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-rw-r--r--security/apparmor/lsm.c6
-rw-r--r--security/inode.c29
-rw-r--r--security/integrity/ima/ima.h2
-rw-r--r--security/integrity/ima/ima_crypto.c2
-rw-r--r--security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c4
-rw-r--r--security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c112
-rw-r--r--security/integrity/ima/ima_template_lib.c3
-rw-r--r--security/lsm_audit.c2
-rw-r--r--security/security.c7
-rw-r--r--security/selinux/avc.c18
-rw-r--r--security/selinux/hooks.c18
-rw-r--r--security/selinux/include/avc.h9
-rw-r--r--security/selinux/selinuxfs.c11
-rw-r--r--security/selinux/xfrm.c3
-rw-r--r--security/smack/smackfs.c24
15 files changed, 175 insertions, 75 deletions
diff --git a/security/apparmor/lsm.c b/security/apparmor/lsm.c
index 5696874e8062..dec607c17b64 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/lsm.c
+++ b/security/apparmor/lsm.c
@@ -654,7 +654,7 @@ static struct security_hook_list apparmor_hooks[] = {
static int param_set_aabool(const char *val, const struct kernel_param *kp);
static int param_get_aabool(char *buffer, const struct kernel_param *kp);
#define param_check_aabool param_check_bool
-static struct kernel_param_ops param_ops_aabool = {
+static const struct kernel_param_ops param_ops_aabool = {
.flags = KERNEL_PARAM_OPS_FL_NOARG,
.set = param_set_aabool,
.get = param_get_aabool
@@ -663,7 +663,7 @@ static struct kernel_param_ops param_ops_aabool = {
static int param_set_aauint(const char *val, const struct kernel_param *kp);
static int param_get_aauint(char *buffer, const struct kernel_param *kp);
#define param_check_aauint param_check_uint
-static struct kernel_param_ops param_ops_aauint = {
+static const struct kernel_param_ops param_ops_aauint = {
.set = param_set_aauint,
.get = param_get_aauint
};
@@ -671,7 +671,7 @@ static struct kernel_param_ops param_ops_aauint = {
static int param_set_aalockpolicy(const char *val, const struct kernel_param *kp);
static int param_get_aalockpolicy(char *buffer, const struct kernel_param *kp);
#define param_check_aalockpolicy param_check_bool
-static struct kernel_param_ops param_ops_aalockpolicy = {
+static const struct kernel_param_ops param_ops_aalockpolicy = {
.flags = KERNEL_PARAM_OPS_FL_NOARG,
.set = param_set_aalockpolicy,
.get = param_get_aalockpolicy
diff --git a/security/inode.c b/security/inode.c
index 91503b79c5f8..16622aef9bde 100644
--- a/security/inode.c
+++ b/security/inode.c
@@ -25,11 +25,6 @@
static struct vfsmount *mount;
static int mount_count;
-static inline int positive(struct dentry *dentry)
-{
- return d_really_is_positive(dentry) && !d_unhashed(dentry);
-}
-
static int fill_super(struct super_block *sb, void *data, int silent)
{
static struct tree_descr files[] = {{""}};
@@ -201,33 +196,29 @@ void securityfs_remove(struct dentry *dentry)
return;
mutex_lock(&d_inode(parent)->i_mutex);
- if (positive(dentry)) {
- if (d_really_is_positive(dentry)) {
- if (d_is_dir(dentry))
- simple_rmdir(d_inode(parent), dentry);
- else
- simple_unlink(d_inode(parent), dentry);
- dput(dentry);
- }
+ if (simple_positive(dentry)) {
+ if (d_is_dir(dentry))
+ simple_rmdir(d_inode(parent), dentry);
+ else
+ simple_unlink(d_inode(parent), dentry);
+ dput(dentry);
}
mutex_unlock(&d_inode(parent)->i_mutex);
simple_release_fs(&mount, &mount_count);
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(securityfs_remove);
-static struct kobject *security_kobj;
-
