From ff4cc3ac93e1d0369928fd60ec1fe82417afc576 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Mike Kershaw <dragorn@kismetwireless.net>
Date: Thu, 1 Sep 2005 17:40:05 -0700
Subject: [TUNTAP]: Allow setting the linktype of the tap device from userspace

Currently tun/tap only supports the EN10MB ARP type.  For use with
wireless and other networking types it should be possible to set the
ARP type via an ioctl.

Patch v2: Included check that the tap interface is down before changing the
link type out from underneath it

Signed-off-by: Mike Kershaw <dragorn@kismetwireless.net>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
---
 drivers/net/tun.c      | 15 +++++++++++++++
 include/linux/if_tun.h |  1 +
 2 files changed, 16 insertions(+)

diff --git a/drivers/net/tun.c b/drivers/net/tun.c
index effab0b9adc..50b8c6754b1 100644
--- a/drivers/net/tun.c
+++ b/drivers/net/tun.c
@@ -18,6 +18,9 @@
 /*
  *  Changes:
  *
+ *  Mike Kershaw <dragorn@kismetwireless.net> 2005/08/14
+ *    Add TUNSETLINK ioctl to set the link encapsulation
+ *
  *  Mark Smith <markzzzsmith@yahoo.com.au>
  *   Use random_ether_addr() for tap MAC address.
  *
@@ -612,6 +615,18 @@ static int tun_chr_ioctl(struct inode *inode, struct file *file,
 		DBG(KERN_INFO "%s: owner set to %d\n", tun->dev->name, tun->owner);
 		break;
 
+	case TUNSETLINK:
+		/* Only allow setting the type when the interface is down */
+		if (tun->dev->flags & IFF_UP) {
+			DBG(KERN_INFO "%s: Linktype set failed because interface is up\n",
+				tun->dev->name);
+			return -EBUSY;
+		} else {
+			tun->dev->type = (int) arg;
+			DBG(KERN_INFO "%s: linktype set to %d\n", tun->dev->name, tun->dev->type);
+		}
+		break;
+
 #ifdef TUN_DEBUG
 	case TUNSETDEBUG:
 		tun->debug = arg;
diff --git a/include/linux/if_tun.h b/include/linux/if_tun.h
index 096a85a58ae..88aef7b86ef 100644
--- a/include/linux/if_tun.h
+++ b/include/linux/if_tun.h
@@ -77,6 +77,7 @@ struct tun_struct {
 #define TUNSETIFF     _IOW('T', 202, int) 
 #define TUNSETPERSIST _IOW('T', 203, int) 
 #define TUNSETOWNER   _IOW('T', 204, int)
+#define TUNSETLINK    _IOW('T', 205, int)
 
 /* TUNSETIFF ifr flags */
 #define IFF_TUN		0x0001
-- 
cgit v1.2.3


From 732db659b83579b922c18dee9123e1529b5fb5d2 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Adrian Bunk <bunk@stusta.de>
Date: Thu, 1 Sep 2005 17:40:26 -0700
Subject: [IPVS]: "extern inline" -> "static inline"

"extern inline" doesn't make much sense.

Signed-off-by: Adrian Bunk <bunk@stusta.de>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
---
 include/net/ip_vs.h | 2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/include/net/ip_vs.h b/include/net/ip_vs.h
index 7a3c43711a1..e426641c519 100644
--- a/include/net/ip_vs.h
+++ b/include/net/ip_vs.h
@@ -958,7 +958,7 @@ static __inline__ int ip_vs_todrop(void)
  */
 #define IP_VS_FWD_METHOD(cp)  (cp->flags & IP_VS_CONN_F_FWD_MASK)
 
-extern __inline__ char ip_vs_fwd_tag(struct ip_vs_conn *cp)
+static inline char ip_vs_fwd_tag(struct ip_vs_conn *cp)
 {
 	char fwd;
 
-- 
cgit v1.2.3


From 0014c6156f9e7d034d20742d164d7d4da289b42a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Geoff Levand <geoffrey.levand@am.sony.com>
Date: Thu, 1 Sep 2005 17:40:46 -0700
Subject: [SUNGEM]: fix minor bug in sungem.h

This changes the Sun Gem Ether driver's tx ring buffer
length to the proper constant.  Currently TX_RING_SIZE
and RX_RING_SIZE are equal, so no malfunction occurs.

Signed-off-by: Geoff Levand <geoffrey.levand@am.sony.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
---
 drivers/net/sungem.h | 2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/drivers/net/sungem.h b/drivers/net/sungem.h
index 7143fd7cf3f..ff8ae5f7997 100644
--- a/drivers/net/sungem.h
+++ b/drivers/net/sungem.h
@@ -1020,7 +1020,7 @@ struct gem {
 		
 	struct gem_init_block	*init_block;
 	struct sk_buff		*rx_skbs[RX_RING_SIZE];
-	struct sk_buff		*tx_skbs[RX_RING_SIZE];
+	struct sk_buff		*tx_skbs[TX_RING_SIZE];
 	dma_addr_t		gblock_dvma;
 
 	struct pci_dev		*pdev;
-- 
cgit v1.2.3


From 86d9f7f0c9cf06d7d3cfa2a9f0514cf21fa5fda1 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Eric Lemoine <eric.lemoine@gmail.com>
Date: Thu, 1 Sep 2005 17:41:07 -0700
Subject: [SUNGEM]: Fix netpoll bug in Sun GEM Ether driver

From: Eric Lemoine <eric.lemoine@gmail.com>

To me the bug is that __LINK_STATE_RX_SCHED can be set while
__netif_rx_schedule() hasen't be called. Why don't fix it in the
simplest way ? See attached patch (absolutely untested).

Signed-off-by: Geoff Levand <geoffrey.levand@am.sony.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
---
 drivers/net/sungem.c | 1 +
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)

diff --git a/drivers/net/sungem.c b/drivers/net/sungem.c
index 2608e7a3d21..3f67a42e850 100644
--- a/drivers/net/sungem.c
+++ b/drivers/net/sungem.c
@@ -948,6 +948,7 @@ static irqreturn_t gem_interrupt(int irq, void *dev_id, struct pt_regs *regs)
 		u32 gem_status = readl(gp->regs + GREG_STAT);
 
 		if (gem_status == 0) {
+			netif_poll_enable(dev);
 			spin_unlock_irqrestore(&gp->lock, flags);
 			return IRQ_NONE;
 		}
-- 
cgit v1.2.3


From 51b9146869ab9492da785c5c9321d85f01655ab6 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Michael Chan <mchan@broadcom.com>
Date: Thu, 1 Sep 2005 17:41:28 -0700
Subject: [TG3]: Minimize locking in TX path.

This is similar to Eric Dumazet's tx_lock patch for tg3 but takes it
one step further to eliminate the tx_lock in the tx_completion path
when the tx queue is not stopped.

Signed-off-by: Michael Chan <mchan@broadcom.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
---
 drivers/net/tg3.c | 24 +++++++++++++-----------
 1 file changed, 13 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-)

diff --git a/drivers/net/tg3.c b/drivers/net/tg3.c
index af8263a1580..e877579aab3 100644
--- a/drivers/net/tg3.c
+++ b/drivers/net/tg3.c
@@ -121,12 +121,9 @@
 			           TG3_RX_RCB_RING_SIZE(tp))
 #define TG3_TX_RING_BYTES	(sizeof(struct tg3_tx_buffer_desc) * \
 				 TG3_TX_RING_SIZE)
-#define TX_RING_GAP(TP)	\
-	(TG3_TX_RING_SIZE - (TP)->tx_pending)
 #define TX_BUFFS_AVAIL(TP)						\
-	(((TP)->tx_cons <= (TP)->tx_prod) ?				\
-	  (TP)->tx_cons + (TP)->tx_pending - (TP)->tx_prod :		\
-	  (TP)->tx_cons - (TP)->tx_prod - TX_RING_GAP(TP))
+	((TP)->tx_pending -						\
+	 (((TP)->tx_prod - (TP)->tx_cons) & (TG3_TX_RING_SIZE - 1)))
 #define NEXT_TX(N)		(((N) + 1) & (TG3_TX_RING_SIZE - 1))
 
 #define RX_PKT_BUF_SZ		(1536 + tp->rx_offset + 64)
@@ -2880,9 +2877,13 @@ static void tg3_tx(struct tg3 *tp)
 
 	tp->tx_cons = sw_idx;
 
-	if (netif_queue_stopped(tp->dev) &&
-	    (TX_BUFFS_AVAIL(tp) > TG3_TX_WAKEUP_THRESH))
-		netif_wake_queue(tp->dev);
+	if (unlikely(netif_queue_stopped(tp->dev))) {
+		spin_lock(&tp->tx_lock);
+		if (netif_queue_stopped(tp->dev) &&
+		    (TX_BUFFS_AVAIL(tp) > TG3_TX_WAKEUP_THRESH))
+			netif_wake_queue(tp->dev);
+		spin_unlock(&tp->tx_lock);
+	}
 }
 
 /* Returns size of skb allocated or < 0 on error.
@@ -3198,9 +3199,7 @@ static int tg3_poll(struct net_device *netdev, int *budget)
 
 	/* run TX completion thread */
 	if (sblk->idx[0].tx_consumer != tp->tx_cons) {
-		spin_lock(&tp->tx_lock);
 		tg3_tx(tp);
-		spin_unlock(&tp->tx_lock);
 	}
 
 	/* run RX thread, within the bounds set by NAPI.
@@ -3716,8 +3715,11 @@ static int tg3_start_xmit(struct sk_buff *skb, struct net_device *dev)
 	tw32_tx_mbox((MAILBOX_SNDHOST_PROD_IDX_0 + TG3_64BIT_REG_LOW), entry);
 
 	tp->tx_prod = entry;
-	if (TX_BUFFS_AVAIL(tp) <= (MAX_SKB_FRAGS + 1))
+	if (TX_BUFFS_AVAIL(tp) <= (MAX_SKB_FRAGS + 1)) {
 		netif_stop_queue(dev);
+		if (TX_BUFFS_AVAIL(tp) > TG3_TX_WAKEUP_THRESH)
+			netif_wake_queue(tp->dev);
+	}
 
 out_unlock:
     	mmiowb();
-- 
cgit v1.2.3


From 75c80c382fbd08acf06fbef9d54c9844e806a8b4 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>
Date: Thu, 1 Sep 2005 17:42:23 -0700
Subject: [TG3]: Update driver version and release date.

Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
---
 drivers/net/tg3.c | 4 ++--
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

diff --git a/drivers/net/tg3.c b/drivers/net/tg3.c
index e877579aab3..3faf62310f8 100644
--- a/drivers/net/tg3.c
+++ b/drivers/net/tg3.c
@@ -66,8 +66,8 @@
 
 #define DRV_MODULE_NAME		"tg3"
 #define PFX DRV_MODULE_NAME	": "
-#define DRV_MODULE_VERSION	"3.37"
-#define DRV_MODULE_RELDATE	"August 25, 2005"
+#define DRV_MODULE_VERSION	"3.38"
+#define DRV_MODULE_RELDATE	"September 1, 2005"
 
 #define TG3_DEF_MAC_MODE	0
 #define TG3_DEF_RX_MODE		0
-- 
cgit v1.2.3


From fb4f10ed50f01b0f953068456bfb6e2885921b01 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Aaron Grothe <ajgrothe@yahoo.com>
Date: Thu, 1 Sep 2005 17:42:46 -0700
Subject: [CRYPTO]: Fix XTEA implementation

The XTEA implementation was incorrect due to a misinterpretation of
operator precedence.  Because of the wide-spread nature of this
error, the erroneous implementation will be kept, albeit under the
new name of XETA.

