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2014-02-10Merge branch 'stable-3.14' of git://git.infradead.org/users/pcmoore/selinux ↵James Morris2-0/+6
into for-linus
2014-02-05SELinux: Fix kernel BUG on empty security contexts.Stephen Smalley1-0/+4
Setting an empty security context (length=0) on a file will lead to incorrectly dereferencing the type and other fields of the security context structure, yielding a kernel BUG. As a zero-length security context is never valid, just reject all such security contexts whether coming from userspace via setxattr or coming from the filesystem upon a getxattr request by SELinux. Setting a security context value (empty or otherwise) unknown to SELinux in the first place is only possible for a root process (CAP_MAC_ADMIN), and, if running SELinux in enforcing mode, only if the corresponding SELinux mac_admin permission is also granted to the domain by policy. In Fedora policies, this is only allowed for specific domains such as livecd for setting down security contexts that are not defined in the build host policy. Reproducer: su setenforce 0 touch foo setfattr -n security.selinux foo Caveat: Relabeling or removing foo after doing the above may not be possible without booting with SELinux disabled. Any subsequent access to foo after doing the above will also trigger the BUG. BUG output from Matthew Thode: [ 473.893141] ------------[ cut here ]------------ [ 473.962110] kernel BUG at security/selinux/ss/services.c:654! [ 473.995314] invalid opcode: 0000 [#6] SMP [ 474.027196] Modules linked in: [ 474.058118] CPU: 0 PID: 8138 Comm: ls Tainted: G D I 3.13.0-grsec #1 [ 474.116637] Hardware name: Supermicro X8ST3/X8ST3, BIOS 2.0 07/29/10 [ 474.149768] task: ffff8805f50cd010 ti: ffff8805f50cd488 task.ti: ffff8805f50cd488 [ 474.183707] RIP: 0010:[<ffffffff814681c7>] [<ffffffff814681c7>] context_struct_compute_av+0xce/0x308 [ 474.219954] RSP: 0018:ffff8805c0ac3c38 EFLAGS: 00010246 [ 474.252253] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff8805c0ac3d94 RCX: 0000000000000100 [ 474.287018] RDX: ffff8805e8aac000 RSI: 00000000ffffffff RDI: ffff8805e8aaa000 [ 474.321199] RBP: ffff8805c0ac3cb8 R08: 0000000000000010 R09: 0000000000000006 [ 474.357446] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: ffff8805c567a000 R12: 0000000000000006 [ 474.419191] R13: ffff8805c2b74e88 R14: 00000000000001da R15: 0000000000000000 [ 474.453816] FS: 00007f2e75220800(0000) GS:ffff88061fc00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 [ 474.489254] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 [ 474.522215] CR2: 00007f2e74716090 CR3: 00000005c085e000 CR4: 00000000000207f0 [ 474.556058] Stack: [ 474.584325] ffff8805c0ac3c98 ffffffff811b549b ffff8805c0ac3c98 ffff8805f1190a40 [ 474.618913] ffff8805a6202f08 ffff8805c2b74e88 00068800d0464990 ffff8805e8aac860 [ 474.653955] ffff8805c0ac3cb8 000700068113833a ffff880606c75060 ffff8805c0ac3d94 [ 474.690461] Call Trace: [ 474.723779] [<ffffffff811b549b>] ? lookup_fast+0x1cd/0x22a [ 474.778049] [<ffffffff81468824>] security_compute_av+0xf4/0x20b [ 474.811398] [<ffffffff8196f419>] avc_compute_av+0x2a/0x179 [ 474.843813] [<ffffffff8145727b>] avc_has_perm+0x45/0xf4 [ 474.875694] [<ffffffff81457d0e>] inode_has_perm+0x2a/0x31 [ 474.907370] [<ffffffff81457e76>] selinux_inode_getattr+0x3c/0x3e [ 474.938726] [<ffffffff81455cf6>] security_inode_getattr+0x1b/0x22 [ 474.970036] [<ffffffff811b057d>] vfs_getattr+0x19/0x2d [ 475.000618] [<ffffffff811b05e5>] vfs_fstatat+0x54/0x91 [ 475.030402] [<ffffffff811b063b>] vfs_lstat+0x19/0x1b [ 475.061097] [<ffffffff811b077e>] SyS_newlstat+0x15/0x30 [ 475.094595] [<ffffffff8113c5c1>] ? __audit_syscall_entry+0xa1/0xc3 [ 475.148405] [<ffffffff8197791e>] system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x1b [ 475.179201] Code: 00 48 85 c0 48 89 45 b8 75 02 0f 0b 48 8b 45 a0 48 8b 3d 45 d0 b6 00 8b 40 08 89 c6 ff ce e8 d1 b0 06 00 48 85 c0 49 89 c7 75 02 <0f> 0b 48 8b 45 b8 4c 8b 28 eb 1e 49 8d 7d 08 be 80 01 00 00 e8 [ 475.255884] RIP [<ffffffff814681c7>] context_struct_compute_av+0xce/0x308 [ 475.296120] RSP <ffff8805c0ac3c38> [ 475.328734] ---[ end trace f076482e9d754adc ]--- Reported-by: Matthew Thode <mthode@mthode.org> Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>
2014-02-05selinux: add SOCK_DIAG_BY_FAMILY to the list of netlink message typesPaul Moore1-0/+2
The SELinux AF_NETLINK/NETLINK_SOCK_DIAG socket class was missing the SOCK_DIAG_BY_FAMILY definition which caused SELINUX_ERR messages when the ss tool was run. # ss Netid State Recv-Q Send-Q Local Address:Port Peer Address:Port u_str ESTAB 0 0 * 14189 * 14190 u_str ESTAB 0 0 * 14145 * 14144 u_str ESTAB 0 0 * 14151 * 14150 {...} # ausearch -m SELINUX_ERR ---- time->Thu Jan 23 11:11:16 2014 type=SYSCALL msg=audit(1390493476.445:374): arch=c000003e syscall=44 success=yes exit=40 a0=3 a1=7fff03aa11f0 a2=28 a3=0 items=0 ppid=1852 pid=1895 auid=0 uid=0 gid=0 euid=0 suid=0 fsuid=0 egid=0 sgid=0 fsgid=0 tty=pts0 ses=1 comm="ss" exe="/usr/sbin/ss" subj=unconfined_u:unconfined_r:unconfined_t:s0-s0:c0.c1023 key=(null) type=SELINUX_ERR msg=audit(1390493476.445:374): SELinux: unrecognized netlink message type=20 for sclass=32 Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>
