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This feature flag indicates that the filesystem contains encrypted
files.
Signed-off-by: Richard Weinberger <richard@nod.at>
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This feature flag indicates that all directory entry nodes have a 32bit
cookie set and therefore UBIFS is allowed to perform lookups by hash.
Signed-off-by: Richard Weinberger <richard@nod.at>
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Signed-off-by: Richard Weinberger <richard@nod.at>
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UBIFS stores a 32bit hash of every file, for traditional lookups by name
this scheme is fine since UBIFS can first try to find the file by the
hash of the filename and upon collisions it can walk through all entries
with the same hash and do a string compare.
When filesnames are encrypted fscrypto will ask the filesystem for a
unique cookie, based on this cookie the filesystem has to be able to
locate the target file again. With 32bit hashes this is impossible
because the chance for collisions is very high. Do deal with that we
store a 32bit cookie directly in the UBIFS directory entry node such
that we get a 64bit cookie (32bit from filename hash and the dent
cookie). For a lookup by hash UBIFS finds the entry by the first 32bit
and then compares the dent cookie. If it does not match, it has to do a
linear search of the whole directory and compares all dent cookies until
the correct entry is found.
Signed-off-by: Richard Weinberger <richard@nod.at>
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tnc_read_hashed_node() is a better name since we read a node
by a given hash, not a name.
Signed-off-by: Richard Weinberger <richard@nod.at>
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Signed-off-by: Richard Weinberger <richard@nod.at>
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Signed-off-by: Richard Weinberger <richard@nod.at>
Signed-off-by: David Gstir <david@sigma-star.at>
Signed-off-by: Richard Weinberger <richard@nod.at>
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As of now all filenames known by UBIFS are strings with a NUL
terminator. With encrypted filenames a filename can be any binary
string and the r5 function cannot search for the NUL terminator.
UBIFS always knows how long a filename is, therefore we can change
the hash function to iterate over the filename length to work
correctly with binary strings.
Signed-off-by: Richard Weinberger <richard@nod.at>
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With encrypted filenames we store raw binary data, doing
string tests is no longer possible.
Signed-off-by: Richard Weinberger <richard@nod.at>
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Signed-off-by: Richard Weinberger <richard@nod.at>
Signed-off-by: David Gstir <david@sigma-star.at>
Signed-off-by: Richard Weinberger <richard@nod.at>
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...and provide a non const variant for fscrypto
Signed-off-by: Richard Weinberger <richard@nod.at>
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When data of a data node is compressed and encrypted
we need to store the size of the compressed data because
before encryption we may have to add padding bytes.
For the new field we consume the last two padding bytes
in struct ubifs_data_node. Two bytes are fine because
the data length is at most 4096.
Signed-off-by: Richard Weinberger <richard@nod.at>
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We need this extra check in mmap because a process could
gain an already opened fd.
Signed-off-by: Richard Weinberger <richard@nod.at>
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When we're creating a new inode in UBIFS the inode is not
yet exposed and fscrypto calls ubifs_xattr_set() without
holding the inode mutex. This is okay but ubifs_xattr_set()
has to know about this.
Signed-off-by: Richard Weinberger <richard@nod.at>
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...and mark the dentry as encrypted.
Signed-off-by: Richard Weinberger <richard@nod.at>
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When a file is moved or linked into another directory
its current crypto policy has to be compatible with the
target policy.
Signed-off-by: Richard Weinberger <richard@nod.at>
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We need ->open() for files to load the crypto key.
If the no key is present and the file is encrypted,
refuse to open.
Signed-off-by: Richard Weinberger <richard@nod.at>
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We need the ->open() hook to load the crypto context
which is needed for all crypto operations within that
directory.
Signed-off-by: Richard Weinberger <richard@nod.at>
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We have to make sure that we don't expose our internal
crypto context to userspace.
Signed-off-by: Richard Weinberger <richard@nod.at>
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This is the first building block to provide file level
encryption on UBIFS.
Signed-off-by: Richard Weinberger <richard@nod.at>
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Like ext4 UBIFS will store the crypto context in a xattr
attribute.
