/apparmor/label.c index 324fe5c60f87..523250e34837 100644 --- a/security/apparmor/label.c +++ b/security/apparmor/label.c @@ -16,7 +16,7 @@ #include <linux/sort.h> #include "include/apparmor.h" -#include "include/context.h" +#include "include/cred.h" #include "include/label.h" #include "include/policy.h" #include "include/secid.h" @@ -1808,14 +1808,17 @@ void aa_label_printk(struct aa_label *label, gfp_t gfp) aa_put_ns(ns); } -static int label_count_str_entries(const char *str) +static int label_count_strn_entries(const char *str, size_t n) { + const char *end = str + n; const char *split; int count = 1; AA_BUG(!str); - for (split = strstr(str, "//&"); split; split = strstr(str, "//&")) { + for (split = aa_label_strn_split(str, end - str); + split; + split = aa_label_strn_split(str, end - str)) { count++; str = split + 3; } @@ -1843,9 +1846,10 @@ static struct aa_profile *fqlookupn_profile(struct aa_label *base, } /** - * aa_label_parse - parse, validate and convert a text string to a label + * aa_label_strn_parse - parse, validate and convert a text string to a label * @base: base label to use for lookups (NOT NULL) * @str: null terminated text string (NOT NULL) + * @n: length of str to parse, will stop at \0 if encountered before n * @gfp: allocation type * @create: true if should create compound labels if they don't exist * @force_stack: true if should stack even if no leading & @@ -1853,19 +1857,24 @@ static struct aa_profile *fqlookupn_profile(struct aa_label *base, * Returns: the matching refcounted label if present * else ERRPTR */ -struct aa_label *aa_label_parse(struct aa_label *base, const char *str, - gfp_t gfp, bool create, bool force_stack) +struct aa_label *aa_label_strn_parse(struct aa_label *base, const char *str, + size_t n, gfp_t gfp, bool create, + bool force_stack) { DEFINE_VEC(profile, vec); struct aa_label *label, *currbase = base; int i, len, stack = 0, error; - char *split; + const char *end = str + n; + const char *split; AA_BUG(!base); AA_BUG(!str); - str = skip_spaces(str); - len = label_count_str_entries(str); + str = skipn_spaces(str, n); + if (str == NULL || (*str == '=' && base != &root_ns->unconfined->label)) + return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL); + + len = label_count_strn_entries(str, end - str); if (*str == '&' || force_stack) { /* stack on top of base */ stack = base->size; @@ -1873,8 +1882,6 @@ struct aa_label *aa_label_parse(struct aa_label *base, const char *str, if (*str == '&') str++; } - if (*str == '=') - base = &root_ns->unconfined->label; error = vec_setup(profile, vec, len, gfp); if (error) @@ -1883,7 +1890,8 @@ struct aa_label *aa_label_parse(struct aa_label *base, const char *str, for (i = 0; i < stack; i++) vec[i] = aa_get_profile(base->vec[i]); - for (split = strstr(str, "//&"), i = stack; split && i < len; i++) { + for (split = aa_label_strn_split(str, end - str), i = stack; + split && i < len; i++) { vec[i] = fqlookupn_profile(base, currbase, str, split - str); if (!vec[i]) goto fail; @@ -1894,11 +1902,11 @@ struct aa_label *aa_label_parse(struct aa_label *base, const char *str, if (vec[i]->ns != labels_ns(currbase)) currbase = &vec[i]->label; str = split + 3; - split = strstr(str, "//&"); + split = aa_label_strn_split(str, end - str); } /* last element doesn't have a split */ if (i < len) { - vec[i] = fqlookupn_profile(base, currbase, str, strlen(str)); + vec[i] = fqlookupn_profile(base, currbase, str, end - str); if (!vec[i]) goto fail; } @@ -1930,6 +1938,12 @@ fail: goto out; } +struct aa_label *aa_label_parse(struct aa_label *base, const char *str, + gfp_t gfp, bool create, bool force_stack) +{ + return aa_label_strn_parse(base, str, strlen(str), gfp, create, + force_stack); +} /** * aa_labelset_destroy - remove all labels from the label set diff --git a/security/apparmor/lib.c b/security/apparmor/lib.c index 4d5e98e49d5e..068a9f471f77 100644 --- a/security/apparmor/lib.c +++ b/security/apparmor/lib.c @@ -211,7 +211,8 @@ void aa_perm_mask_to_str(char *str, const char *chrs, u32 mask) *str = '\0'; } -void aa_audit_perm_names(struct audit_buffer *ab, const char **names, u32 mask) +void aa_audit_perm_names(struct audit_buffer *ab, const char * const *names, + u32 mask) { const char *fmt = "%s"; unsigned int i, perm = 1; @@ -229,7 +230,7 @@ void aa_audit_perm_names(struct audit_buffer *ab, const char **names, u32 mask) } void aa_audit_perm_mask(struct audit_buffer *ab, u32 mask, const char *chrs, - u32 chrsmask, const char **names, u32 namesmask) + u32 chrsmask, const char * const *names, u32 namesmask) { char str[33]; diff --git a/security/apparmor/lsm.c b/security/apparmor/lsm.c index 528f59b580a8..ce2b89e9ad94 100644 --- a/security/apparmor/lsm.c +++ b/security/apparmor/lsm.c @@ -29,9 +29,10 @@ #include "include/apparmorfs.h" #include "include/audit.h" #include "include/capability.h" -#include "include/context.h" +#include "include/cred.h" #include "include/file.h" #include "include/ipc.h" +#include "include/net.h" #include "include/path.h" #include "include/label.h" #include "include/policy.h" @@ -50,12 +51,12 @@ DEFINE_PER_CPU(struct aa_buffers, aa_buffers); */ /* - * free the associated aa_task_ctx and put its labels + * put the associated labels */ static void apparmor_cred_free(struct cred *cred) { - aa_free_task_context(cred_ctx(cred)); - cred_ctx(cred) = NULL; + aa_put_label(cred_label(cred)); + cred_label(cred) = NULL; } /* @@ -63,30 +64,17 @@ static void apparmor_cred_free(struct cred *cred) */ static int apparmor_cred_alloc_blank(struct cred *cred, gfp_t gfp) { - /* freed by apparmor_cred_free */ - struct aa_task_ctx *ctx = aa_alloc_task_context(gfp); - - if (!ctx) - return -ENOMEM; - - cred_ctx(cred) = ctx; + cred_label(cred) = NULL; return 0; } /* - * prepare new aa_task_ctx for modification by prepare_cred block + * prepare new cred label for modification by prepare_cred block */ static int apparmor_cred_prepare(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old, gfp_t gfp) { - /* freed by apparmor_cred_free */ - struct aa_task_ctx *ctx = aa_alloc_task_context(gfp); - - if (!ctx) - return -ENOMEM; - - aa_dup_task_context(ctx, cred_ctx(old)); - cred_ctx(new) = ctx; + cred_label(new) = aa_get_newest_label(cred_label(old)); return 0; } @@ -95,10 +83,28 @@ static int apparmor_cred_prepare(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old, */ static void apparmor_cred_transfer(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old) { - const struct aa_task_ctx *old_ctx = cred_ctx(old); - struct aa_task_ctx *new_ctx = cred_ctx(new); + cred_label(new) = aa_get_newest_label(cred_label(old)); +} + +static void apparmor_task_free(struct task_struct *task) +{ + + aa_free_task_ctx(task_ctx(task)); + task_ctx(task) = NULL; +} + +static int apparmor_task_alloc(struct task_struct *task, + unsigned long clone_flags) +{ + struct aa_task_ctx *new = aa_alloc_task_ctx(GFP_KERNEL); + + if (!new) + return -ENOMEM; + + aa_dup_task_ctx(new, task_ctx(current)); + task_ctx(task) = new; - aa_dup_task_context(new_ctx, old_ctx); + return 0; } static int apparmor_ptrace_access_check(struct task_struct *child, @@ -576,11 +582,11 @@ static