Signed-off-by: Aaron Grothe <ajgrothe@yahoo.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
---
 Documentation/crypto/api-intro.txt |   1 +
 crypto/Kconfig                     |   5 +-
 crypto/tcrypt.c                    |  11 ++-
 crypto/tcrypt.h                    | 138 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-------
 crypto/tea.c                       |  81 ++++++++++++++++++++--
 5 files changed, 207 insertions(+), 29 deletions(-)

diff --git a/Documentation/crypto/api-intro.txt b/Documentation/crypto/api-intro.txt
index a2d5b490077..74dffc68ff9 100644
--- a/Documentation/crypto/api-intro.txt
+++ b/Documentation/crypto/api-intro.txt
@@ -223,6 +223,7 @@ CAST5 algorithm contributors:
 
 TEA/XTEA algorithm contributors:
   Aaron Grothe
+  Michael Ringe
 
 Khazad algorithm contributors:
   Aaron Grothe
diff --git a/crypto/Kconfig b/crypto/Kconfig
index 256c0b1fed1..89299f4ffe1 100644
--- a/crypto/Kconfig
+++ b/crypto/Kconfig
@@ -219,7 +219,7 @@ config CRYPTO_CAST6
 	  described in RFC2612.
 
 config CRYPTO_TEA
-	tristate "TEA and XTEA cipher algorithms"
+	tristate "TEA, XTEA and XETA cipher algorithms"
 	depends on CRYPTO
 	help
 	  TEA cipher algorithm.
@@ -232,6 +232,9 @@ config CRYPTO_TEA
 	  the TEA algorithm to address a potential key weakness
 	  in the TEA algorithm.
 
+	  Xtendend Encryption Tiny Algorithm is a mis-implementation 
+	  of the XTEA algorithm for compatibility purposes.
+
 config CRYPTO_ARC4
 	tristate "ARC4 cipher algorithm"
 	depends on CRYPTO
diff --git a/crypto/tcrypt.c b/crypto/tcrypt.c
index bd7524cfff3..68639419c5b 100644
--- a/crypto/tcrypt.c
+++ b/crypto/tcrypt.c
@@ -72,7 +72,7 @@ static char *check[] = {
 	"des", "md5", "des3_ede", "rot13", "sha1", "sha256", "blowfish",
 	"twofish", "serpent", "sha384", "sha512", "md4", "aes", "cast6",
 	"arc4", "michael_mic", "deflate", "crc32c", "tea", "xtea",
-	"khazad", "wp512", "wp384", "wp256", "tnepres", NULL
+	"khazad", "wp512", "wp384", "wp256", "tnepres", "xeta", NULL
 };
 
 static void hexdump(unsigned char *buf, unsigned int len)
@@ -859,6 +859,10 @@ static void do_test(void)
 		test_cipher ("anubis", MODE_CBC, ENCRYPT, anubis_cbc_enc_tv_template, ANUBIS_CBC_ENC_TEST_VECTORS);
 		test_cipher ("anubis", MODE_CBC, DECRYPT, anubis_cbc_dec_tv_template, ANUBIS_CBC_ENC_TEST_VECTORS);
 
+		//XETA
+		test_cipher ("xeta", MODE_ECB, ENCRYPT, xeta_enc_tv_template, XETA_ENC_TEST_VECTORS);
+		test_cipher ("xeta", MODE_ECB, DECRYPT, xeta_dec_tv_template, XETA_DEC_TEST_VECTORS);
+
 		test_hash("sha384", sha384_tv_template, SHA384_TEST_VECTORS);
 		test_hash("sha512", sha512_tv_template, SHA512_TEST_VECTORS);
 		test_hash("wp512", wp512_tv_template, WP512_TEST_VECTORS);
@@ -1016,6 +1020,11 @@ static void do_test(void)
 	case 29:
 		test_hash("tgr128", tgr128_tv_template, TGR128_TEST_VECTORS);
 		break;
+		
+	case 30:
+		test_cipher ("xeta", MODE_ECB, ENCRYPT, xeta_enc_tv_template, XETA_ENC_TEST_VECTORS);
+		test_cipher ("xeta", MODE_ECB, DECRYPT, xeta_dec_tv_template, XETA_DEC_TEST_VECTORS);
+		break;
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_CRYPTO_HMAC
 	case 100:
diff --git a/crypto/tcrypt.h b/crypto/tcrypt.h
index c01a0ce9b40..522ffd4b6f4 100644
--- a/crypto/tcrypt.h
+++ b/crypto/tcrypt.h
@@ -2211,7 +2211,7 @@ static struct cipher_testvec xtea_enc_tv_template[] = {
 		.klen	= 16,
 		.input  = { [0 ... 8] = 0x00 },
 		.ilen	= 8,
-		.result	= { 0xaa, 0x22, 0x96, 0xe5, 0x6c, 0x61, 0xf3, 0x45 },
+		.result	= { 0xd8, 0xd4, 0xe9, 0xde, 0xd9, 0x1e, 0x13, 0xf7 },
 		.rlen	= 8,
 	}, {
 		.key	= { 0x2b, 0x02, 0x05, 0x68, 0x06, 0x14, 0x49, 0x76,
@@ -2219,31 +2219,31 @@ static struct cipher_testvec xtea_enc_tv_template[] = {
 		.klen	= 16,
 		.input	= { 0x74, 0x65, 0x73, 0x74, 0x20, 0x6d, 0x65, 0x2e },
 		.ilen	= 8,
-		.result	= { 0x82, 0x3e, 0xeb, 0x35, 0xdc, 0xdd, 0xd9, 0xc3 },
+		.result	= { 0x94, 0xeb, 0xc8, 0x96, 0x84, 0x6a, 0x49, 0xa8 },
 		.rlen	= 8,
 	}, {
 		.key	= { 0x09, 0x65, 0x43, 0x11, 0x66, 0x44, 0x39, 0x25,
 			    0x51, 0x3a, 0x16, 0x10, 0x0a, 0x08, 0x12, 0x6e },
 		.klen	= 16,
-		.input	= { 0x6c, 0x6f, 0x6e, 0x67, 0x65, 0x72, 0x5f, 0x74,
+		.input	= { 0x3e, 0xce, 0xae, 0x22, 0x60, 0x56, 0xa8, 0x9d,
 			    0x65, 0x73, 0x74, 0x5f, 0x76, 0x65, 0x63, 0x74 },
 		.ilen	= 16,
-		.result	= { 0xe2, 0x04, 0xdb, 0xf2, 0x89, 0x85, 0x9e, 0xea,
+		.result	= { 0xe2, 0x04, 0xdb, 0xf2, 0x89, 0x85, 0x9e, 0xea, 
 			    0x61, 0x35, 0xaa, 0xed, 0xb5, 0xcb, 0x71, 0x2c },
 		.rlen	= 16,
 	}, {
 		.key	= { 0x4d, 0x76, 0x32, 0x17, 0x05, 0x3f, 0x75, 0x2c,
 			    0x5d, 0x04, 0x16, 0x36, 0x15, 0x72, 0x63, 0x2f },
 		.klen	= 16,
-		.input	= { 0x54, 0x65, 0x61, 0x20, 0x69, 0x73, 0x20, 0x67,
-			    0x6f, 0x6f, 0x64, 0x20, 0x66, 0x6f, 0x72, 0x20,
-			    0x79, 0x6f, 0x75, 0x21, 0x21, 0x21, 0x20, 0x72,
+		.input	= { 0x54, 0x65, 0x61, 0x20, 0x69, 0x73, 0x20, 0x67, 
+			    0x6f, 0x6f, 0x64, 0x20, 0x66, 0x6f, 0x72, 0x20, 
+			    0x79, 0x6f, 0x75, 0x21, 0x21, 0x21, 0x20, 0x72, 
 			    0x65, 0x61, 0x6c, 0x6c, 0x79, 0x21, 0x21, 0x21 },
 		.ilen	= 32,
-		.result	= { 0x0b, 0x03, 0xcd, 0x8a, 0xbe, 0x95, 0xfd, 0xb1,
-			    0xc1, 0x44, 0x91, 0x0b, 0xa5, 0xc9, 0x1b, 0xb4,
-			    0xa9, 0xda, 0x1e, 0x9e, 0xb1, 0x3e, 0x2a, 0x8f,
-			    0xea, 0xa5, 0x6a, 0x85, 0xd1, 0xf4, 0xa8, 0xa5 },
+		.result	= { 0x99, 0x81, 0x9f, 0x5d, 0x6f, 0x4b, 0x31, 0x3a,
+			    0x86, 0xff, 0x6f, 0xd0, 0xe3, 0x87, 0x70, 0x07,
+			    0x4d, 0xb8, 0xcf, 0xf3, 0x99, 0x50, 0xb3, 0xd4,
+			    0x73, 0xa2, 0xfa, 0xc9, 0x16, 0x59, 0x5d, 0x81 },
 		.rlen	= 32,
 	}
 };
@@ -2252,7 +2252,7 @@ static struct cipher_testvec xtea_dec_tv_template[] = {
 	{
 		.key    = { [0 ... 15] = 0x00 },
 		.klen	= 16,
-		.input	= { 0xaa, 0x22, 0x96, 0xe5, 0x6c, 0x61, 0xf3, 0x45 },
+		.input	= { 0xd8, 0xd4, 0xe9, 0xde, 0xd9, 0x1e, 0x13, 0xf7 },
 		.ilen	= 8,
 		.result = { [0 ... 8] = 0x00 },
 		.rlen	= 8,
@@ -2260,7 +2260,7 @@ static struct cipher_testvec xtea_dec_tv_template[] = {
 		.key	= { 0x2b, 0x02, 0x05, 0x68, 0x06, 0x14, 0x49, 0x76,
 			    0x77, 0x5d, 0x0e, 0x26, 0x6c, 0x28, 0x78, 0x43 },
 		.klen	= 16,
-		.input	= { 0x82, 0x3e, 0xeb, 0x35, 0xdc, 0xdd, 0xd9, 0xc3 },
+		.input	= { 0x94, 0xeb, 0xc8, 0x96, 0x84, 0x6a, 0x49, 0xa8 },
 		.ilen	= 8,
 		.result	= { 0x74, 0x65, 0x73, 0x74, 0x20, 0x6d, 0x65, 0x2e },
 		.rlen	= 8,
@@ -2268,24 +2268,24 @@ static struct cipher_testvec xtea_dec_tv_template[] = {
 		.key	= { 0x09, 0x65, 0x43, 0x11, 0x66, 0x44, 0x39, 0x25,
 			    0x51, 0x3a, 0x16, 0x10, 0x0a, 0x08, 0x12, 0x6e },
 		.klen	= 16,
-		.input	= { 0xe2, 0x04, 0xdb, 0xf2, 0x89, 0x85, 0x9e, 0xea,
-			    0x61, 0x35, 0xaa, 0xed, 0xb5, 0xcb, 0x71, 0x2c },
+		.input	= { 0x3e, 0xce, 0xae, 0x22, 0x60, 0x56, 0xa8, 0x9d,
+			    0x77, 0x4d, 0xd4, 0xb4, 0x87, 0x24, 0xe3, 0x9a },
 		.ilen	= 16,
-		.result	= { 0x6c, 0x6f, 0x6e, 0x67, 0x65, 0x72, 0x5f, 0x74,
+		.result	= { 0x6c, 0x6f, 0x6e, 0x67, 0x65, 0x72, 0x5f, 0x74, 
 			    0x65, 0x73, 0x74, 0x5f, 0x76, 0x65, 0x63, 0x74 },
 		.rlen	= 16,
 	}, {
 		.key	= { 0x4d, 0x76, 0x32, 0x17, 0x05, 0x3f, 0x75, 0x2c,
 			    0x5d, 0x04, 0x16, 0x36, 0x15, 0x72, 0x63, 0x2f },
 		.klen	= 16,
-		.input	= { 0x0b, 0x03, 0xcd, 0x8a, 0xbe, 0x95, 0xfd, 0xb1,
-			    0xc1, 0x44, 0x91, 0x0b, 0xa5, 0xc9, 0x1b, 0xb4,
-			    0xa9, 0xda, 0x1e, 0x9e, 0xb1, 0x3e, 0x2a, 0x8f,
-			    0xea, 0xa5, 0x6a, 0x85, 0xd1, 0xf4, 0xa8, 0xa5 },
+		.input	= { 0x99, 0x81, 0x9f, 0x5d, 0x6f, 0x4b, 0x31, 0x3a,
+			    0x86, 0xff, 0x6f, 0xd0, 0xe3, 0x87, 0x70, 0x07,
+			    0x4d, 0xb8, 0xcf, 0xf3, 0x99, 0x50, 0xb3, 0xd4,
+			    0x73, 0xa2, 0xfa, 0xc9, 0x16, 0x59, 0x5d, 0x81 },
 		.ilen	= 32,
-		.result	= { 0x54, 0x65, 0x61, 0x20, 0x69, 0x73, 0x20, 0x67,
-			    0x6f, 0x6f, 0x64, 0x20, 0x66, 0x6f, 0x72, 0x20,
-			    0x79, 0x6f, 0x75, 0x21, 0x21, 0x21, 0x20, 0x72,
+		.result	= { 0x54, 0x65, 0x61, 0x20, 0x69, 0x73, 0x20, 0x67, 
+			    0x6f, 0x6f, 0x64, 0x20, 0x66, 0x6f, 0x72, 0x20, 
+			    0x79, 0x6f, 0x75, 0x21, 0x21, 0x21, 0x20, 0x72, 
 			    0x65, 0x61, 0x6c, 0x6c, 0x79, 0x21, 0x21, 0x21 },
 		.rlen	= 32,
 	}
@@ -2594,6 +2594,98 @@ static struct cipher_testvec anubis_cbc_dec_tv_template[] = {
 	},
 };
 