2014-02-05Merge tag 'v3.13' into stable-3.14Paul Moore54-1239/+2802
Linux 3.13 Conflicts: security/selinux/hooks.c Trivial merge issue in selinux_inet_conn_request() likely due to me including patches that I sent to the stable folks in my next tree resulting in the patch hitting twice (I think). Thankfully it was an easy fix this time, but regardless, lesson learned, I will not do that again.
2014-02-05security: select correct default LSM_MMAP_MIN_ADDR on arm on arm64Colin Cross1-1/+1
Binaries compiled for arm may run on arm64 if CONFIG_COMPAT is selected. Set LSM_MMAP_MIN_ADDR to 32768 if ARM64 && COMPAT to prevent selinux failures launching 32-bit static executables that are mapped at 0x8000. Signed-off-by: Colin Cross <ccross@android.com> Acked-by: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com> Acked-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> Acked-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
2014-01-23Merge git://git.infradead.org/users/eparis/auditLinus Torvalds2-11/+6
Pull audit update from Eric Paris: "Again we stayed pretty well contained inside the audit system. Venturing out was fixing a couple of function prototypes which were inconsistent (didn't hurt anything, but we used the same value as an int, uint, u32, and I think even a long in a couple of places). We also made a couple of minor changes to when a couple of LSMs called the audit system. We hoped to add aarch64 audit support this go round, but it wasn't ready. I'm disappearing on vacation on Thursday. I should have internet access, but it'll be spotty. If anything goes wrong please be sure to cc rgb@redhat.com. He'll make fixing things his top priority" * git://git.infradead.org/users/eparis/audit: (50 commits) audit: whitespace fix in kernel-parameters.txt audit: fix location of __net_initdata for audit_net_ops audit: remove pr_info for every network namespace audit: Modify a set of system calls in audit class definitions audit: Convert int limit uses to u32 audit: Use more current logging style audit: Use hex_byte_pack_upper audit: correct a type mismatch in audit_syscall_exit() audit: reorder AUDIT_TTY_SET arguments audit: rework AUDIT_TTY_SET to only grab spin_lock once audit: remove needless switch in AUDIT_SET audit: use define's for audit version audit: documentation of audit= kernel parameter audit: wait_for_auditd rework for readability audit: update MAINTAINERS audit: log task info on feature change audit: fix incorrect set of audit_sock audit: print error message when fail to create audit socket audit: fix dangling keywords in audit_log_set_loginuid() output audit: log on errors from filter user rules ...
2014-01-21Merge branch 'for-3.14' of ↵Linus Torvalds1-4/+3
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tj/cgroup Pull cgroup updates from Tejun Heo: "The bulk of changes are cleanups and preparations for the upcoming kernfs conversion. - cgroup_event mechanism which is and will be used only by memcg is moved to memcg. - pidlist handling is updated so that it can be served by seq_file. Also, the list is not sorted if sane_behavior. cgroup documentation explicitly states that the file is not sorted but it has been for quite some time. - All cgroup file handling now happens on top of seq_file. This is to prepare for kernfs conversion. In addition, all operations are restructured so that they map 1-1 to kernfs operations. - Other cleanups and low-pri fixes" * 'for-3.14' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tj/cgroup: (40 commits) cgroup: trivial style updates cgroup: remove stray references to css_id doc: cgroups: Fix typo in doc/cgroups cgroup: fix fail path in cgroup_load_subsys() cgroup: fix missing unlock on error in cgroup_load_subsys() cgroup: remove for_each_root_subsys() cgroup: implement for_each_css() cgroup: factor out cgroup_subsys_state creation into create_css() cgroup: combine css handling loops in cgroup_create() cgroup: reorder operations in cgroup_create() cgroup: make for_each_subsys() useable under cgroup_root_mutex cgroup: css iterations and css_from_dir() are safe under cgroup_mutex cgroup: unify pidlist and other file handling cgroup: replace cftype->read_seq_string() with cftype->seq_show() cgroup: attach cgroup_open_file to all cgroup files cgroup: generalize cgroup_pidlist_open_file cgroup: unify read path so that seq_file is always used cgroup: unify cgroup_write_X64() and cgroup_write_string() cgroup: remove cftype->read(), ->read_map() and ->write() hugetlb_cgroup: convert away from cftype->read() ...