int apparmor_getprocattr(struct task_struct *task, char *name, int error = -ENOENT; /* released below */ const struct cred *cred = get_task_cred(task); - struct aa_task_ctx *ctx = cred_ctx(cred); + struct aa_task_ctx *ctx = task_ctx(current); struct aa_label *label = NULL; if (strcmp(name, "current") == 0) - label = aa_get_newest_label(ctx->label); + label = aa_get_newest_label(cred_label(cred)); else if (strcmp(name, "prev") == 0 && ctx->previous) label = aa_get_newest_label(ctx->previous); else if (strcmp(name, "exec") == 0 && ctx->onexec) @@ -677,11 +683,11 @@ fail: static void apparmor_bprm_committing_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm) { struct aa_label *label = aa_current_raw_label(); - struct aa_task_ctx *new_ctx = cred_ctx(bprm->cred); + struct aa_label *new_label = cred_label(bprm->cred); /* bail out if unconfined or not changing profile */ - if ((new_ctx->label->proxy == label->proxy) || - (unconfined(new_ctx->label))) + if ((new_label->proxy == label->proxy) || + (unconfined(new_label))) return; aa_inherit_files(bprm->cred, current->files); @@ -689,7 +695,7 @@ static void apparmor_bprm_committing_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm) current->pdeath_signal = 0; /* reset soft limits and set hard limits for the new label */ - __aa_transition_rlimits(label, new_ctx->label); + __aa_transition_rlimits(label, new_label); } /** @@ -698,7 +704,9 @@ static void apparmor_bprm_committing_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm) */ static void apparmor_bprm_committed_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm) { - /* TODO: cleanup signals - ipc mediation */ + /* clear out temporary/transitional state from the context */ + aa_clear_task_ctx_trans(task_ctx(current)); + return; } @@ -742,6 +750,373 @@ static int apparmor_task_kill(struct task_struct *target, struct siginfo *info, return error; } +/** + * apparmor_sk_alloc_security - allocate and attach the sk_security field + */ +static int apparmor_sk_alloc_security(struct sock *sk, int family, gfp_t flags) +{ + struct aa_sk_ctx *ctx; + + ctx = kzalloc(sizeof(*ctx), flags); + if (!ctx) + return -ENOMEM; + + SK_CTX(sk) = ctx; + + return 0; +} + +/** + * apparmor_sk_free_security - free the sk_security field + */ +static void apparmor_sk_free_security(struct sock *sk) +{ + struct aa_sk_ctx *ctx = SK_CTX(sk); + + SK_CTX(sk) = NULL; + aa_put_label(ctx->label); + aa_put_label(ctx->peer); + kfree(ctx); +} + +/** + * apparmor_clone_security - clone the sk_security field + */ +static void apparmor_sk_clone_security(const struct sock *sk, + struct sock *newsk) +{ + struct aa_sk_ctx *ctx = SK_CTX(sk); + struct aa_sk_ctx *new = SK_CTX(newsk); + + new->label = aa_get_label(ctx->label); + new->peer = aa_get_label(ctx->peer); +} + +/** + * apparmor_socket_create - check perms before creating a new socket + */ +static int apparmor_socket_create(int family, int type, int protocol, int kern) +{ + struct aa_label *label; + int error = 0; + + AA_BUG(in_interrupt()); + + label = begin_current_label_crit_section(); + if (!(kern || unconfined(label))) + error = af_select(family, + create_perm(label, family, type, protocol), + aa_af_perm(label, OP_CREATE, AA_MAY_CREATE, + family, type, protocol)); + end_current_label_crit_section(label); + + return error; +} + +/** + * apparmor_socket_post_create - setup the per-socket security struct + * + * Note: + * - kernel sockets currently labeled unconfined but we may want to + * move to a special kernel label + * - socket may not have sk here if created with sock_create_lite or + * sock_alloc. These should be accept cases which will be handled in + * sock_graft. + */ +static int apparmor_socket_post_create(struct socket *sock, int family, + int type, int protocol, int kern) +{ + struct aa_label *label; + + if (kern) { + struct aa_ns *ns = aa_get_current_ns(); + + label = aa_get_label(ns_unconfined(ns)); + aa_put_ns(ns); + } else + label = aa_get_current_label(); + + if (sock->sk) { + struct aa_sk_ctx *ctx = SK_CTX(sock->sk); + + aa_put_label(ctx->label); + ctx->label = aa_get_label(label); + } + aa_put_label(label); + + return 0; +} + +/** + * apparmor_socket_bind - check perms before bind addr to socket + */ +static int apparmor_socket_bind(struct socket *sock, + struct sockaddr *address, int addrlen) +{ + AA_BUG(!sock); + AA_BUG(!sock->sk); + AA_BUG(!address); + AA_BUG(in_interrupt()); + + return af_select(sock->sk->sk_family, + bind_perm(sock, address, addrlen), + aa_sk_perm(OP_BIND, AA_MAY_BIND, sock->sk)); +} + +/** + * apparmor_socket_connect - check perms before connecting @sock to @address + */ +static int apparmor_socket_connect(struct socket *sock, + struct sockaddr *address, int addrlen) +{ + AA_BUG(!sock); + AA_BUG(!sock->sk); + AA_BUG(!address); + AA_BUG(in_interrupt()); + + return af_select(sock->sk->sk_family, + connect_perm(sock, address, addrlen), + aa_sk_perm(OP_CONNECT, AA_MAY_CONNECT, sock->sk)); +} + +/** + * apparmor_socket_list - check perms before allowing listen + */ +static int apparmor_socket_listen(struct socket *sock, int backlog) +{ + AA_BUG(!sock); + AA_BUG(!sock->sk); + AA_BUG(in_interrupt()); + + return af_select(sock->sk->sk_family, + listen_perm(sock, backlog), + aa_sk_perm(OP_LISTEN, AA_MAY_LISTEN, sock->sk)); +} + +/** + * apparmor_socket_accept - check perms before accepting a new connection. + * + * Note: while @newsock is created and has some information, the accept + * has not been done. + */ +static int apparmor_socket_accept(struct socket *sock, struct socket *newsock) +{ + AA_BUG(!sock); + AA_BUG(!sock->sk); + AA_BUG(!newsock); + AA_BUG(in_interrupt()); + + return af_select(sock->sk->sk_family, + accept_perm(sock, newsock), + aa_sk_perm(OP_ACCEPT, AA_MAY_ACCEPT, sock->sk)); +} + +static int aa_sock_msg_perm(const char *op, u32 request, struct socket *sock, + struct msghdr *msg, int size) +{ + AA_BUG(!sock); + AA_BUG(!sock->sk); + AA_BUG(!msg); + AA_BUG(in_interrupt()); + + return af_select(sock->sk->sk_family, + msg_perm(op, request, sock, msg, size), + aa_sk_perm(op, request, sock->sk)); +} + +/** + * apparmor_socket_sendmsg - check perms before sending msg to another socket + */ +static int apparmor_socket_sendmsg(struct socket *sock, + struct msghdr *msg, int size) +{ + return aa_sock_msg_perm(OP_SENDMSG, AA_MAY_SEND, sock, msg, size); +} + +/** + * apparmor_socket_recvmsg - check perms before receiving a message + */ +static int apparmor_socket_recvmsg(struct socket *sock, + struct msghdr *msg, int size, int flags) +{ + return aa_sock_msg_perm(OP_RECVMSG, AA_MAY_RECEIVE, sock, msg, size); +} + +/* revaliation, get/set attr, shutdown */ +static int aa_sock_perm(const char *op, u32 request, struct socket *sock) +{ + AA_BUG(!sock); + AA_BUG(!sock->sk); + AA_BUG(in_interrupt()); + + return af_select(sock->sk->sk_family, + sock_perm(op, request, sock), + aa_sk_perm(op, request, sock->sk)); +} + +/** + * apparmor_socket_getsockname - check perms before getting the local address + */ +static int apparmor_socket_getsockname(struct socket *sock) +{ + return aa_sock_perm(OP_GETSOCKNAME, AA_MAY_GETATTR, sock); +} + +/** + * apparmor_socket_getpeername - check perms before getting remote address + */ +static int apparmor_socket_getpeername(struct socket *sock) +{ + return aa_sock_perm(OP_GETPEERNAME, AA_MAY_GETATTR, sock); +} + +/* revaliation, get/set attr, opt */ +static int aa_sock_opt_perm(const char *op, u32 request, struct socket *sock, + int level, int optname) +{ + AA_BUG(!sock); + AA_BUG(!sock->sk); + AA_BUG(in_interrupt()); + + return af_select(sock->sk->sk_family, + opt_perm(op, request, sock, level, optname), + aa_sk_perm(op, request, sock->sk)); +} + +/** + * apparmor_getsockopt - check perms before getting socket options + */ +static int apparmor_socket_getsockopt(struct socket *sock, int level, + int optname) +{ + return aa_sock_opt_perm(OP_GETSOCKOPT, AA_MAY_GETOPT, sock, + level, optname); +} + +/** + * apparmor_setsockopt - check perms before setting socket options + */ +static int apparmor_socket_setsockopt(struct socket *sock, int level, + int optname) +{ + return aa_sock_opt_perm(OP_SETSOCKOPT, AA_MAY_SETOPT, sock, + level, optname); +} + +/** + * apparmor_socket_shutdown - check perms before shutting down @sock conn + */ +static int apparmor_socket_shutdown(struct socket *sock, int how) +{ + return aa_sock_perm(OP_SHUTDOWN, AA_MAY_SHUTDOWN, sock); +} + +/** + * apparmor_socket_sock_recv_skb - check perms before associating skb to sk + * + * Note: can not sleep may be called with locks held + * + * dont want protocol specific in __skb_recv_datagram() + * to deny an incoming connection socket_sock_rcv_skb() + */ +static int apparmor_socket_sock_rcv_skb(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb) +{ + return 0; +} + + +static struct aa_label *sk_peer_label(struct sock *sk) +{ + struct aa_sk_ctx *ctx = SK_CTX(sk); + + if (ctx->peer) + return ctx->peer; + + return ERR_PTR(-ENOPROTOOPT); +} + +/** + * apparmor_socket_getpeersec_stream - get security context of peer + * + * Note: for tcp only valid if using ipsec or cipso on lan + */ +static int apparmor_socket_getpeersec_stream(struct socket *sock, + char __user *optval, + int __user *optlen, + unsigned int len) +{ + char *name; + int slen, error = 0; + struct aa_label *label; + struct aa_label *peer; + + label = begin_current_label_crit_section(); + peer = sk_peer_label(sock->sk); + if (IS_ERR(peer)) { + error = PTR_ERR(peer); + goto done; + } + slen = aa_label_asxprint(&name, labels_ns(label), peer, + FLAG_SHOW_MODE | FLAG_VIEW_SUBNS | + FLAG_HIDDEN_UNCONFINED, GFP_KERNEL); + /* don't include terminating \0 in slen, it breaks some apps */ + if (slen < 0) { + error = -ENOMEM; + } else { + if (slen > len) { + error = -ERANGE; + } else if (copy_to_user(optval, name, slen)) { + error = -EFAULT; + goto out; + } + if (put_user(slen, optlen)) + error = -EFAULT; +out: + kfree(name); + + } + +done: + end_current_label_crit_section(label); + + return error; +} + +/** + * apparmor_socket_getpeersec_dgram - get security label of packet + * @sock: the peer socket + * @skb: packet data + * @secid: pointer to where to put the secid of the packet + * + * Sets the netlabel socket state on sk from parent + */ +static int apparmor_socket_getpeersec_dgram(struct socket *sock, + struct sk_buff *skb, u32 *secid) + +{ + /* TODO: requires secid support */ + return -ENOPROTOOPT; +} + +/** + * apparmor_sock_graft - Initialize newly created socket + * @sk: child sock + * @parent: parent socket + * + * Note: could set off of SOCK_CTX(parent) but need to track inode and we can + * just set sk security information off of current creating process label + * Labeling of sk for accept case - probably should be sock based + * instead of task, because of the case where an implicitly labeled + * socket is shared by different tasks. + */ +static void apparmor_sock_graft(struct sock *sk, struct socket *parent) +{ + struct aa_sk_ctx *ctx = SK_CTX(sk); + + if (!ctx->label) + ctx->label = aa_get_current_label(); +} + static struct security_hook_list apparmor_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = { LSM_HOOK_INIT(ptrace_access_check, apparmor_ptrace_access_check), LSM_HOOK_INIT(ptrace_traceme, apparmor_ptrace_traceme), @@ -776,6 +1151,30 @@ static struct security_hook_list apparmor_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = { LSM_HOOK_INIT(getprocattr, apparmor_getprocattr), LSM_HOOK_INIT(setprocattr, apparmor_setprocattr), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(sk_alloc_security, apparmor_sk_alloc_security), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(sk_free_security, apparmor_sk_free_security), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(sk_clone_security, apparmor_sk_clone_security), + + LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_create, apparmor_socket_create), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_post_create, apparmor_socket_post_create), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_bind, apparmor_socket_bind), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_connect, apparmor_socket_connect), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_listen, apparmor_socket_listen), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_accept, apparmor_socket_accept), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_sendmsg, apparmor_socket_sendmsg), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_recvmsg, apparmor_socket_recvmsg), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_getsockname, apparmor_socket_getsockname), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_getpeername, apparmor_socket_getpeername), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_getsockopt, apparmor_socket_getsockopt), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_setsockopt, apparmor_socket_setsockopt), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_shutdown, apparmor_socket_shutdown), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_sock_rcv_skb, apparmor_socket_sock_rcv_skb), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_getpeersec_stream, + apparmor_socket_getpeersec_stream), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_getpeersec_dgram, + apparmor_socket_getpeersec_dgram), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(sock_graft, apparmor_sock_graft), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(cred_alloc_blank, apparmor_cred_alloc_blank), LSM_HOOK_INIT(cred_free, apparmor_cred_free), LSM_HOOK_INIT(cred_prepare, apparmor_cred_prepare), @@ -785,6 +1184,8 @@ static struct security_hook_list apparmor_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = { LSM_HOOK_INIT(bprm_committing_creds, apparmor_bprm_committing_creds), LSM_HOOK_INIT(bprm_committed_creds, apparmor_bprm_committed_creds), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_free, apparmor_task_free), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_alloc, apparmor_task_alloc), LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_setrlimit, apparmor_task_setrlimit), LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_kill, apparmor_task_kill), }; @@ -1032,12 +1433,12 @@ static int __init set_init_ctx(void) struct cred *cred = (struct cred *)current->real_cred; struct aa_task_ctx *ctx; - ctx = aa_alloc_task_context(GFP_KERNEL); + ctx = aa_alloc_task_ctx(GFP_KERNEL); if (!ctx) return -ENOMEM; - ctx->label = aa_get_label(ns_unconfined(root_ns)); - cred_ctx(cred) = ctx; + cred_label(cred) = aa_get_label(ns_unconfined(root_ns)); + task_ctx(current) = ctx; return 0; } diff --git a/security/apparmor/match.c b/security/apparmor/match.c index 72c604350e80..280eba082c7b 100644 --- a/security/apparmor/match.c +++ b/security/apparmor/match.c @@ -30,6 +30,11 @@ static char nulldfa_src[] = { }; struct aa_dfa *nulldfa; +static char stacksplitdfa_src[] = { + #include "stacksplitdfa.in" +}; +struct aa_dfa *stacksplitdfa; + int aa_setup_dfa_engine(void) { int error; @@ -37,19 +42,31 @@ int aa_setup_dfa_engine(void) nulldfa = aa_dfa_unpack(nulldfa_src, sizeof(nulldfa_src), TO_ACCEPT1_FLAG(YYTD_DATA32) | TO_ACCEPT2_FLAG(YYTD_DATA32)); - if (!IS_ERR(nulldfa)) - return 0; + if (IS_ERR(nulldfa)) { + error = PTR_ERR(nulldfa); + nulldfa = NULL; + return error; + } - error = PTR_ERR(nulldfa); - nulldfa = NULL; + stacksplitdfa = aa_dfa_unpack(stacksplitdfa_src, + sizeof(stacksplitdfa_src), + TO_ACCEPT1_FLAG(YYTD_DATA32) | + TO_ACCEPT2_FLAG(YYTD_DATA32)); + if (IS_ERR(stacksplitdfa)) { + aa_put_dfa(nulldfa); + nulldfa = NULL; + error = PTR_ERR(stacksplitdfa); + stacksplitdfa = NULL; + return error; + } - return error; + return 0; } void aa_teardown_dfa_engine(void) { + aa_put_dfa(stacksplitdfa); aa_put_dfa(nulldfa); - nulldfa = NULL; } /** @@ -119,8 +136,8 @@ fail: } /** - * verify_dfa - verify that transitions and states in the tables are in bounds. - * @dfa: dfa to test (NOT NULL) + * verify_table_headers - verify that the tables headers are as expected + * @tables - array of dfa tables to check (NOT NULL) * @flags: flags controlling what type of accept table are acceptable * * Assumes dfa has gone through the first pass verification done by unpacking @@ -128,64 +145,98 @@ fail: * * Returns: %0 else error code on failure to verify */ -static int verify_dfa(struct aa_dfa *dfa, int flags) +static int verify_table_headers(struct table_header **tables, int flags) { - size_t i, state_count, trans_count; + size_t state_count, trans_count; int error = -EPROTO; /* check that required tables exist */ - if (!(dfa->tables[YYTD_ID_DEF] && - dfa->tables[YYTD_ID_BASE] && - dfa->tables[YYTD_ID_NXT] && dfa->tables[YYTD_ID_CHK])) + if (!(tables[YYTD_ID_DEF] && tables[YYTD_ID_BASE] && + tables[YYTD_ID_NXT] && tables[YYTD_ID_CHK])) goto out; /* accept.size == default.size == base.size */ - state_count = dfa->tables[YYTD_ID_BASE]->td_lolen; + state_count = tables[YYTD_ID_BASE]->td_lolen; if (ACCEPT1_FLAGS(flags)) { - if (!dfa->tables[YYTD_ID_ACCEPT]) + if (!tables[YYTD_ID_ACCEPT]) goto out; - if (state_count != dfa->tables[YYTD_ID_ACCEPT]->td_lolen) + if (state_count != tables[YYTD_ID_ACCEPT]->td_lolen) goto out; } if (ACCEPT2_FLAGS(flags)) { - if (!dfa->tables[YYTD_ID_ACCEPT2]) + if (!tables[YYTD_ID_ACCEPT2]) goto out; - if (state_count != dfa->tables[YYTD_ID_ACCEPT2]->td_lolen) + if (state_count != tables[YYTD_ID_ACCEPT2]->td_lolen) goto out; } - if (state_count != dfa->tables[YYTD_ID_DEF]->td_lolen) + if (state_count != tables[YYTD_ID_DEF]->td_lolen) goto out; /* next.size == chk.size */ - trans_count = dfa->tables[YYTD_ID_NXT]->td_lolen; - if (trans_count != dfa->tables[YYTD_ID_CHK]->td_lolen) + trans_count = tables[YYTD_ID_NXT]->td_lolen; + if (trans_count != tables[YYTD_ID_CHK]->td_lolen) goto out; /* if equivalence classes then its table size must be 256 */ - if (dfa->tables[YYTD_ID_EC] && - dfa->tables[YYTD_ID_EC]->td_lolen != 256) + if (tables[YYTD_ID_EC] && tables[YYTD_ID_EC]->td_lolen != 256) goto out; - if (flags & DFA_FLAG_VERIFY_STATES) { - for (i = 0; i < state_count; i++) { - if (DEFAULT_TABLE(dfa)[i] >= state_count) - goto out; - if (base_idx(BASE_TABLE(dfa)[i]) + 255 >= trans_count) { - printk(KERN_ERR "AppArmor DFA next/check upper " - "bounds error\n"); - goto out; - } + error = 0; +out: + return error; +} + +/** + * verify_dfa - verify that transitions and states in the tables are in bounds. + * @dfa: dfa to test (NOT NULL) + * + * Assumes dfa has gone through the first pass verification done by unpacking + * NOTE: this does not valid accept table values + * + * Returns: %0 else error code on failure to verify + */ +static int verify_dfa(struct aa_dfa *dfa) +{ + size_t i, state_count, trans_count; + int error = -EPROTO; + + state_count = dfa->tables[YYTD_ID_BASE]->td_lolen; + trans_count = dfa->tables[YYTD_ID_NXT]->td_lolen; + for (i = 0; i < state_count; i++) { + if (!(BASE_TABLE(dfa)[i] & MATCH_FLAG_DIFF_ENCODE) && + (DEFAULT_TABLE(dfa)[i] >= state_count)) + goto out; + if (base_idx(BASE_TABLE(dfa)[i]) + 255 >= trans_count) { + pr_err("AppArmor DFA next/check upper bounds error\n"); + goto out; } + } - for (i = 0; i < trans_count; i++) { - if (NEXT_TABLE(dfa)[i] >= state_count) - goto out; - if (CHECK_TABLE(dfa)[i] >= state_count) + for (i = 0; i < trans_count; i++) { + if (NEXT_TABLE(dfa)[i] >= state_count) + goto out; + if (CHECK_TABLE(dfa)[i] >= state_count) + goto out; + } + + /* Now that all the other tables are verified, verify diffencoding */ + for (i = 0; i < state_count; i++) { + size_t j, k; + + for (j = i; + (BASE_TABLE(dfa)[j] & MATCH_FLAG_DIFF_ENCODE) && + !(BASE_TABLE(dfa)[j] & MARK_DIFF_ENCODE); + j = k) { + k = DEFAULT_TABLE(dfa)[j]; + if (j == k) goto out; + if (k < j) + break; /* already verified */ + BASE_TABLE(dfa)[j] |= MARK_DIFF_ENCODE; } } - error = 0; + out: return error; } @@ -257,6 +308,9 @@ struct aa_dfa *aa_dfa_unpack(void *blob, size_t size, int flags) goto fail; dfa->flags = ntohs(*(__be16 *) (data + 12)); + if (dfa->flags != 0 && dfa->flags != YYTH_FLAG_DIFF_ENCODE) + goto fail; + data += hsize; size -= hsize; @@ -299,11 +353,16 @@ struct aa_dfa *aa_dfa_unpack(void *blob, size_t size, int flags) size -= table_size(table->td_lolen, table->td_flags); table = NULL; } - - error = verify_dfa(dfa, flags); + error = verify_table_headers(dfa->tables, flags); if (error) goto fail; + if (flags & DFA_FLAG_VERIFY_STATES) { + error = verify_dfa(dfa); + if (error) + goto fail; + } + return dfa; fail: @@ -312,6 +371,20 @@ fail: return ERR_PTR(error); } +#define match_char(state, def, base, next, check, C) \ +do { \ + u32 b = (base)[(state)]; \ + unsigned int pos = base_idx(b) + (C); \ + if ((check)[pos] != (state)) { \ + (state) = (def)[(state)]; \ + if (b & MATCH_FLAG_DIFF_ENCODE) \ + continue; \ + break; \ + } \ + (state) = (next)[pos]; \ + break; \ +} while (1) + /** * aa_dfa_match_len - traverse @dfa to find state @str stops at * @dfa: the dfa to match @str against (NOT NULL) @@ -335,6 +408,118 @@ unsigned int aa_dfa_match_len(struct aa_dfa *dfa, unsigned int start, u32 *base = BASE_TABLE(dfa); u16 *next = NEXT_TABLE(dfa); u16 *check = CHECK_TABLE(dfa); + unsigned int state = start; + + if (state == 0) + return 0; + + /* current state is <state>, matching character *str */ + if (dfa->tables[YYTD_ID_EC]) { + /* Equivalence class table defined */ + u8 *equiv = EQUIV_TABLE(dfa); + for (; len; len--) + match_char(state, def, base, next, check, + equiv[(u8) *str++]); + } else { + /* default is direct to next state */ + for (; len; len--) + match_char(state, def, base, next, check, (u8) *str++); + } + + return state; +} + +/** + * aa_dfa_match - traverse @dfa to find state @str stops at + * @dfa: the dfa to match @str against (NOT NULL) + * @start: the state of the dfa to start matching in + * @str: the null terminated string of bytes to match against the dfa (NOT NULL) + * + * aa_dfa_match will match @str against the dfa and return the state it + * finished matching in. The final state can be used to look up the accepting + * label, or as the start state of a continuing match. + * + * Returns: final state reached after input is consumed + */ +unsigned int aa_dfa_match(struct aa_dfa *dfa, unsigned int start, + const char *str) +{ + u16 *def = DEFAULT_TABLE(dfa); + u32 *base = BASE_TABLE(dfa); + u16 *next = NEXT_TABLE(dfa); + u16 *check = CHECK_TABLE(dfa); + unsigned int state = start; + + if (state == 0) + return 0; + + /* current state is <state>, matching character *str */ + if (dfa->tables[YYTD_ID_EC]) { + /* Equivalence class table defined */ + u8 *equiv = EQUIV_TABLE(dfa); + /* default is direct to next state */ + while (*str) + match_char(state, def, base, next, check, + equiv[(u8) *str++]); + } else { + /* default is direct to next state */ + while (*str) + match_char(state, def, base, next, check, (u8) *str++); + } + + return state; +} + +/** + * aa_dfa_next - step one character to the next state in the dfa + * @dfa: the dfa to tranverse (NOT NULL) + * @state: the state to start in + * @c: the input character to transition on + * + * aa_dfa_match will step through the dfa by one input character @c + * + * Returns: state reach after input @c + */ +unsigned int aa_dfa_next(struct aa_dfa *dfa, unsigned int state, + const char c) +{ + u16 *def = DEFAULT_TABLE(dfa); + u32 *base = BASE_TABLE(dfa); + u16 *next = NEXT_TABLE(dfa); + u16 *check = CHECK_TABLE(dfa); + + /* current state is <state>, matching character *str */ + if (dfa->tables[YYTD_ID_EC]) { + /* Equivalence class table defined */ + u8 *equiv = EQUIV_TABLE(dfa); + match_char(state, def, base, next, check, equiv[(u8) c]); + } else + match_char(state, def, base, next, check, (u8) c); + + return state; +} + +/** + * aa_dfa_match_until - traverse @dfa until accept state or end of input + * @dfa: the dfa to match @str against (NOT NULL) + * @start: the state of the dfa to start matching in + * @str: the null terminated string of bytes to match against the dfa (NOT NULL) + * @retpos: first character in str after match OR end of string + * + * aa_dfa_match will match @str against the dfa and return the state it + * finished matching in. The final state can be used to look up the accepting + * label, or as the start state of a continuing match. + * + * Returns: final state reached after input is consumed + */ +unsigned int aa_dfa_match_until(struct aa_dfa *dfa, unsigned int start, + const char *str, const char **retpos) +{ + u16 *def = DEFAULT_TABLE(dfa); + u32 *base = BASE_TABLE(dfa); + u16 *next = NEXT_TABLE(dfa); + u16 *check = CHECK_TABLE(dfa); + u32 *accept = ACCEPT_TABLE(dfa); unsigned int state = start, pos; if (state == 0) @@ -345,48 +530,60 @@ unsigned int aa_dfa_match_len(struct aa_dfa *dfa, unsigned int start, /* Equivalence class table defined */ u8 *equiv = EQUIV_TABLE(dfa); /* default is direct to next state */ - for (; len; len--) { + while (*str) { pos = base_idx(base[state]) + equiv[(u8) *str++]; if (check[pos] == state) state = next[pos]; else state = def[state]; + if (accept[state]) + break; } } else { /* default is direct to next state */ - for (; len; len--) { + while (*str) { pos = base_idx(base[state]) + (u8) *str++; if (check[pos] == state) state = next[pos]; else state = def[state]; + if (accept[state]) + break; } } + *retpos = str; return state; } /** - * aa_dfa_match - traverse @dfa to find state @str stops at + * aa_dfa_matchn_until - traverse @dfa until accept or @n bytes consumed * @dfa: the dfa to match @str against (NOT NULL) * @start: the state of the dfa to start matching in - * @str: the null terminated string of bytes to match against the dfa (NOT NULL) + * @str: the string of bytes to match against the dfa (NOT NULL) + * @n: length of the string of bytes to match + * @retpos: first character in str after match OR str + n * - * aa_dfa_match will match @str against the dfa and return the state it + * aa_dfa_match_len will match @str against the dfa and return the state it * finished matching in. The final state can be used to look up the accepting * label, or as the start state of a continuing match. * + * This function will happily match again the 0 byte and only finishes + * when @n input is consumed. + * * Returns: final state reached after input is consumed */ -unsigned int aa_dfa_match(struct aa_dfa *dfa, unsigned int start, - const char *str) +unsigned int aa_dfa_matchn_until(struct aa_dfa *dfa, unsigned int start, + const char *str, int n, const char **retpos) { u16 *def = DEFAULT_TABLE(dfa); u32 *base = BASE_TABLE(dfa); u16 *next = NEXT_TABLE(dfa); u16 *check = CHECK_TABLE(dfa); + u32 *accept = ACCEPT_TABLE(dfa); unsigned int state = start, pos; + *retpos = NULL; if (state == 0) return 0; @@ -395,65 +592,149 @@ unsigned int aa_dfa_match(struct aa_dfa *dfa, unsigned int start, /* Equivalence class table defined */ u8 *equiv = EQUIV_TABLE(dfa); /* default is direct to next state */ - while (*str) { + for (; n; n--) { pos = base_idx(base[state]) + equiv[(u8) *str++]; if (check[pos] == state) state = next[pos]; else state = def[state]; + if (accept[state]) + break; } } else { /* default is direct to next state */ - while (*str) { + for (; n; n--) { pos = base_idx(base[state]) + (u8) *str++; if (check[pos] == state) state = next[pos]; else state = def[state]; + if (accept[state]) + break; } } + *retpos = str; return state; } -/** - * aa_dfa_next - step one character to the next state in the dfa - * @dfa: the dfa to tranverse (NOT NULL) - * @state: the state to start in - * @c: the input character to transition on - * - * aa_dfa_match will step through the dfa by one input character @c - * - * Returns: state reach after input @c - */ -unsigned int aa_dfa_next(struct aa_dfa *dfa, unsigned int state, - const char c) +#define inc_wb_pos(wb) \ +do { \ + wb->pos = (wb->pos + 1) & (wb->size - 1); \ + wb->len = (wb->len + 1) & (wb->size - 1); \ +} while (0) + +/* For DFAs that don't support extended tagging of states */ +static bool is_loop(struct match_workbuf *wb, unsigned int state, + unsigned int *adjust) +{ + unsigned int pos = wb->pos; + unsigned int i; + + if (wb->history[pos] < state) + return false; + + for (i = 0; i <= wb->len; i++) { + if (wb->history[pos] == state) { + *adjust = i; + return true; + } + if (pos == 0) + pos = wb->size; + pos--; + } + + *adjust = i; + return true; +} + +static unsigned int leftmatch_fb(struct aa_dfa *dfa, unsigned int start, + const char *str, struct match_workbuf *wb, + unsigned int *count) { u16 *def = DEFAULT_TABLE(dfa); u32 *base = BASE_TABLE(dfa); u16 *next = NEXT_TABLE(dfa); u16 *check = CHECK_TABLE(dfa); - unsigned int pos; + unsigned int state = start, pos; + + AA_BUG(!dfa); + AA_BUG(!str); + AA_BUG(!wb); + AA_BUG(!count); + + *count = 0; + if (state == 0) + return 0; /* current state is <state>, matching character *str */ if (dfa->tables[YYTD_ID_EC]) { /* Equivalence class table defined */ u8 *equiv = EQUIV_TABLE(dfa); /* default is direct to next state */ + while (*str) { + unsigned int adjust; - pos = base_idx(base[state]) + equiv[(u8) c]; - if (check[pos] == state) - state = next[pos]; - else - state = def[state]; + wb->history[wb->pos] = state; + pos = base_idx(base[state]) + equiv[(u8) *str++]; + if (check[pos] == state) + state = next[pos]; + else + state = def[state]; + if (is_loop(wb, state, &adjust)) { + state = aa_dfa_match(dfa, state, str); + *count -= adjust; + goto out; + } + inc_wb_pos(wb); + (*count)++; + } } else { /* default is direct to next state */ - pos = base_idx(base[state]) + (u8) c; - if (check[pos] == state) - state = next[pos]; - else - state = def[state]; + while (*str) { + unsigned int adjust; + + wb->history[wb->pos] = state; + pos = base_idx(base[state]) + (u8) *str++; + if (check[pos] == state) + state = next[pos]; + else + state = def[state]; + if (is_loop(wb, state, &adjust)) { + state = aa_dfa_match(dfa, state, str); + *count -= adjust; + goto out; + } + inc_wb_pos(wb); + (*count)++; + } } +out: + if (!state) + *count = 0; return state; } + +/** + * aa_dfa_leftmatch - traverse @dfa to find state @str stops at + * @dfa: the dfa to match @str against (NOT NULL) + * @start: the state of the dfa to start matching in + * @str: the null terminated string of bytes to match against the dfa (NOT NULL) + * @count: current count of longest left. + * + * aa_dfa_match will match @str against the dfa and return the state it + * finished matching in. The final state can be used to look up the accepting + * label, or as the start state of a continuing match. + * + * Returns: final state reached after input is consumed + */ +unsigned int aa_dfa_leftmatch(struct aa_dfa *dfa, unsigned int start, + const char *str, unsigned int *count) +{ + DEFINE_MATCH_WB(wb); + + /* TODO: match for extended state dfas */ + + return leftmatch_fb(dfa, start, str, &wb, count); +} diff --git a/security/apparmor/mount.c b/security/apparmor/mount.c index 8c558cbce930..6e8c7ac0b33d 100644 --- a/security/apparmor/mount.c +++ b/security/apparmor/mount.c @@ -18,7 +18,7 @@ #include "include/apparmor.h" #include "include/audit.h" -#include "include/context.h" +#include "include/cred.h" #include "include/domain.h" #include "include/file.h" #include "include/match.h" diff --git a/security/apparmor/net.c b/security/apparmor/net.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..bb24cfa0a164 --- /dev/null +++ b/security/apparmor/net.c @@ -0,0 +1,187 @@ +/* + * AppArmor security module + * + * This file contains AppArmor network mediation + * + * Copyright (C) 1998-2008 Novell/SUSE + * Copyright 2009-2017 Canonical Ltd. + * + * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or + * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as + * published by the Free Software Foundation, version 2 of the + * License. + */ + +#include "include/apparmor.h" +#include "include/audit.h" +#include "include/cred.h" +#include "include/label.h" +#include "include/net.h" +#include "include/policy.h" + +#include "net_names.h" + + +struct aa_sfs_entry aa_sfs_entry_network[] = { + AA_SFS_FILE_STRING("af_mask", AA_SFS_AF_MASK), + { } +}; + +static const char * const net_mask_names[] = { + "unknown", + "send", + "receive", + "unknown", + + "create", + "shutdown", + "connect", + "unknown", + + "setattr", + "getattr", + "setcred", + "getcred", + + "chmod", + "chown", + "chgrp", + "lock", + + "mmap", + "mprot", + "unknown", + "unknown", + + "accept", + "bind", + "listen", + "unknown", + + "setopt", + "getopt", + "unknown", + "unknown", + + "unknown", + "unknown", + "unknown", + "unknown", +}; + + +/* audit callback for net specific fields */ +void audit_net_cb(struct audit_buffer *ab, void *va) +{ + struct common_audit_data *sa = va; + + audit_log_format(ab, " family="); + if (address_family_names[sa->u.net->family]) + audit_log_string(ab, address_family_names[sa->u.net->family]); + else + audit_log_format(ab, "\"unknown(%d)\"", sa->u.net->family); + audit_log_format(ab, " sock_type="); + if (sock_type_names[aad(sa)->net.type]) + audit_log_string(ab, sock_type_names[aad(sa)->net.type]); + else + audit_log_format(ab, "\"unknown(%d)\"", aad(sa)->net.type); + audit_log_format(ab, " protocol=%d", aad(sa)->net.protocol); + + if (aad(sa)->request & NET_PERMS_MASK) { + audit_log_format(ab, " requested_mask="); + aa_audit_perm_mask(ab, aad(sa)->request, NULL, 0, + net_mask_names, NET_PERMS_MASK); + + if (aad(sa)->denied & NET_PERMS_MASK) { + audit_log_format(ab, " denied_mask="); + aa_audit_perm_mask(ab, aad(sa)->denied, NULL, 0, + net_mask_names, NET_PERMS_MASK); + } + } + if (aad(sa)->peer) { + audit_log_format(ab, " peer="); + aa_label_xaudit(ab, labels_ns(aad(sa)->label), aad(sa)->peer, + FLAGS_NONE, GFP_ATOMIC); + } +} + +/* Generic af perm */ +int aa_profile_af_perm(struct aa_profile *profile, struct common_audit_data *sa, + u32 request, u16 family, int type) +{ + struct aa_perms perms = { }; + unsigned int state; + __be16 buffer[2]; + + AA_BUG(family >= AF_MAX); + AA_BUG(type < 0 || type >= SOCK_MAX); + + if (profile_unconfined(profile)) + return 0; + state = PROFILE_MEDIATES(profile, AA_CLASS_NET); + if (!state) + return 0; + + buffer[0] = cpu_to_be16(family); + buffer[1] = cpu_to_be16((u16) type); + state = aa_dfa_match_len(profile->policy.dfa, state, (char *) &buffer, + 4); + aa_compute_perms(profile->policy.dfa, state, &perms); + aa_apply_modes_to_perms(profile, &perms); + + return aa_check_perms(profile, &perms, request, sa, audit_net_cb); +} + +int aa_af_perm(struct aa_label *label, const char *op, u32 request, u16 family, + int type, int protocol) +{ + struct aa_profile *profile; + DEFINE_AUDIT_NET(sa, op, NULL, family, type, protocol); + + return fn_for_each_confined(label, profile, + aa_profile_af_perm(profile, &sa, request, family, + type)); +} + +static int aa_label_sk_perm(struct aa_label *label, const char *op, u32 request, + struct sock *sk) +{ + struct aa_profile *profile; + DEFINE_AUDIT_SK(sa, op, sk); + + AA_BUG(!label); + AA_BUG(!sk); + + if (unconfined(label)) + return 0; + + return fn_for_each_confined(label, profile, + aa_profile_af_sk_perm(profile, &sa, request, sk)); +} + +int aa_sk_perm(const char *op, u32 request, struct sock *sk) +{ + struct aa_label *label; + int error; + + AA_BUG(!sk); + AA_BUG(in_interrupt()); + + /* TODO: switch to begin_current_label ???? */ + label = begin_current_label_crit_section(); + error = aa_label_sk_perm(label, op, request, sk); + end_current_label_crit_section(label); + + return error; +} + + +int aa_sock_file_perm(struct aa_label *label, const char *op, u32 request, + struct socket *sock) +{ + AA_BUG(!label); + AA_BUG(!sock); + AA_BUG(!sock->sk); + + return aa_label_sk_perm(label, op, request, sock->sk); +} diff --git a/security/apparmor/nulldfa.in b/security/apparmor/nulldfa.in index 3cb38022902e..095f42a24cbc 100644 --- a/security/apparmor/nulldfa.in +++ b/security/apparmor/nulldfa.in @@ -1 +1,107 @@ -0x1B, 0x5E, 0x78, 0x3D, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x18, 0x00, 0x00, 0x04, 0x90, 0x00, 0x00, 0x6E, 0x6F, 0x74, 0x66, 0x6C, 0x65, 0x78, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x01, 0x00, 0x04, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x02, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x07, 0x00, 0x04, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x02, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x02, 0x00, 0x04, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x02, 0x00, 0x00, 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0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, +0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, +0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, +0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, +0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, +0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, +0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, +0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, +0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, +0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, +0x00, 0x00 diff --git a/security/apparmor/policy.c b/security/apparmor/policy.c index b0b58848c248..c07493ce2376 100644 --- a/security/apparmor/policy.c +++ b/security/apparmor/policy.c @@ -82,7 +82,7 @@ #include "include/apparmor.h" #include "include/capability.h" -#include "include/context.h" +#include "include/cred.h" #include "include/file.h" #include "include/ipc.h" #include "include/match.h" @@ -210,6 +210,7 @@ static void aa_free_data(void *ptr, void *arg) void aa_free_profile(struct aa_profile *profile) { struct rhashtable *rht; + int i; AA_DEBUG("%s(%p)\n", __func__, profile); @@ -227,6 +228,9 @@ void aa_free_profile(struct aa_profile *profile) aa_free_cap_rules(&profile->caps); aa_free_rlimit_rules(&profile->rlimits); + for (i = 0; i < profile->xattr_count; i++) + kzfree(profile->xattrs[i]); + kzfree(profile->xattrs); kzfree(profile->dirname); aa_put_dfa(profile->xmatch); aa_put_dfa(profile->policy.dfa); @@ -845,8 +849,9 @@ static struct aa_profile *update_to_newest_parent(struct aa_profile *new) * @udata: serialized data stream (NOT NULL) * * unpack and replace a profile on the profile list and uses of that profile - * by any aa_task_ctx. If the profile does not exist on the profile list - * it is added. + * by any task creds via invalidating the old version of the profile, which + * tasks will notice to update their own cred. If the profile does not exist + * on the profile list it is added. * * Returns: size of data consumed else error code on failure. */ diff --git a/security/apparmor/policy_ns.c b/security/apparmor/policy_ns.c index b1e629cba70b..b0f9dc3f765a 100644 --- a/security/apparmor/policy_ns.c +++ b/security/apparmor/policy_ns.c @@ -21,7 +21,7 @@ #include <linux/string.h> #include "include/apparmor.h" -#include "include/context.h" +#include "include/cred.h" #include "include/policy_ns.h" #include "include/label.h" #include "include/policy.h" diff --git a/security/apparmor/policy_unpack.c b/security/apparmor/policy_unpack.c index 59a1a25b7d43..b9e6b2cafa69 100644 --- a/security/apparmor/policy_unpack.c +++ b/security/apparmor/policy_unpack.c @@ -23,7 +23,7 @@ #include "include/apparmor.h" #include "include/audit.h" -#include "include/context.h" +#include "include/cred.h" #include "include/crypto.h" #include "include/match.h" #include "include/path.h" @@ -37,7 +37,8 @@ #define v5 5 /* base version */ #define v6 6 /* per entry policydb mediation check */ -#define v7 7 /* full network masking */ +#define v7 7 +#define v8 8 /* full network masking */ /* * The AppArmor interface treats data as a type byte followed by the @@ -164,8 +165,9 @@ static void do_loaddata_free(struct work_struct *work) } kzfree(d->hash); - kfree(d->name); - kvfree(d); + kzfree(d->name); + kvfree(d->data); + kzfree(d); } void aa_loaddata_kref(struct kref *kref) @@ -180,10 +182,16 @@ void aa_loaddata_kref(struct kref *kref) struct aa_loaddata *aa_loaddata_alloc(size_t size) { - struct aa_loaddata *d = kvzalloc(sizeof(*d) + size, GFP_KERNEL); + struct aa_loaddata *d; + d = kzalloc(sizeof(*d), GFP_KERNEL); if (d == NULL) return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM); + d->data = kvzalloc(size, GFP_KERNEL); + if (!d->data) { + kfree(d); + return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM); + } kref_init(&d->count); INIT_LIST_HEAD(&d->list); @@ -196,6 +204,15 @@ static bool inbounds(struct aa_ext *e, size_t size) return (size <= e->end - e->pos); } +static void *kvmemdup(const void *src, size_t len) +{ + void *p = kvmalloc(len, GFP_KERNEL); + + if (p) + memcpy(p, src, len); + return p; +} + /** * aa_u16_chunck - test and do bounds checking for a u16 size based chunk * @e: serialized data read head (NOT NULL) @@ -515,6 +532,35 @@ fail: return 0; } +static bool unpack_xattrs(struct aa_ext *e, struct aa_profile *profile) +{ + void *pos = e->pos; + + if (unpack_nameX(e, AA_STRUCT, "xattrs")) { + int i, size; + + size = unpack_array(e, NULL); + profile->xattr_count = size; + profile->xattrs = kcalloc(size, sizeof(char *), GFP_KERNEL); + if (!profile->xattrs) + goto fail; + for (i = 0; i < size; i++) { + if (!unpack_strdup(e, &profile->xattrs[i], NULL)) + goto fail; + } + if (!unpack_nameX(e, AA_ARRAYEND, NULL)) + goto fail; + if (!unpack_nameX(e, AA_STRUCTEND, NULL)) + goto fail; + } + + return 1; + +fail: + e->pos = pos; + return 0; +} + static bool unpack_rlimits(struct aa_ext *e, struct aa_profile *profile) { void *pos = e->pos; @@ -549,15 +595,6 @@ fail: return 0; } -static void *kvmemdup(const void *src, size_t len) -{ - void *p = kvmalloc(len, GFP_KERNEL); - - if (p) - memcpy(p, src, len); - return p; -} - static u32 strhash(const void *data, u32 len, u32 seed) { const char * const *key = data; @@ -712,6 +749,11 @@ static struct aa_profile *unpack_profile(struct aa_ext *e, char **ns_name) goto fail; } + if (!unpack_xattrs(e, profile)) { + info = "failed to unpack profile xattrs"; + goto fail; + } + if (!unpack_rlimits(e, profile)) { info = "failed to unpack profile rlimits"; goto fail; diff --git a/security/apparmor/procattr.c b/security/apparmor/procattr.c index d81617379d63..80c34ed373c3 100644 --- a/security/apparmor/procattr.c +++ b/security/apparmor/procattr.c @@ -13,7 +13,7 @@ */ #include "include/apparmor.h" -#include "include/context.h" +#include "include/cred.h" #include "include/policy.h" #include "include/policy_ns.h" #include "include/domain.h" diff --git a/security/apparmor/resource.c b/security/apparmor/resource.c index cf4d234febe9..d022137143b9 100644 --- a/security/apparmor/resource.c +++ b/security/apparmor/resource.c @@ -16,7 +16,7 @@ #include <linux/security.h> #include "include/audit.h" -#include "include/context.h" +#include "include/cred.h" #include "include/resource.h" #include "include/policy.h" diff --git a/security/apparmor/stacksplitdfa.in b/security/apparmor/stacksplitdfa.in new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..4bddd10b62a9 --- /dev/null +++ b/security/apparmor/stacksplitdfa.in @@ -0,0 +1,114 @@ +/* 0x1 [^\000]*[^/\000]//& */ 0x1B, 0x5E, 0x78, 0x3D, 0x00, 0x00, +0x00, 0x18, 0x00, 0x00, 0x04, 0xD8, 0x00, 0x00, 0x6E, 0x6F, 0x74, +0x66, 0x6C, 0x65, 0x78, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x01, 0x00, 0x04, +0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x06, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, +0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, +0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x01, 0x00, +0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x07, 0x00, 0x04, 0x00, 0x00, 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0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, +0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, +0x00, 0x00 diff --git a/security/apparmor/context.c b/security/apparmor/task.c index c95f1ac6190b..c6b78a14da91 100644 --- a/security/apparmor/context.c +++ b/security/apparmor/task.c @@ -1,72 +1,23 @@ /* * AppArmor security module * - * This file contains AppArmor functions used to manipulate object security - * contexts. + * This file contains AppArmor task related definitions and mediation * - * Copyright (C) 1998-2008 Novell/SUSE - * Copyright 2009-2010 Canonical Ltd. + * Copyright 2017 Canonical Ltd. * * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as * published by the Free Software Foundation, version 2 of the * License. * - * - * AppArmor sets confinement on every task, via the the aa_task_ctx and - * the aa_task_ctx.label, both of which are required and are not allowed - * to be NULL. The aa_task_ctx is not reference counted and is unique - * to each cred (which is reference count). The label pointed to by - * the task_ctx is reference counted. - * * TODO * If a task uses change_hat it currently does not return to the old * cred or task context but instead creates a new one. Ideally the task * should return to the previous cred if it has not been modified. - * */ -#include "include/context.h" -#include "include/policy.h" - -/** - * aa_alloc_task_context - allocate a new task_ctx - * @flags: gfp flags for allocation - * - * Returns: allocated buffer or NULL on failure - */ -struct aa_task_ctx *aa_alloc_task_context(gfp_t flags) -{ - return kzalloc(sizeof(struct aa_task_ctx), flags); -} - -/** - * aa_free_task_context - free a task_ctx - * @ctx: task_ctx to free (MAYBE NULL) - */ -void aa_free_task_context(struct aa_task_ctx *ctx) -{ - if (ctx) { - aa_put_label(ctx->label); - aa_put_label(ctx->previous); - aa_put_label(ctx->onexec); - - kzfree(ctx); - } -} - -/** - * aa_dup_task_context - duplicate a task context, incrementing reference counts - * @new: a blank task context (NOT NULL) - * @old: the task context to copy (NOT NULL) - */ -void aa_dup_task_context(struct aa_task_ctx *new, const struct aa_task_ctx *old) -{ - *new = *old; - aa_get_label(new->label); - aa_get_label(new->previous); - aa_get_label(new->onexec); -} +#include "include/cred.h" +#include "include/task.h" /** * aa_get_task_label - Get another task's label @@ -93,11 +44,13 @@ struct aa_label *aa_get_task_label(struct task_struct *task) */ int aa_replace_current_label(struct aa_label *label) { - struct aa_task_ctx *ctx = current_ctx(); + struct aa_label *old = aa_current_raw_label(); + struct aa_task_ctx *ctx = task_ctx(current); struct cred *new; + AA_BUG(!label); - if (ctx->label == label) + if (old == label) return 0; if (current_cred() != current_real_cred()) @@ -107,27 +60,34 @@ int aa_replace_current_label(struct aa_label *label) if (!new) return -ENOMEM; - ctx = cred_ctx(new); - if (unconfined(label) || (labels_ns(ctx->label) != labels_ns(label))) - /* if switching to unconfined or a different label namespace + if (ctx->nnp && label_is_stale(ctx->nnp)) { + struct aa_label *tmp = ctx->nnp; + + ctx->nnp = aa_get_newest_label(tmp); + aa_put_label(tmp); + } + if (unconfined(label) || (labels_ns(old) != labels_ns(label))) + /* + * if switching to unconfined or a different label namespace * clear out context state */ - aa_clear_task_ctx_trans(ctx); + aa_clear_task_ctx_trans(task_ctx(current)); /* - * be careful switching ctx->profile, when racing replacement it - * is possible that ctx->profile->proxy->profile is the reference - * keeping @profile valid, so make sure to get its reference before - * dropping the reference on ctx->profile + * be careful switching cred label, when racing replacement it + * is possible that the cred labels's->proxy->label is the reference + * keeping @label valid, so make sure to get its reference before + * dropping the reference on the cred's label */ aa_get_label(label); - aa_put_label(ctx->label); - ctx->label = label; + aa_put_label(cred_label(new)); + cred_label(new) = label; commit_creds(new); return 0; } + /** * aa_set_current_onexec - set the tasks change_profile to happen onexec * @label: system label to set at exec (MAYBE NULL to clear value) @@ -136,18 +96,13 @@ int aa_replace_current_label(struct aa_label *label) */ int aa_set_current_onexec(struct aa_label *label, bool stack) { - struct aa_task_ctx *ctx; - struct cred *new = prepare_creds(); - if (!new) - return -ENOMEM; + struct aa_task_ctx *ctx = task_ctx(current); - ctx = cred_ctx(new); aa_get_label(label); - aa_clear_task_ctx_trans(ctx); + aa_put_label(ctx->onexec); ctx->onexec = label; ctx->token = stack; - commit_creds(new); return 0; } @@ -163,25 +118,27 @@ int aa_set_current_onexec(struct aa_label *label, bool stack) */ int aa_set_current_hat(struct aa_label *label, u64 token) { - struct aa_task_ctx *ctx; - struct cred *new = prepare_creds(); + struct aa_task_ctx *ctx = task_ctx(current); + struct cred *new; + + new = prepare_creds(); if (!new) return -ENOMEM; AA_BUG(!label); - ctx = cred_ctx(new); if (!ctx->previous) { /* transfer refcount */ - ctx->previous = ctx->label; + ctx->previous = cred_label(new); ctx->token = token; } else if (ctx->token == token) { - aa_put_label(ctx->label); + aa_put_label(cred_label(new)); } else { /* previous_profile && ctx->token != token */ abort_creds(new); return -EACCES; } - ctx->label = aa_get_newest_label(label); + + cred_label(new) = aa_get_newest_label(label); /* clear exec on switching context */ aa_put_label(ctx->onexec); ctx->onexec = NULL; @@ -201,28 +158,26 @@ int aa_set_current_hat(struct aa_label *label, u64 token) */ int aa_restore_previous_label(u64 token) { - struct aa_task_ctx *ctx; - struct cred *new = prepare_creds(); - if (!new) - return -ENOMEM; + struct aa_task_ctx *ctx = task_ctx(current); + struct cred *new; - ctx = cred_ctx(new); - if (ctx->token != token) { - abort_creds(new); + if (ctx->token != token) return -EACCES; - } /* ignore restores when there is no saved label */ - if (!ctx->previous) { - abort_creds(new); + if (!ctx->previous) return 0; - } - aa_put_label(ctx->label); - ctx->label = aa_get_newest_label(ctx->previous); - AA_BUG(!ctx->label); + new = prepare_creds(); + if (!new) + return -ENOMEM; + + aa_put_label(cred_label(new)); + cred_label(new) = aa_get_newest_label(ctx->previous); + AA_BUG(!cred_label(new)); /* clear exec && prev information when restoring to previous context */ aa_clear_task_ctx_trans(ctx); commit_creds(new); + return 0; } |