static int __init securityfs_init(void)
{
int retval;
- security_kobj = kobject_create_and_add("security", kernel_kobj);
- if (!security_kobj)
- return -EINVAL;
+ retval = sysfs_create_mount_point(kernel_kobj, "security");
+ if (retval)
+ return retval;
retval = register_filesystem(&fs_type);
if (retval)
- kobject_put(security_kobj);
+ sysfs_remove_mount_point(kernel_kobj, "security");
return retval;
}
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h
index c996f7edff3a..e2a60c30df44 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h
@@ -115,7 +115,7 @@ void ima_add_violation(struct file *file, const unsigned char *filename,
const char *op, const char *cause);
int ima_init_crypto(void);
void ima_putc(struct seq_file *m, void *data, int datalen);
-void ima_print_digest(struct seq_file *m, u8 *digest, int size);
+void ima_print_digest(struct seq_file *m, u8 *digest, u32 size);
struct ima_template_desc *ima_template_desc_current(void);
int ima_init_template(void);
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_crypto.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_crypto.c
index 686355fea7fd..e24121afb2f2 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_crypto.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_crypto.c
@@ -55,7 +55,7 @@ static int param_set_bufsize(const char *val, const struct kernel_param *kp)
return 0;
}
-static struct kernel_param_ops param_ops_bufsize = {
+static const struct kernel_param_ops param_ops_bufsize = {
.set = param_set_bufsize,
.get = param_get_uint,
};
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c
index 461215e5fd31..816d175da79a 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c
@@ -190,9 +190,9 @@ static const struct file_operations ima_measurements_ops = {
.release = seq_release,
};
-void ima_print_digest(struct seq_file *m, u8 *digest, int size)
+void ima_print_digest(struct seq_file *m, u8 *digest, u32 size)
{
- int i;
+ u32 i;
for (i = 0; i < size; i++)
seq_printf(m, "%02x", *(digest + i));
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
index f2421f7fa3c8..3997e206f82d 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
@@ -27,6 +27,8 @@
#define IMA_UID 0x0008
#define IMA_FOWNER 0x0010
#define IMA_FSUUID 0x0020
+#define IMA_INMASK 0x0040
+#define IMA_EUID 0x0080
#define UNKNOWN 0
#define MEASURE 0x0001 /* same as IMA_MEASURE */
@@ -42,6 +44,8 @@ enum lsm_rule_types { LSM_OBJ_USER, LSM_OBJ_ROLE, LSM_OBJ_TYPE,
LSM_SUBJ_USER, LSM_SUBJ_ROLE, LSM_SUBJ_TYPE
};
+enum policy_types { ORIGINAL_TCB = 1, DEFAULT_TCB };
+
struct ima_rule_entry {
struct list_head list;
int action;
@@ -70,7 +74,7 @@ struct ima_rule_entry {
* normal users can easily run the machine out of memory simply building
* and running executables.
*/
-static struct ima_rule_entry default_rules[] = {
+static struct ima_rule_entry dont_measure_rules[] = {
{.action = DONT_MEASURE, .fsmagic = PROC_SUPER_MAGIC, .flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
{.action = DONT_MEASURE, .fsmagic = SYSFS_MAGIC, .flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
{.action = DONT_MEASURE, .fsmagic = DEBUGFS_MAGIC, .flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
@@ -81,13 +85,29 @@ static struct ima_rule_entry default_rules[] = {
{.action = DONT_MEASURE, .fsmagic = SELINUX_MAGIC, .flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
{.action = DONT_MEASURE, .fsmagic = CGROUP_SUPER_MAGIC,
.flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
