diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'security')
44 files changed, 448 insertions, 230 deletions
diff --git a/security/apparmor/Kconfig b/security/apparmor/Kconfig index 232469baa94f..be5e9414a295 100644 --- a/security/apparmor/Kconfig +++ b/security/apparmor/Kconfig @@ -31,13 +31,26 @@ config SECURITY_APPARMOR_BOOTPARAM_VALUE If you are unsure how to answer this question, answer 1. config SECURITY_APPARMOR_HASH - bool "SHA1 hash of loaded profiles" + bool "Enable introspection of sha1 hashes for loaded profiles" depends on SECURITY_APPARMOR select CRYPTO select CRYPTO_SHA1 default y help - This option selects whether sha1 hashing is done against loaded - profiles and exported for inspection to user space via the apparmor - filesystem. + This option selects whether introspection of loaded policy + is available to userspace via the apparmor filesystem. + +config SECURITY_APPARMOR_HASH_DEFAULT + bool "Enable policy hash introspection by default" + depends on SECURITY_APPARMOR_HASH + default y + + help + This option selects whether sha1 hashing of loaded policy + is enabled by default. The generation of sha1 hashes for + loaded policy provide system administrators a quick way + to verify that policy in the kernel matches what is expected, + however it can slow down policy load on some devices. In + these cases policy hashing can be disabled by default and + enabled only if needed. diff --git a/security/apparmor/apparmorfs.c b/security/apparmor/apparmorfs.c index ad4fa49ad1db..729e595119ed 100644 --- a/security/apparmor/apparmorfs.c +++ b/security/apparmor/apparmorfs.c @@ -331,6 +331,7 @@ static int aa_fs_seq_hash_show(struct seq_file *seq, void *v) seq_printf(seq, "%.2x", profile->hash[i]); seq_puts(seq, "\n"); } + aa_put_profile(profile); return 0; } @@ -379,6 +380,8 @@ void __aa_fs_profile_migrate_dents(struct aa_profile *old, for (i = 0; i < AAFS_PROF_SIZEOF; i++) { new->dents[i] = old->dents[i]; + if (new->dents[i]) + new->dents[i]->d_inode->i_mtime = CURRENT_TIME; old->dents[i] = NULL; } } @@ -550,8 +553,6 @@ fail2: } -#define list_entry_next(pos, member) \ - list_entry(pos->member.next, typeof(*pos), member) #define list_entry_is_head(pos, head, member) (&pos->member == (head)) /** @@ -582,7 +583,7 @@ static struct aa_namespace *__next_namespace(struct aa_namespace *root, parent = ns->parent; while (ns != root) { mutex_unlock(&ns->lock); - next = list_entry_next(ns, base.list); + next = list_next_entry(ns, base.list); if (!list_entry_is_head(next, &parent->sub_ns, base.list)) { mutex_lock(&next->lock); return next; @@ -636,7 +637,7 @@ static struct aa_profile *__next_profile(struct aa_profile *p) parent = rcu_dereference_protected(p->parent, mutex_is_locked(&p->ns->lock)); while (parent) { - p = list_entry_next(p, base.list); + p = list_next_entry(p, base.list); if (!list_entry_is_head(p, &parent->base.profiles, base.list)) return p; p = parent; @@ -645,7 +646,7 @@ static struct aa_profile *__next_profile(struct aa_profile *p) } /* is next another profile in the namespace */ - p = list_entry_next(p, base.list); + p = list_next_entry(p, base.list); if (!list_entry_is_head(p, &ns->base.profiles, base.list)) return p; diff --git a/security/apparmor/audit.c b/security/apparmor/audit.c index 89c78658031f..3a7f1da1425e 100644 --- a/security/apparmor/audit.c +++ b/security/apparmor/audit.c @@ -200,7 +200,8 @@ int aa_audit(int type, struct aa_profile *profile, gfp_t gfp, if (sa->aad->type == AUDIT_APPARMOR_KILL) (void)send_sig_info(SIGKILL, NULL, - sa->u.tsk ? sa->u.tsk : current); + sa->type == LSM_AUDIT_DATA_TASK && sa->u.tsk ? + sa->u.tsk : current); if (sa->aad->type == AUDIT_APPARMOR_ALLOWED) return complain_error(sa->aad->error); diff --git a/security/apparmor/crypto.c b/security/apparmor/crypto.c index 532471d0b3a0..b75dab0df1cb 100644 --- a/security/apparmor/crypto.c +++ b/security/apparmor/crypto.c @@ -39,6 +39,9 @@ int aa_calc_profile_hash(struct aa_profile *profile, u32 version, void *start, int error = -ENOMEM; u32 le32_version = cpu_to_le32(version); + if (!aa_g_hash_policy) + return 0; + if (!apparmor_tfm) return 0; diff --git a/security/apparmor/domain.c b/security/apparmor/domain.c index dc0027b28b04..fc3036b34e51 100644 --- a/security/apparmor/domain.c +++ b/security/apparmor/domain.c @@ -346,7 +346,7 @@ int apparmor_bprm_set_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm) file_inode(bprm->file)->i_uid, file_inode(bprm->file)->i_mode }; - const char *name = NULL, *target = NULL, *info = NULL; + const char *name = NULL, *info = NULL; int error = 0; if (bprm->cred_prepared) @@ -399,6 +399,7 @@ int apparmor_bprm_set_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm) if (cxt->onexec) { struct file_perms cp; info = "change_profile onexec"; + new_profile = aa_get_newest_profile(cxt->onexec); if (!(perms.allow & AA_MAY_ONEXEC)) goto audit; @@ -413,7 +414,6 @@ int apparmor_bprm_set_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm) if (!(cp.allow & AA_MAY_ONEXEC)) goto audit; - new_profile = aa_get_newest_profile(cxt->onexec); goto apply; } @@ -433,7 +433,7 @@ int apparmor_bprm_set_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm) new_profile = aa_get_newest_profile(ns->unconfined); info = "ux fallback"; } else { - error = -ENOENT; + error = -EACCES; info = "profile not found"; /* remove MAY_EXEC to audit as failure */ perms.allow &= ~MAY_EXEC; @@ -445,10 +445,8 @@ int apparmor_bprm_set_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm) if (!new_profile) { error = -ENOMEM; info = "could not create null profile"; - } else { + } else error = -EACCES; - target = new_profile->base.hname; - } perms.xindex |= AA_X_UNSAFE; } else /* fail exec */ @@ -459,7 +457,6 @@ int apparmor_bprm_set_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm) * fail the exec. */ if (bprm->unsafe & LSM_UNSAFE_NO_NEW_PRIVS) { - aa_put_profile(new_profile); error = -EPERM; goto cleanup; } @@ -474,10 +471,8 @@ int apparmor_bprm_set_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm) if (bprm->unsafe & (LSM_UNSAFE_PTRACE | LSM_UNSAFE_PTRACE_CAP)) { error = may_change_ptraced_domain(new_profile); - if (error) { - aa_put_profile(new_profile); + if (error) goto audit; - } } /* Determine if secure exec is needed. @@ -498,7 +493,6 @@ int apparmor_bprm_set_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm) bprm->unsafe |= AA_SECURE_X_NEEDED; } apply: - target = new_profile->base.hname; /* when transitioning profiles clear unsafe personality bits */ bprm->per_clear |= PER_CLEAR_ON_SETID; @@ -506,15 +500,19 @@ x_clear: aa_put_profile(cxt->profile); /* transfer new profile reference will be released when cxt is freed */ cxt->profile = new_profile; + new_profile = NULL; /* clear out all temporary/transitional state from the context */ aa_clear_task_cxt_trans(cxt); audit: error = aa_audit_file(profile, &perms, GFP_KERNEL, OP_EXEC, MAY_EXEC, - name, target, cond.uid, info, error); + name, + new_profile ? new_profile->base.hname : NULL, + cond.uid, info, error); cleanup: + aa_put_profile(new_profile); aa_put_profile(profile); kfree(buffer); diff --git a/security/apparmor/file.c b/security/apparmor/file.c index d186674f973a..4d2af4b01033 100644 --- a/security/apparmor/file.c +++ b/security/apparmor/file.c @@ -110,7 +110,8 @@ int aa_audit_file(struct aa_profile *profile, struct file_perms *perms, int type = AUDIT_APPARMOR_AUTO; struct common_audit_data sa; struct apparmor_audit_data aad = {0,}; - sa.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NONE; + sa.