+/* 
+ * XETA test vectors 
+ */
+#define XETA_ENC_TEST_VECTORS	4
+#define XETA_DEC_TEST_VECTORS	4
+
+static struct cipher_testvec xeta_enc_tv_template[] = {
+	{
+		.key    = { [0 ... 15] = 0x00 },
+		.klen	= 16,
+		.input  = { [0 ... 8] = 0x00 },
+		.ilen	= 8,
+		.result	= { 0xaa, 0x22, 0x96, 0xe5, 0x6c, 0x61, 0xf3, 0x45 },
+		.rlen	= 8,
+	}, {
+		.key	= { 0x2b, 0x02, 0x05, 0x68, 0x06, 0x14, 0x49, 0x76,
+			    0x77, 0x5d, 0x0e, 0x26, 0x6c, 0x28, 0x78, 0x43 },
+		.klen	= 16,
+		.input	= { 0x74, 0x65, 0x73, 0x74, 0x20, 0x6d, 0x65, 0x2e },
+		.ilen	= 8,
+		.result	= { 0x82, 0x3e, 0xeb, 0x35, 0xdc, 0xdd, 0xd9, 0xc3 },
+		.rlen	= 8,
+	}, {
+		.key	= { 0x09, 0x65, 0x43, 0x11, 0x66, 0x44, 0x39, 0x25,
+			    0x51, 0x3a, 0x16, 0x10, 0x0a, 0x08, 0x12, 0x6e },
+		.klen	= 16,
+		.input	= { 0x6c, 0x6f, 0x6e, 0x67, 0x65, 0x72, 0x5f, 0x74, 
+			    0x65, 0x73, 0x74, 0x5f, 0x76, 0x65, 0x63, 0x74 },
+		.ilen	= 16,
+		.result	= { 0xe2, 0x04, 0xdb, 0xf2, 0x89, 0x85, 0x9e, 0xea, 
+			    0x61, 0x35, 0xaa, 0xed, 0xb5, 0xcb, 0x71, 0x2c },
+		.rlen	= 16,
+	}, {
+		.key	= { 0x4d, 0x76, 0x32, 0x17, 0x05, 0x3f, 0x75, 0x2c,
+			    0x5d, 0x04, 0x16, 0x36, 0x15, 0x72, 0x63, 0x2f },
+		.klen	= 16,
+		.input	= { 0x54, 0x65, 0x61, 0x20, 0x69, 0x73, 0x20, 0x67, 
+			    0x6f, 0x6f, 0x64, 0x20, 0x66, 0x6f, 0x72, 0x20, 
+			    0x79, 0x6f, 0x75, 0x21, 0x21, 0x21, 0x20, 0x72, 
+			    0x65, 0x61, 0x6c, 0x6c, 0x79, 0x21, 0x21, 0x21 },
+		.ilen	= 32,
+		.result	= { 0x0b, 0x03, 0xcd, 0x8a, 0xbe, 0x95, 0xfd, 0xb1, 
+			    0xc1, 0x44, 0x91, 0x0b, 0xa5, 0xc9, 0x1b, 0xb4, 
+			    0xa9, 0xda, 0x1e, 0x9e, 0xb1, 0x3e, 0x2a, 0x8f, 
+			    0xea, 0xa5, 0x6a, 0x85, 0xd1, 0xf4, 0xa8, 0xa5 },
+		.rlen	= 32,
+	}
+};
+
+static struct cipher_testvec xeta_dec_tv_template[] = {
+	{
+		.key    = { [0 ... 15] = 0x00 },
+		.klen	= 16,
+		.input	= { 0xaa, 0x22, 0x96, 0xe5, 0x6c, 0x61, 0xf3, 0x45 },
+		.ilen	= 8,
+		.result = { [0 ... 8] = 0x00 },
+		.rlen	= 8,
+	}, {
+		.key	= { 0x2b, 0x02, 0x05, 0x68, 0x06, 0x14, 0x49, 0x76,
+			    0x77, 0x5d, 0x0e, 0x26, 0x6c, 0x28, 0x78, 0x43 },
+		.klen	= 16,
+		.input	= { 0x82, 0x3e, 0xeb, 0x35, 0xdc, 0xdd, 0xd9, 0xc3 },
+		.ilen	= 8,
+		.result	= { 0x74, 0x65, 0x73, 0x74, 0x20, 0x6d, 0x65, 0x2e },
+		.rlen	= 8,
+	}, {
+		.key	= { 0x09, 0x65, 0x43, 0x11, 0x66, 0x44, 0x39, 0x25,
+			    0x51, 0x3a, 0x16, 0x10, 0x0a, 0x08, 0x12, 0x6e },
+		.klen	= 16,
+		.input	= { 0xe2, 0x04, 0xdb, 0xf2, 0x89, 0x85, 0x9e, 0xea, 
+			    0x61, 0x35, 0xaa, 0xed, 0xb5, 0xcb, 0x71, 0x2c },
+		.ilen	= 16,
+		.result	= { 0x6c, 0x6f, 0x6e, 0x67, 0x65, 0x72, 0x5f, 0x74, 
+			    0x65, 0x73, 0x74, 0x5f, 0x76, 0x65, 0x63, 0x74 },
+		.rlen	= 16,
+	}, {
+		.key	= { 0x4d, 0x76, 0x32, 0x17, 0x05, 0x3f, 0x75, 0x2c,
+			    0x5d, 0x04, 0x16, 0x36, 0x15, 0x72, 0x63, 0x2f },
+		.klen	= 16,
+		.input	= { 0x0b, 0x03, 0xcd, 0x8a, 0xbe, 0x95, 0xfd, 0xb1, 
+			    0xc1, 0x44, 0x91, 0x0b, 0xa5, 0xc9, 0x1b, 0xb4, 
+			    0xa9, 0xda, 0x1e, 0x9e, 0xb1, 0x3e, 0x2a, 0x8f, 
+			    0xea, 0xa5, 0x6a, 0x85, 0xd1, 0xf4, 0xa8, 0xa5 },
+		.ilen	= 32,
+		.result	= { 0x54, 0x65, 0x61, 0x20, 0x69, 0x73, 0x20, 0x67, 
+			    0x6f, 0x6f, 0x64, 0x20, 0x66, 0x6f, 0x72, 0x20, 
+			    0x79, 0x6f, 0x75, 0x21, 0x21, 0x21, 0x20, 0x72, 
+			    0x65, 0x61, 0x6c, 0x6c, 0x79, 0x21, 0x21, 0x21 },
+		.rlen	= 32,
+	}
+};
+
 /*
  * Compression stuff.
  */
diff --git a/crypto/tea.c b/crypto/tea.c
index 03c23cbd3af..5924efdd3a1 100644
--- a/crypto/tea.c
+++ b/crypto/tea.c
@@ -1,11 +1,15 @@
 /* 
  * Cryptographic API.
  *
- * TEA and Xtended TEA Algorithms
+ * TEA, XTEA, and XETA crypto alogrithms
  *
  * The TEA and Xtended TEA algorithms were developed by David Wheeler 
  * and Roger Needham at the Computer Laboratory of Cambridge University.
  *
+ * Due to the order of evaluation in XTEA many people have incorrectly
+ * implemented it.  XETA (XTEA in the wrong order), exists for
+ * compatibility with these implementations.
+ *
  * Copyright (c) 2004 Aaron Grothe ajgrothe@yahoo.com
  *
  * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
@@ -153,9 +157,9 @@ static void xtea_encrypt(void *ctx_arg, u8 *dst, const u8 *src)
 	z = u32_in (src + 4);
 
 	while (sum != limit) {
-		y += (z << 4 ^ z >> 5) + (z ^ sum) + ctx->KEY[sum&3]; 
+		y += ((z << 4 ^ z >> 5) + z) ^ (sum + ctx->KEY[sum&3]); 
 		sum += XTEA_DELTA;
-		z += (y << 4 ^ y >> 5) + (y ^ sum) + ctx->KEY[sum>>11 &3]; 
+		z += ((y << 4 ^ y >> 5) + y) ^ (sum + ctx->KEY[sum>>11 &3]); 
 	}
 	
 	u32_out (dst, y);
@@ -174,6 +178,51 @@ static void xtea_decrypt(void *ctx_arg, u8 *dst, const u8 *src)
 
 	sum = XTEA_DELTA * XTEA_ROUNDS;
 