Signed-off-by: Richard Weinberger <richard@nod.at>
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For fscrypto we need this function outside of xattr.c.
Signed-off-by: Richard Weinberger <richard@nod.at>
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fscrypto will need this function too. Also get struct ubifs_info
from the provided inode. Not all callers will have a reference to
struct ubifs_info.
Signed-off-by: Richard Weinberger <richard@nod.at>
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'ubifs_fast_find_freeable()' can not return an error pointer, so this test
can be removed.
Signed-off-by: Christophe JAILLET <christophe.jaillet@wanadoo.fr>
Signed-off-by: Richard Weinberger <richard@nod.at>
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Right now wbuf timer has hardcoded timeouts and there is no place for
manual adjustments. Some projects / cases many need that though. Few
file systems allow doing that by respecting dirty_writeback_interval
that can be set using sysctl (dirty_writeback_centisecs).
Lowering dirty_writeback_interval could be some way of dealing with user
space apps lacking proper fsyncs. This is definitely *not* a perfect
solution but we don't have ideal (user space) world. There were already
advanced discussions on this matter, mostly when ext4 was introduced and
it wasn't behaving as ext3. Anyway, the final decision was to add some
hacks to the ext4, as trying to fix whole user space or adding new API
was pointless.
We can't (and shouldn't?) just follow ext4. We can't e.g. sync on close
as this would cause too many commits and flash wearing. On the other
hand we still should allow some trade-off between -o sync and default
wbuf timeout. Respecting dirty_writeback_interval should allow some sane
cutomizations if used warily.
Signed-off-by: Rafał Miłecki <rafal@milecki.pl>
Reviewed-by: Boris Brezillon <boris.brezillon@free-electrons.com>
Signed-off-by: Richard Weinberger <richard@nod.at>
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Values of these fields are set during init and never modified. They are
used (read) in a single function only. There isn't really any reason to
keep them in a struct. It only makes struct just a bit bigger without
any visible gain.
Signed-off-by: Rafał Miłecki <rafal@milecki.pl>
Reviewed-by: Boris Brezillon <boris.brezillon@free-electrons.com>
Signed-off-by: Richard Weinberger <richard@nod.at>
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... to better explain its purpose after introducing in-place encryption
without bounce buffer.
Signed-off-by: David Gstir <david@sigma-star.at>
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
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Since fscrypt users can now indicated if fscrypt_encrypt_page() should
use a bounce page, we can delay the bounce page pool initialization util
it is really needed. That is until fscrypt_operations has no
FS_CFLG_OWN_PAGES flag set.
Signed-off-by: David Gstir <david@sigma-star.at>
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
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Rename the FS_CFLG_INPLACE_ENCRYPTION flag to FS_CFLG_OWN_PAGES which,
when set, indicates that the fs uses pages under its own control as
opposed to writeback pages which require locking and a bounce buffer for
encryption.
Signed-off-by: David Gstir <david@sigma-star.at>
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
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- Improve documentation
- Add BUG_ON(len == 0) to avoid accidental switch of offs and len
parameters
- Improve variable names for readability
Signed-off-by: David Gstir <david@sigma-star.at>
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
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In case of in-place encryption fscrypt_ctx was allocated but never
released. Since we don't need it for in-place encryption, we skip
allocating it.
Fixes: 1c7dcf69eea3 ("fscrypt: Add in-place encryption mode")
Signed-off-by: David Gstir <david@sigma-star.at>
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
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Actually use the fs-provided index instead of always using page->index
which is only set for page-cache pages.
Fixes: 9c4bb8a3a9b4 ("fscrypt: Let fs select encryption index/tweak")
Signed-off-by: David Gstir <david@sigma-star.at>
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
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Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Reviewed-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
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The fscrypt_initalize() function isn't used outside fs/crypto, so
there's no point making it be an exported symbol.
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Reviewed-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
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To avoid namespace collisions, rename get_crypt_info() to
fscrypt_get_crypt_info(). The function is only used inside the
fs/crypto directory, so declare it in the new header file,
fscrypt_private.h.