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_TASK; + sa.u.tsk = NULL; sa.aad = &aad; aad.op = op, aad.fs.request = request; diff --git a/security/apparmor/include/apparmor.h b/security/apparmor/include/apparmor.h index e4ea62663866..5d721e990876 100644 --- a/security/apparmor/include/apparmor.h +++ b/security/apparmor/include/apparmor.h @@ -37,6 +37,7 @@ extern enum audit_mode aa_g_audit; extern bool aa_g_audit_header; extern bool aa_g_debug; +extern bool aa_g_hash_policy; extern bool aa_g_lock_policy; extern bool aa_g_logsyscall; extern bool aa_g_paranoid_load; diff --git a/security/apparmor/include/match.h b/security/apparmor/include/match.h index 001c43aa0406..a1c04fe86790 100644 --- a/security/apparmor/include/match.h +++ b/security/apparmor/include/match.h @@ -62,6 +62,7 @@ struct table_set_header { #define YYTD_ID_ACCEPT2 6 #define YYTD_ID_NXT 7 #define YYTD_ID_TSIZE 8 +#define YYTD_ID_MAX 8 #define YYTD_DATA8 1 #define YYTD_DATA16 2 diff --git a/security/apparmor/include/policy.h b/security/apparmor/include/policy.h index c28b0f20ab53..52275f040a5f 100644 --- a/security/apparmor/include/policy.h +++ b/security/apparmor/include/policy.h @@ -403,6 +403,8 @@ static inline int AUDIT_MODE(struct aa_profile *profile) return profile->audit; } +bool policy_view_capable(void); +bool policy_admin_capable(void); bool aa_may_manage_policy(int op); #endif /* __AA_POLICY_H */ diff --git a/security/apparmor/lsm.c b/security/apparmor/lsm.c index 7798e1608f4f..41b8cb115801 100644 --- a/security/apparmor/lsm.c +++ b/security/apparmor/lsm.c @@ -529,7 +529,7 @@ static int apparmor_setprocattr(struct task_struct *task, char *name, if (!*args) goto out; - arg_size = size - (args - (char *) value); + arg_size = size - (args - (largs ? largs : (char *) value)); if (strcmp(name, "current") == 0) { if (strcmp(command, "changehat") == 0) { error = aa_setprocattr_changehat(args, arg_size, @@ -671,6 +671,12 @@ enum profile_mode aa_g_profile_mode = APPARMOR_ENFORCE; module_param_call(mode, param_set_mode, param_get_mode, &aa_g_profile_mode, S_IRUSR | S_IWUSR); +#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_APPARMOR_HASH +/* whether policy verification hashing is enabled */ +bool aa_g_hash_policy = IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SECURITY_APPARMOR_HASH_DEFAULT); +module_param_named(hash_policy, aa_g_hash_policy, aabool, S_IRUSR | S_IWUSR); +#endif + /* Debug mode */ bool aa_g_debug; module_param_named(debug, aa_g_debug, aabool, S_IRUSR | S_IWUSR); @@ -728,51 +734,49 @@ __setup("apparmor=", apparmor_enabled_setup); /* set global flag turning off the ability to load policy */ static int param_set_aalockpolicy(const char *val, const struct kernel_param *kp) { - if (!capable(CAP_MAC_ADMIN)) + if (!policy_admin_capable()) return -EPERM; - if (aa_g_lock_policy) - return -EACCES; return param_set_bool(val, kp); } static int param_get_aalockpolicy(char *buffer, const struct kernel_param *kp) { - if (!capable(CAP_MAC_ADMIN)) + if (!policy_view_capable()) return -EPERM; return param_get_bool(buffer, kp); } static int param_set_aabool(const char *val, const struct kernel_param *kp) { - if (!capable(CAP_MAC_ADMIN)) + if (!policy_admin_capable()) return -EPERM; return param_set_bool(val, kp); } static int param_get_aabool(char *buffer, const struct kernel_param *kp) { - if (!capable(CAP_MAC_ADMIN)) + if (!policy_view_capable()) return -EPERM; return param_get_bool(buffer, kp); } static int param_set_aauint(const char *val, const struct kernel_param *kp) { - if (!capable(CAP_MAC_ADMIN)) + if (!policy_admin_capable()) return -EPERM; return param_set_uint(val, kp); } static int param_get_aauint(char *buffer, const struct kernel_param *kp) { - if (!capable(CAP_MAC_ADMIN)) + if (!policy_view_capable()) return -EPERM; return param_get_uint(buffer, kp); } static int param_get_audit(char *buffer, struct kernel_param *kp) { - if (!capable(CAP_MAC_ADMIN)) + if (!policy_view_capable()) return -EPERM; if (!apparmor_enabled) @@ -784,7 +788,7 @@ static int param_get_audit(char *buffer, struct kernel_param *kp) static int param_set_audit(const char *val, struct kernel_param *kp) { int i; - if (!capable(CAP_MAC_ADMIN)) + if (!policy_admin_capable()) return -EPERM; if (!apparmor_enabled) @@ -805,7 +809,7 @@ static int param_set_audit(const char *val, struct kernel_param *kp) static int param_get_mode(char *buffer, struct kernel_param *kp) { - if (!capable(CAP_MAC_ADMIN)) + if (!policy_admin_capable()) return -EPERM; if (!apparmor_enabled) @@ -817,7 +821,7 @@ static int param_get_mode(char *buffer, struct kernel_param *kp) static int param_set_mode(const char *val, struct kernel_param *kp) { int i; - if (!capable(CAP_MAC_ADMIN)) + if (!policy_admin_capable()) return -EPERM; if (!apparmor_enabled) diff --git a/security/apparmor/match.c b/security/apparmor/match.c index 727eb4200d5c..3f900fcca8fb 100644 --- a/security/apparmor/match.c +++ b/security/apparmor/match.c @@ -47,6 +47,8 @@ static struct table_header *unpack_table(char *blob, size_t bsize) * it every time we use td_id as an index */ th.td_id = be16_to_cpu(*(u16 *) (blob)) - 1; + if (th.td_id > YYTD_ID_MAX) + goto out; th.td_flags = be16_to_cpu(*(u16 *) (blob + 2)); th.td_lolen = be32_to_cpu(*(u32 *) (blob + 8)); blob += sizeof(struct table_header); @@ -61,7 +63,9 @@ static struct table_header *unpack_table(char *blob, size_t bsize) table = kvzalloc(tsize); if (table) { - *table = th; + table->td_id = th.td_id; + table->td_flags = th.td_flags; + table->td_lolen = th.td_lolen; if (th.td_flags == YYTD_DATA8) UNPACK_ARRAY(table->td_data, blob, th.td_lolen, u8, byte_to_byte); @@ -73,14 +77,14 @@ static struct table_header *unpack_table(char *blob, size_t bsize) u32, be32_to_cpu); else goto fail; + /* if table was vmalloced make sure the page tables are synced + * before it is used, as it goes live to all cpus. + */ + if (is_vmalloc_addr(table)) + vm_unmap_aliases(); } out: - /* if table was vmalloced make sure the page tables are synced - * before it is used, as it goes live to all cpus. - */ - if (is_vmalloc_addr(table)) - vm_unmap_aliases(); return table; fail: kvfree(table); diff --git a/security/apparmor/path.c b/security/apparmor/path.c index edddc026406b..a8fc7d08c144 100644 --- a/security/apparmor/path.c +++ b/security/apparmor/path.c @@ -25,7 +25,6 @@ #include "include/path.h" #include "include/policy.h" - /* modified from dcache.c */ static int prepend(char **buffer, int buflen, const char *str, int namelen) { @@ -39,6 +38,38 @@ static int prepend(char **buffer, int buflen, const char *str, int namelen) #define CHROOT_NSCONNECT (PATH_CHROOT_REL | PATH_CHROOT_NSCONNECT) +/* If the path is not connected to the expected root, + * check if it is a sysctl and handle specially else remove any + * leading / that __d_path may have returned. + * Unless + * specifically directed to connect the path, + * OR + * if in a chroot and doing chroot relative paths and the path + * resolves to the namespace root (would be connected outside + * of chroot) and specifically directed to connect paths to + * namespace root. + */ +static int disconnect(const struct path *path, char *buf, char **name, + int flags) +{ + int error = 0; + + if (!(flags & PATH_CONNECT_PATH) && + !(((flags & CHROOT_NSCONNECT) == CHROOT_NSCONNECT) && + our_mnt(path->mnt))) { + /* disconnected path, don't return pathname starting + * with '/' + */ + error = -EACCES; + if (**name == '/') + *name = *name + 1; + } else if (**name != '/') + /* CONNECT_PATH with missing root */ + error = prepend(name, *name - buf, "/", 1); + + return error; +} + /** * d_namespace_path - lookup a name associated with a given path * @path: path to lookup (NOT NULL) @@ -74,7 +105,8 @@ static int d_namespace_path(const struct path *path, char *buf, int buflen, * control instead of hard coded /proc */ return prepend(name, *name - buf, "/proc", 5); - } + } else + return disconnect(path, buf, name, flags); return 0; } @@ -120,29 +152,8 @@ static int d_namespace_path(const struct path *path, char *buf, int buflen, goto out; } - /* If the path is not connected to the expected root, - * check if it is a sysctl and handle specially else remove any - * leading / that __d_path may have returned. - * Unless - * specifically directed to connect the path, - * OR - * if in a chroot and doing chroot relative paths and the path - * resolves to the namespace root (would be connected outside - * of chroot) and specifically directed to connect paths to - * namespace root. - */ - if (!connected) { - if (!(flags & PATH_CONNECT_PATH) && - !