+	while (sum) {
+		z -= ((y << 4 ^ y >> 5) + y) ^ (sum + ctx->KEY[sum>>11 & 3]);
+		sum -= XTEA_DELTA;
+		y -= ((z << 4 ^ z >> 5) + z) ^ (sum + ctx->KEY[sum & 3]);
+	}
+	
+	u32_out (dst, y);
+	u32_out (dst + 4, z);
+
+}
+
+
+static void xeta_encrypt(void *ctx_arg, u8 *dst, const u8 *src)
+{ 
+
+	u32 y, z, sum = 0;
+	u32 limit = XTEA_DELTA * XTEA_ROUNDS;
+
+	struct xtea_ctx *ctx = ctx_arg;
+
+	y = u32_in (src);
+	z = u32_in (src + 4);
+
+	while (sum != limit) {
+		y += (z << 4 ^ z >> 5) + (z ^ sum) + ctx->KEY[sum&3];
+		sum += XTEA_DELTA;
+		z += (y << 4 ^ y >> 5) + (y ^ sum) + ctx->KEY[sum>>11 &3];
+	}
+	
+	u32_out (dst, y);
+	u32_out (dst + 4, z);
+
+}
+
+static void xeta_decrypt(void *ctx_arg, u8 *dst, const u8 *src)
+{ 
+
+	u32 y, z, sum;
+	struct tea_ctx *ctx = ctx_arg;
+
+	y = u32_in (src);
+	z = u32_in (src + 4);
+
+	sum = XTEA_DELTA * XTEA_ROUNDS;
+
 	while (sum) {
 		z -= (y << 4 ^ y >> 5) + (y ^ sum) + ctx->KEY[sum>>11 & 3];
 		sum -= XTEA_DELTA;
@@ -215,6 +264,21 @@ static struct crypto_alg xtea_alg = {
 	.cia_decrypt		=	xtea_decrypt } }
 };
 
+static struct crypto_alg xeta_alg = {
+	.cra_name		=	"xeta",
+	.cra_flags		=	CRYPTO_ALG_TYPE_CIPHER,
+	.cra_blocksize		=	XTEA_BLOCK_SIZE,
+	.cra_ctxsize		=	sizeof (struct xtea_ctx),
+	.cra_module		=	THIS_MODULE,
+	.cra_list		=	LIST_HEAD_INIT(xtea_alg.cra_list),
+	.cra_u			=	{ .cipher = {
+	.cia_min_keysize	=	XTEA_KEY_SIZE,
+	.cia_max_keysize	=	XTEA_KEY_SIZE,
+	.cia_setkey		= 	xtea_setkey,
+	.cia_encrypt		=	xeta_encrypt,
+	.cia_decrypt		=	xeta_decrypt } }
+};
+
 static int __init init(void)
 {
 	int ret = 0;
@@ -229,6 +293,13 @@ static int __init init(void)
 		goto out;
 	}
 
+	ret = crypto_register_alg(&xeta_alg);
+	if (ret < 0) {
+		crypto_unregister_alg(&tea_alg);
+		crypto_unregister_alg(&xtea_alg);
+		goto out;
+	}
+
 out:	
 	return ret;
 }
@@ -237,12 +308,14 @@ static void __exit fini(void)
 {
 	crypto_unregister_alg(&tea_alg);
 	crypto_unregister_alg(&xtea_alg);
+	crypto_unregister_alg(&xeta_alg);
 }
 
 MODULE_ALIAS("xtea");
+MODULE_ALIAS("xeta");
 
 module_init(init);
 module_exit(fini);
 
 MODULE_LICENSE("GPL");
-MODULE_DESCRIPTION("TEA & XTEA Cryptographic Algorithms");
+MODULE_DESCRIPTION("TEA, XTEA & XETA Cryptographic Algorithms");
-- 
cgit v1.2.3


From 64baf3cfea974d2b9e671ccfdbc03e030ea5ebc6 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Date: Thu, 1 Sep 2005 17:43:05 -0700
Subject: [CRYPTO]: Added CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_SLEEP flag

The crypto layer currently uses in_atomic() to determine whether it is
allowed to sleep.  This is incorrect since spin locks don't always cause
in_atomic() to return true.

Instead of that, this patch returns to an earlier idea of a per-tfm flag
which determines whether sleeping is allowed.  Unlike the earlier version,
the default is to not allow sleeping.  This ensures that no existing code
can break.

As usual, this flag may either be set through crypto_alloc_tfm(), or
just before a specific crypto operation.

Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
---
 crypto/api.c           | 3 ++-
 crypto/cipher.c        | 4 ----
 crypto/internal.h      | 3 ++-
 include/linux/crypto.h | 1 +
 4 files changed, 5 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)

diff --git a/crypto/api.c b/crypto/api.c
index b4728811ce3..959c4e5f264 100644
--- a/crypto/api.c
+++ b/crypto/api.c
@@ -66,7 +66,8 @@ static inline struct crypto_alg *crypto_alg_mod_lookup(const char *name)
 
 static int crypto_init_flags(struct crypto_tfm *tfm, u32 flags)
 {
-	tfm->crt_flags = 0;
+	tfm->crt_flags = flags & CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MASK;
+	flags &= ~CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MASK;
 	
 	switch (crypto_tfm_alg_type(tfm)) {
 	case CRYPTO_ALG_TYPE_CIPHER:
diff --git a/crypto/cipher.c b/crypto/cipher.c
index 8da644364cb..3df47f93c9d 100644
--- a/crypto/cipher.c
+++ b/crypto/cipher.c
@@ -377,11 +377,7 @@ static int nocrypt_iv(struct crypto_tfm *tfm,
 int crypto_init_cipher_flags(struct crypto_tfm *tfm, u32 flags)
 {
 	u32 mode = flags & CRYPTO_TFM_MODE_MASK;
-	
 	tfm->crt_cipher.cit_mode = mode ? mode : CRYPTO_TFM_MODE_ECB;
-	if (flags & CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_WEAK_KEY)
-		tfm->crt_flags = CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_WEAK_KEY;
-	
 	return 0;
 }
 
diff --git a/crypto/internal.h b/crypto/internal.h
index 37515beafc8..37aa652ce5c 100644
--- a/crypto/internal.h
+++ b/crypto/internal.h
@@ -17,6 +17,7 @@
 #include <linux/interrupt.h>
 #include <linux/init.h>
 #include <linux/kernel.h>
+#include <linux/slab.h>
 #include <asm/kmap_types.h>
 
 extern enum km_type crypto_km_types[];
@@ -38,7 +39,7 @@ static inline void crypto_kunmap(void *vaddr, int out)
 
 static inline void crypto_yield(struct crypto_tfm *tfm)
 {
-	if (!in_atomic())
+	if (tfm->crt_flags & CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_SLEEP)
 		cond_resched();
 }
 
diff --git a/include/linux/crypto.h b/include/linux/crypto.h
index 5e2bcc636a0..3c89df6e776 100644
--- a/include/linux/crypto.h
+++ b/include/linux/crypto.h
@@ -45,6 +45,7 @@
 #define CRYPTO_TFM_MODE_CTR		0x00000008
 
 #define CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_WEAK_KEY		0x00000100
+#define CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_SLEEP	0x00000200
 #define CRYPTO_TFM_RES_WEAK_KEY		0x00100000
 #define CRYPTO_TFM_RES_BAD_KEY_LEN   	0x00200000
 #define CRYPTO_TFM_RES_BAD_KEY_SCHED 	0x00400000
-- 
cgit v1.2.3


From eb6f1160ddb2fdadf50f350da79d0796c37f17e2 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Date: Thu, 1 Sep 2005 17:43:25 -0700
Subject: [CRYPTO]: Use CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_SLEEP where appropriate

This patch goes through the current users of the crypto layer and sets
CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_SLEEP at crypto_alloc_tfm() where all crypto operations
are performed in process context.

Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
---
 drivers/block/cryptoloop.c            | 6 ++++--
 drivers/md/dm-crypt.c                 | 7 ++++---
 drivers/net/wireless/airo.c           | 2 +-
 fs/nfsd/nfs4recover.c                 | 2 +-
 net/sunrpc/auth_gss/gss_krb5_crypto.c | 2 +-
 security/seclvl.c                     | 2 +-
 6 files changed, 12 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)

diff --git a/drivers/block/cryptoloop.c b/drivers/block/cryptoloop.c
index 5be6f998d8c..3d4261c39f1 100644
--- a/drivers/block/cryptoloop.c
+++ b/drivers/block/cryptoloop.c
@@ -57,9 +57,11 @@ cryptoloop_init(struct loop_device *lo, const struct loop_info64 *info)
 	mode = strsep(&cmsp, "-");
 
 	if (mode == NULL || strcmp(mode, "cbc") == 0)
-		tfm = crypto_alloc_tfm(cipher, CRYPTO_TFM_MODE_CBC);
+		tfm = crypto_alloc_tfm(cipher, CRYPTO_TFM_MODE_CBC |
+					       CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_SLEEP);
 	else if (strcmp(mode, "ecb") == 0)
-		tfm = crypto_alloc_tfm(cipher, CRYPTO_TFM_MODE_ECB);
+		tfm = crypto_alloc_tfm(cipher, CRYPTO_TFM_MODE_ECB |
+					       CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_SLEEP);
 	if (tfm == NULL)
 		return -EINVAL;
 
diff --git a/drivers/md/dm-crypt.c b/drivers/md/dm-crypt.c
index d0a4bab220e..b82bc315047 100644
--- a/drivers/md/dm-crypt.c
+++ b/drivers/md/dm-crypt.c
@@ -144,7 +144,7 @@ static int crypt_iv_essiv_ctr(struct crypt_config *cc, struct dm_target *ti,
 	}
 
 	/* Hash the cipher key with the given hash algorithm */
-	hash_tfm = crypto_alloc_tfm(opts, 0);
+	hash_tfm = crypto_alloc_tfm(opts, CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_SLEEP);
 	if (hash_tfm == NULL) {
 		ti->error = PFX "Error initializing ESSIV hash";
 		return -EINVAL;
@@ -172,7 +172,8 @@ static int crypt_iv_essiv_ctr(struct crypt_config *cc, struct dm_target *ti,
 
 	/* Setup the essiv_tfm with the given salt */
 	essiv_tfm = crypto_alloc_tfm(crypto_tfm_alg_name(cc->tfm),
-	                             CRYPTO_TFM_MODE_ECB);
+	                             CRYPTO_TFM_MODE_ECB |
+	                             CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_SLEEP);
 	if (essiv_tfm == NULL) {
 		ti->error = PFX "Error allocating crypto tfm for ESSIV";
 		kfree(salt);
@@ -587,7 +588,7 @@ static int crypt_ctr(struct dm_target *ti, unsigned int argc, char **argv)
 		goto bad1;
 	}
 