2014-01-21Merge branch 'for-linus' of ↵Linus Torvalds11-148/+366
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security Pull security layer updates from James Morris: "Changes for this kernel include maintenance updates for Smack, SELinux (and several networking fixes), IMA and TPM" * 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security: (39 commits) SELinux: Fix memory leak upon loading policy tpm/tpm-sysfs: active_show() can be static tpm: tpm_tis: Fix compile problems with CONFIG_PM_SLEEP/CONFIG_PNP tpm: Make tpm-dev allocate a per-file structure tpm: Use the ops structure instead of a copy in tpm_vendor_specific tpm: Create a tpm_class_ops structure and use it in the drivers tpm: Pull all driver sysfs code into tpm-sysfs.c tpm: Move sysfs functions from tpm-interface to tpm-sysfs tpm: Pull everything related to /dev/tpmX into tpm-dev.c char: tpm: nuvoton: remove unused variable tpm: MAINTAINERS: Cleanup TPM Maintainers file tpm/tpm_i2c_atmel: fix coccinelle warnings tpm/tpm_ibmvtpm: fix unreachable code warning (smatch warning) tpm/tpm_i2c_stm_st33: Check return code of get_burstcount tpm/tpm_ppi: Check return value of acpi_get_name tpm/tpm_ppi: Do not compare strcmp(a,b) == -1 ima: remove unneeded size_limit argument from ima_eventdigest_init_common() ima: update IMA-templates.txt documentation ima: pass HASH_ALGO__LAST as hash algo in ima_eventdigest_init() ima: change the default hash algorithm to SHA1 in ima_eventdigest_ng_init() ...
2014-01-13smack: call WARN_ONCE() instead of calling audit_log_start()Richard Guy Briggs1-3/+2
Remove the call to audit_log() (which call audit_log_start()) and deal with the errors in the caller, logging only once if the condition is met. Calling audit_log_start() in this location makes buffer allocation and locking more complicated in the calling tree (audit_filter_user()). Signed-off-by: Richard Guy Briggs <rgb@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
2014-01-13selinux: call WARN_ONCE() instead of calling audit_log_start()Richard Guy Briggs1-8/+4
Two of the conditions in selinux_audit_rule_match() should never happen and the third indicates a race that should be retried. Remove the calls to audit_log() (which call audit_log_start()) and deal with the errors in the caller, logging only once if the condition is met. Calling audit_log_start() in this location makes buffer allocation and locking more complicated in the calling tree (audit_filter_user()). Signed-off-by: Richard Guy Briggs <rgb@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
2014-01-12SELinux: Fix possible NULL pointer dereference in selinux_inode_permission()Steven Rostedt2-3/+22
While running stress tests on adding and deleting ftrace instances I hit this bug: BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 0000000000000020 IP: selinux_inode_permission+0x85/0x160 PGD 63681067 PUD 7ddbe067 PMD 0 Oops: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT CPU: 0 PID: 5634 Comm: ftrace-test-mki Not tainted 3.13.0-rc4-test-00033-gd2a6dde-dirty #20 Hardware name: /DG965MQ, BIOS MQ96510J.86A.0372.2006.0605.1717 06/05/2006 task: ffff880078375800 ti: ffff88007ddb0000 task.ti: ffff88007ddb0000 RIP: 0010:[<ffffffff812d8bc5>] [<ffffffff812d8bc5>] selinux_inode_permission+0x85/0x160 RSP: 0018:ffff88007ddb1c48 EFLAGS: 00010246 RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 0000000000800000 RCX: ffff88006dd43840 RDX: 0000000000000001 RSI: 0000000000000081 RDI: ffff88006ee46000 RBP: ffff88007ddb1c88 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: ffff88007ddb1c54 R10: 6e6576652f6f6f66 R11: 0000000000000003 R12: 0000000000000000 R13: 0000000000000081 R14: ffff88006ee46000 R15: 0000000000000000 FS: 00007f217b5b6700(0000) GS:ffffffff81e21000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033^M CR2: 0000000000000020 CR3: 000000006a0fe000 CR4: 00000000000007f0 Call Trace: security_inode_permission+0x1c/0x30 __inode_permission+0x41/0xa0 inode_permission+0x18/0x50 link_path_walk+0x66/0x920 path_openat+0xa6/0x6c0 do_filp_open+0x43/0xa0 do_sys_open+0x146/0x240 SyS_open+0x1e/0x20 system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x1b Code: 84 a1 00 00 00 81 e3 00 20 00 00 89 d8 83 c8 02 40 f6 c6 04 0f 45 d8 40 f6 c6 08 74 71 80 cf 02 49 8b 46 38 4c 8d 4d cc 45 31 c0 <0f> b7 50 20 8b 70 1c 48 8b 41 70 89 d9 8b 78 04 e8 36 cf ff ff RIP selinux_inode_permission+0x85/0x160 CR2: 0000000000000020 Investigating, I found that the inode->i_security was NULL, and the dereference of it caused the oops. in selinux_inode_permission(): isec = inode->i_security; rc = avc_has_perm_noaudit(sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, perms, 0, &avd); Note, the crash came from stressing the deletion and reading of debugfs files. I was not able to recreate this via normal files. But I'm not sure they are safe. It may just be that the race window is much harder to hit. What seems to have happened (and what I have traced), is the file is being opened at the same time the file or directory is being deleted. As the dentry and inode locks are not held during the path walk, nor is the inodes ref counts being incremented, there is nothing saving these structures from being discarded except for an rcu_read_lock(). The rcu_read_lock() protects against freeing of the inode, but it does not protect freeing of the inode_security_struct. Now if the freeing of the i_security happens with a call_rcu(), and the i_security field of the inode is not changed (it gets freed as the inode gets freed) then there will be no issue here. (Linus Torvalds suggested not setting the field to NULL such that we do not need to check if it is NULL in the permission check). Note, this is a hack, but it fixes the problem at hand. A real fix is to restructure the destroy_inode() to call all the destructor handlers from the RCU callback. But that is a major job to do, and requires a lot of work. For now, we just band-aid this bug with this fix (it works), and work on a more maintainable solution in the future. Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20140109101932.0508dec7@gandalf.local.home Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20140109182756.17abaaa8@gandalf.local.home Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2014-01-08Merge branch 'master' of git://git.infradead.org/users/pcmoore/selinux into nextJames Morris1-1/+13