- {.action = DONT_MEASURE, .fsmagic = NSFS_MAGIC, .flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
+ {.action = DONT_MEASURE, .fsmagic = NSFS_MAGIC, .flags = IMA_FSMAGIC}
+};
+
+static struct ima_rule_entry original_measurement_rules[] = {
{.action = MEASURE, .func = MMAP_CHECK, .mask = MAY_EXEC,
.flags = IMA_FUNC | IMA_MASK},
{.action = MEASURE, .func = BPRM_CHECK, .mask = MAY_EXEC,
.flags = IMA_FUNC | IMA_MASK},
- {.action = MEASURE, .func = FILE_CHECK, .mask = MAY_READ, .uid = GLOBAL_ROOT_UID,
- .flags = IMA_FUNC | IMA_MASK | IMA_UID},
+ {.action = MEASURE, .func = FILE_CHECK, .mask = MAY_READ,
+ .uid = GLOBAL_ROOT_UID, .flags = IMA_FUNC | IMA_MASK | IMA_UID},
+ {.action = MEASURE, .func = MODULE_CHECK, .flags = IMA_FUNC},
+ {.action = MEASURE, .func = FIRMWARE_CHECK, .flags = IMA_FUNC},
+};
+
+static struct ima_rule_entry default_measurement_rules[] = {
+ {.action = MEASURE, .func = MMAP_CHECK, .mask = MAY_EXEC,
+ .flags = IMA_FUNC | IMA_MASK},
+ {.action = MEASURE, .func = BPRM_CHECK, .mask = MAY_EXEC,
+ .flags = IMA_FUNC | IMA_MASK},
+ {.action = MEASURE, .func = FILE_CHECK, .mask = MAY_READ,
+ .uid = GLOBAL_ROOT_UID, .flags = IMA_FUNC | IMA_INMASK | IMA_EUID},
+ {.action = MEASURE, .func = FILE_CHECK, .mask = MAY_READ,
+ .uid = GLOBAL_ROOT_UID, .flags = IMA_FUNC | IMA_INMASK | IMA_UID},
{.action = MEASURE, .func = MODULE_CHECK, .flags = IMA_FUNC},
{.action = MEASURE, .func = FIRMWARE_CHECK, .flags = IMA_FUNC},
};
@@ -119,14 +139,29 @@ static struct list_head *ima_rules;
static DEFINE_MUTEX(ima_rules_mutex);
-static bool ima_use_tcb __initdata;
+static int ima_policy __initdata;
static int __init default_measure_policy_setup(char *str)
{
- ima_use_tcb = 1;
+ if (ima_policy)
+ return 1;
+
+ ima_policy = ORIGINAL_TCB;
return 1;
}
__setup("ima_tcb", default_measure_policy_setup);
+static int __init policy_setup(char *str)
+{
+ if (ima_policy)
+ return 1;
+
+ if (strcmp(str, "tcb") == 0)
+ ima_policy = DEFAULT_TCB;
+
+ return 1;
+}
+__setup("ima_policy=", policy_setup);
+
static bool ima_use_appraise_tcb __initdata;
static int __init default_appraise_policy_setup(char *str)
{
@@ -186,6 +221,9 @@ static bool ima_match_rules(struct ima_rule_entry *rule,
if ((rule->flags & IMA_MASK) &&
(rule->mask != mask && func != POST_SETATTR))
return false;
+ if ((rule->flags & IMA_INMASK) &&
+ (!(rule->mask & mask) && func != POST_SETATTR))
+ return false;
if ((rule->flags & IMA_FSMAGIC)
&& rule->fsmagic != inode->i_sb->s_magic)
return false;
@@ -194,6 +232,16 @@ static bool ima_match_rules(struct ima_rule_entry *rule,
return false;
if ((rule->flags & IMA_UID) && !uid_eq(rule->uid, cred->uid))
return false;
+ if (rule->flags & IMA_EUID) {
+ if (has_capability_noaudit(current, CAP_SETUID)) {
+ if (!uid_eq(rule->uid, cred->euid)
+ && !uid_eq(rule->uid, cred->suid)
+ && !uid_eq(rule->uid, cred->uid))
+ return false;
+ } else if (!uid_eq(rule->uid, cred->euid))
+ return false;
+ }
+
if ((rule->flags & IMA_FOWNER) && !uid_eq(rule->fowner, inode->i_uid))
return false;
for (i = 0; i < MAX_LSM_RULES; i++) {
@@ -337,13 +385,27 @@ void __init ima_init_policy(void)
{
int i, measure_entries, appraise_entries;
- /* if !ima_use_tcb set entries = 0 so we load NO default rules */
- measure_entries = ima_use_tcb ? ARRAY_SIZE(default_rules) : 0;
+ /* if !ima_policy set entries = 0 so we load NO default rules */
+ measure_entries = ima_policy ? ARRAY_SIZE(dont_measure_rules) : 0;
appraise_entries = ima_use_appraise_tcb ?
