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path: root/drivers/virt/coco
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2022-07-19virt: sev-guest: Pass the appropriate argument type to iounmap()Tom Lendacky1-3/+6
Fix a sparse warning in sev_guest_probe() where the wrong argument type is provided to iounmap(). Fixes: fce96cf04430 ("virt: Add SEV-SNP guest driver") Reported-by: kernel test robot <lkp@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/202207150617.jqwQ0Rpz-lkp@intel.com
2022-05-23Merge tag 'x86_sev_for_v5.19_rc1' of ↵Linus Torvalds4-0/+822
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip Pull AMD SEV-SNP support from Borislav Petkov: "The third AMD confidential computing feature called Secure Nested Paging. Add to confidential guests the necessary memory integrity protection against malicious hypervisor-based attacks like data replay, memory remapping and others, thus achieving a stronger isolation from the hypervisor. At the core of the functionality is a new structure called a reverse map table (RMP) with which the guest has a say in which pages get assigned to it and gets notified when a page which it owns, gets accessed/modified under the covers so that the guest can take an appropriate action. In addition, add support for the whole machinery needed to launch a SNP guest, details of which is properly explained in each patch. And last but not least, the series refactors and improves parts of the previous SEV support so that the new code is accomodated properly and not just bolted on" * tag 'x86_sev_for_v5.19_rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip: (60 commits) x86/entry: Fixup objtool/ibt validation x86/sev: Mark the code returning to user space as syscall gap x86/sev: Annotate stack change in the #VC handler x86/sev: Remove duplicated assignment to variable info x86/sev: Fix address space sparse warning x86/sev: Get the AP jump table address from secrets page x86/sev: Add missing __init annotations to SEV init routines virt: sevguest: Rename the sevguest dir and files to sev-guest virt: sevguest: Change driver name to reflect generic SEV support x86/boot: Put globals that are accessed early into the .data section x86/boot: Add an efi.h header for the decompressor virt: sevguest: Fix bool function returning negative value virt: sevguest: Fix return value check in alloc_shared_pages() x86/sev-es: Replace open-coded hlt-loop with sev_es_terminate() virt: sevguest: Add documentation for SEV-SNP CPUID Enforcement virt: sevguest: Add support to get extended report virt: sevguest: Add support to derive key virt: Add SEV-SNP guest driver x86/sev: Register SEV-SNP guest request platform device x86/sev: Provide support for SNP guest request NAEs ...
2022-04-27x86/sev: Get the AP jump table address from secrets pageBrijesh Singh1-35/+0
The GHCB specification section 2.7 states that when SEV-SNP is enabled, a guest should not rely on the hypervisor to provide the address of the AP jump table. Instead, if a guest BIOS wants to provide an AP jump table, it should record the address in the SNP secrets page so the guest operating system can obtain it directly from there. Fix this on the guest kernel side by having SNP guests use the AP jump table address published in the secrets page rather than issuing a GHCB request to get it. [ mroth: - Improve error handling when ioremap()/memremap() return NULL - Don't mix function calls with declarations - Add missing __init - Tweak commit message ] Fixes: 0afb6b660a6b ("x86/sev: Use SEV-SNP AP creation to start secondary CPUs") Signed-off-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com> Signed-off-by: Michael Roth <michael.roth@amd.com> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220422135624.114172-3-michael.roth@amd.com
2022-04-27virt: sevguest: Rename the sevguest dir and files to sev-guestTom Lendacky4-6/+6
Rename the drivers/virt/coco/sevguest directory and files to sev-guest so as to match the driver name. [ bp: Rename Documentation/virt/coco/sevguest.rst too, as reported by sfr: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220427101059.3bf55262@canb.auug.org.au ] Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/2f5c9cb16e3a67599c8e3170f6c72c8712c47d53.1650464054.git.thomas.lendacky@amd.com
2022-04-21virt: sevguest: Change driver name to reflect generic SEV supportTom Lendacky1-18/+21