(((flags & CHROOT_NSCONNECT) == CHROOT_NSCONNECT) && - our_mnt(path->mnt))) { - /* disconnected path, don't return pathname starting - * with '/' - */ - error = -EACCES; - if (*res == '/') - *name = res + 1; - } - } + if (!connected) + error = disconnect(path, buf, name, flags); out: return error; diff --git a/security/apparmor/policy.c b/security/apparmor/policy.c index 705c2879d3a9..179e68d7dc5f 100644 --- a/security/apparmor/policy.c +++ b/security/apparmor/policy.c @@ -766,7 +766,9 @@ struct aa_profile *aa_find_child(struct aa_profile *parent, const char *name) struct aa_profile *profile; rcu_read_lock(); - profile = aa_get_profile(__find_child(&parent->base.profiles, name)); + do { + profile = __find_child(&parent->base.profiles, name); + } while (profile && !aa_get_profile_not0(profile)); rcu_read_unlock(); /* refcount released by caller */ @@ -916,6 +918,22 @@ static int audit_policy(int op, gfp_t gfp, const char *name, const char *info, &sa, NULL); } +bool policy_view_capable(void) +{ + struct user_namespace *user_ns = current_user_ns(); + bool response = false; + + if (ns_capable(user_ns, CAP_MAC_ADMIN)) + response = true; + + return response; +} + +bool policy_admin_capable(void) +{ + return policy_view_capable() && !aa_g_lock_policy; +} + /** * aa_may_manage_policy - can the current task manage policy * @op: the policy manipulation operation being done @@ -930,7 +948,7 @@ bool aa_may_manage_policy(int op) return 0; } - if (!capable(CAP_MAC_ADMIN)) { + if (!policy_admin_capable()) { audit_policy(op, GFP_KERNEL, NULL, "not policy admin", -EACCES); return 0; } @@ -1067,7 +1085,7 @@ static int __lookup_replace(struct aa_namespace *ns, const char *hname, */ ssize_t aa_replace_profiles(void *udata, size_t size, bool noreplace) { - const char *ns_name, *name = NULL, *info = NULL; + const char *ns_name, *info = NULL; struct aa_namespace *ns = NULL; struct aa_load_ent *ent, *tmp; int op = OP_PROF_REPL; @@ -1082,18 +1100,15 @@ ssize_t aa_replace_profiles(void *udata, size_t size, bool noreplace) /* released below */ ns = aa_prepare_namespace(ns_name); if (!ns) { - info = "failed to prepare namespace"; - error = -ENOMEM; - name = ns_name; - goto fail; + error = audit_policy(op, GFP_KERNEL, ns_name, + "failed to prepare namespace", -ENOMEM); + goto free; } mutex_lock(&ns->lock); /* setup parent and ns info */ list_for_each_entry(ent, &lh, list) { struct aa_policy *policy; - - name = ent->new->base.hname; error = __lookup_replace(ns, ent->new->base.hname, noreplace, &ent->old, &info); if (error) @@ -1121,7 +1136,6 @@ ssize_t aa_replace_profiles(void *udata, size_t size, bool noreplace) if (!p) { error = -ENOENT; info = "parent does not exist"; - name = ent->new->base.hname; goto fail_lock; } rcu_assign_pointer(ent->new->parent, aa_get_profile(p)); @@ -1163,7 +1177,7 @@ ssize_t aa_replace_profiles(void *udata, size_t size, bool noreplace) list_del_init(&ent->list); op = (!ent->old && !ent->rename) ? OP_PROF_LOAD : OP_PROF_REPL; - audit_policy(op, GFP_ATOMIC, ent->new->base.name, NULL, error); + audit_policy(op, GFP_ATOMIC, ent->new->base.hname, NULL, error); if (ent->old) { __replace_profile(ent->old, ent->new, 1); @@ -1187,14 +1201,14 @@ ssize_t aa_replace_profiles(void *udata, size_t size, bool noreplace) /* parent replaced in this atomic set? */ if (newest != parent) { aa_get_profile(newest); - aa_put_profile(parent); rcu_assign_pointer(ent->new->parent, newest); - } else - aa_put_profile(newest); + aa_put_profile(parent); + } /* aafs interface uses replacedby */ rcu_assign_pointer(ent->new->replacedby->profile, aa_get_profile(ent->new)); - __list_add_profile(&parent->base.profiles, ent->new); + __list_add_profile(&newest->base.profiles, ent->new); + aa_put_profile(newest); } else { /* aafs interface uses replacedby */ rcu_assign_pointer(ent->new->replacedby->profile, @@ -1214,9 +1228,22 @@ out: fail_lock: mutex_unlock(&ns->lock); -fail: - error = audit_policy(op, GFP_KERNEL, name, info, error); + /* audit cause of failure */ + op = (!ent->old) ? OP_PROF_LOAD : OP_PROF_REPL; + audit_policy(op, GFP_KERNEL, ent->new->base.hname, info, error); + /* audit status that rest of profiles in the atomic set failed too */ + info = "valid profile in failed atomic policy load"; + list_for_each_entry(tmp, &lh, list) { + if (tmp == ent) { + info = "unchecked profile in failed atomic policy load"; + /* skip entry that caused failure */ + continue; + } + op = (!ent->old) ? OP_PROF_LOAD : OP_PROF_REPL; + audit_policy(op, GFP_KERNEL, tmp->new->base.hname, info, error); + } +free: list_for_each_entry_safe(ent, tmp, &lh, list) { list_del_init(&ent->list); aa_load_ent_free(ent); diff --git a/security/apparmor/policy_unpack.c b/security/apparmor/policy_unpack.c index a689f10930b5..138120698f83 100644 --- a/security/apparmor/policy_unpack.c +++ b/security/apparmor/policy_unpack.c @@ -583,6 +583,9 @@ static struct aa_profile *unpack_profile(struct aa_ext *e) error = PTR_ERR(profile->policy.dfa); profile->policy.dfa = NULL; goto fail; + } else if (!profile->policy.dfa) { + error = -EPROTO; + goto fail; } if (!unpack_u32(e, &profile->policy.start[0], "start")) /* default start state */ @@ -676,7 +679,7 @@ static bool verify_xindex(int xindex, int table_size) int index, xtype; xtype = xindex & AA_X_TYPE_MASK; index = xindex & AA_X_INDEX_MASK; - if (xtype == AA_X_TABLE && index > table_size) + if (xtype == AA_X_TABLE && index >= table_size) return 0; return 1; } @@ -776,7 +779,7 @@ int aa_unpack(void *udata, size_t size, struct list_head *lh, const char **ns) goto fail_profile; error = aa_calc_profile_hash(profile, e.version, start, - e.pos - start); + e.pos - start); if (error) goto fail_profile; diff --git a/security/apparmor/resource.c b/security/apparmor/resource.c index 748bf0ca6c9f..67a6072ead4b 100644 --- a/security/apparmor/resource.c +++ b/security/apparmor/resource.c @@ -101,9 +101,11 @@ int aa_task_setrlimit(struct aa_profile *profile, struct task_struct *task, /* TODO: extend resource control to handle other (non current) * profiles. AppArmor rules currently have the implicit assumption * that the task is setting the resource of a task confined with - * the same profile. + * the same profile or that the task setting the resource of another + * task has CAP_SYS_RESOURCE. */ - if (profile != task_profile || + if ((profile != task_profile && + aa_capable(profile, CAP_SYS_RESOURCE, 1)) || (profile->rlimits.mask & (1 << resource) && new_rlim->rlim_max > profile->rlimits.limits[resource].rlim_max)) error = -EACCES; diff --git a/security/commoncap.c b/security/commoncap.c index e7fadde737f4..14540bd78561 100644 --- a/security/commoncap.c +++ b/security/commoncap.c @@ -453,7 +453,15 @@ static int get_file_caps(struct linux_binprm *bprm, bool *effective, bool *has_c if (!file_caps_enabled) return 0; - if (bprm->file->f_path.mnt->mnt_flags & MNT_NOSUID) + if (!mnt_may_suid(bprm->file->f_path.mnt)) + return 0; + + /* + * This check is redundant with mnt_may_suid() but is kept to make + * explicit that capability bits are limited to s_user_ns and its + * descendants. + */ + if (!current_in_userns(bprm->file->f_path.mnt->mnt_sb->s_user_ns)) return 0; rc = get_vfs_caps_from_disk(bprm->file->f_path.dentry, &vcaps); diff --git a/security/inode.c b/security/inode.c index 28414b0207ce..e3df905ab5b1 100644 --- a/security/inode.c +++ b/security/inode.c @@ -186,24 +186,21 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(securityfs_create_dir); */ void securityfs_remove(struct dentry *dentry) { - struct dentry *parent; + struct inode *dir; if (!dentry || IS_ERR(dentry)) return; - parent = dentry->d_parent; - if (!parent || d_really_is_negative(parent)) - return; - - inode_lock(d_inode(parent)); + dir = d_inode(dentry->d_parent); + inode_lock(dir); if (simple_positive(dentry)) { if (d_is_dir(dentry)) - simple_rmdir(d_inode(parent), dentry); + simple_rmdir(dir, dentry); else - simple_unlink(d_inode(parent), dentry); + simple_unlink(dir, dentry); dput(dentry); } - inode_unlock(d_inode(parent)); + inode_unlock(dir); simple_release_fs(&mount, &mount_count); } EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(securityfs_remove); diff --git a/security/integrity/evm/evm_crypto.c b/security/integrity/evm/evm_crypto.c index 30b6b7d0429f..11c1d30bd705 100644 --- a/security/integrity/evm/evm_crypto.c +++ b/security/integrity/evm/evm_crypto.c @@ -151,8 +151,8 @@ static void hmac_add_misc(struct shash_desc *desc, struct inode *inode, memset(&hmac_misc, 0, sizeof(hmac_misc)); hmac_misc.ino = inode->i_ino; hmac_misc.generation = inode->i_generation; - hmac_misc.uid = from_kuid(&init_user_ns, inode->i_uid); - hmac_misc.gid = from_kgid(&init_user_ns, inode->i_gid); + hmac_misc.uid = from_kuid(inode->i_sb->s_user_ns, inode->i_uid); + hmac_misc.gid = from_kgid(inode->i_sb->s_user_ns, inode->i_gid); hmac_misc.mode = inode->i_mode; crypto_shash_update(desc, (const u8 *)&hmac_misc, sizeof(hmac_misc)); if (evm_hmac_attrs & EVM_ATTR_FSUUID) diff --git a/security/integrity/iint.c b/security/integrity/iint.c index 345b75997e4c..c710d22042f9 100644 --- a/security/integrity/iint.c +++ b/security/integrity/iint.c @@ -79,6 +79,7 @@ static void iint_free(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint) iint->ima_bprm_status = INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN; iint->ima_read_status = INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN; iint->evm_status = INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN; + iint->measured_pcrs = 0; kmem_cache_free(iint_cache, iint); } @@ -159,6 +160,7 @@ static void init_once(void *foo) iint->ima_bprm_status = INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN; iint->ima_read_status = INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN; iint->evm_status = INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN; + iint->measured_pcrs = 0; } static int __init integrity_iintcache_init(void) diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h index d3a939bf2781..db25f54a04fe 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h @@ -88,6 +88,7 @@ struct ima_template_desc { }; struct ima_template_entry { + int pcr; u8 digest[TPM_DIGEST_SIZE]; /* sha1 or md5 measurement hash */ struct ima_template_desc *template_desc; /* template descriptor */ u32 template_data_len; @@ -154,7 +155,8 @@ enum ima_hooks { }; /* LIM API function definitions */ -int ima_get_action(struct inode *inode, int mask, enum ima_hooks func); +int ima_get_action(struct inode *inode, int mask, + enum ima_hooks func, int *pcr); int ima_must_measure(struct inode *inode, int mask, enum ima_hooks func); int ima_collect_measurement(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint, struct file *file, void *buf, loff_t size, @@ -162,19 +164,20 @@ int ima_collect_measurement(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint, void ima_store_measurement(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint, struct file *file, const unsigned char *filename, struct evm_ima_xattr_data *xattr_value, - int xattr_len); + int xattr_len, int pcr); void ima_audit_measurement(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint, const unsigned char *filename); int ima_alloc_init_template(struct ima_event_data *event_data, struct ima_template_entry **entry); int ima_store_template(struct ima_template_entry *entry, int violation, - struct inode *inode, const unsigned char *filename); + struct inode *inode, + const unsigned char *filename, int pcr); void ima_free_template_entry(struct ima_template_entry *entry); const char *ima_d_path(const struct path *path, char **pathbuf); /* IMA policy related functions */ int ima_match_policy(struct inode *inode, enum ima_hooks func, int mask, - int flags); + int flags, int *pcr); void ima_init_policy(void); void ima_update_policy(void); void ima_update_policy_flag(void); diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c index 5a2218fe877a..9df26a2b75ba 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c @@ -87,7 +87,7 @@ out: */ int ima_store_template(struct ima_template_entry *entry, int violation, struct inode *inode, - const unsigned char *filename) + const unsigned char *filename, int pcr) { static const char op[] = "add_template_measure"; static const char audit_cause[] = "hashing_error"; @@ -114,6 +114,7 @@ int ima_store_template(struct ima_template_entry *entry, } memcpy(entry->digest, hash.hdr.digest, hash.hdr.length); } + entry->pcr = pcr; result = ima_add_template_entry(entry, violation, op, inode, filename); return result; } @@ -144,7 +145,8 @@ void ima_add_violation(struct file *file, const unsigned char *filename, result = -ENOMEM; goto err_out; } - result = ima_store_template(entry, violation, inode, filename); + result = ima_store_template(entry, violation, inode, + filename, CONFIG_IMA_MEASURE_PCR_IDX); if (result < 0) ima_free_template_entry(entry); err_out: @@ -157,6 +159,7 @@ err_out: * @inode: pointer to inode to measure * @mask: contains the permission mask (MAY_READ, MAY_WRITE, MAY_EXECUTE) * @func: caller identifier + * @pcr: pointer filled in if matched measure policy sets pcr= * * The policy is defined in terms of keypairs: * subj=, obj=, type=, func=, mask=, fsmagic= @@ -168,13 +171,13 @@ err_out: * Returns IMA_MEASURE, IMA_APPRAISE mask. * */ -int ima_get_action(struct inode *inode, int mask, enum ima_hooks func) +int ima_get_action(struct inode *inode, int mask, enum ima_hooks func, int *pcr) { int flags = IMA_MEASURE | IMA_AUDIT | IMA_APPRAISE; flags &= ima_policy_flag; - return ima_match_policy(inode, func, mask, flags); + return ima_match_policy(inode, func, mask, flags, pcr); } /* @@ -252,7 +255,7 @@ out: void ima_store_measurement(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint, struct file *file, const unsigned char *filename, struct evm_ima_xattr_data *xattr_value, - int xattr_len) + int xattr_len, int pcr) { static const char op[] = "add_template_measure"; static const char audit_cause[] = "ENOMEM"; @@ -263,7 +266,7 @@ void ima_store_measurement(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint, xattr_len, NULL}; int violation = 0; - if (iint->flags & IMA_MEASURED) + if (iint->measured_pcrs & (0x1 << pcr)) return; result = ima_alloc_init_template(&event_data, &entry); @@ -273,9 +276,11 @@ void ima_store_measurement(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint, return; } - result = ima_store_template(entry, violation, inode, filename); - if (!result || result == -EEXIST) + result = ima_store_template(entry, violation, inode, filename, pcr); + if (!result || result == -EEXIST) { iint->flags |= IMA_MEASURED; + iint->measured_pcrs |= (0x1 << pcr); + } if (result < 0) ima_free_template_entry(entry); } diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c index 1bcbc12e03d9..4b9b4a4e1b89 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c @@ -41,7 +41,7 @@ int ima_must_appraise(struct inode *inode, int mask, enum ima_hooks func) if (!ima_appraise) return 0; - return ima_match_policy(inode, func, mask, IMA_APPRAISE); + return ima_match_policy(inode, func, mask, IMA_APPRAISE, NULL); } static int ima_fix_xattr(struct dentry *dentry, @@ -370,6 +370,7 @@ static void ima_reset_appraise_flags(struct inode *inode, int digsig) return; iint->flags &= ~IMA_DONE_MASK; + iint->measured_pcrs = 0; if (digsig) iint->flags |= IMA_DIGSIG; return; diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c index 60d011aaec38..c07a3844ea0a 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c @@ -123,7 +123,6 @@ static int ima_measurements_show(struct seq_file *m, void *v) struct ima_template_entry *e; char *template_name; int namelen; - u32 pcr = CONFIG_IMA_MEASURE_PCR_IDX; bool is_ima_template = false; int i; @@ -137,10 +136,10 @@ static int ima_measurements_show(struct seq_file *m, void *v) /* * 1st: PCRIndex - * PCR used is always the same (config option) in - * little-endian format + * PCR used defaults to the same (config option) in + * little-endian format, unless set in policy */ - ima_putc(m, &pcr, sizeof(pcr)); + ima_putc(m, &e->pcr, sizeof(e->pcr)); /* 2nd: template digest */ ima_putc(m, e->digest, TPM_DIGEST_SIZE); @@ -219,7 +218,7 @@ static int ima_ascii_measurements_show(struct seq_file *m, void *v) e->template_desc->name : e->template_desc->fmt; /* 1st: PCR used (config option) */ - seq_printf(m, "%2d ", CONFIG_IMA_MEASURE_PCR_IDX); + seq_printf(m, "%2d ", e->pcr); /* 2nd: SHA1 template hash */ ima_print_digest(m, e->digest, TPM_DIGEST_SIZE); diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_init.