2014-01-07SELinux: Fix memory leak upon loading policyTetsuo Handa1-1/+13
Hello. I got below leak with linux-3.10.0-54.0.1.el7.x86_64 . [ 681.903890] kmemleak: 5538 new suspected memory leaks (see /sys/kernel/debug/kmemleak) Below is a patch, but I don't know whether we need special handing for undoing ebitmap_set_bit() call. ---------- >>From fe97527a90fe95e2239dfbaa7558f0ed559c0992 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp> Date: Mon, 6 Jan 2014 16:30:21 +0900 Subject: [PATCH] SELinux: Fix memory leak upon loading policy Commit 2463c26d "SELinux: put name based create rules in a hashtable" did not check return value from hashtab_insert() in filename_trans_read(). It leaks memory if hashtab_insert() returns error. unreferenced object 0xffff88005c9160d0 (size 8): comm "systemd", pid 1, jiffies 4294688674 (age 235.265s) hex dump (first 8 bytes): 57 0b 00 00 6b 6b 6b a5 W...kkk. backtrace: [<ffffffff816604ae>] kmemleak_alloc+0x4e/0xb0 [<ffffffff811cba5e>] kmem_cache_alloc_trace+0x12e/0x360 [<ffffffff812aec5d>] policydb_read+0xd1d/0xf70 [<ffffffff812b345c>] security_load_policy+0x6c/0x500 [<ffffffff812a623c>] sel_write_load+0xac/0x750 [<ffffffff811eb680>] vfs_write+0xc0/0x1f0 [<ffffffff811ec08c>] SyS_write+0x4c/0xa0 [<ffffffff81690419>] system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x1b [<ffffffffffffffff>] 0xffffffffffffffff However, we should not return EEXIST error to the caller, or the systemd will show below message and the boot sequence freezes. systemd[1]: Failed to load SELinux policy. Freezing. Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp> Acked-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>
2014-01-07Merge branch 'master' of git://git.infradead.org/users/pcmoore/selinux into nextJames Morris7-39/+164
Conflicts: security/selinux/hooks.c Resolved using request struct. Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
2014-01-06Merge to v3.13-rc7 for prerequisite changes in the Xen code for TPMJames Morris29-326/+361
2014-01-03ima: remove unneeded size_limit argument from ima_eventdigest_init_common()Roberto Sassu1-8/+6
This patch removes the 'size_limit' argument from ima_eventdigest_init_common(). Since the 'd' field will never include the hash algorithm as prefix and the 'd-ng' will always have it, we can use the hash algorithm to differentiate the two cases in the modified function (it is equal to HASH_ALGO__LAST in the first case, the opposite in the second). Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@polito.it> Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
2014-01-03ima: pass HASH_ALGO__LAST as hash algo in ima_eventdigest_init()Roberto Sassu1-2/+2
Replace the '-1' value with HASH_ALGO__LAST in ima_eventdigest_init() as the called function ima_eventdigest_init_common() expects an unsigned char. Fix commit: 4d7aeee ima: define new template ima-ng and template fields d-ng and n-ng Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@polito.it> Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
2014-01-03ima: change the default hash algorithm to SHA1 in ima_eventdigest_ng_init()Roberto Sassu1-1/+1
Replace HASH_ALGO__LAST with HASH_ALGO_SHA1 as the initial value of the hash algorithm so that the prefix 'sha1:' is added to violation digests. Fix commit: 4d7aeee ima: define new template ima-ng and template fields d-ng and n-ng Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@polito.it> Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # 3.13.x Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
2013-12-31Smack: File receive audit correctionCasey Schaufler1-1/+1
Eric Paris politely points out: Inside smack_file_receive() it seems like you are initting the audit field with LSM_AUDIT_DATA_TASK. And then use smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_path(). Seems like LSM_AUDIT_DATA_PATH would make more sense. (and depending on how it's used fix a crash...) He is correct. This puts things in order. Targeted for git://git.gitorious.org/smack-next/kernel.git Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
2013-12-31Smack: Rationalize mount restrictionsCasey Schaufler1-54/+29
The mount restrictions imposed by Smack rely heavily on the use of the filesystem "floor", which is the label that all processes writing to the filesystem must have access to. It turns out that while the "floor" notion is sound, it has yet to be fully implemented and has never been used. The sb_mount and sb_umount hooks only make sense if the filesystem floor is used actively, and it isn't. They can be reintroduced if a rational restriction comes up. Until then, they get removed. The sb_kern_mount hook is required for the option processing. It is too permissive in the case of unprivileged mounts, effectively bypassing the CAP_MAC_ADMIN restrictions if any of the smack options are specified. Unprivileged mounts are no longer allowed to set Smack filesystem options. Additionally, the root and default values are set to the label of the caller, in keeping with the policy that objects get the label of their creator. Targeted for git://git.gitorious.org/smack-next/kernel.git Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
2013-12-23Smack: change rule cap checkCasey Schaufler1-1/+1