-	tfm = crypto_alloc_tfm(cipher, crypto_flags);
+	tfm = crypto_alloc_tfm(cipher, crypto_flags | CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_SLEEP);
 	if (!tfm) {
 		ti->error = PFX "Error allocating crypto tfm";
 		goto bad1;
diff --git a/drivers/net/wireless/airo.c b/drivers/net/wireless/airo.c
index df20adcd073..7fdb85dda4e 100644
--- a/drivers/net/wireless/airo.c
+++ b/drivers/net/wireless/airo.c
@@ -1301,7 +1301,7 @@ static int micsetup(struct airo_info *ai) {
 	int i;
 
 	if (ai->tfm == NULL)
-	        ai->tfm = crypto_alloc_tfm("aes", 0);
+	        ai->tfm = crypto_alloc_tfm("aes", CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_SLEEP);
 
         if (ai->tfm == NULL) {
                 printk(KERN_ERR "airo: failed to load transform for AES\n");
diff --git a/fs/nfsd/nfs4recover.c b/fs/nfsd/nfs4recover.c
index 57ed50fe7f8..02132f33320 100644
--- a/fs/nfsd/nfs4recover.c
+++ b/fs/nfsd/nfs4recover.c
@@ -93,7 +93,7 @@ nfs4_make_rec_clidname(char *dname, struct xdr_netobj *clname)
 
 	dprintk("NFSD: nfs4_make_rec_clidname for %.*s\n",
 			clname->len, clname->data);
-	tfm = crypto_alloc_tfm("md5", 0);
+	tfm = crypto_alloc_tfm("md5", CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_SLEEP);
 	if (tfm == NULL)
 		goto out;
 	cksum.len = crypto_tfm_alg_digestsize(tfm);
diff --git a/net/sunrpc/auth_gss/gss_krb5_crypto.c b/net/sunrpc/auth_gss/gss_krb5_crypto.c
index 5a7265aeaf8..7ad74449b18 100644
--- a/net/sunrpc/auth_gss/gss_krb5_crypto.c
+++ b/net/sunrpc/auth_gss/gss_krb5_crypto.c
@@ -160,7 +160,7 @@ make_checksum(s32 cksumtype, char *header, int hdrlen, struct xdr_buf *body,
 				" unsupported checksum %d", cksumtype);
 			goto out;
 	}
-	if (!(tfm = crypto_alloc_tfm(cksumname, 0)))
+	if (!(tfm = crypto_alloc_tfm(cksumname, CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_SLEEP)))
 		goto out;
 	cksum->len = crypto_tfm_alg_digestsize(tfm);
 	if ((cksum->data = kmalloc(cksum->len, GFP_KERNEL)) == NULL)
diff --git a/security/seclvl.c b/security/seclvl.c
index c8e87b22c9b..96b1f2122f6 100644
--- a/security/seclvl.c
+++ b/security/seclvl.c
@@ -321,7 +321,7 @@ plaintext_to_sha1(unsigned char *hash, const char *plaintext, int len)
 			      "bytes.\n", len, PAGE_SIZE);
 		return -ENOMEM;
 	}
-	tfm = crypto_alloc_tfm("sha1", 0);
+	tfm = crypto_alloc_tfm("sha1", CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_SLEEP);
 	if (tfm == NULL) {
 		seclvl_printk(0, KERN_ERR,
 			      "Failed to load transform for SHA1\n");
-- 
cgit v1.2.3


From 12a49ffd842bf5b07c62eaabf178703ce4fe09d7 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Patrick Caulfield <patrick@tykepenguin.com>
Date: Thu, 1 Sep 2005 17:43:45 -0700
Subject: [DECNET]: Tidy send side socket SKB allocation.

Patch from Steve Whitehouse which I've vetted and tested:

"This patch is really intended has a move towards fixing the
sendmsg/recvmsg functions in various ways so that we will finally
have working nagle. Also reduces code duplication."

Signed-off-by: Patrick Caulfield <patrick@tykepenguin.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
---
 net/decnet/af_decnet.c  | 40 +++++++++++++++++++++++++------
 net/decnet/dn_nsp_out.c | 63 -------------------------------------------------
 2 files changed, 33 insertions(+), 70 deletions(-)

diff --git a/net/decnet/af_decnet.c b/net/decnet/af_decnet.c
index 621680f127a..348f36b529f 100644
--- a/net/decnet/af_decnet.c
+++ b/net/decnet/af_decnet.c
@@ -1876,8 +1876,27 @@ static inline unsigned int dn_current_mss(struct sock *sk, int flags)
 	return mss_now;
 }
 
+/* 
+ * N.B. We get the timeout wrong here, but then we always did get it
+ * wrong before and this is another step along the road to correcting
+ * it. It ought to get updated each time we pass through the routine,
+ * but in practise it probably doesn't matter too much for now.
+ */
+static inline struct sk_buff *dn_alloc_send_pskb(struct sock *sk,
+			      unsigned long datalen, int noblock,
+			      int *errcode)
+{
+	struct sk_buff *skb = sock_alloc_send_skb(sk, datalen,
+						   noblock, errcode);
+	if (skb) {
+		skb->protocol = __constant_htons(ETH_P_DNA_RT);
+		skb->pkt_type = PACKET_OUTGOING;
+	}
+	return skb;
+}
+
 static int dn_sendmsg(struct kiocb *iocb, struct socket *sock,
-	   struct msghdr *msg, size_t size)
+		      struct msghdr *msg, size_t size)
 {
 	struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
 	struct dn_scp *scp = DN_SK(sk);
@@ -1892,7 +1911,7 @@ static int dn_sendmsg(struct kiocb *iocb, struct socket *sock,
 	struct dn_skb_cb *cb;
 	size_t len;
 	unsigned char fctype;
-	long timeo = sock_sndtimeo(sk, flags & MSG_DONTWAIT);
+	long timeo;
 
 	if (flags & ~(MSG_TRYHARD|MSG_OOB|MSG_DONTWAIT|MSG_EOR|MSG_NOSIGNAL|MSG_MORE|MSG_CMSG_COMPAT))
 		return -EOPNOTSUPP;
@@ -1900,18 +1919,21 @@ static int dn_sendmsg(struct kiocb *iocb, struct socket *sock,
 	if (addr_len && (addr_len != sizeof(struct sockaddr_dn)))
 		return -EINVAL;
 
+	lock_sock(sk);
+	timeo = sock_sndtimeo(sk, flags & MSG_DONTWAIT);
 	/*
 	 * The only difference between stream sockets and sequenced packet
 	 * sockets is that the stream sockets always behave as if MSG_EOR
 	 * has been set.
 	 */
 	if (sock->type == SOCK_STREAM) {
-		if (flags & MSG_EOR)
-			return -EINVAL;
+		if (flags & MSG_EOR) {
+			err = -EINVAL;
+			goto out;
+		}
 		flags |= MSG_EOR;
 	}
 
-	lock_sock(sk);
 
 	err = dn_check_state(sk, addr, addr_len, &timeo, flags);
 	if (err)
@@ -1980,8 +2002,12 @@ static int dn_sendmsg(struct kiocb *iocb, struct socket *sock,
 
 		/*
 		 * Get a suitably sized skb.
+		 * 64 is a bit of a hack really, but its larger than any
+		 * link-layer headers and has served us well as a good
+		 * guess as to their real length.
 		 */
-		skb = dn_alloc_send_skb(sk, &len, flags & MSG_DONTWAIT, timeo, &err);
+		skb = dn_alloc_send_pskb(sk, len + 64 + DN_MAX_NSP_DATA_HEADER,
+					 flags & MSG_DONTWAIT, &err);
 
 		if (err)
 			break;
@@ -1991,7 +2017,7 @@ static int dn_sendmsg(struct kiocb *iocb, struct socket *sock,
 
 		cb = DN_SKB_CB(skb);
 
-		skb_reserve(skb, DN_MAX_NSP_DATA_HEADER);
+		skb_reserve(skb, 64 + DN_MAX_NSP_DATA_HEADER);
 
 		if (memcpy_fromiovec(skb_put(skb, len), msg->msg_iov, len)) {
 			err = -EFAULT;
diff --git a/net/decnet/dn_nsp_out.c b/net/decnet/dn_nsp_out.c
index e0bebf4bbca..53633d35286 100644
--- a/net/decnet/dn_nsp_out.c
+++ b/net/decnet/dn_nsp_out.c
@@ -136,69 +136,6 @@ struct sk_buff *dn_alloc_skb(struct sock *sk, int size, int pri)
 	return skb;
 }
 
-/*
- * Wrapper for the above, for allocs of data skbs. We try and get the
- * whole size thats been asked for (plus 11 bytes of header). If this
- * fails, then we try for any size over 16 bytes for SOCK_STREAMS.
- */
-struct sk_buff *dn_alloc_send_skb(struct sock *sk, size_t *size, int noblock, long timeo, int *err)
-{
-	int space;
-	int len;
-	struct sk_buff *skb = NULL;
-
-	*err = 0;
-
-	while(skb == NULL) {
-		if (signal_pending(current)) {
-			*err = sock_intr_errno(timeo);
-			break;
-		}
-
-		if (sk->sk_shutdown & SEND_SHUTDOWN) {
-			*err = EINVAL;
-			break;
-		}
-
-		if (sk->sk_err)
-			break;
-
-		len = *size + 11;
-		space = sk->sk_sndbuf - atomic_read(&sk->sk_wmem_alloc);
-
-		if (space < len) {
-			if ((sk->sk_socket->type == SOCK_STREAM) &&
-			    (space >= (16 + 11)))
-				len = space;
-		}
-
-		if (space < len) {
-			set_bit(SOCK_ASYNC_NOSPACE, &sk->sk_socket->flags);
-			if (noblock) {
-				*err = EWOULDBLOCK;
-				break;
-			}
-
-			clear_bit(SOCK_ASYNC_WAITDATA, &sk->sk_socket->flags);
-			SOCK_SLEEP_PRE(sk)
-
-			if ((sk->sk_sndbuf - atomic_read(&sk->sk_wmem_alloc)) <
-			    len)
-				schedule();
-
-			SOCK_SLEEP_POST(sk)
-			continue;
-		}
-
-		if ((skb = dn_alloc_skb(sk, len, sk->sk_allocation)) == NULL)
-			continue;
-
-		*size = len - 11;
-	}
-
-	return skb;
-}
-
 /*
  * Calculate persist timer based upon the smoothed round
  * trip time and the variance. Backoff according to the
-- 
cgit v1.2.3


From 5170dbebbb2e9159cdf6bbf35e5d79cd7009799a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: KOVACS Krisztian <hidden@balabit.hu>
Date: Thu, 1 Sep 2005 17:44:06 -0700
Subject: [NETFILTER]: CLUSTERIP: fix memcpy() length typo

Fix a trivial typo in clusterip_config_init().