ARRAY_SIZE(default_appraise_rules) : 0;
for (i = 0; i < measure_entries; i++)
- list_add_tail(&default_rules[i].list, &ima_default_rules);
+ list_add_tail(&dont_measure_rules[i].list, &ima_default_rules);
+
+ switch (ima_policy) {
+ case ORIGINAL_TCB:
+ for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(original_measurement_rules); i++)
+ list_add_tail(&original_measurement_rules[i].list,
+ &ima_default_rules);
+ break;
+ case DEFAULT_TCB:
+ for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(default_measurement_rules); i++)
+ list_add_tail(&default_measurement_rules[i].list,
+ &ima_default_rules);
+ default:
+ break;
+ }
for (i = 0; i < appraise_entries; i++) {
list_add_tail(&default_appraise_rules[i].list,
@@ -373,7 +435,8 @@ enum {
Opt_audit,
Opt_obj_user, Opt_obj_role, Opt_obj_type,
Opt_subj_user, Opt_subj_role, Opt_subj_type,
- Opt_func, Opt_mask, Opt_fsmagic, Opt_uid, Opt_fowner,
+ Opt_func, Opt_mask, Opt_fsmagic,
+ Opt_uid, Opt_euid, Opt_fowner,
Opt_appraise_type, Opt_fsuuid, Opt_permit_directio
};
@@ -394,6 +457,7 @@ static match_table_t policy_tokens = {
{Opt_fsmagic, "fsmagic=%s"},
{Opt_fsuuid, "fsuuid=%s"},
{Opt_uid, "uid=%s"},
+ {Opt_euid, "euid=%s"},
{Opt_fowner, "fowner=%s"},
{Opt_appraise_type, "appraise_type=%s"},
{Opt_permit_directio, "permit_directio"},
@@ -435,6 +499,7 @@ static void ima_log_string(struct audit_buffer *ab, char *key, char *value)
static int ima_parse_rule(char *rule, struct ima_rule_entry *entry)
{
struct audit_buffer *ab;
+ char *from;
char *p;
int result = 0;
@@ -525,18 +590,23 @@ static int ima_parse_rule(char *rule, struct ima_rule_entry *entry)
if (entry->mask)
result = -EINVAL;
- if ((strcmp(args[0].from, "MAY_EXEC")) == 0)
+ from = args[0].from;
+ if (*from == '^')
+ from++;
+
+ if ((strcmp(from, "MAY_EXEC")) == 0)
entry->mask = MAY_EXEC;
- else if (strcmp(args[0].from, "MAY_WRITE") == 0)
+ else if (strcmp(from, "MAY_WRITE") == 0)
entry->mask = MAY_WRITE;
- else if (strcmp(args[0].from, "MAY_READ") == 0)
+ else if (strcmp(from, "MAY_READ") == 0)
entry->mask = MAY_READ;
- else if (strcmp(args[0].from, "MAY_APPEND") == 0)
+ else if (strcmp(from, "MAY_APPEND") == 0)
entry->mask = MAY_APPEND;
else
result = -EINVAL;
if (!result)
- entry->flags |= IMA_MASK;
+ entry->flags |= (*args[0].from == '^')
+ ? IMA_INMASK : IMA_MASK;
break;
case Opt_fsmagic:
ima_log_string(ab, "fsmagic", args[0].from);
@@ -566,6 +636,9 @@ static int ima_parse_rule(char *rule, struct ima_rule_entry *entry)
break;
case Opt_uid:
ima_log_string(ab, "uid", args[0].from);
+ case Opt_euid:
+ if (token == Opt_euid)
+ ima_log_string(ab, "euid", args[0].from);
if (uid_valid(entry->uid)) {
result = -EINVAL;
@@ -574,11 +647,14 @@ static int ima_parse_rule(char *rule, struct ima_rule_entry *entry)
result = kstrtoul(args[0].from, 10, &lnum);
if (!result) {
- entry->uid = make_kuid(current_user_ns(), (uid_t)lnum);
- if (!uid_valid(entry->uid) || (((uid_t)lnum) != lnum))
+ entry->uid = make_kuid(current_user_ns(),
+ (uid_t) lnum);
+ if (!uid_valid(entry->uid) ||
+ (uid_t)lnum != lnum)
result = -EINVAL;
else
- entry->flags |= IMA_UID;
+ entry->flags |= (token == Opt_uid)
+ ? IMA_UID : IMA_EUID;
}
break;
case Opt_fowner:
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_template_lib.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_template_lib.c
index de0ce4fbdf69..2934e3d377f1 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_template_lib.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_template_lib.c
@@ -70,7 +70,8 @@ static void ima_show_template_data_ascii(struct seq_file *m,
enum data_formats datafmt,
struct ima_field_data *field_data)
{
- u8 *buf_ptr = field_data->data, buflen = field_data->len;
+ u8 *buf_ptr = field_data->data;
+ u32 buflen = field_data->len;
switch (datafmt) {
case DATA_FMT_DIGEST_WITH_ALGO:
diff --git a/security/lsm_audit.c b/security/lsm_audit.c
