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Signed-off-by: Povilas Kanapickas <povilas@radix.lt>
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Previously, AllocateGlyph would return a new glyph with refcount=0 and a
re-used glyph would end up not changing the refcount at all. The
resulting glyph_new array would thus have multiple entries pointing to
the same non-refcounted glyphs.
AddGlyph may free a glyph, resulting in a UAF when the same glyph
pointer is then later used.
Fix this by returning a refcount of 1 for a new glyph and always
incrementing the refcount for a re-used glyph, followed by dropping that
refcount back down again when we're done with it.
CVE-2024-31083, ZDI-CAN-22880
This vulnerability was discovered by:
Jan-Niklas Sohn working with Trend Micro Zero Day Initiative
Part-of: <https://gitlab.freedesktop.org/xorg/xserver/-/merge_requests/1463>
(cherry picked from commit bdca6c3d1f5057eeb31609b1280fc93237b00c77)
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CVE-2024-31082
Fixes: 14205ade0 ("XQuartz: appledri: Fix byte swapping in replies")
Signed-off-by: Alan Coopersmith <alan.coopersmith@oracle.com>
Part-of: <https://gitlab.freedesktop.org/xorg/xserver/-/merge_requests/1463>
(cherry picked from commit 6c684d035c06fd41c727f0ef0744517580864cef)
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CVE-2024-31081
Fixes: d220d6907 ("Xi: add GrabButton and GrabKeysym code.")
Signed-off-by: Alan Coopersmith <alan.coopersmith@oracle.com>
Part-of: <https://gitlab.freedesktop.org/xorg/xserver/-/merge_requests/1463>
(cherry picked from commit 3e77295f888c67fc7645db5d0c00926a29ffecee)
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CVE-2024-31080
Reported-by: https://debbugs.gnu.org/cgi/bugreport.cgi?bug=69762
Fixes: 53e821ab4 ("Xi: add request processing for XIGetSelectedEvents.")
Signed-off-by: Alan Coopersmith <alan.coopersmith@oracle.com>
Part-of: <https://gitlab.freedesktop.org/xorg/xserver/-/merge_requests/1463>
(cherry picked from commit 96798fc1967491c80a4d0c8d9e0a80586cb2152b)
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Otherwise it causes the server to return BadDrawable giving a
byte-swapped resource id instead of the real id the client sent.
Reported-by: https://debbugs.gnu.org/cgi/bugreport.cgi?bug=69762
Fixes: 397dfd9f8 ("Create/Destroy/Trigger/Reset/Query Fence Sync objs")
Signed-off-by: Alan Coopersmith <alan.coopersmith@oracle.com>
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(cherry picked from commit e6573baa7d99a77f44229b9a96a41bbda57e2387)
Part-of: <https://gitlab.freedesktop.org/xorg/xserver/-/merge_requests/1438>
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The X server swapping code is a huge attack surface, much of this code
is untested and prone to security issues. The use-case of byte-swapped
clients is very niche, so allow users to disable this if they don't
need it, using either a config option or commandline flag.
For Xorg, this adds the ServerFlag "AllowByteSwappedClients" "off".
For all DDX, this adds the commandline options +byteswappedclients and
-byteswappedclients to enable or disable, respectively.
Fixes #1201
Signed-off-by: Peter Hutterer <peter.hutterer@who-t.net>
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(cherry picked from commit 412777664a20dd3561b936c02c96571a756fe9b2)
(cherry picked from commit af5cd5acc9012e527ee869f8e98bf6c2e9a02ca4)
Backport to server-21.1-branch modified to keep byte-swapping enabled
by default but easy to disable by users or admins (or even by distros
shipping an xorg.conf.d fragment in their packages).
Signed-off-by: Alan Coopersmith <alan.coopersmith@oracle.com>
Part-of: <https://gitlab.freedesktop.org/xorg/xserver/-/merge_requests/1440>
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This was overlooked when converting the function to use libxcvt.
Bring back name initialization from old code.
This was causing a segfault in xf86LookupMode() if modes where
name is NULL are present the modePool list.