Signed-off-by: KOVACS Krisztian <hidden@balabit.hu>
Signed-off-by: Harald Welte <laforge@netfilter.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
---
 net/ipv4/netfilter/ipt_CLUSTERIP.c | 2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/net/ipv4/netfilter/ipt_CLUSTERIP.c b/net/ipv4/netfilter/ipt_CLUSTERIP.c
index 2d05cafec22..7d38913754b 100644
--- a/net/ipv4/netfilter/ipt_CLUSTERIP.c
+++ b/net/ipv4/netfilter/ipt_CLUSTERIP.c
@@ -144,7 +144,7 @@ clusterip_config_init(struct ipt_clusterip_tgt_info *i, u_int32_t ip,
 	memcpy(&c->clustermac, &i->clustermac, ETH_ALEN);
 	c->num_total_nodes = i->num_total_nodes;
 	c->num_local_nodes = i->num_local_nodes;
-	memcpy(&c->local_nodes, &i->local_nodes, sizeof(&c->local_nodes));
+	memcpy(&c->local_nodes, &i->local_nodes, sizeof(c->local_nodes));
 	c->hash_mode = i->hash_mode;
 	c->hash_initval = i->hash_initval;
 	atomic_set(&c->refcount, 1);
-- 
cgit v1.2.3


From 573dbd95964b01a942aa0c68e92b06f2c9536964 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Jesper Juhl <jesper.juhl@gmail.com>
Date: Thu, 1 Sep 2005 17:44:29 -0700
Subject: [CRYPTO]: crypto_free_tfm() callers no longer need to check for NULL

Since the patch to add a NULL short-circuit to crypto_free_tfm() went in,
there's no longer any need for callers of that function to check for NULL.
This patch removes the redundant NULL checks and also a few similar checks
for NULL before calls to kfree() that I ran into while doing the
crypto_free_tfm bits.

I've succesfuly compile tested this patch, and a kernel with the patch
applied boots and runs just fine.

When I posted the patch to LKML (and other lists/people on Cc) it drew the
following comments :

 J. Bruce Fields commented
  "I've no problem with the auth_gss or nfsv4 bits.--b."

 Sridhar Samudrala said
  "sctp change looks fine."

 Herbert Xu signed off on the patch.

So, I guess this is ready to be dropped into -mm and eventually mainline.

Signed-off-by: Jesper Juhl <jesper.juhl@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
---
 drivers/net/wireless/airo.c           |  3 +--
 fs/nfsd/nfs4recover.c                 |  3 +--
 net/ipv4/ah4.c                        | 18 ++++++------------
 net/ipv4/esp4.c                       | 24 ++++++++----------------
 net/ipv4/ipcomp.c                     |  3 +--
 net/ipv6/addrconf.c                   |  6 ++----
 net/ipv6/ah6.c                        | 18 ++++++------------
 net/ipv6/esp6.c                       | 24 ++++++++----------------
 net/ipv6/ipcomp6.c                    |  3 +--
 net/sctp/endpointola.c                |  3 +--
 net/sctp/socket.c                     |  3 +--
 net/sunrpc/auth_gss/gss_krb5_crypto.c |  3 +--
 net/sunrpc/auth_gss/gss_krb5_mech.c   |  9 +++------
 net/sunrpc/auth_gss/gss_spkm3_mech.c  | 12 ++++--------
 14 files changed, 44 insertions(+), 88 deletions(-)

diff --git a/drivers/net/wireless/airo.c b/drivers/net/wireless/airo.c
index 7fdb85dda4e..2bb8170cf6f 100644
--- a/drivers/net/wireless/airo.c
+++ b/drivers/net/wireless/airo.c
@@ -2403,8 +2403,7 @@ void stop_airo_card( struct net_device *dev, int freeres )
 		}
         }
 #ifdef MICSUPPORT
-	if (ai->tfm)
-		crypto_free_tfm(ai->tfm);
+	crypto_free_tfm(ai->tfm);
 #endif
 	del_airo_dev( dev );
 	free_netdev( dev );
diff --git a/fs/nfsd/nfs4recover.c b/fs/nfsd/nfs4recover.c
index 02132f33320..954cf893d50 100644
--- a/fs/nfsd/nfs4recover.c
+++ b/fs/nfsd/nfs4recover.c
@@ -114,8 +114,7 @@ nfs4_make_rec_clidname(char *dname, struct xdr_netobj *clname)
 	kfree(cksum.data);
 	status = nfs_ok;
 out:
-	if (tfm)
-		crypto_free_tfm(tfm);
+	crypto_free_tfm(tfm);
 	return status;
 }
 
diff --git a/net/ipv4/ah4.c b/net/ipv4/ah4.c
index 514c85b2631..035ad2c9e1b 100644
--- a/net/ipv4/ah4.c
+++ b/net/ipv4/ah4.c
@@ -263,10 +263,8 @@ static int ah_init_state(struct xfrm_state *x)
 
 error:
 	if (ahp) {
-		if (ahp->work_icv)
-			kfree(ahp->work_icv);
-		if (ahp->tfm)
-			crypto_free_tfm(ahp->tfm);
+		kfree(ahp->work_icv);
+		crypto_free_tfm(ahp->tfm);
 		kfree(ahp);
 	}
 	return -EINVAL;
@@ -279,14 +277,10 @@ static void ah_destroy(struct xfrm_state *x)
 	if (!ahp)
 		return;
 
-	if (ahp->work_icv) {
-		kfree(ahp->work_icv);
-		ahp->work_icv = NULL;
-	}
-	if (ahp->tfm) {
-		crypto_free_tfm(ahp->tfm);
-		ahp->tfm = NULL;
-	}
+	kfree(ahp->work_icv);
+	ahp->work_icv = NULL;
+	crypto_free_tfm(ahp->tfm);
+	ahp->tfm = NULL;
 	kfree(ahp);
 }
 
diff --git a/net/ipv4/esp4.c b/net/ipv4/esp4.c
index b31ffc5053d..1b5a09d1b90 100644
--- a/net/ipv4/esp4.c
+++ b/net/ipv4/esp4.c
@@ -343,22 +343,14 @@ static void esp_destroy(struct xfrm_state *x)
 	if (!esp)
 		return;
 
-	if (esp->conf.tfm) {
-		crypto_free_tfm(esp->conf.tfm);
-		esp->conf.tfm = NULL;
-	}
-	if (esp->conf.ivec) {
-		kfree(esp->conf.ivec);
-		esp->conf.ivec = NULL;
-	}
-	if (esp->auth.tfm) {
-		crypto_free_tfm(esp->auth.tfm);
-		esp->auth.tfm = NULL;
-	}
-	if (esp->auth.work_icv) {
-		kfree(esp->auth.work_icv);
-		esp->auth.work_icv = NULL;
-	}
+	crypto_free_tfm(esp->conf.tfm);
+	esp->conf.tfm = NULL;
+	kfree(esp->conf.ivec);
+	esp->conf.ivec = NULL;
+	crypto_free_tfm(esp->auth.tfm);
+	esp->auth.tfm = NULL;
+	kfree(esp->auth.work_icv);
+	esp->auth.work_icv = NULL;
 	kfree(esp);
 }
 
diff --git a/net/ipv4/ipcomp.c b/net/ipv4/ipcomp.c
index dcb7ee6c485..fc718df17b4 100644
--- a/net/ipv4/ipcomp.c
+++ b/net/ipv4/ipcomp.c
@@ -345,8 +345,7 @@ static void ipcomp_free_tfms(struct crypto_tfm **tfms)
 
 	for_each_cpu(cpu) {
 		struct crypto_tfm *tfm = *per_cpu_ptr(tfms, cpu);
-		if (tfm)
-			crypto_free_tfm(tfm);
+		crypto_free_tfm(tfm);
 	}
 	free_percpu(tfms);
 }
diff --git a/net/ipv6/addrconf.c b/net/ipv6/addrconf.c
index 937ad32db77..6d6fb74f3b5 100644
--- a/net/ipv6/addrconf.c
+++ b/net/ipv6/addrconf.c
@@ -3593,10 +3593,8 @@ void __exit addrconf_cleanup(void)
 	rtnl_unlock();
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_IPV6_PRIVACY
-	if (likely(md5_tfm != NULL)) {
-		crypto_free_tfm(md5_tfm);
-		md5_tfm = NULL;
-	}
+	crypto_free_tfm(md5_tfm);
+	md5_tfm = NULL;
 #endif
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_PROC_FS
diff --git a/net/ipv6/ah6.c b/net/ipv6/ah6.c
index 0ebfad907a0..f3629730eb1 100644
--- a/net/ipv6/ah6.c
+++ b/net/ipv6/ah6.c
@@ -401,10 +401,8 @@ static int ah6_init_state(struct xfrm_state *x)
 
 error:
 	if (ahp) {
-		if (ahp->work_icv)
-			kfree(ahp->work_icv);
-		if (ahp->tfm)
-			crypto_free_tfm(ahp->tfm);
+		kfree(ahp->work_icv);
+		crypto_free_tfm(ahp->tfm);
 		kfree(ahp);
 	}
 	return -EINVAL;
@@ -417,14 +415,10 @@ static void ah6_destroy(struct xfrm_state *x)
 	if (!ahp)
 		return;
 
-	if (ahp->work_icv) {
-		kfree(ahp->work_icv);
-		ahp->work_icv = NULL;
-	}
-	if (ahp->tfm) {
-		crypto_free_tfm(ahp->tfm);
-		ahp->tfm = NULL;
-	}
+	kfree(ahp->work_icv);
+	ahp->work_icv = NULL;
+	crypto_free_tfm(ahp->tfm);
+	ahp->tfm = NULL;
 	kfree(ahp);
 }
 
diff --git a/net/ipv6/esp6.c b/net/ipv6/esp6.c
index e8bff9d3d96..9b27460f0cc 100644
--- a/net/ipv6/esp6.c
+++ b/net/ipv6/esp6.c
@@ -276,22 +276,14 @@ static void esp6_destroy(struct xfrm_state *x)
 	if (!esp)
 		return;
 
-	if (esp->conf.tfm) {
-		crypto_free_tfm(esp->conf.tfm);
-		esp->conf.tfm = NULL;
-	}
-	if (esp->conf.ivec) {
-		kfree(esp->conf.ivec);
-		esp->conf.ivec = NULL;
-	}
-	if (esp->auth.tfm) {
-		crypto_free_tfm(esp->auth.tfm);
-		esp->auth.tfm = NULL;
-	}
-	if (esp->auth.work_icv) {
-		kfree(esp->auth.work_icv);
-		esp->auth.work_icv = NULL;
-	}
+	crypto_free_tfm(esp->conf.tfm);
+	esp->conf.tfm = NULL;
+	kfree(esp->conf.ivec);
+	esp->conf.ivec = NULL;
+	crypto_free_tfm(esp->auth.tfm);
+	esp->auth.tfm = NULL;
+	kfree(esp->auth.work_icv);
+	esp->auth.work_icv = NULL;
 	kfree(esp);
 }
 
diff --git a/net/ipv6/ipcomp6.c b/net/ipv6/ipcomp6.c
index 135383ef538..85bfbc69b2c 100644
--- a/net/ipv6/ipcomp6.c
+++ b/net/ipv6/ipcomp6.c
@@ -341,8 +341,7 @@ static void ipcomp6_free_tfms(struct crypto_tfm **tfms)
 
 	for_each_cpu(cpu) {
 		struct crypto_tfm *tfm = *per_cpu_ptr(tfms, cpu);
-		if (tfm)
-			crypto_free_tfm(tfm);
+		crypto_free_tfm(tfm);
 	}
 	free_percpu(tfms);
 }
diff --git a/net/sctp/endpointola.c b/net/sctp/endpointola.c
index e47ac0d1a6d..e22ccd65596 100644
--- a/net/sctp/endpointola.c
+++ b/net/sctp/endpointola.c
@@ -193,8 +193,7 @@ static void sctp_endpoint_destroy(struct sctp_endpoint *ep)
 	sctp_unhash_endpoint(ep);
 