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Reviewed-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
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Multiple bugs were recently fixed in the "set encryption policy" ioctl.
To make it clear that fscrypt_process_policy() and fscrypt_get_policy()
implement ioctls and therefore their implementations must take standard
security and correctness precautions, rename them to
fscrypt_ioctl_set_policy() and fscrypt_ioctl_get_policy(). Make the
latter take in a struct file * to make it consistent with the former.
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
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SHA256 and ENCRYPTED_KEYS are not needed. CTR shouldn't be needed
either, but I left it for now because it was intentionally added by
commit 71dea01ea2ed ("ext4 crypto: require CONFIG_CRYPTO_CTR if ext4
encryption is enabled"). So it sounds like there may be a dependency
problem elsewhere, which I have not been able to identify specifically,
that must be solved before CTR can be removed.
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
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With the new (in 4.9) option to use a virtually-mapped stack
(CONFIG_VMAP_STACK), stack buffers cannot be used as input/output for
the scatterlist crypto API because they may not be directly mappable to
struct page. get_crypt_info() was using a stack buffer to hold the
output from the encryption operation used to derive the per-file key.
Fix it by using a heap buffer.
This bug could most easily be observed in a CONFIG_DEBUG_SG kernel
because this allowed the BUG in sg_set_buf() to be triggered.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
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With the new (in 4.9) option to use a virtually-mapped stack
(CONFIG_VMAP_STACK), stack buffers cannot be used as input/output for
the scatterlist crypto API because they may not be directly mappable to
struct page. For short filenames, fname_encrypt() was encrypting a
stack buffer holding the padded filename. Fix it by encrypting the
filename in-place in the output buffer, thereby making the temporary
buffer unnecessary.
This bug could most easily be observed in a CONFIG_DEBUG_SG kernel
because this allowed the BUG in sg_set_buf() to be triggered.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
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Avoid re-use of page index as tweak for AES-XTS when multiple parts of
same page are encrypted. This will happen on multiple (partial) calls of
fscrypt_encrypt_page on same page.
page->index is only valid for writeback pages.
Signed-off-by: David Gstir <david@sigma-star.at>
Signed-off-by: Richard Weinberger <richard@nod.at>
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
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Some filesystems, such as UBIFS, maintain a const pointer for struct
inode.
Signed-off-by: David Gstir <david@sigma-star.at>
Signed-off-by: Richard Weinberger <richard@nod.at>
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
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Not all filesystems work on full pages, thus we should allow them to
hand partial pages to fscrypt for en/decryption.
Signed-off-by: David Gstir <david@sigma-star.at>
Signed-off-by: Richard Weinberger <richard@nod.at>
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
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Some filesystem might pass pages which do not have page->mapping->host
set to the encrypted inode. We want the caller to explicitly pass the
corresponding inode.
Signed-off-by: David Gstir <david@sigma-star.at>
Signed-off-by: Richard Weinberger <richard@nod.at>
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
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ext4 and f2fs require a bounce page when encrypting pages. However, not
all filesystems will need that (eg. UBIFS). This is handled via a
flag on fscrypt_operations where a fs implementation can select in-place
encryption over using a bounce page (which is the default).