Signed-off-by: Matthieu Herrb <matthieu@herrb.eu>
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(cherry picked from ed11c4d443ad2e82512df64358d38008e0ee7693)
Reported-by: "Sergiy" <Black_N@ukr.net>
Part-of: <https://gitlab.freedesktop.org/xorg/xserver/-/merge_requests/1319>
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Potentially, the pointer to the mode name could be unset, this can
occur with the xf86-video-nv DDX, in that case there isnt much we can do
except check if the next mode is any better.
Signed-off-by: Yusuf Khan <yusisamerican@gmail.com>
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(cherry picked from db3aa4e03b180244e8b4b02272c49f1e0c48b463)
Part-of: <https://gitlab.freedesktop.org/xorg/xserver/-/merge_requests/1309>
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This fixes access to freed heap memory via dev->master. E.g. when
running BarrierNotify.ReceivesNotifyEvents/7 test from
xorg-integration-tests:
==24736==ERROR: AddressSanitizer: heap-use-after-free on address
0x619000065020 at pc 0x55c450e2b9cf bp 0x7fffc532fd20 sp 0x7fffc532fd10
READ of size 4 at 0x619000065020 thread T0
#0 0x55c450e2b9ce in GetMaster ../../../dix/devices.c:2722
#1 0x55c450e9d035 in IsFloating ../../../dix/events.c:346
#2 0x55c4513209c6 in GetDeviceUse ../../../Xi/xiquerydevice.c:525
../../../Xi/xichangehierarchy.c:95
#4 0x55c450e3455c in RemoveDevice ../../../dix/devices.c:1204
../../../hw/xfree86/common/xf86Xinput.c:1142
#6 0x55c450e17b04 in CloseDeviceList ../../../dix/devices.c:1038
#7 0x55c450e1de85 in CloseDownDevices ../../../dix/devices.c:1068
#8 0x55c450e837ef in dix_main ../../../dix/main.c:302
#9 0x55c4517a8d93 in main ../../../dix/stubmain.c:34
(/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libc.so.6+0x28564)
#11 0x55c450d0113d in _start (/usr/lib/xorg/Xorg+0x117713d)
0x619000065020 is located 160 bytes inside of 912-byte region
[0x619000064f80,0x619000065310)
freed by thread T0 here:
(/usr/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libasan.so.5+0x10d7cf)
#1 0x55c450e19f1c in CloseDevice ../../../dix/devices.c:1014
#2 0x55c450e343a4 in RemoveDevice ../../../dix/devices.c:1186
../../../hw/xfree86/common/xf86Xinput.c:1142
#4 0x55c450e17b04 in CloseDeviceList ../../../dix/devices.c:1038
#5 0x55c450e1de85 in CloseDownDevices ../../../dix/devices.c:1068
#6 0x55c450e837ef in dix_main ../../../dix/main.c:302
#7 0x55c4517a8d93 in main ../../../dix/stubmain.c:34
(/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libc.so.6+0x28564)
previously allocated by thread T0 here:
(/usr/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libasan.so.5+0x10ddc6)
#1 0x55c450e1c57b in AddInputDevice ../../../dix/devices.c:259
#2 0x55c450e34840 in AllocDevicePair ../../../dix/devices.c:2755
#3 0x55c45130318f in add_master ../../../Xi/xichangehierarchy.c:152
../../../Xi/xichangehierarchy.c:465
#5 0x55c4512cb9f5 in ProcIDispatch ../../../Xi/extinit.c:390
#6 0x55c450e6a92b in Dispatch ../../../dix/dispatch.c:551
#7 0x55c450e834b7 in dix_main ../../../dix/main.c:272
#8 0x55c4517a8d93 in main ../../../dix/stubmain.c:34
(/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libc.so.6+0x28564)
The problem is caused by dev->master being not reset when disabling the
device, which then causes dangling pointer when the master device itself
is being deleted when exiting whole server.
Note that RecalculateMasterButtons() requires dev->master to be still
valid, so we can reset it only at the end of function.