 	/* Free up the HMAC transform. */
-	if (sctp_sk(ep->base.sk)->hmac)
-		sctp_crypto_free_tfm(sctp_sk(ep->base.sk)->hmac);
+	sctp_crypto_free_tfm(sctp_sk(ep->base.sk)->hmac);
 
 	/* Cleanup. */
 	sctp_inq_free(&ep->base.inqueue);
diff --git a/net/sctp/socket.c b/net/sctp/socket.c
index 4454afe4727..91ec8c93691 100644
--- a/net/sctp/socket.c
+++ b/net/sctp/socket.c
@@ -4194,8 +4194,7 @@ out:
 	sctp_release_sock(sk);
 	return err;
 cleanup:
-	if (tfm)
-		sctp_crypto_free_tfm(tfm);
+	sctp_crypto_free_tfm(tfm);
 	goto out;
 }
 
diff --git a/net/sunrpc/auth_gss/gss_krb5_crypto.c b/net/sunrpc/auth_gss/gss_krb5_crypto.c
index 7ad74449b18..ee6ae74cd1b 100644
--- a/net/sunrpc/auth_gss/gss_krb5_crypto.c
+++ b/net/sunrpc/auth_gss/gss_krb5_crypto.c
@@ -199,8 +199,7 @@ make_checksum(s32 cksumtype, char *header, int hdrlen, struct xdr_buf *body,
 	crypto_digest_final(tfm, cksum->data);
 	code = 0;
 out:
-	if (tfm)
-		crypto_free_tfm(tfm);
+	crypto_free_tfm(tfm);
 	return code;
 }
 
diff --git a/net/sunrpc/auth_gss/gss_krb5_mech.c b/net/sunrpc/auth_gss/gss_krb5_mech.c
index cf726510df8..606a8a82caf 100644
--- a/net/sunrpc/auth_gss/gss_krb5_mech.c
+++ b/net/sunrpc/auth_gss/gss_krb5_mech.c
@@ -185,12 +185,9 @@ static void
 gss_delete_sec_context_kerberos(void *internal_ctx) {
 	struct krb5_ctx *kctx = internal_ctx;
 
-	if (kctx->seq)
-		crypto_free_tfm(kctx->seq);
-	if (kctx->enc)
-		crypto_free_tfm(kctx->enc);
-	if (kctx->mech_used.data)
-		kfree(kctx->mech_used.data);
+	crypto_free_tfm(kctx->seq);
+	crypto_free_tfm(kctx->enc);
+	kfree(kctx->mech_used.data);
 	kfree(kctx);
 }
 
diff --git a/net/sunrpc/auth_gss/gss_spkm3_mech.c b/net/sunrpc/auth_gss/gss_spkm3_mech.c
index dad05994c3e..6c97d61baa9 100644
--- a/net/sunrpc/auth_gss/gss_spkm3_mech.c
+++ b/net/sunrpc/auth_gss/gss_spkm3_mech.c
@@ -214,14 +214,10 @@ static void
 gss_delete_sec_context_spkm3(void *internal_ctx) {
 	struct spkm3_ctx *sctx = internal_ctx;
 
-	if(sctx->derived_integ_key)
-		crypto_free_tfm(sctx->derived_integ_key);
-	if(sctx->derived_conf_key)
-		crypto_free_tfm(sctx->derived_conf_key);
-	if(sctx->share_key.data)
-		kfree(sctx->share_key.data);
-	if(sctx->mech_used.data)
-		kfree(sctx->mech_used.data);
+	crypto_free_tfm(sctx->derived_integ_key);
+	crypto_free_tfm(sctx->derived_conf_key);
+	kfree(sctx->share_key.data);
+	kfree(sctx->mech_used.data);
 	kfree(sctx);
 }
 
-- 
cgit v1.2.3


From 2dac4b96b9362954a0638317b90e3e7bcb112e83 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: YOSHIFUJI Hideaki <yoshfuji@linux-ipv6.org>
Date: Thu, 1 Sep 2005 17:44:49 -0700
Subject: [IPV6]: Repair Incoming Interface Handling for Raw Socket.

Due to changes to enforce checking interface bindings,
sockets did not see loopback packets bound for our local address
on our interface.

e.g.)
  When we ping6 fe80::1%eth0, skb->dev points loopback_dev while
  IP6CB(skb)->iif indicates eth0.

This patch fixes the issue by using appropriate incoming interface,
in the sense of scoping architecture.

Signed-off-by: YOSHIFUJI Hideaki <yoshfuji@linux-ipv6.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
---
 net/ipv6/icmp.c | 2 +-
 net/ipv6/raw.c  | 4 ++--
 2 files changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)

diff --git a/net/ipv6/icmp.c b/net/ipv6/icmp.c
index 5176fc655ea..fa8f1bb0aa5 100644
--- a/net/ipv6/icmp.c
+++ b/net/ipv6/icmp.c
@@ -549,7 +549,7 @@ static void icmpv6_notify(struct sk_buff *skb, int type, int code, u32 info)
 	read_lock(&raw_v6_lock);
 	if ((sk = sk_head(&raw_v6_htable[hash])) != NULL) {
 		while((sk = __raw_v6_lookup(sk, nexthdr, daddr, saddr,
-					    skb->dev->ifindex))) {
+					    IP6CB(skb)->iif))) {
 			rawv6_err(sk, skb, NULL, type, code, inner_offset, info);
 			sk = sk_next(sk);
 		}
diff --git a/net/ipv6/raw.c b/net/ipv6/raw.c
index 7a5863298f3..ed3a76b30fd 100644
--- a/net/ipv6/raw.c
+++ b/net/ipv6/raw.c
@@ -166,7 +166,7 @@ int ipv6_raw_deliver(struct sk_buff *skb, int nexthdr)
 	if (sk == NULL)
 		goto out;
 
-	sk = __raw_v6_lookup(sk, nexthdr, daddr, saddr, skb->dev->ifindex);
+	sk = __raw_v6_lookup(sk, nexthdr, daddr, saddr, IP6CB(skb)->iif);
 
 	while (sk) {
 		delivered = 1;
@@ -178,7 +178,7 @@ int ipv6_raw_deliver(struct sk_buff *skb, int nexthdr)
 				rawv6_rcv(sk, clone);
 		}
 		sk = __raw_v6_lookup(sk_next(sk), nexthdr, daddr, saddr,
-				     skb->dev->ifindex);
+				     IP6CB(skb)->iif);
 	}
 out:
 	read_unlock(&raw_v6_lock);
-- 
cgit v1.2.3


From d80d99d643090c3cf2b1f9fb3fadd1256f7e384f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Date: Thu, 1 Sep 2005 17:48:23 -0700
Subject: [NET]: Add sk_stream_wmem_schedule

This patch introduces sk_stream_wmem_schedule as a short-hand for
the sk_forward_alloc checking on egress.

Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
---
 include/net/sock.h | 12 ++++++++----
 net/ipv4/tcp.c     |  3 +--
 2 files changed, 9 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)

diff --git a/include/net/sock.h b/include/net/sock.h
index 312cb25cbd1..e51e626e9af 100644
--- a/include/net/sock.h
+++ b/include/net/sock.h
@@ -709,6 +709,12 @@ static inline int sk_stream_rmem_schedule(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
 		sk_stream_mem_schedule(sk, skb->truesize, 1);
 }
 
+static inline int sk_stream_wmem_schedule(struct sock *sk, int size)
+{
+	return size <= sk->sk_forward_alloc ||
+	       sk_stream_mem_schedule(sk, size, 0);
+}
+
 /* Used by processes to "lock" a socket state, so that
  * interrupts and bottom half handlers won't change it
  * from under us. It essentially blocks any incoming
@@ -1203,8 +1209,7 @@ static inline struct sk_buff *sk_stream_alloc_pskb(struct sock *sk,
 	skb = alloc_skb_fclone(size + hdr_len, gfp);
 	if (skb) {
 		skb->truesize += mem;
-		if (sk->sk_forward_alloc >= (int)skb->truesize ||
-		    sk_stream_mem_schedule(sk, skb->truesize, 0)) {
+		if (sk_stream_wmem_schedule(sk, skb->truesize)) {
 			skb_reserve(skb, hdr_len);
 			return skb;
 		}
@@ -1227,8 +1232,7 @@ static inline struct page *sk_stream_alloc_page(struct sock *sk)
 {
 	struct page *page = NULL;
 
-	if (sk->sk_forward_alloc >= (int)PAGE_SIZE ||
-	    sk_stream_mem_schedule(sk, PAGE_SIZE, 0))
+	if (sk_stream_wmem_schedule(sk, PAGE_SIZE))
 		page = alloc_pages(sk->sk_allocation, 0);
 	else {
 		sk->sk_prot->enter_memory_pressure();
diff --git a/net/ipv4/tcp.c b/net/ipv4/tcp.c
index 02fdda68718..854f6d0c4bb 100644
--- a/net/ipv4/tcp.c
+++ b/net/ipv4/tcp.c
@@ -552,8 +552,7 @@ new_segment:
 			tcp_mark_push(tp, skb);
 			goto new_segment;
 		}
-		if (sk->sk_forward_alloc < copy &&
-		    !sk_stream_mem_schedule(sk, copy, 0))
+		if (!sk_stream_wmem_schedule(sk, copy))
 			goto wait_for_memory;
 		
 		if (can_coalesce) {
-- 
cgit v1.2.3


From ef015786152adaff5a6a8bf0c8ea2f70cee8059d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Date: Thu, 1 Sep 2005 17:48:59 -0700
Subject: [TCP]: Fix sk_forward_alloc underflow in tcp_sendmsg

I've finally found a potential cause of the sk_forward_alloc underflows
that people have been reporting sporadically.

When tcp_sendmsg tacks on extra bits to an existing TCP_PAGE we don't
check sk_forward_alloc even though a large amount of time may have
elapsed since we allocated the page.  In the mean time someone could've
come along and liberated packets and reclaimed sk_forward_alloc memory.

This patch makes tcp_sendmsg check sk_forward_alloc every time as we
do in do_tcp_sendpages.

Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
---
 include/net/sock.h |  5 ++---
 net/ipv4/tcp.c     | 14 +++++++++-----
 2 files changed, 11 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)

diff --git a/include/net/sock.h b/include/net/sock.h
index e51e626e9af..cf628261da5 100644
--- a/include/net/sock.h
+++ b/include/net/sock.h
@@ -1232,9 +1232,8 @@ static inline struct page *sk_stream_alloc_page(struct sock *sk)
 {
 	struct page *page = NULL;
 
-	if (sk_stream_wmem_schedule(sk, PAGE_SIZE))
-		page = alloc_pages(sk->sk_allocation, 0);
-	else {
+	page = alloc_pages(sk->sk_allocation, 0);
+	if (!page) {
 		sk->sk_prot->enter_memory_pressure();
 		sk_stream_moderate_sndbuf(sk);
 	}
diff --git a/net/ipv4/tcp.c b/net/ipv4/tcp.c
index 854f6d0c4bb..cbcc9fc4778 100644
--- a/net/ipv4/tcp.c
+++ b/net/ipv4/tcp.c
@@ -769,19 +769,23 @@ new_segment:
 					if (off == PAGE_SIZE) {
 						put_page(page);
 						TCP_PAGE(sk) = page = NULL;
+						TCP_OFF(sk) = off = 0;
 					}
-				}
+				} else
+					BUG_ON(off);
+
+				if (copy > PAGE_SIZE - off)
+					copy = PAGE_SIZE - off;
+
+				if (!sk_stream_wmem_schedule(sk, copy))
+					goto wait_for_memory;
 
 				if (!page) {
 					/* Allocate new cache page. */
 					if (!(page = sk_stream_alloc_page(sk)))
 						goto wait_for_memory;
-					off = 0;
 				}
 
-				if (copy > PAGE_SIZE - off)
-					copy = PAGE_SIZE - off;
-
 				/* Time to copy data. We are close to
 				 * the end! */
 				err = skb_copy_to_page(sk, from, skb, page,
-- 
cgit v1.2.3


From 6475be16fd9b3c6746ca4d18959246b13c669ea8 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>
Date: Thu, 1 Sep 2005 22:47:01 -0700
Subject: [TCP]: Keep TSO enabled even during loss events.

