From c981f254cc82f50f8cb864ce6432097b23195b9c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Al Viro Date: Sun, 7 Jan 2018 13:19:09 -0500 Subject: sctp: use vmemdup_user() rather than badly open-coding memdup_user() Signed-off-by: Al Viro --- net/sctp/socket.c | 59 +++++++++++-------------------------------------------- 1 file changed, 11 insertions(+), 48 deletions(-) (limited to 'net/sctp') diff --git a/net/sctp/socket.c b/net/sctp/socket.c index 3204a9b29407..c2cccc9902d6 100644 --- a/net/sctp/socket.c +++ b/net/sctp/socket.c @@ -970,13 +970,6 @@ int sctp_asconf_mgmt(struct sctp_sock *sp, struct sctp_sockaddr_entry *addrw) * This is used for tunneling the sctp_bindx() request through sctp_setsockopt() * from userspace. * - * We don't use copy_from_user() for optimization: we first do the - * sanity checks (buffer size -fast- and access check-healthy - * pointer); if all of those succeed, then we can alloc the memory - * (expensive operation) needed to copy the data to kernel. Then we do - * the copying without checking the user space area - * (__copy_from_user()). - * * On exit there is no need to do sockfd_put(), sys_setsockopt() does * it. * @@ -1006,25 +999,15 @@ static int sctp_setsockopt_bindx(struct sock *sk, if (unlikely(addrs_size <= 0)) return -EINVAL; - /* Check the user passed a healthy pointer. */ - if (unlikely(!access_ok(VERIFY_READ, addrs, addrs_size))) - return -EFAULT; - - /* Alloc space for the address array in kernel memory. */ - kaddrs = kmalloc(addrs_size, GFP_USER | __GFP_NOWARN); - if (unlikely(!kaddrs)) - return -ENOMEM; - - if (__copy_from_user(kaddrs, addrs, addrs_size)) { - kfree(kaddrs); - return -EFAULT; - } + kaddrs = vmemdup_user(addrs, addrs_size); + if (unlikely(IS_ERR(kaddrs))) + return PTR_ERR(kaddrs); /* Walk through the addrs buffer and count the number of addresses. */ addr_buf = kaddrs; while (walk_size < addrs_size) { if (walk_size + sizeof(sa_family_t) > addrs_size) { - kfree(kaddrs); + kvfree(kaddrs); return -EINVAL; } @@ -1035,7 +1018,7 @@ static int sctp_setsockopt_bindx(struct sock *sk, * causes the address buffer to overflow return EINVAL. */ if (!af || (walk_size + af->sockaddr_len) > addrs_size) { - kfree(kaddrs); + kvfree(kaddrs); return -EINVAL; } addrcnt++; @@ -1065,7 +1048,7 @@ static int sctp_setsockopt_bindx(struct sock *sk, } out: - kfree(kaddrs); + kvfree(kaddrs); return err; } @@ -1323,13 +1306,6 @@ out_free: * land and invoking either sctp_connectx(). This is used for tunneling * the sctp_connectx() request through sctp_setsockopt() from userspace. * - * We don't use copy_from_user() for optimization: we first do the - * sanity checks (buffer size -fast- and access check-healthy - * pointer); if all of those succeed, then we can alloc the memory - * (expensive operation) needed to copy the data to kernel. Then we do - * the copying without checking the user space area - * (__copy_from_user()). - * * On exit there is no need to do sockfd_put(), sys_setsockopt() does * it. * @@ -1345,7 +1321,6 @@ static int __sctp_setsockopt_connectx(struct sock *sk, sctp_assoc_t *assoc_id) { struct sockaddr *kaddrs; - gfp_t gfp = GFP_KERNEL; int err = 0; pr_debug("%s: sk:%p addrs:%p addrs_size:%d\n", @@ -1354,24 +1329,12 @@ static int __sctp_setsockopt_connectx(struct sock *sk, if (unlikely(addrs_size <= 0)) return -EINVAL; - /* Check the user passed a healthy pointer. */ - if (unlikely(!access_ok(VERIFY_READ, addrs, addrs_size))) - return -EFAULT; - - /* Alloc space for the address array in kernel memory. */ - if (sk->sk_socket->file) - gfp = GFP_USER | __GFP_NOWARN; - kaddrs = kmalloc(addrs_size, gfp); - if (unlikely(!kaddrs)) - return -ENOMEM; - - if (__copy_from_user(kaddrs, addrs, addrs_size)) { - err = -EFAULT; - } else { - err = __sctp_connect(sk, kaddrs, addrs_size, assoc_id); - } + kaddrs = vmemdup_user(addrs, addrs_size); + if (unlikely(IS_ERR(kaddrs))) + return PTR_ERR(kaddrs); - kfree(kaddrs); + err = __sctp_connect(sk, kaddrs, addrs_size, assoc_id); + kvfree(kaddrs); return err; } -- cgit v1.2.3