Signed-off-by: David Gstir <david@sigma-star.at>
Signed-off-by: Richard Weinberger <richard@nod.at>
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
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Pull nfsd bugfixes from Bruce Fields:
"Fixes for some recent regressions including fallout from the vmalloc'd
stack change (after which we can no longer encrypt stuff on the
stack)"
* tag 'nfsd-4.9-1' of git://linux-nfs.org/~bfields/linux:
nfsd: Fix general protection fault in release_lock_stateid()
svcrdma: backchannel cannot share a page for send and rcv buffers
sunrpc: fix some missing rq_rbuffer assignments
sunrpc: don't pass on-stack memory to sg_set_buf
nfsd: move blocked lock handling under a dedicated spinlock
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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/kdave/linux
Pull btrfs fixes from Chris Mason:
"Some fixes that Dave Sterba collected. We held off on these last week
because I was focused on the memory corruption testing"
* 'for-4.9-rc3' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/kdave/linux:
btrfs: fix WARNING in btrfs_select_ref_head()
Btrfs: remove some no-op casts
btrfs: pass correct args to btrfs_async_run_delayed_refs()
btrfs: make file clone aware of fatal signals
btrfs: qgroup: Prevent qgroup->reserved from going subzero
Btrfs: kill BUG_ON in do_relocation
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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/mszeredi/vfs
Pull overlayfs fixes from Miklos Szeredi:
"Fix two more POSIX ACL bugs introduced in 4.8 and add a missing fsync
during copy up to prevent possible data loss"
* 'overlayfs-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/mszeredi/vfs:
ovl: fsync after copy-up
ovl: fix get_acl() on tmpfs
ovl: update S_ISGID when setting posix ACLs
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When I push NFSv4.1 / RDMA hard, (xfstests generic/089, for example),
I get this crash on the server:
Oct 28 22:04:30 klimt kernel: general protection fault: 0000 [#1] SMP DEBUG_PAGEALLOC
Oct 28 22:04:30 klimt kernel: Modules linked in: cts rpcsec_gss_krb5 iTCO_wdt iTCO_vendor_support sb_edac edac_core x86_pkg_temp_thermal intel_powerclamp coretemp kvm_intel kvm btrfs irqbypass crct10dif_pclmul crc32_pclmul ghash_clmulni_intel aesni_intel lrw gf128mul glue_helper ablk_helper cryptd xor pcspkr raid6_pq i2c_i801 i2c_smbus lpc_ich mfd_core sg mei_me mei ioatdma shpchp wmi ipmi_si ipmi_msghandler rpcrdma ib_ipoib rdma_ucm acpi_power_meter acpi_pad ib_ucm ib_uverbs ib_umad rdma_cm ib_cm iw_cm nfsd auth_rpcgss nfs_acl lockd grace sunrpc ip_tables xfs libcrc32c mlx4_ib mlx4_en ib_core sr_mod cdrom sd_mod ast drm_kms_helper syscopyarea sysfillrect sysimgblt fb_sys_fops ttm drm crc32c_intel igb ahci libahci ptp mlx4_core pps_core dca libata i2c_algo_bit i2c_core dm_mirror dm_region_hash dm_log dm_mod
Oct 28 22:04:30 klimt kernel: CPU: 7 PID: 1558 Comm: nfsd Not tainted 4.9.0-rc2-00005-g82cd754 #8
Oct 28 22:04:30 klimt kernel: Hardware name: Supermicro Super Server/X10SRL-F, BIOS 1.0c 09/09/2015
Oct 28 22:04:30 klimt kernel: task: ffff880835c3a100 task.stack: ffff8808420d8000
Oct 28 22:04:30 klimt kernel: RIP: 0010:[<ffffffffa05a759f>] [<ffffffffa05a759f>] release_lock_stateid+0x1f/0x60 [nfsd]
Oct 28 22:04:30 klimt kernel: RSP: 0018:ffff8808420dbce0 EFLAGS: 00010246
Oct 28 22:04:30 klimt kernel: RAX: ffff88084e6660f0 RBX: ffff88084e667020 RCX: 0000000000000000
Oct 28 22:04:30 klimt kernel: RDX: 0000000000000007 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: ffff88084e667020
Oct 28 22:04:30 klimt kernel: RBP: ffff8808420dbcf8 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: 0000000000000000
Oct 28 22:04:30 klimt kernel: R10: ffff880835c3a100 R11: ffff880835c3aca8 R12: 6b6b6b6b6b6b6b6b