index 1d34277dc402..4ed98107ace3 100644
--- a/security/lsm_audit.c
+++ b/security/lsm_audit.c
@@ -282,7 +282,7 @@ static void dump_common_audit_data(struct audit_buffer *ab,
pid_t pid = task_pid_nr(tsk);
if (pid) {
char comm[sizeof(tsk->comm)];
- audit_log_format(ab, " pid=%d comm=", pid);
+ audit_log_format(ab, " opid=%d ocomm=", pid);
audit_log_untrustedstring(ab,
memcpy(comm, tsk->comm, sizeof(comm)));
}
diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
index bd4c5f6a5b78..595fffab48b0 100644
--- a/security/security.c
+++ b/security/security.c
@@ -589,11 +589,12 @@ int security_inode_readlink(struct dentry *dentry)
return call_int_hook(inode_readlink, 0, dentry);
}
-int security_inode_follow_link(struct dentry *dentry, struct nameidata *nd)
+int security_inode_follow_link(struct dentry *dentry, struct inode *inode,
+ bool rcu)
{
- if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(dentry))))
+ if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(inode)))
return 0;
- return call_int_hook(inode_follow_link, 0, dentry, nd);
+ return call_int_hook(inode_follow_link, 0, dentry, inode, rcu);
}
int security_inode_permission(struct inode *inode, int mask)
diff --git a/security/selinux/avc.c b/security/selinux/avc.c
index 3c17dda9571d..0b122b1421a9 100644
--- a/security/selinux/avc.c
+++ b/security/selinux/avc.c
@@ -761,7 +761,23 @@ int avc_has_perm(u32 ssid, u32 tsid, u16 tclass,
rc = avc_has_perm_noaudit(ssid, tsid, tclass, requested, 0, &avd);
- rc2 = avc_audit(ssid, tsid, tclass, requested, &avd, rc, auditdata);
+ rc2 = avc_audit(ssid, tsid, tclass, requested, &avd, rc, auditdata, 0);
+ if (rc2)
+ return rc2;
+ return rc;
+}
+
+int avc_has_perm_flags(u32 ssid, u32 tsid, u16 tclass,
+ u32 requested, struct common_audit_data *auditdata,
+ int flags)
+{
+ struct av_decision avd;
+ int rc, rc2;
+
+ rc = avc_has_perm_noaudit(ssid, tsid, tclass, requested, 0, &avd);
+
+ rc2 = avc_audit(ssid, tsid, tclass, requested, &avd, rc,
+ auditdata, flags);
if (rc2)
return rc2;
return rc;
diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c
index 692e3cc8ce23..564079c5c49d 100644
--- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
+++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
@@ -1578,7 +1578,7 @@ static int cred_has_capability(const struct cred *cred,
rc = avc_has_perm_noaudit(sid, sid, sclass, av, 0, &avd);
if (audit == SECURITY_CAP_AUDIT) {
- int rc2 = avc_audit(sid, sid, sclass, av, &avd, rc, &ad);
+ int rc2 = avc_audit(sid, sid, sclass, av, &avd, rc, &ad, 0);
if (rc2)
return rc2;
}
@@ -2842,11 +2842,23 @@ static int selinux_inode_readlink(struct dentry *dentry)
return dentry_has_perm(cred, dentry, FILE__READ);
}
-static int selinux_inode_follow_link(struct dentry *dentry, struct nameidata *nameidata)
+static int selinux_inode_follow_link(struct dentry *dentry, struct inode *inode,
+ bool rcu)
{
const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
+ struct common_audit_data ad;
+ struct inode_security_struct *isec;
+ u32 sid;
- return dentry_has_perm(cred, dentry, FILE__READ);
+ validate_creds(cred);
+
+ ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY;
+ ad.u.dentry = dentry;
+ sid = cred_sid(cred);
+ isec = inode->i_security;
+
+ return avc_has_perm_flags(sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, FILE__READ, &ad,
+ rcu ? MAY_NOT_BLOCK : 0);
}
static noinline int audit_inode_permission(struct inode *inode,
diff --git a/security/selinux/include/avc.h b/security/selinux/include/avc.h
index ddf8eec03f21..5973c327c54e 100644
--- a/security/selinux/include/avc.h
+++ b/security/selinux/include/avc.h
@@ -130,7 +130,8 @@ static inline int avc_audit(u32 ssid, u32 tsid,
u16 tclass, u32 requested,
struct av_decision *avd,
int result,
- struct common_audit_data *a)
+ struct common_audit_data *a,
+ int flags)
{
u32 audited, denied;
audited = avc_audit_required(requested, avd, result, 0, &denied);