smk_write_change_rule() is calling capable rather than the more correct smack_privileged(). This allows for setting rules in violation of the onlycap facility. This is the simple repair. Targeted for git://git.gitorious.org/smack-next/kernel.git Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
2013-12-23Smack: Make the syslog control configurableCasey Schaufler3-13/+99
The syslog control requires that the calling proccess have the floor ("_") Smack label. Tizen does not run any processes except for kernel helpers with the floor label. This changes allows the admin to configure a specific label for syslog. The default value is the star ("*") label, effectively removing the restriction. The value can be set using smackfs/syslog for anyone who wants a more restrictive behavior. Targeted for git://git.gitorious.org/smack-next/kernel.git Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
2013-12-23selinux: selinux_setprocattr()->ptrace_parent() needs rcu_read_lock()Oleg Nesterov1-2/+2
selinux_setprocattr() does ptrace_parent(p) under task_lock(p), but task_struct->alloc_lock doesn't pin ->parent or ->ptrace, this looks confusing and triggers the "suspicious RCU usage" warning because ptrace_parent() does rcu_dereference_check(). And in theory this is wrong, spin_lock()->preempt_disable() doesn't necessarily imply rcu_read_lock() we need to access the ->parent. Reported-by: Evan McNabb <emcnabb@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>
2013-12-23selinux: fix broken peer recv checkChad Hanson1-1/+3
Fix a broken networking check. Return an error if peer recv fails. If secmark is active and the packet recv succeeds the peer recv error is ignored. Signed-off-by: Chad Hanson <chanson@trustedcs.com> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>
2013-12-19Smack: Prevent the * and @ labels from being used in SMACK64EXECCasey Schaufler1-16/+37
Smack prohibits processes from using the star ("*") and web ("@") labels because we don't want files with those labels getting created implicitly. All setting of those labels should be done explicitly. The trouble is that there is no check for these labels in the processing of SMACK64EXEC. That is repaired. Targeted for git://git.gitorious.org/smack-next/kernel.git Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
2013-12-16selinux: selinux_setprocattr()->ptrace_parent() needs rcu_read_lock()Oleg Nesterov1-2/+2
selinux_setprocattr() does ptrace_parent(p) under task_lock(p), but task_struct->alloc_lock doesn't pin ->parent or ->ptrace, this looks confusing and triggers the "suspicious RCU usage" warning because ptrace_parent() does rcu_dereference_check(). And in theory this is wrong, spin_lock()->preempt_disable() doesn't necessarily imply rcu_read_lock() we need to access the ->parent. Reported-by: Evan McNabb <emcnabb@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>
2013-12-16SELinux: remove duplicated include from hooks.cWei Yongjun1-1/+0
Remove duplicated include. Signed-off-by: Wei Yongjun <yongjun_wei@trendmicro.com.cn> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>
2013-12-15Merge branch 'for-linus' of ↵Linus Torvalds3-42/+165
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security Pull SELinux fixes from James Morris. * 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security: selinux: process labeled IPsec TCP SYN-ACK packets properly in selinux_ip_postroute() selinux: look for IPsec labels on both inbound and outbound packets selinux: handle TCP SYN-ACK packets correctly in selinux_ip_postroute() selinux: handle TCP SYN-ACK packets correctly in selinux_ip_output() selinux: fix possible memory leak
2013-12-15Revert "selinux: consider filesystem subtype in policies"Linus Torvalds2-60/+22
This reverts commit 102aefdda4d8275ce7d7100bc16c88c74272b260. Tom London reports that it causes sync() to hang on Fedora rawhide: https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1033965 and Josh Boyer bisected it down to this commit. Reverting the commit in the rawhide kernel fixes the problem. Eric Paris root-caused it to incorrect subtype matching in that commit breaking fuse, and has a tentative patch, but by now we're better off retrying this in 3.14 rather than playing with it any more. Reported-by: Tom London <selinux@gmail.com> Bisected-by: Josh Boyer <jwboyer@fedoraproject.org> Acked-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Cc: Anand Avati <avati@redhat.com> Cc: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2013-12-13selinux: revert 102aefdda4d8275ce7d7100bc16c88c74272b260Paul Moore2-60/+22
Revert "selinux: consider filesystem subtype in policies" This reverts commit 102aefdda4d8275ce7d7100bc16c88c74272b260. Explanation from Eric Paris: SELinux policy can specify if it should use a filesystem's xattrs or not. In current policy we have a specification that fuse should not use xattrs but fuse.glusterfs should use xattrs. This patch has a bug in which non-glusterfs filesystems would match the rule saying fuse.glusterfs should use xattrs. If both fuse and the particular filesystem in question are not written to handle xattr calls during the mount command, they will deadlock. I have fixed the bug to do proper matching, however I believe a revert is still the correct solution. The reason I believe that is because the code still does not work. The s_subtype is not set until after the SELinux hook which attempts to match on the ".gluster" portion of the rule. So we cannot match on the rule in question. The code is useless. Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>
2013-12-13Merge branch 'master' of git://git.infradead.org/users/pcmoore/selinux_fixes ↵James Morris3-42/+165
into for-linus
2013-12-12selinux: process labeled IPsec TCP SYN-ACK packets properly in ↵Paul Moore1-7/+35