During patch review, it was decided the SNP guest driver name should not be SEV-SNP specific, but should be generic for use with anything SEV. However, this feedback was missed and the driver name, and many of the driver functions and structures, are SEV-SNP name specific. Rename the driver to "sev-guest" (to match the misc device that is created) and update some of the function and structure names, too. While in the file, adjust the one pr_err() message to be a dev_err() message so that the message, if issued, uses the driver name. Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/307710bb5515c9088a19fd0b930268c7300479b2.1650464054.git.thomas.lendacky@amd.com
2022-04-14virt: sevguest: Fix bool function returning negative valueHaowen Bai1-1/+1
The function enc_payload() is wrongly declared bool but returns an integer value. Correct it. [ bp: Massage commit message. ] Fixes: fce96cf04430 ("virt: Add SEV-SNP guest driver") Signed-off-by: Haowen Bai <baihaowen@meizu.com> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/1649930657-10837-1-git-send-email-baihaowen@meizu.com
2022-04-13virt: Add efi_secret module to expose confidential computing secretsDov Murik3-0/+367
The new efi_secret module exposes the confidential computing (coco) EFI secret area via securityfs interface. When the module is loaded (and securityfs is mounted, typically under /sys/kernel/security), a "secrets/coco" directory is created in securityfs. In it, a file is created for each secret entry. The name of each such file is the GUID of the secret entry, and its content is the secret data. This allows applications running in a confidential computing setting to read secrets provided by the guest owner via a secure secret injection mechanism (such as AMD SEV's LAUNCH_SECRET command). Removing (unlinking) files in the "secrets/coco" directory will zero out the secret in memory, and remove the filesystem entry. If the module is removed and loaded again, that secret will not appear in the filesystem. Signed-off-by: Dov Murik <dovmurik@linux.ibm.com> Reviewed-by: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220412212127.154182-3-dovmurik@linux.ibm.com Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
2022-04-11virt: sevguest: Fix return value check in alloc_shared_pages()Yang Yingliang1-1/+1
If alloc_pages() fails, it returns a NULL pointer. Replace the wrong IS_ERR() check with the proper NULL pointer check. Fixes: fce96cf04430 ("virt: Add SEV-SNP guest driver") Reported-by: Hulk Robot <hulkci@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Yang Yingliang <yangyingliang@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Reviewed-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220411111213.1477853-1-yangyingliang@huawei.com
2022-04-07virt: sevguest: Add support to get extended reportBrijesh Singh1-2/+90
Version 2 of GHCB specification defines Non-Automatic-Exit (NAE) to get extended guest report which is similar to the SNP_GET_REPORT ioctl. The main difference is related to the additional data that will be returned. That additional data returned is a certificate blob that can be used by the SNP guest user. The certificate blob layout is defined in the GHCB specification. The driver simply treats the blob as a opaque data and copies it to userspace. [ bp: Massage commit message, cast 1st arg of access_ok() ] Signed-off-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220307213356.2797205-46-brijesh.singh@amd.com
2022-04-07virt: sevguest: Add support to derive keyBrijesh Singh1-0/+45
The SNP_GET_DERIVED_KEY ioctl interface can be used by the SNP guest to ask the firmware to provide a key derived from a root key. The derived key may be used by the guest for any purposes it chooses, such as a sealing key or communicating with the external entities. See SEV-SNP firmware spec for more information. [ bp: No need to memset "req" - it will get overwritten. ] Signed-off-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Reviewed-by: Liam Merwick <liam.merwick@oracle.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220307213356.2797205-45-brijesh.singh@amd.com
2022-04-07virt: Add SEV-SNP guest driverBrijesh Singh4-0/+721
The SEV-SNP specification provides the guest a mechanism to communicate with the PSP without risk from a malicious hypervisor who wishes to read, alter, drop or replay the messages sent. The driver uses snp_issue_guest_request() to issue GHCB SNP_GUEST_REQUEST or SNP_EXT_GUEST_REQUEST NAE events to submit the request to PSP. The PSP requires that all communication should be encrypted using key specified through a struct snp_guest_platform_data descriptor. Userspace can use SNP_GET_REPORT ioctl() to query the guest attestation report. See SEV-SNP spec section Guest Messages for more details. [ bp: Remove the "what" from the commit message, massage. ] Signed-off-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220307213356.2797205-44-brijesh.singh@amd.com
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