diff options
| author | Alan Coopersmith <alan.coopersmith@oracle.com> | 2014-01-22 23:44:46 -0800 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Alan Coopersmith <alan.coopersmith@oracle.com> | 2014-12-08 18:09:47 -0800 |
| commit | e0e11644622a589129a01e11e5d105dc74a098de (patch) | |
| tree | b96144fd618c86620e52ef927cad2ba580159e1e /include | |
| parent | 97015a07b9e15d8ec5608b95d95ec0eb51202acb (diff) | |
dix: integer overflow in REQUEST_FIXED_SIZE() [CVE-2014-8092 4/4]
Force use of 64-bit integers when evaluating data provided by clients
in 32-bit fields which can overflow when added or multiplied during
checks.
Reported-by: Ilja Van Sprundel <ivansprundel@ioactive.com>
Signed-off-by: Alan Coopersmith <alan.coopersmith@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Peter Hutterer <peter.hutterer@who-t.net>
Diffstat (limited to 'include')
| -rw-r--r-- | include/dix.h | 3 |
1 files changed, 2 insertions, 1 deletions
diff --git a/include/dix.h b/include/dix.h index 991a3ce88..e0c6ed84f 100644 --- a/include/dix.h +++ b/include/dix.h @@ -76,7 +76,8 @@ SOFTWARE. #define REQUEST_FIXED_SIZE(req, n)\ if (((sizeof(req) >> 2) > client->req_len) || \ - (((sizeof(req) + (n) + 3) >> 2) != client->req_len)) \ + ((n >> 2) >= client->req_len) || \ + ((((uint64_t) sizeof(req) + (n) + 3) >> 2) != (uint64_t) client->req_len)) \ return(BadLength) #define LEGAL_NEW_RESOURCE(id,client)\ |