All we need to do is resegment the queue so that
we record SACK information accurately.  The edges
of the SACK blocks guide our resegmenting decisions.

With help from Herbert Xu.

Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
---
 include/net/tcp.h     |  1 +
 net/ipv4/tcp_input.c  | 36 ++++++++++++++++++++++-----------
 net/ipv4/tcp_output.c | 55 +++++++++++++++++++--------------------------------
 3 files changed, 45 insertions(+), 47 deletions(-)

diff --git a/include/net/tcp.h b/include/net/tcp.h
index d6bcf1317a6..97af77c4d09 100644
--- a/include/net/tcp.h
+++ b/include/net/tcp.h
@@ -454,6 +454,7 @@ extern int tcp_retransmit_skb(struct sock *, struct sk_buff *);
 extern void tcp_xmit_retransmit_queue(struct sock *);
 extern void tcp_simple_retransmit(struct sock *);
 extern int tcp_trim_head(struct sock *, struct sk_buff *, u32);
+extern int tcp_fragment(struct sock *, struct sk_buff *, u32, unsigned int);
 
 extern void tcp_send_probe0(struct sock *);
 extern void tcp_send_partial(struct sock *);
diff --git a/net/ipv4/tcp_input.c b/net/ipv4/tcp_input.c
index 1afb080bdf0..29222b96495 100644
--- a/net/ipv4/tcp_input.c
+++ b/net/ipv4/tcp_input.c
@@ -923,14 +923,6 @@ tcp_sacktag_write_queue(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *ack_skb, u32 prior_snd_
 	int flag = 0;
 	int i;
 
-	/* So, SACKs for already sent large segments will be lost.
-	 * Not good, but alternative is to resegment the queue. */
-	if (sk->sk_route_caps & NETIF_F_TSO) {
-		sk->sk_route_caps &= ~NETIF_F_TSO;
-		sock_set_flag(sk, SOCK_NO_LARGESEND);
-		tp->mss_cache = tp->mss_cache;
-	}
-
 	if (!tp->sacked_out)
 		tp->fackets_out = 0;
 	prior_fackets = tp->fackets_out;
@@ -978,20 +970,40 @@ tcp_sacktag_write_queue(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *ack_skb, u32 prior_snd_
 			flag |= FLAG_DATA_LOST;
 
 		sk_stream_for_retrans_queue(skb, sk) {
-			u8 sacked = TCP_SKB_CB(skb)->sacked;
-			int in_sack;
+			int in_sack, pcount;
+			u8 sacked;
 
 			/* The retransmission queue is always in order, so
 			 * we can short-circuit the walk early.
 			 */
-			if(!before(TCP_SKB_CB(skb)->seq, end_seq))
+			if (!before(TCP_SKB_CB(skb)->seq, end_seq))
 				break;
 
-			fack_count += tcp_skb_pcount(skb);
+			pcount = tcp_skb_pcount(skb);
+
+			if (pcount > 1 &&
+			    (after(start_seq, TCP_SKB_CB(skb)->seq) ||
+			     before(end_seq, TCP_SKB_CB(skb)->end_seq))) {
+				unsigned int pkt_len;
+
+				if (after(start_seq, TCP_SKB_CB(skb)->seq))
+					pkt_len = (start_seq -
+						   TCP_SKB_CB(skb)->seq);
+				else
+					pkt_len = (end_seq -
+						   TCP_SKB_CB(skb)->seq);
+				if (tcp_fragment(sk, skb, pkt_len, skb_shinfo(skb)->tso_size))
+					break;
+				pcount = tcp_skb_pcount(skb);
+			}
+
+			fack_count += pcount;
 
 			in_sack = !after(start_seq, TCP_SKB_CB(skb)->seq) &&
 				!before(end_seq, TCP_SKB_CB(skb)->end_seq);
 
+			sacked = TCP_SKB_CB(skb)->sacked;
+
 			/* Account D-SACK for retransmitted packet. */
 			if ((dup_sack && in_sack) &&
 			    (sacked & TCPCB_RETRANS) &&
diff --git a/net/ipv4/tcp_output.c b/net/ipv4/tcp_output.c
index 75b68116682..6094db5e11b 100644
--- a/net/ipv4/tcp_output.c
+++ b/net/ipv4/tcp_output.c
@@ -428,11 +428,11 @@ static void tcp_set_skb_tso_segs(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb, unsigned
  * packet to the list.  This won't be called frequently, I hope. 
  * Remember, these are still headerless SKBs at this point.
  */
-static int tcp_fragment(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb, u32 len, unsigned int mss_now)
+int tcp_fragment(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb, u32 len, unsigned int mss_now)
 {
 	struct tcp_sock *tp = tcp_sk(sk);
 	struct sk_buff *buff;
-	int nsize;
+	int nsize, old_factor;
 	u16 flags;
 
 	nsize = skb_headlen(skb) - len;
@@ -490,18 +490,29 @@ static int tcp_fragment(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb, u32 len, unsigned
 		tp->left_out -= tcp_skb_pcount(skb);
 	}
 
+	old_factor = tcp_skb_pcount(skb);
+
 	/* Fix up tso_factor for both original and new SKB.  */
 	tcp_set_skb_tso_segs(sk, skb, mss_now);
 	tcp_set_skb_tso_segs(sk, buff, mss_now);
 
-	if (TCP_SKB_CB(skb)->sacked & TCPCB_LOST) {
-		tp->lost_out += tcp_skb_pcount(skb);
-		tp->left_out += tcp_skb_pcount(skb);
-	}
+	/* If this packet has been sent out already, we must
+	 * adjust the various packet counters.
+	 */
+	if (after(tp->snd_nxt, TCP_SKB_CB(buff)->end_seq)) {
+		int diff = old_factor - tcp_skb_pcount(skb) -
+			tcp_skb_pcount(buff);
 
-	if (TCP_SKB_CB(buff)->sacked&TCPCB_LOST) {
-		tp->lost_out += tcp_skb_pcount(buff);
-		tp->left_out += tcp_skb_pcount(buff);
+		tp->packets_out -= diff;
+		if (TCP_SKB_CB(skb)->sacked & TCPCB_LOST) {
+			tp->lost_out -= diff;
+			tp->left_out -= diff;
+		}
+		if (diff > 0) {
+			tp->fackets_out -= diff;
+			if ((int)tp->fackets_out < 0)
+				tp->fackets_out = 0;
+		}
 	}
 
 	/* Link BUFF into the send queue. */
@@ -1350,12 +1361,6 @@ int tcp_retransmit_skb(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
 	if (before(TCP_SKB_CB(skb)->seq, tp->snd_una)) {
 		if (before(TCP_SKB_CB(skb)->end_seq, tp->snd_una))
 			BUG();
-
-		if (sk->sk_route_caps & NETIF_F_TSO) {
-			sk->sk_route_caps &= ~NETIF_F_TSO;
-			sock_set_flag(sk, SOCK_NO_LARGESEND);
-		}
-
 		if (tcp_trim_head(sk, skb, tp->snd_una - TCP_SKB_CB(skb)->seq))
 			return -ENOMEM;
 	}
@@ -1370,22 +1375,8 @@ int tcp_retransmit_skb(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
 		return -EAGAIN;
 
 	if (skb->len > cur_mss) {
-		int old_factor = tcp_skb_pcount(skb);
-		int diff;
-
 		if (tcp_fragment(sk, skb, cur_mss, cur_mss))
 			return -ENOMEM; /* We'll try again later. */
-
-		/* New SKB created, account for it. */
-		diff = old_factor - tcp_skb_pcount(skb) -
-		       tcp_skb_pcount(skb->next);
-		tp->packets_out -= diff;
-
-		if (diff > 0) {
-			tp->fackets_out -= diff;
-			if ((int)tp->fackets_out < 0)
-				tp->fackets_out = 0;
-		}
 	}
 
 	/* Collapse two adjacent packets if worthwhile and we can. */
@@ -1993,12 +1984,6 @@ int tcp_write_wakeup(struct sock *sk)
 				TCP_SKB_CB(skb)->flags |= TCPCB_FLAG_PSH;
 				if (tcp_fragment(sk, skb, seg_size, mss))
 					return -1;
-				/* SWS override triggered forced fragmentation.
-				 * Disable TSO, the connection is too sick. */
-				if (sk->sk_route_caps & NETIF_F_TSO) {
-					sock_set_flag(sk, SOCK_NO_LARGESEND);
-					sk->sk_route_caps &= ~NETIF_F_TSO;
-				}
 			} else if (!tcp_skb_pcount(skb))
 				tcp_set_skb_tso_segs(sk, skb, mss);
 
-- 
cgit v1.2.3


From d70063c4634af060a5387337b7632f6334ca3458 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Date: Fri, 2 Sep 2005 12:18:03 -0700
Subject: [ATM]: Fix dereference of uninitialized pointer in zatm

Fixing breakage from [NET]: Kill skb->list - original was
	assign vcc
	do a bunch of stuff using ZATM_VCC(vcc)->pool as common subexpression
Now we do
	int pos = ZATM_VCC(vcc)->pool;
	assign vcc
	do a bunch of stuff
even though vcc is not even initialized when we enter that block...

Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
---
 drivers/atm/zatm.c | 4 ++--
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

diff --git a/drivers/atm/zatm.c b/drivers/atm/zatm.c
index c4b75ecf946..55959e4d1cb 100644
--- a/drivers/atm/zatm.c
+++ b/drivers/atm/zatm.c
@@ -417,9 +417,9 @@ printk("dummy: 0x%08lx, 0x%08lx\n",dummy[0],dummy[1]);
 		chan = (here[3] & uPD98401_AAL5_CHAN) >>
 		    uPD98401_AAL5_CHAN_SHIFT;
 		if (chan < zatm_dev->chans && zatm_dev->rx_map[chan]) {
-			int pos = ZATM_VCC(vcc)->pool;
-
+			int pos;
 			vcc = zatm_dev->rx_map[chan];
+			pos = ZATM_VCC(vcc)->pool;
 			if (skb == zatm_dev->last_free[pos])
 				zatm_dev->last_free[pos] = NULL;
 			skb_unlink(skb, zatm_dev->pool + pos);
-- 
cgit v1.2.3