Signed-off-by: Povilas Kanapickas <povilas@radix.lt>
(cherry picked from commit 1801fe0ac3926882d47d7e1ad6c0518a2cdffd41)
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Signed-off-by: José Expósito <jose.exposito89@gmail.com>
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The cursor in DIX is actually split in two parts, the cursor itself and
the cursor bits, each with their own devPrivates.
The cursor itself includes the cursor bits, meaning that the cursor bits
devPrivates in within structure of the cursor.
Both Xephyr and Xwayland were using the private key for the cursor bits
to store the data for the cursor, and when using XSELINUX which comes
with its own special devPrivates, the data stored in that cursor bits'
devPrivates would interfere with the XSELINUX devPrivates data and the
SELINUX security ID would point to some other unrelated data, causing a
crash in the XSELINUX code when trying to (re)use the security ID.
CVE-2024-0409
Signed-off-by: Olivier Fourdan <ofourdan@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Peter Hutterer <peter.hutterer@who-t.net>
(cherry picked from commit 2ef0f1116c65d5cb06d7b6d83f8a1aea702c94f7)
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The XSELINUX code will label resources at creation by checking the
access mode. When the access mode is DixCreateAccess, it will call the
function to label the new resource SELinuxLabelResource().
However, GLX buffers do not go through the XACE hooks when created,
hence leaving the resource actually unlabeled.
When, later, the client tries to create another resource using that
drawable (like a GC for example), the XSELINUX code would try to use
the security ID of that object which has never been labeled, get a NULL
pointer and crash when checking whether the requested permissions are
granted for subject security ID.
To avoid the issue, make sure to call the XACE hooks when creating the
GLX buffers.
Credit goes to Donn Seeley <donn@xmission.com> for providing the patch.
CVE-2024-0408
Signed-off-by: Olivier Fourdan <ofourdan@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Peter Hutterer <peter.hutterer@who-t.net>
(cherry picked from commit e5e8586a12a3ec915673edffa10dc8fe5e15dac3)
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Disabling a master device floats all slave devices but we didn't do this
to already-disabled slave devices. As a result those devices kept their
reference to the master device resulting in access to already freed
memory if the master device was removed before the corresponding slave
device.
And to match this behavior, also forcibly reset that pointer during
CloseDownDevices().
Related to CVE-2024-21886, ZDI-CAN-22840
(cherry picked from commit 26769aa71fcbe0a8403b7fb13b7c9010cc07c3a8)
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The `DisableDevice()` function is called whenever an enabled device
is disabled and it moves the device from the `inputInfo.devices` linked
list to the `inputInfo.off_devices` linked list.
However, its link/unlink operation has an issue during the recursive
call to `DisableDevice()` due to the `prev` pointer pointing to a
removed device.
This issue leads to a length mismatch between the total number of
devices and the number of device in the list, leading to a heap
overflow and, possibly, to local privilege escalation.
Simplify the code that checked whether the device passed to
`DisableDevice()` was in `inputInfo.devices` or not and find the
previous device after the recursion.
CVE-2024-21886, ZDI-CAN-22840
This vulnerability was discovered by:
Jan-Niklas Sohn working with Trend Micro Zero Day Initiative
(cherry picked from commit bc1fdbe46559dd947674375946bbef54dd0ce36b)
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The `XISendDeviceHierarchyEvent()` function allocates space to store up
to `MAXDEVICES` (256) `xXIHierarchyInfo` structures in `info`.
If a device with a given ID was removed and a new device with the same
ID added both in the same operation, the single device ID will lead to
two info structures being written to `info`.
Since this case can occur for every device ID at once, a total of two
times `MAXDEVICES` info structures might be written to the allocation.
To avoid it, once one add/remove master is processed, send out the
device hierarchy event for the current state and continue. That event
thus only ever has exactly one of either added/removed in it (and
optionally slave attached/detached).
CVE-2024-21885, ZDI-CAN-22744
This vulnerability was discovered by:
Jan-Niklas Sohn working with Trend Micro Zero Day Initiative
(cherry picked from commit 4a5e9b1895627d40d26045bd0b7ef3dce503cbd1)
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There's a racy sequence where a master device may copy the button class
from the slave, without ever initializing numButtons. This leads to a
device with zero buttons but a button class which is invalid.