selinux_ip_postroute() Due to difficulty in arriving at the proper security label for TCP SYN-ACK packets in selinux_ip_postroute(), we need to check packets while/before they are undergoing XFRM transforms instead of waiting until afterwards so that we can determine the correct security label. Reported-by: Janak Desai <Janak.Desai@gtri.gatech.edu> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>
2013-12-12selinux: look for IPsec labels on both inbound and outbound packetsPaul Moore3-14/+47
Previously selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid() would only check for labeled IPsec security labels on inbound packets, this patch enables it to check both inbound and outbound traffic for labeled IPsec security labels. Reported-by: Janak Desai <Janak.Desai@gtri.gatech.edu> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>
2013-12-12selinux: handle TCP SYN-ACK packets correctly in selinux_ip_postroute()Paul Moore1-15/+53
In selinux_ip_postroute() we perform access checks based on the packet's security label. For locally generated traffic we get the packet's security label from the associated socket; this works in all cases except for TCP SYN-ACK packets. In the case of SYN-ACK packet's the correct security label is stored in the connection's request_sock, not the server's socket. Unfortunately, at the point in time when selinux_ip_postroute() is called we can't query the request_sock directly, we need to recreate the label using the same logic that originally labeled the associated request_sock. See the inline comments for more explanation. Reported-by: Janak Desai <Janak.Desai@gtri.gatech.edu> Tested-by: Janak Desai <Janak.Desai@gtri.gatech.edu> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>
2013-12-12selinux: handle TCP SYN-ACK packets correctly in selinux_ip_output()Paul Moore1-2/+23
In selinux_ip_output() we always label packets based on the parent socket. While this approach works in almost all cases, it doesn't work in the case of TCP SYN-ACK packets when the correct label is not the label of the parent socket, but rather the label of the larval socket represented by the request_sock struct. Unfortunately, since the request_sock isn't queued on the parent socket until *after* the SYN-ACK packet is sent, we can't lookup the request_sock to determine the correct label for the packet; at this point in time the best we can do is simply pass/NF_ACCEPT the packet. It must be said that simply passing the packet without any explicit labeling action, while far from ideal, is not terrible as the SYN-ACK packet will inherit any IP option based labeling from the initial connection request so the label *should* be correct and all our access controls remain in place so we shouldn't have to worry about information leaks. Reported-by: Janak Desai <Janak.Desai@gtri.gatech.edu> Tested-by: Janak Desai <Janak.Desai@gtri.gatech.edu> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>
2013-12-12Merge tag 'keys-devel-20131210' of ↵Linus Torvalds3-17/+10
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/dhowells/linux-fs Pull misc keyrings fixes from David Howells: "These break down into five sets: - A patch to error handling in the big_key type for huge payloads. If the payload is larger than the "low limit" and the backing store allocation fails, then big_key_instantiate() doesn't clear the payload pointers in the key, assuming them to have been previously cleared - but only one of them is. Unfortunately, the garbage collector still calls big_key_destroy() when sees one of the pointers with a weird value in it (and not NULL) which it then tries to clean up. - Three patches to fix the keyring type: * A patch to fix the hash function to correctly divide keyrings off from keys in the topology of the tree inside the associative array. This is only a problem if searching through nested keyrings - and only if the hash function incorrectly puts the a keyring outside of the 0 branch of the root node. * A patch to fix keyrings' use of the associative array. The __key_link_begin() function initially passes a NULL key pointer to assoc_array_insert() on the basis that it's holding a place in the tree whilst it does more allocation and stuff. This is only a problem when a node contains 16 keys that match at that level and we want to add an also matching 17th. This should easily be manufactured with a keyring full of keyrings (without chucking any other sort of key into the mix) - except for (a) above which makes it on average adding the 65th keyring. * A patch to fix searching down through nested keyrings, where any keyring in the set has more than 16 keyrings and none of the first keyrings we look through has a match (before the tree iteration needs to step to a more distal node). Test in keyutils test suite: http://git.kernel.org/cgit/linux/kernel/git/dhowells/keyutils.git/commit/?id=8b4ae963ed92523aea18dfbb8cab3f4979e13bd1 - A patch to fix the big_key type's use of a shmem file as its backing store causing audit messages and LSM check failures. This is done by setting S_PRIVATE on the file to avoid LSM checks on the file (access to the shmem file goes through the keyctl() interface and so is gated by the LSM that way). This isn't normally a problem if a key is used by the context that generated it - and it's currently only used by libkrb5. Test in keyutils test suite: http://git.kernel.org/cgit/linux/kernel/git/dhowells/keyutils.git/commit/?id=d9a53cbab42c293962f2f78f7190253fc73bd32e - A patch to add a generated file to .gitignore. - A patch to fix the alignment of the system certificate data such that it it works on s390. As I understand it, on the S390 arch, symbols must be 2-byte aligned because loading the address discards the least-significant bit" * tag 'keys-devel-20131210' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/dhowells/linux-fs: KEYS: correct alignment of system_certificate_list content in assembly file Ignore generated file kernel/x509_certificate_list security: shmem: implement kernel private shmem inodes KEYS: Fix searching of nested keyrings KEYS: Fix multiple key add into associative array KEYS: Fix the keyring hash function KEYS: Pre-clear struct key on allocation