Oct 28 22:04:30 klimt kernel: R13: ffff88084e6670d8 R14: ffff880835f546f0 R15: ffff880835f1c548
Oct 28 22:04:30 klimt kernel: FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff88087bdc0000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
Oct 28 22:04:30 klimt kernel: CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
Oct 28 22:04:30 klimt kernel: CR2: 00007ff020389000 CR3: 0000000001c06000 CR4: 00000000001406e0
Oct 28 22:04:30 klimt kernel: Stack:
Oct 28 22:04:30 klimt kernel: ffff88084e667020 0000000000000000 ffff88084e6670d8 ffff8808420dbd20
Oct 28 22:04:30 klimt kernel: ffffffffa05ac80d ffff880835f54548 ffff88084e640008 ffff880835f545b0
Oct 28 22:04:30 klimt kernel: ffff8808420dbd70 ffffffffa059803d ffff880835f1c768 0000000000000870
Oct 28 22:04:30 klimt kernel: Call Trace:
Oct 28 22:04:30 klimt kernel: [<ffffffffa05ac80d>] nfsd4_free_stateid+0xfd/0x1b0 [nfsd]
Oct 28 22:04:30 klimt kernel: [<ffffffffa059803d>] nfsd4_proc_compound+0x40d/0x690 [nfsd]
Oct 28 22:04:30 klimt kernel: [<ffffffffa0583114>] nfsd_dispatch+0xd4/0x1d0 [nfsd]
Oct 28 22:04:30 klimt kernel: [<ffffffffa047bbf9>] svc_process_common+0x3d9/0x700 [sunrpc]
Oct 28 22:04:30 klimt kernel: [<ffffffffa047ca64>] svc_process+0xf4/0x330 [sunrpc]
Oct 28 22:04:30 klimt kernel: [<ffffffffa05827ca>] nfsd+0xfa/0x160 [nfsd]
Oct 28 22:04:30 klimt kernel: [<ffffffffa05826d0>] ? nfsd_destroy+0x170/0x170 [nfsd]
Oct 28 22:04:30 klimt kernel: [<ffffffff810b367b>] kthread+0x10b/0x120
Oct 28 22:04:30 klimt kernel: [<ffffffff810b3570>] ? kthread_stop+0x280/0x280
Oct 28 22:04:30 klimt kernel: [<ffffffff8174e8ba>] ret_from_fork+0x2a/0x40
Oct 28 22:04:30 klimt kernel: Code: c3 66 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 0f 1f 44 00 00 55 48 89 e5 41 55 41 54 53 48 8b 87 b0 00 00 00 48 89 fb 4c 8b a0 98 00 00 00 <49> 8b 44 24 20 48 8d b8 80 03 00 00 e8 10 66 1a e1 48 89 df e8
Oct 28 22:04:30 klimt kernel: RIP [<ffffffffa05a759f>] release_lock_stateid+0x1f/0x60 [nfsd]
Oct 28 22:04:30 klimt kernel: RSP <ffff8808420dbce0>
Oct 28 22:04:30 klimt kernel: ---[ end trace cf5d0b371973e167 ]---
Jeff Layton says:
> Hm...now that I look though, this is a little suspicious:
>
> struct nfs4_openowner *oo = openowner(stp->st_openstp->st_stateowner);
>
> I wonder if it's possible for the openstateid to have already been
> destroyed at this point.
>
> We might be better off doing something like this to get the client pointer:
>
> stp->st_stid.sc_client;
>
> ...which should be more direct and less dependent on other stateids
> staying valid.
With the suggested change, I am no longer able to reproduce the above oops.
v2: Fix unhash_lock_stateid() as well
Fix-suggested-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com>
Fixes: 42691398be08 ('nfsd: Fix race between FREE_STATEID and LOCK')
Signed-off-by: Chuck Lever <chuck.lever@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: J. Bruce Fields <bfields@redhat.com>
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Make sure the copied up file hits the disk before renaming to the final
destination. If this is not done then the copy-up may corrupt the data in
the file in case of a crash.
Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@redhat.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
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tmpfs doesn't have ->get_acl() because it only uses cached acls.
This fixes the acl tests in pjdfstest when tmpfs is used as the upper layer
of the overlay.
Reported-by: Amir Goldstein <amir73il@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@redhat.com>
Fixes: 39a25b2b3762 ("ovl: define ->get_acl() for overlay inodes")
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v4.8
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