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_init.c index 5d679a685616..32912bd54ead 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_init.c +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_init.c @@ -79,7 +79,8 @@ static int __init ima_add_boot_aggregate(void) } result = ima_store_template(entry, violation, NULL, - boot_aggregate_name); + boot_aggregate_name, + CONFIG_IMA_MEASURE_PCR_IDX); if (result < 0) { ima_free_template_entry(entry); audit_cause = "store_entry"; diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c index 68b26c340acd..596ef616ac21 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c @@ -125,6 +125,7 @@ static void ima_check_last_writer(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint, if ((iint->version != inode->i_version) || (iint->flags & IMA_NEW_FILE)) { iint->flags &= ~(IMA_DONE_MASK | IMA_NEW_FILE); + iint->measured_pcrs = 0; if (iint->flags & IMA_APPRAISE) ima_update_xattr(iint, file); } @@ -162,6 +163,7 @@ static int process_measurement(struct file *file, char *buf, loff_t size, char *pathbuf = NULL; const char *pathname = NULL; int rc = -ENOMEM, action, must_appraise; + int pcr = CONFIG_IMA_MEASURE_PCR_IDX; struct evm_ima_xattr_data *xattr_value = NULL; int xattr_len = 0; bool violation_check; @@ -174,7 +176,7 @@ static int process_measurement(struct file *file, char *buf, loff_t size, * bitmask based on the appraise/audit/measurement policy. * Included is the appraise submask. */ - action = ima_get_action(inode, mask, func); + action = ima_get_action(inode, mask, func, &pcr); violation_check = ((func == FILE_CHECK || func == MMAP_CHECK) && (ima_policy_flag & IMA_MEASURE)); if (!action && !violation_check) @@ -209,7 +211,11 @@ static int process_measurement(struct file *file, char *buf, loff_t size, */ iint->flags |= action; action &= IMA_DO_MASK; - action &= ~((iint->flags & IMA_DONE_MASK) >> 1); + action &= ~((iint->flags & (IMA_DONE_MASK ^ IMA_MEASURED)) >> 1); + + /* If target pcr is already measured, unset IMA_MEASURE action */ + if ((action & IMA_MEASURE) && (iint->measured_pcrs & (0x1 << pcr))) + action ^= IMA_MEASURE; /* Nothing to do, just return existing appraised status */ if (!action) { @@ -238,7 +244,7 @@ static int process_measurement(struct file *file, char *buf, loff_t size, if (action & IMA_MEASURE) ima_store_measurement(iint, file, pathname, - xattr_value, xattr_len); + xattr_value, xattr_len, pcr); if (action & IMA_APPRAISE_SUBMASK) rc = ima_appraise_measurement(func, iint, file, pathname, xattr_value, xattr_len, opened); diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c index 0f887a564a29..aed47b777a57 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c @@ -32,6 +32,7 @@ #define IMA_FSUUID 0x0020 #define IMA_INMASK 0x0040 #define IMA_EUID 0x0080 +#define IMA_PCR 0x0100 #define UNKNOWN 0 #define MEASURE 0x0001 /* same as IMA_MEASURE */ @@ -40,6 +41,9 @@ #define DONT_APPRAISE 0x0008 #define AUDIT 0x0040 +#define INVALID_PCR(a) (((a) < 0) || \ + (a) >= (FIELD_SIZEOF(struct integrity_iint_cache, measured_pcrs) * 8)) + int ima_policy_flag; static int temp_ima_appraise; @@ -60,6 +64,7 @@ struct ima_rule_entry { u8 fsuuid[16]; kuid_t uid; kuid_t fowner; + int pcr; struct { void *rule; /* LSM file metadata specific */ void *args_p; /* audit value */ @@ -319,6 +324,7 @@ static int get_subaction(struct ima_rule_entry *rule, enum ima_hooks func) * @inode: pointer to an inode for which the policy decision is being made * @func: IMA hook identifier * @mask: requested action (MAY_READ | MAY_WRITE | MAY_APPEND | MAY_EXEC) + * @pcr: set the pcr to extend * * Measure decision based on func/mask/fsmagic and LSM(subj/obj/type) * conditions. @@ -328,7 +334,7 @@ static int get_subaction(struct ima_rule_entry *rule, enum ima_hooks func) * than writes so ima_match_policy() is classical RCU candidate. */ int ima_match_policy(struct inode *inode, enum ima_hooks func, int mask, - int flags) + int flags, int *pcr) { struct ima_rule_entry *entry; int action = 0, actmask = flags | (flags << 1); @@ -353,6 +359,9 @@ int ima_match_policy(struct inode *inode, enum ima_hooks func, int mask, else actmask &= ~(entry->action | entry->action >> 1); + if ((pcr) && (entry->flags & IMA_PCR)) + *pcr = entry->pcr; + if (!actmask) break; } @@ -478,7 +487,8 @@ enum { Opt_subj_user, Opt_subj_role, Opt_subj_type, Opt_func, Opt_mask, Opt_fsmagic, Opt_fsuuid, Opt_uid, Opt_euid, Opt_fowner, - Opt_appraise_type, Opt_permit_directio + Opt_appraise_type, Opt_permit_directio, + Opt_pcr }; static match_table_t policy_tokens = { @@ -502,6 +512,7 @@ static match_table_t policy_tokens = { {Opt_fowner, "fowner=%s"}, {Opt_appraise_type, "appraise_type=%s"}, {Opt_permit_directio, "permit_directio"}, + {Opt_pcr, "pcr=%s"}, {Opt_err, NULL} }; @@ -774,6 +785,20 @@ static int ima_parse_rule(char *rule, struct ima_rule_entry *entry) case Opt_permit_directio: entry->flags |= IMA_PERMIT_DIRECTIO; break; + case Opt_pcr: + if (entry->action != MEASURE) { + result = -EINVAL; + break; + } + ima_log_string(ab, "pcr", args[0].from); + + result = kstrtoint(args[0].from, 10, &entry->pcr); + if (result || INVALID_PCR(entry->pcr)) + result = -EINVAL; + else + entry->flags |= IMA_PCR; + + break; case Opt_err: ima_log_string(ab, "UNKNOWN", p); result = -EINVAL; @@ -1011,6 +1036,12 @@ int ima_policy_show(struct seq_file *m, void *v) seq_puts(m, " "); } + if (entry->flags & IMA_PCR) { + snprintf(tbuf, sizeof(tbuf), "%d", entry->pcr); + seq_printf(m, pt(Opt_pcr), tbuf); + seq_puts(m, " "); + } + if (entry->flags & IMA_FSUUID) { seq_printf(m, "fsuuid=%pU", entry->fsuuid); seq_puts(m, " "); diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_queue.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_queue.c index 552705d5a78d..32f6ac0f96df 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_queue.c +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_queue.c @@ -44,7 +44,8 @@ struct ima_h_table ima_htable = { static DEFINE_MUTEX(ima_extend_list_mutex); /* lookup up the digest value in the hash table, and return the entry */ -static struct ima_queue_entry *ima_lookup_digest_entry(u8 *digest_value) +static struct ima_queue_entry *ima_lookup_digest_entry(u8 *digest_value, + int pcr) { struct ima_queue_entry *qe, *ret = NULL; unsigned int key; @@ -54,7 +55,7 @@ static struct ima_queue_entry *ima_lookup_digest_entry(u8 *digest_value) rcu_read_lock(); hlist_for_each_entry_rcu(qe, &ima_htable.queue[key], hnext) { rc = memcmp(qe->entry->digest, digest_value, TPM_DIGEST_SIZE); - if (rc == 0) { + if ((rc == 0) && (qe->entry->pcr == pcr)) { ret = qe; break; } @@ -89,14 +90,14 @@ static int ima_add_digest_entry(struct ima_template_entry *entry) return 0; } -static int ima_pcr_extend(const u8 *hash) +static int ima_pcr_extend(const u8 *hash, int pcr) { int result = 0; if (!ima_used_chip) return result; - result = tpm_pcr_extend(TPM_ANY_NUM, CONFIG_IMA_MEASURE_PCR_IDX, hash); + result = tpm_pcr_extend(TPM_ANY_NUM, pcr, hash); if (result != 0) pr_err("Error Communicating to TPM chip, result: %d\n", result); return result; @@ -118,7 +119,7 @@ int ima_add_template_entry(struct ima_template_entry *entry, int violation, mutex_lock(&ima_extend_list_mutex); if (!violation) { memcpy(digest, entry->digest, sizeof(digest)); - if (ima_lookup_digest_entry(digest)) { + if (ima_lookup_digest_entry(digest, entry->pcr)) { audit_cause = "hash_exists"; result = -EEXIST; goto out; @@ -135,7 +136,7 @@ int ima_add_template_entry(struct ima_template_entry *entry, int violation, if (violation) /* invalidate pcr */ memset(digest, 0xff, sizeof(digest)); - tpmresult = ima_pcr_extend(digest); + tpmresult = ima_pcr_extend(digest, entry->pcr); if (tpmresult != 0) { snprintf(tpm_audit_cause, AUDIT_CAUSE_LEN_MAX, "TPM_error(%d)", tpmresult); diff --git a/security/integrity/integrity.h b/security/integrity/integrity.h index 90bc57d796ec..24520b4ef3b0 100644 --- a/security/integrity/integrity.h +++ b/security/integrity/integrity.h @@ -103,6 +103,7 @@ struct integrity_iint_cache { struct inode *inode; /* back pointer to inode in question */ u64 version; /* track inode changes */ unsigned long flags; + unsigned long measured_pcrs; enum integrity_status ima_file_status:4; enum integrity_status ima_mmap_status:4; enum integrity_status ima_bprm_status:4; diff --git a/security/keys/big_key.c b/security/keys/big_key.c index 9e443fccad4c..c0b3030b5634 100644 --- a/security/keys/big_key.c +++ b/security/keys/big_key.c @@ -18,6 +18,7 @@ #include <keys/user-type.h> #include <keys/big_key-type.h> #include <crypto/rng.h> +#include <crypto/skcipher.h> /* * Layout of key payload words. @@ -74,7 +75,7 @@ static const char big_key_alg_name[] = "ecb(aes)"; * Crypto algorithms for big_key data encryption */ static struct crypto_rng *big_key_rng; -static struct crypto_blkcipher *big_key_blkcipher; +static struct crypto_skcipher *big_key_skcipher; /* * Generate random key to encrypt big_key data @@ -91,22 +92,26 @@ static int big_key_crypt(enum big_key_op op, u8 *data, size_t datalen, u8 *key) { int ret = -EINVAL; struct scatterlist sgio; - struct blkcipher_desc desc; + SKCIPHER_REQUEST_ON_STACK(req, big_key_skcipher); - if (crypto_blkcipher_setkey(big_key_blkcipher, key, ENC_KEY_SIZE)) { + if (crypto_skcipher_setkey(big_key_skcipher, key, ENC_KEY_SIZE)) { ret = -EAGAIN; goto error; } - desc.flags = 0; - desc.tfm = big_key_blkcipher; + skcipher_request_set_tfm(req, big_key_skcipher); + skcipher_request_set_callback(req, CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_SLEEP, + NULL, NULL); sg_init_one(&sgio, data, datalen); + skcipher_request_set_crypt(req, &sgio, &sgio, datalen, NULL); if (op == BIG_KEY_ENC) - ret = crypto_blkcipher_encrypt(&desc, &sgio, &sgio, datalen); + ret = crypto_skcipher_encrypt(req); else - ret = crypto_blkcipher_decrypt(&desc, &sgio, &sgio, datalen); + ret = crypto_skcipher_decrypt(req); + + skcipher_request_zero(req); error: return ret; @@ -140,7 +145,7 @@ int big_key_preparse(struct key_preparsed_payload *prep) * * File content is stored encrypted with randomly generated key. */ - size_t enclen = ALIGN(datalen, crypto_blkcipher_blocksize(big_key_blkcipher)); + size_t enclen = ALIGN(datalen, crypto_skcipher_blocksize(big_key_skcipher)); /* prepare aligned data to encrypt */ data = kmalloc(enclen, GFP_KERNEL); @@ -288,7 +293,7 @@ long big_key_read(const struct key *key, char __user *buffer, size_t buflen) struct file *file; u8 *data; u8 *enckey = (u8 *)key->payload.data[big_key_data]; - size_t enclen = ALIGN(datalen, crypto_blkcipher_blocksize(big_key_blkcipher)); + size_t enclen = ALIGN(datalen, crypto_skcipher_blocksize(big_key_skcipher)); data = kmalloc(enclen, GFP_KERNEL); if (!data) @@ -359,9 +364,10 @@ static int __init big_key_crypto_init(void) goto error; /* init block cipher */ - big_key_blkcipher = crypto_alloc_blkcipher(big_key_alg_name, 0, 0); - if (IS_ERR(big_key_blkcipher)) { - big_key_blkcipher = NULL; + big_key_skcipher = crypto_alloc_skcipher(big_key_alg_name, + 0, CRYPTO_ALG_ASYNC); + if (IS_ERR(big_key_skcipher)) { + big_key_skcipher = NULL; ret = -EFAULT; goto error; } diff --git a/security/keys/persistent.c b/security/keys/persistent.c index 2ef45b319dd9..1edc1f0a0ce2 100644 --- a/security/keys/persistent.c +++ b/security/keys/persistent.c @@ -114,7 +114,7 @@ found: ret = key_link(key_ref_to_ptr(dest_ref), persistent); if (ret == 0) { key_set_timeout(persistent, persistent_keyring_expiry); - ret = persistent->serial; + ret = persistent->serial; } } diff --git a/security/keys/request_key.c b/security/keys/request_key.c index a29e3554751e..43affcf10b22 100644 --- a/security/keys/request_key.c +++ b/security/keys/request_key.c @@ -442,7 +442,7 @@ static struct key *construct_key_and_link(struct keyring_search_context *ctx, if (ctx->index_key.type == &key_type_keyring) return ERR_PTR(-EPERM); - + user = key_user_lookup(current_fsuid()); if (!user) return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM); diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c index 709569305d32..4838e7fefa1f 100644 --- a/security/security.c +++ b/security/security.c @@ -356,7 +356,7 @@ void security_inode_free(struct inode *inode) } int security_dentry_init_security(struct dentry *dentry, int mode, - struct qstr *name, void **ctx, + const struct qstr *name, void **ctx, u32 *ctxlen) { return call_int_hook(dentry_init_security, -EOPNOTSUPP, dentry, mode, @@ -700,18 +700,39 @@ int security_inode_killpriv(struct dentry *dentry) int security_inode_getsecurity(struct inode *inode, const char *name, void **buffer, bool alloc) { + struct security_hook_list *hp; + int rc; + if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(inode))) return -EOPNOTSUPP; - return call_int_hook(inode_getsecurity, -EOPNOTSUPP, inode, name, - buffer, alloc); + /* + * Only one module will provide an attribute with a given name. + */ + list_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.inode_getsecurity, list) { + rc = hp->hook.inode_getsecurity(inode, name, buffer, alloc); + if (rc != -EOPNOTSUPP) + return rc; + } + return -EOPNOTSUPP; } int security_inode_setsecurity(struct inode *inode, const char *name, const void *value, size_t size, int flags) { + struct security_hook_list *hp; + int rc; + if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(inode))) return -EOPNOTSUPP; - return call_int_hook(inode_setsecurity, -EOPNOTSUPP, inode, name, - value, size, flags); + /* + * Only one module will provide an attribute with a given name. + */ + list_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.inode_setsecurity, list) { + rc = hp->hook.inode_setsecurity(inode, name, value, size, + flags); + if (rc != -EOPNOTSUPP) + return rc; + } + return -EOPNOTSUPP; } int security_inode_listsecurity(struct inode *inode, char *buffer, size_t buffer_size) diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c index a86d537eb79b..13185a6c266a 100644 --- a/security/selinux/hooks.c +++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c @@ -830,6 +830,28 @@ static int selinux_set_mnt_opts(struct super_block *sb, goto out; } } + + /* + * If this is a user namespace mount, no contexts are allowed + * on the command line and security labels must be ignored. + */ + if (sb->s_user_ns != &init_user_ns) { + if (context_sid || fscontext_sid || rootcontext_sid || + defcontext_sid) { + rc = -EACCES; + goto out; + } + if (sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_XATTR) { + sbsec->behavior = SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT; + rc = security_transition_sid(current_sid(), current_sid(), + SECCLASS_FILE, NULL, + &sbsec->mntpoint_sid); + if (rc) + goto out; + } + goto out_set_opts; + } + /* sets the context of the superblock for the fs being mounted. */ if (fscontext_sid) { rc = may_context_mount_sb_relabel(fscontext_sid, sbsec, cred); @@ -898,6 +920,7 @@ static int selinux_set_mnt_opts(struct super_block *sb, sbsec->def_sid = defcontext_sid; } +out_set_opts: rc = sb_finish_set_opts(sb); out: mutex_unlock(&sbsec->lock); @@ -2259,7 +2282,7 @@ static int check_nnp_nosuid(const struct linux_binprm *bprm, const struct task_security_struct *new_tsec) { int nnp = (bprm->unsafe & LSM_UNSAFE_NO_NEW_PRIVS); - int nosuid = (bprm->file->f_path.mnt->mnt_flags & MNT_NOSUID); + int nosuid = !mnt_may_suid(bprm->file->f_path.mnt); int rc; if (!nnp && !nosuid) @@ -2809,7 +2832,7 @@ static void selinux_inode_free_security(struct inode *inode) } static int selinux_dentry_init_security(struct dentry *dentry, int mode, - struct qstr *name, void **ctx, + const struct qstr *name, void **ctx, u32 *ctxlen) { u32 newsid; @@ -4604,13 +4627,13 @@ static int selinux_socket_sock_rcv_skb(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb) err = selinux_inet_sys_rcv_skb(sock_net(sk), skb->skb_iif, addrp, family, peer_sid, &ad); if (err) { - selinux_netlbl_err(skb, err, 0); + selinux_netlbl_err(skb, family, err, 0); return err; } err = avc_has_perm(sk_sid, peer_sid, SECCLASS_PEER, PEER__RECV, &ad); if (err) { - selinux_netlbl_err(skb, err, 0); + selinux_netlbl_err(skb, family, err, 0); return err; } } @@ -4978,7 +5001,7 @@ static unsigned int selinux_ip_forward(struct sk_buff *skb, err = selinux_inet_sys_rcv_skb(dev_net(indev), indev->ifindex, addrp, family, peer_sid, &ad); if (err) { - selinux_netlbl_err(skb, err, 1); + selinux_netlbl_err(skb, family, err, 1); return NF_DROP; } } @@ -5064,6 +5087,15 @@ static unsigned int selinux_ipv4_output(void *priv, return selinux_ip_output(skb, PF_INET); } +#if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE) +static unsigned int selinux_ipv6_output(void *priv, + struct sk_buff *skb, + const struct nf_hook_state *state) +{ + return selinux_ip_output(skb, PF_INET6); +} +#endif /* IPV6 */ + static unsigned int selinux_ip_postroute_compat(struct sk_buff *skb, int ifindex, u16 family) @@ -6298,6 +6330,12 @@ static struct nf_hook_ops selinux_nf_ops[] = { .hooknum = NF_INET_FORWARD, .priority = NF_IP6_PRI_SELINUX_FIRST, }, + { + .hook = selinux_ipv6_output, + .pf = NFPROTO_IPV6, + .hooknum = NF_INET_LOCAL_OUT, + .priority = NF_IP6_PRI_SELINUX_FIRST, + }, #endif /* IPV6 */ }; diff --git a/security/selinux/include/netlabel.h b/security/selinux/include/netlabel.h index 8c59b8f150e8..75686d53df07 100644 --- a/security/selinux/include/netlabel.h +++ b/security/selinux/include/netlabel.h @@ -40,7 +40,8 @@ #ifdef CONFIG_NETLABEL void selinux_netlbl_cache_invalidate(void); -void selinux_netlbl_err(struct sk_buff *skb, int error, int gateway); +void selinux_netlbl_err(struct sk_buff *skb, u16 family, int error, + int gateway); void selinux_netlbl_sk_security_free(struct sk_security_struct *sksec); void selinux_netlbl_sk_security_reset(struct sk_security_struct *sksec); @@ -72,6 +73,7 @@ static inline void selinux_netlbl_cache_invalidate(void) } static inline void selinux_netlbl_err(struct sk_buff *skb, + u16 family, int error, int gateway) { diff --git a/security/selinux/netlabel.c b/security/selinux/netlabel.c index 1f989a539fd4..aaba6677ee2e 100644 --- a/security/selinux/netlabel.c +++ b/security/selinux/netlabel.c @@ -54,6 +54,7 @@ * */ static int selinux_netlbl_sidlookup_cached(struct sk_buff *skb, + u16 family, struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *secattr, u32 *sid) { @@ -63,7 +64,7 @@ static int selinux_netlbl_sidlookup_cached(struct sk_buff *skb, if (rc == 0 && (secattr->flags & NETLBL_SECATTR_CACHEABLE) && (secattr->flags & NETLBL_SECATTR_CACHE)) - netlbl_cache_add(skb, secattr); + netlbl_cache_add(skb, family, secattr); return rc; } @@ -151,9 +152,9 @@ void selinux_netlbl_cache_invalidate(void) * present on the packet, NetLabel is smart enough to only act when it should. * */ -void selinux_netlbl_err(struct sk_buff *skb, int error, int gateway) +void selinux_netlbl_err(struct sk_buff *skb, u16 family, int error, int gateway) { - netlbl_skbuff_err(skb, error, gateway); + netlbl_skbuff_err(skb, family, error, gateway); } /** @@ -214,7 +215,8 @@ int selinux_netlbl_skbuff_getsid(struct sk_buff *skb, netlbl_secattr_init(&secattr); rc = netlbl_skbuff_getattr(skb, family, &secattr); if (rc == 0 && secattr.flags != NETLBL_SECATTR_NONE) - rc = selinux_netlbl_sidlookup_cached(skb, &secattr, sid); + rc = selinux_netlbl_sidlookup_cached(skb, family, + &secattr, sid); else *sid = SECSID_NULL; *type = secattr.type; @@ -284,7 +286,7 @@ int selinux_netlbl_inet_conn_request(struct request_sock *req, u16 family) int rc; struct netlbl_lsm_secattr secattr; - if (family != PF_INET) + if (family != PF_INET && family != PF_INET6) return 0; netlbl_secattr_init(&secattr); @@ -333,7 +335,7 @@ int selinux_netlbl_socket_post_create(struct sock *sk, u16 family) struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security; struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *secattr; - if (family != PF_INET) + if (family != PF_INET && family != PF_INET6) return 0; secattr = selinux_netlbl_sock_genattr(sk); @@ -382,7 +384,8 @@ int selinux_netlbl_sock_rcv_skb(struct sk_security_struct *sksec, netlbl_secattr_init(&secattr); rc = netlbl_skbuff_getattr(skb, family, &secattr); if (rc == 0 && secattr.flags != NETLBL_SECATTR_NONE) - rc = selinux_netlbl_sidlookup_cached(skb, &secattr, &nlbl_sid); + rc = selinux_netlbl_sidlookup_cached(skb, family, + &secattr, &nlbl_sid); else nlbl_sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED; netlbl_secattr_destroy(&secattr); @@ -405,11 +408,26 @@ int selinux_netlbl_sock_rcv_skb(struct sk_security_struct *sksec, return 0; if (nlbl_sid != SECINITSID_UNLABELED) - netlbl_skbuff_err(skb, rc, 0); + netlbl_skbuff_err(skb, family, rc, 0); return rc; } /** + * selinux_netlbl_option - Is this a NetLabel option + * @level: the socket level or protocol + * @optname: the socket option name + * + * Description: + * Returns true if @level and @optname refer to a NetLabel option. + * Helper for selinux_netlbl_socket_setsockopt(). + */ +static inline int selinux_netlbl_option(int level, int optname) +{ + return (level == IPPROTO_IP && optname == IP_OPTIONS) || + (level == IPPROTO_IPV6 && optname == IPV6_HOPOPTS); +} + +/** * selinux_netlbl_socket_setsockopt - Do not allow users to remove a NetLabel * @sock: the socket * @level: the socket level or protocol @@ -431,7 +449,7 @@ int selinux_netlbl_socket_setsockopt(struct socket *sock, struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security; struct netlbl_lsm_secattr secattr; - if (level == IPPROTO_IP && optname == IP_OPTIONS && + if (selinux_netlbl_option(level, optname) && (sksec->nlbl_state == NLBL_LABELED || sksec->nlbl_state == NLBL_CONNLABELED)) { netlbl_secattr_init(&secattr); diff --git a/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c b/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c index 1b1fd27de632..0765c5b053b5 100644 --- a/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c +++ b/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c @@ -1347,7 +1347,7 @@ static ssize_t sel_write_avc_cache_threshold(struct file *file, { char *page; ssize_t ret; - int new_value; + unsigned int new_value; ret = task_has_security(current, SECURITY__SETSECPARAM); if (ret) diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/ebitmap.c b/security/selinux/ss/ebitmap.c index 57644b1dc42e..894b6cdc11c5 100644 --- a/security/selinux/ss/ebitmap.c +++ b/security/selinux/ss/ebitmap.c @@ -165,7 +165,7 @@ int ebitmap_netlbl_import(struct ebitmap *ebmap, e_iter = kzalloc(sizeof(*e_iter), GFP_ATOMIC); if (e_iter == NULL) goto netlbl_import_failure; - e_iter->startbit = offset & ~(EBITMAP_SIZE - 1); + e_iter->startbit = offset - (offset % EBITMAP_SIZE); if (e_prev == NULL) ebmap->node = e_iter; else diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/services.c b/security/selinux/ss/services.c index 89df64672b89..082b20c78363 100644 --- a/security/selinux/ss/services.c +++ b/security/selinux/ss/services.c @@ -543,7 +543,7 @@ static void type_attribute_bounds_av(struct context *scontext, struct av_decision *avd) { struct context lo_scontext; - struct context lo_tcontext; + struct context lo_tcontext, *tcontextp = tcontext; struct av_decision lo_avd; struct type_datum *source; struct type_datum *target; @@ -553,67 +553,41 @@ static void type_attribute_bounds_av(struct context *scontext, scontext->type - 1); BUG_ON(!source); + if (!source->bounds) + return; + target = flex_array_get_ptr(policydb.type_val_to_struct_array, tcontext->type - 1); BUG_ON(!target); - if (source->bounds) { - memset(&lo_avd, 0, sizeof(lo_avd)); - - memcpy(&lo_scontext, scontext, sizeof(lo_scontext)); - lo_scontext.type = source->bounds; + memset(&lo_avd, 0, sizeof(lo_avd)); - context_struct_compute_av(&lo_scontext, - tcontext, - tclass, - &lo_avd, - NULL); - if ((lo_avd.allowed & avd->allowed) == avd->allowed) - return; /* no masked permission */ - masked = ~lo_avd.allowed & avd->allowed; - } + memcpy(&lo_scontext, scontext, sizeof(lo_scontext)); + lo_scontext.type = source->bounds; if (target->bounds) { - memset(&lo_avd, 0, sizeof(lo_avd)); - memcpy(&lo_tcontext, tcontext, sizeof(lo_tcontext)); lo_tcontext.type = target->bounds; - - context_struct_compute_av(scontext, - &lo_tcontext, - tclass, - &lo_avd, - NULL); - if ((lo_avd.allowed & avd->allowed) == avd->allowed) - return; /* no masked permission */ - masked = ~lo_avd.allowed & avd->allowed; + tcontextp = &lo_tcontext; } - if (source->bounds && target->bounds) { - memset(&lo_avd, 0, sizeof(lo_avd)); - /* - * lo_scontext and lo_tcontext are already - * set up. - */ + context_struct_compute_av(&lo_scontext, + tcontextp, + tclass, + &lo_avd, + NULL); - context_struct_compute_av(&lo_scontext, - &lo_tcontext, - tclass, - &lo_avd, - NULL); - if ((lo_avd.allowed & avd->allowed) == avd->allowed) - return; /* no masked permission */ - masked = ~lo_avd.allowed & avd->allowed; - } + masked = ~lo_avd.allowed & avd->allowed; - if (masked) { - /* mask violated permissions */ - avd->allowed &= ~masked; + if (likely(!masked)) + return; /* no masked permission */ - /* audit masked permissions */ - security_dump_masked_av(scontext, tcontext, - tclass, masked, "bounds"); - } + /* mask violated permissions */ + avd->allowed &= ~masked; + + /* audit masked permissions */ + security_dump_masked_av(scontext, tcontext, + tclass, masked, "bounds"); } /* diff --git a/security/smack/smack.h b/security/smack/smack.h index 6c91156ae225..26e58f1804b1 100644 --- a/security/smack/smack.h +++ b/security/smack/smack.h @@ -90,9 +90,15 @@ struct superblock_smack { struct smack_known *smk_floor; struct smack_known *smk_hat; struct smack_known *smk_default; - int smk_initialized; + int smk_flags; }; +/* + * Superblock flags + */ +#define SMK_SB_INITIALIZED 0x01 +#define SMK_SB_UNTRUSTED 0x02 + struct socket_smack { struct smack_known *smk_out; /* outbound label */ struct smack_known *smk_in; /* inbound label */ diff --git a/security/smack/smack_access.c b/security/smack/smack_access.c index a283f9e796c1..23e5808a0970 100644 --- a/security/smack/smack_access.c +++ b/security/smack/smack_access.c @@ -413,7 +413,7 @@ void smk_insert_entry(struct smack_known *skp) unsigned int hash; struct hlist_head *head; - hash = full_name_hash(skp->smk_known, strlen(skp->smk_known)); + hash = full_name_hash(NULL, skp->smk_known, strlen(skp->smk_known)); head = &smack_known_hash[hash & (SMACK_HASH_SLOTS - 1)]; hlist_add_head_rcu(&skp->smk_hashed, head); @@ -433,7 +433,7 @@ struct smack_known *smk_find_entry(const char *string) struct hlist_head *head; struct smack_known *skp; - hash = full_name_hash(string, strlen(string)); + hash = full_name_hash(NULL, string, strlen(string)); head = &smack_known_hash[hash & (SMACK_HASH_SLOTS - 1)]; hlist_for_each_entry_rcu(skp, head, smk_hashed) diff --git a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c index 6777295f4b2b..87a9741b0d02 100644 --- a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c +++ b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c @@ -549,7 +549,7 @@ static int smack_sb_alloc_security(struct super_block *sb) sbsp->smk_floor = &smack_known_floor; sbsp->smk_hat = &smack_known_hat; /* - * smk_initialized will be zero from kzalloc. + * SMK_SB_INITIALIZED will be zero from kzalloc. */ sb->s_security = sbsp; @@ -766,10 +766,10 @@ static int smack_set_mnt_opts(struct super_block *sb, int num_opts = opts->num_mnt_opts; int transmute = 0; - if (sp->smk_initialized) + if (sp->smk_flags & SMK_SB_INITIALIZED) return 0; - sp->smk_initialized = 1; + sp->smk_flags |= SMK_SB_INITIALIZED; for (i = 0; i < num_opts; i++) { switch (opts->mnt_opts_flags[i]) { @@ -821,6 +821,17 @@ static int smack_set_mnt_opts(struct super_block *sb, skp = smk_of_current(); sp->smk_root = skp; sp->smk_default = skp; + /* + * For a handful of fs types with no user-controlled + * backing store it's okay to trust security labels + * in the filesystem. The rest are untrusted. + */ + if (sb->s_user_ns != &init_user_ns && + sb->s_magic != SYSFS_MAGIC && sb->s_magic != TMPFS_MAGIC && + sb->s_magic != RAMFS_MAGIC) { + transmute = 1; + sp->smk_flags |= SMK_SB_UNTRUSTED; + } } /* @@ -908,6 +919,7 @@ static int smack_bprm_set_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm) struct inode *inode = file_inode(bprm->file); struct task_smack *bsp = bprm->cred->security; struct inode_smack *isp; + struct superblock_smack *sbsp; int rc; if (bprm->cred_prepared) @@ -917,6 +929,11 @@ static int smack_bprm_set_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm) if (isp->smk_task == NULL || isp->smk_task == bsp->smk_task) return 0; + sbsp = inode->i_sb->s_security; + if ((sbsp->smk_flags & SMK_SB_UNTRUSTED) && + isp->smk_task != sbsp->smk_root) + return 0; + if (bprm->unsafe & (LSM_UNSAFE_PTRACE | LSM_UNSAFE_PTRACE_CAP)) { struct task_struct *tracer; rc = 0; @@ -1203,6 +1220,7 @@ static int smack_inode_rename(struct inode *old_inode, */ static int smack_inode_permission(struct inode *inode, int mask) { + struct superblock_smack *sbsp = inode->i_sb->s_security; struct smk_audit_info ad; int no_block = mask & MAY_NOT_BLOCK; int rc; @@ -1214,6 +1232,11 @@ static int smack_inode_permission(struct inode *inode, int mask) if (mask == 0) return 0; + if (sbsp->smk_flags & SMK_SB_UNTRUSTED) { + if (smk_of_inode(inode) != sbsp->smk_root) + return -EACCES; + } + /* May be droppable after audit */ if (no_block) return -ECHILD; @@ -1708,6 +1731,7 @@ static int smack_mmap_file(struct file *file, struct task_smack *tsp; struct smack_known *okp; struct inode_smack *isp; + struct superblock_smack *sbsp; int may; int mmay; int tmay; @@ -1719,6 +1743,10 @@ static int smack_mmap_file(struct file *file, isp = file_inode(file)->i_security; if (isp->smk_mmap == NULL) return 0; + sbsp = file_inode(file)->i_sb->s_security; + if (sbsp->smk_flags & SMK_SB_UNTRUSTED && + isp->smk_mmap != sbsp->smk_root) + return -EACCES; mkp = isp->smk_mmap; tsp = current_security(); @@ -2227,6 +2255,9 @@ static int smack_task_kill(struct task_struct *p, struct siginfo *info, struct smack_known *tkp = smk_of_task_struct(p); int rc; + if (!sig) + return 0; /* null signal; existence test */ + smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_TASK); smk_ad_setfield_u_tsk(&ad, p); /* @@ -3992,7 +4023,7 @@ access_check: rc = smk_bu_note("IPv4 delivery", skp, ssp->smk_in, MAY_WRITE, rc); if (rc != 0) - netlbl_skbuff_err(skb, rc, 0); + netlbl_skbuff_err(skb, sk->sk_family, rc, 0); break; #if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6) case PF_INET6: diff --git a/security/tomoyo/gc.c b/security/tomoyo/gc.c index 986a6a756868..540bc29e1b5a 100644 --- a/security/tomoyo/gc.c +++ b/security/tomoyo/gc.c @@ -645,11 +645,6 @@ void tomoyo_notify_gc(struct tomoyo_io_buffer *head, const bool is_register) } } spin_unlock(&tomoyo_io_buffer_list_lock); - if (is_write) { - struct task_struct *task = kthread_create(tomoyo_gc_thread, - NULL, - "GC for TOMOYO"); - if (!IS_ERR(task)) - wake_up_process(task); - } + if (is_write) + kthread_run(tomoyo_gc_thread, NULL, "GC for TOMOYO"); } diff --git a/security/tomoyo/memory.c b/security/tomoyo/memory.c index 0e995716cc25..1598b559ac42 100644 --- a/security/tomoyo/memory.c +++ b/security/tomoyo/memory.c @@ -154,7 +154,7 @@ const struct tomoyo_path_info *tomoyo_get_name(const char *name) if (!name) return NULL; len = strlen(name) + 1; - hash = full_name_hash((const unsigned char *) name, len - 1); + hash = full_name_hash(NULL, (const unsigned char *) name, len - 1); head = &tomoyo_name_list[hash_long(hash, TOMOYO_HASH_BITS)]; if (mutex_lock_interruptible(&tomoyo_policy_lock)) return NULL; diff --git a/security/tomoyo/util.c b/security/tomoyo/util.c index b974a6997d7f..5fe3679137ae 100644 --- a/security/tomoyo/util.c +++ b/security/tomoyo/util.c @@ -666,7 +666,7 @@ void tomoyo_fill_path_info(struct tomoyo_path_info *ptr) ptr->const_len = tomoyo_const_part_length(name); ptr->is_dir = len && (name[len - 1] == '/'); ptr->is_patterned = (ptr->const_len < len); - ptr->hash = full_name_hash(name, len); + ptr->hash = full_name_hash(NULL, name, len); } /** |