2013-12-11selinux: fix broken peer recv checkChad Hanson1-1/+3
Fix a broken networking check. Return an error if peer recv fails. If secmark is active and the packet recv succeeds the peer recv error is ignored. Signed-off-by: Chad Hanson <chanson@trustedcs.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>
2013-12-11smack: fix: allow either entry be missing on access/access2 check (v2)Jarkko Sakkinen1-14/+15
This is a regression caused by f7112e6c. When either subject or object is not found the answer for access should be no. This patch fixes the situation. '0' is written back instead of failing with -EINVAL. v2: cosmetic style fixes Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com>
2013-12-10selinux: process labeled IPsec TCP SYN-ACK packets properly in ↵Paul Moore1-7/+35
selinux_ip_postroute() Due to difficulty in arriving at the proper security label for TCP SYN-ACK packets in selinux_ip_postroute(), we need to check packets while/before they are undergoing XFRM transforms instead of waiting until afterwards so that we can determine the correct security label. Reported-by: Janak Desai <Janak.Desai@gtri.gatech.edu> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>
2013-12-09selinux: look for IPsec labels on both inbound and outbound packetsPaul Moore3-14/+47
Previously selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid() would only check for labeled IPsec security labels on inbound packets, this patch enables it to check both inbound and outbound traffic for labeled IPsec security labels. Reported-by: Janak Desai <Janak.Desai@gtri.gatech.edu> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>
2013-12-05cgroup: replace cftype->read_seq_string() with cftype->seq_show()Tejun Heo1-4/+3
In preparation of conversion to kernfs, cgroup file handling is updated so that it can be easily mapped to kernfs. This patch replaces cftype->read_seq_string() with cftype->seq_show() which is not limited to single_open() operation and will map directcly to kernfs seq_file interface. The conversions are mechanical. As ->seq_show() doesn't have @css and @cft, the functions which make use of them are converted to use seq_css() and seq_cft() respectively. In several occassions, e.f. if it has seq_string in its name, the function name is updated to fit the new method better. This patch does not introduce any behavior changes. Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org> Acked-by: Aristeu Rozanski <arozansk@redhat.com> Acked-by: Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com> Acked-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.cz> Acked-by: Daniel Wagner <daniel.wagner@bmw-carit.de> Acked-by: Li Zefan <lizefan@huawei.com> Cc: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Johannes Weiner <hannes@cmpxchg.org> Cc: Balbir Singh <bsingharora@gmail.com> Cc: KAMEZAWA Hiroyuki <kamezawa.hiroyu@jp.fujitsu.com> Cc: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com>
2013-12-04selinux: fix possible memory leakGeyslan G. Bem1-4/+7
Free 'ctx_str' when necessary. Signed-off-by: Geyslan G. Bem <geyslan@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>
2013-12-04selinux: pull address family directly from the request_sock structPaul Moore1-5/+1
We don't need to inspect the packet to determine if the packet is an IPv4 packet arriving on an IPv6 socket when we can query the request_sock directly. Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>
2013-12-04selinux: ensure that the cached NetLabel secattr matches the desired SIDPaul Moore1-1/+30
In selinux_netlbl_skbuff_setsid() we leverage a cached NetLabel secattr whenever possible. However, we never check to ensure that the desired SID matches the cached NetLabel secattr. This patch checks the SID against the secattr before use and only uses the cached secattr when the SID values match. Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>
2013-12-04selinux: handle TCP SYN-ACK packets correctly in selinux_ip_postroute()Paul Moore1-15/+53
In selinux_ip_postroute() we perform access checks based on the packet's security label. For locally generated traffic we get the packet's security label from the associated socket; this works in all cases except for TCP SYN-ACK packets. In the case of SYN-ACK packet's the correct security label is stored in the connection's request_sock, not the server's socket. Unfortunately, at the point in time when selinux_ip_postroute() is called we can't query the request_sock directly, we need to recreate the label using the same logic that originally labeled the associated request_sock. See the inline comments for more explanation. Reported-by: Janak Desai <Janak.Desai@gtri.gatech.edu> Tested-by: Janak Desai <Janak.Desai@gtri.gatech.edu> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>
2013-12-04selinux: handle TCP SYN-ACK packets correctly in selinux_ip_output()Paul Moore1-2/+23
In selinux_ip_output() we always label packets based on the parent socket. While this approach works in almost all cases, it doesn't work in the case of TCP SYN-ACK packets when the correct label is not the label of the parent socket, but rather the label of the larval socket represented by the request_sock struct. Unfortunately, since the request_sock isn't queued on the parent socket until *after* the SYN-ACK packet is sent, we can't lookup the request_sock to determine the correct label for the packet; at this point in time the best we can do is simply pass/NF_ACCEPT the packet. It must be said that simply passing the packet without any explicit labeling action, while far from ideal, is not terrible as the SYN-ACK packet will inherit any IP option based labeling from the initial connection request so the label *should* be correct and all our access controls remain in place so we shouldn't have to worry about information leaks. Reported-by: Janak Desai <Janak.Desai@gtri.gatech.edu> Tested-by: Janak Desai <Janak.Desai@gtri.gatech.edu> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>