@@ -138,7 +139,7 @@ static inline int avc_audit(u32 ssid, u32 tsid,
return 0;
return slow_avc_audit(ssid, tsid, tclass,
requested, audited, denied, result,
- a, 0);
+ a, flags);
}
#define AVC_STRICT 1 /* Ignore permissive mode. */
@@ -150,6 +151,10 @@ int avc_has_perm_noaudit(u32 ssid, u32 tsid,
int avc_has_perm(u32 ssid, u32 tsid,
u16 tclass, u32 requested,
struct common_audit_data *auditdata);
+int avc_has_perm_flags(u32 ssid, u32 tsid,
+ u16 tclass, u32 requested,
+ struct common_audit_data *auditdata,
+ int flags);
u32 avc_policy_seqno(void);
diff --git a/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c b/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c
index d2787cca1fcb..3d2201413028 100644
--- a/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c
+++ b/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c
@@ -1853,7 +1853,6 @@ static struct file_system_type sel_fs_type = {
};
struct vfsmount *selinuxfs_mount;
-static struct kobject *selinuxfs_kobj;
static int __init init_sel_fs(void)
{
@@ -1862,13 +1861,13 @@ static int __init init_sel_fs(void)
if (!selinux_enabled)
return 0;
- selinuxfs_kobj = kobject_create_and_add("selinux", fs_kobj);
- if (!selinuxfs_kobj)
- return -ENOMEM;
+ err = sysfs_create_mount_point(fs_kobj, "selinux");
+ if (err)
+ return err;
err = register_filesystem(&sel_fs_type);
if (err) {
- kobject_put(selinuxfs_kobj);
+ sysfs_remove_mount_point(fs_kobj, "selinux");
return err;
}
@@ -1887,7 +1886,7 @@ __initcall(init_sel_fs);
#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DISABLE
void exit_sel_fs(void)
{
- kobject_put(selinuxfs_kobj);
+ sysfs_remove_mount_point(fs_kobj, "selinux");
kern_unmount(selinuxfs_mount);
unregister_filesystem(&sel_fs_type);
}
diff --git a/security/selinux/xfrm.c b/security/selinux/xfrm.c
index 98b042630a9e..56e354fcdfc6 100644
--- a/security/selinux/xfrm.c
+++ b/security/selinux/xfrm.c
@@ -35,9 +35,6 @@
#include <linux/init.h>
#include <linux/security.h>
#include <linux/types.h>
-#include <linux/netfilter.h>
-#include <linux/netfilter_ipv4.h>
-#include <linux/netfilter_ipv6.h>
#include <linux/slab.h>
#include <linux/ip.h>
#include <linux/tcp.h>
diff --git a/security/smack/smackfs.c b/security/smack/smackfs.c
index f1c22a891b1a..2716d02119f3 100644
--- a/security/smack/smackfs.c
+++ b/security/smack/smackfs.c
@@ -2253,8 +2253,8 @@ static const struct file_operations smk_access2_ops = {
static ssize_t smk_write_revoke_subj(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
{
- char *data = NULL;
- const char *cp = NULL;
+ char *data;
+ const char *cp;
struct smack_known *skp;
struct smack_rule *sp;
struct list_head *rule_list;
@@ -2276,18 +2276,18 @@ static ssize_t smk_write_revoke_subj(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
if (copy_from_user(data, buf, count) != 0) {
rc = -EFAULT;
- goto free_out;
+ goto out_data;
}
cp = smk_parse_smack(data, count);
if (IS_ERR(cp)) {
rc = PTR_ERR(cp);
- goto free_out;
+ goto out_data;
}
skp = smk_find_entry(cp);
if (skp == NULL)
- goto free_out;
+ goto out_cp;
rule_list = &skp->smk_rules;
rule_lock = &skp->smk_rules_lock;
@@ -2299,9 +2299,11 @@ static ssize_t smk_write_revoke_subj(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
mutex_unlock(rule_lock);
-free_out:
- kfree(data);
+out_cp:
kfree(cp);
+out_data:
+ kfree(data);
+
return rc;
}
@@ -2312,16 +2314,16 @@ static const struct file_operations smk_revoke_subj_ops = {
.llseek = generic_file_llseek,
};
-static struct kset *smackfs_kset;
/**
* smk_init_sysfs - initialize /sys/fs/smackfs
*
*/
static int smk_init_sysfs(void)
{
- smackfs_kset = kset_create_and_add("smackfs", NULL, fs_kobj);
- if (!smackfs_kset)
- return -ENOMEM;
+ int err;
+ err = sysfs_create_mount_point(fs_kobj, "smackfs");
+ if (err)
+ return err;
return 0;
}
generated by cgit v1.2.3 (git 2.39.1) at 2024-11-23 11:08:21 +0000