2013-12-02ima: properly free ima_template_entry structuresRoberto Sassu3-5/+19
The new templates management mechanism records information associated to an event into an array of 'ima_field_data' structures and makes it available through the 'template_data' field of the 'ima_template_entry' structure (the element of the measurements list created by IMA). Since 'ima_field_data' contains dynamically allocated data (which length varies depending on the data associated to a selected template field), it is not enough to just free the memory reserved for a 'ima_template_entry' structure if something goes wrong. This patch creates the new function ima_free_template_entry() which walks the array of 'ima_field_data' structures, frees the memory referenced by the 'data' pointer and finally the space reserved for the 'ima_template_entry' structure. Further, it replaces existing kfree() that have a pointer to an 'ima_template_entry' structure as argument with calls to the new function. Fixes: a71dc65: ima: switch to new template management mechanism Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@polito.it> Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com>
2013-12-02ima: Do not free 'entry' before it is initializedChristoph Paasch1-1/+0
7bc5f447ce9d0 (ima: define new function ima_alloc_init_template() to API) moved the initialization of 'entry' in ima_add_boot_aggregate() a bit more below, after the if (ima_used_chip). So, 'entry' is not initialized while being inside this if-block. So, we should not attempt to free it. Found by Coverity (CID: 1131971) Fixes: 7bc5f447ce9d0 (ima: define new function ima_alloc_init_template() to API) Signed-off-by: Christoph Paasch <christoph.paasch@uclouvain.be> Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com>
2013-12-02security: shmem: implement kernel private shmem inodesEric Paris1-1/+1
We have a problem where the big_key key storage implementation uses a shmem backed inode to hold the key contents. Because of this detail of implementation LSM checks are being done between processes trying to read the keys and the tmpfs backed inode. The LSM checks are already being handled on the key interface level and should not be enforced at the inode level (since the inode is an implementation detail, not a part of the security model) This patch implements a new function shmem_kernel_file_setup() which returns the equivalent to shmem_file_setup() only the underlying inode has S_PRIVATE set. This means that all LSM checks for the inode in question are skipped. It should only be used for kernel internal operations where the inode is not exposed to userspace without proper LSM checking. It is possible that some other users of shmem_file_setup() should use the new interface, but this has not been explored. Reproducing this bug is a little bit difficult. The steps I used on Fedora are: (1) Turn off selinux enforcing: setenforce 0 (2) Create a huge key k=`dd if=/dev/zero bs=8192 count=1 | keyctl padd big_key test-key @s` (3) Access the key in another context: runcon system_u:system_r:httpd_t:s0-s0:c0.c1023 keyctl print $k >/dev/null (4) Examine the audit logs: ausearch -m AVC -i --subject httpd_t | audit2allow If the last command's output includes a line that looks like: allow httpd_t user_tmpfs_t:file { open read }; There was an inode check between httpd and the tmpfs filesystem. With this patch no such denial will be seen. (NOTE! you should clear your audit log if you have tested for this previously) (Please return you box to enforcing) Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> cc: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com> cc: linux-mm@kvack.org
2013-12-02KEYS: Fix searching of nested keyringsDavid Howells1-1/+1
If a keyring contains more than 16 keyrings (the capacity of a single node in the associative array) then those keyrings are split over multiple nodes arranged as a tree. If search_nested_keyrings() is called to search the keyring then it will attempt to manually walk over just the 0 branch of the associative array tree where all the keyring links are stored. This works provided the key is found before the algorithm steps from one node containing keyrings to a child node or if there are sufficiently few keyring links that the keyrings are all in one node. However, if the algorithm does need to step from a node to a child node, it doesn't change the node pointer unless a shortcut also gets transited. This means that the algorithm will keep scanning the same node over and over again without terminating and without returning. To fix this, move the internal-pointer-to-node translation from inside the shortcut transit handler so that it applies it to node arrival as well. This can be tested by: r=`keyctl newring sandbox @s` for ((i=0; i<=16; i++)); do keyctl newring ring$i $r; done for ((i=0; i<=16; i++)); do keyctl add user a$i a %:ring$i; done for ((i=0; i<=16; i++)); do keyctl search $r user a$i; done for ((i=17; i<=20; i++)); do keyctl search $r user a$i; done The searches should all complete successfully (or with an error for 17-20), but instead one or more of them will hang. Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Tested-by: Stephen Gallagher <sgallagh@redhat.com>
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