Let's copy the numButtons value from the source - by definition if we
don't have a button class yet we do not have any other slave devices
with more than this number of buttons anyway.
CVE-2024-0229, ZDI-CAN-22678
This vulnerability was discovered by:
Jan-Niklas Sohn working with Trend Micro Zero Day Initiative
(cherry picked from commit df3c65706eb169d5938df0052059f3e0d5981b74)
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The previous code only made sense if one considers buttons and keys to
be mutually exclusive on a device. That is not necessarily true, causing
a number of issues.
This function allocates and fills in the number of xEvents we need to
send the device state down the wire. This is split across multiple
32-byte devices including one deviceStateNotify event and optional
deviceKeyStateNotify, deviceButtonStateNotify and (possibly multiple)
deviceValuator events.
The previous behavior would instead compose a sequence
of [state, buttonstate, state, keystate, valuator...]. This is not
protocol correct, and on top of that made the code extremely convoluted.
Fix this by streamlining: add both button and key into the deviceStateNotify
and then append the key state and button state, followed by the
valuators. Finally, the deviceValuator events contain up to 6 valuators
per event but we only ever sent through 3 at a time. Let's double that
troughput.
CVE-2024-0229, ZDI-CAN-22678
This vulnerability was discovered by:
Jan-Niklas Sohn working with Trend Micro Zero Day Initiative
(cherry picked from commit 219c54b8a3337456ce5270ded6a67bcde53553d5)
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If a device has both a button class and a key class and numButtons is
zero, we can get an OOB write due to event under-allocation.
This function seems to assume a device has either keys or buttons, not
both. It has two virtually identical code paths, both of which assume
they're applying to the first event in the sequence.
A device with both a key and button class triggered a logic bug - only
one xEvent was allocated but the deviceStateNotify pointer was pushed on
once per type. So effectively this logic code:
int count = 1;
if (button && nbuttons > 32) count++;
if (key && nbuttons > 0) count++;
if (key && nkeys > 32) count++; // this is basically always true
// count is at 2 for our keys + zero button device
ev = alloc(count * sizeof(xEvent));
FixDeviceStateNotify(ev);
if (button)
FixDeviceStateNotify(ev++);
if (key)
FixDeviceStateNotify(ev++); // santa drops into the wrong chimney here
If the device has more than 3 valuators, the OOB is pushed back - we're
off by one so it will happen when the last deviceValuator event is
written instead.
Fix this by allocating the maximum number of events we may allocate.
Note that the current behavior is not protocol-correct anyway, this
patch fixes only the allocation issue.
Note that this issue does not trigger if the device has at least one
button. While the server does not prevent a button class with zero
buttons, it is very unlikely.
CVE-2024-0229, ZDI-CAN-22678
This vulnerability was discovered by:
Jan-Niklas Sohn working with Trend Micro Zero Day Initiative
(cherry picked from commit ece23be888a93b741aa1209d1dbf64636109d6a5)
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Both DeviceFocusEvent and the XIQueryPointer reply contain a bit for
each logical button currently down. Since buttons can be arbitrarily mapped
to anything up to 255 make sure we have enough bits for the maximum mapping.
CVE-2023-6816, ZDI-CAN-22664, ZDI-CAN-22665
This vulnerability was discovered by:
Jan-Niklas Sohn working with Trend Micro Zero Day Initiative
(cherry picked from commit 9e2ecb2af8302dedc49cb6a63ebe063c58a9e7e3)
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In commit 7e1f86d4 monitor support was added to randr. At this time it seemed to be reasonable not to have
more than one (virtual) monitor on a particular physical display. The code was never changed since.
Nowadays, extremely large displays exists (4k displays, ultra-wide displays). In some use cases it makes sense to
split these large physical displays into multiple virtual monitors. An example are ultra-wide screens that can be
split into 2 monitors. The change in this commit makes this work.
Besides that, removing a monitor in a function that is called "RRMonitorAdd" is bad practice and causes
unexpected behaviour.
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Signed-off-by: Peter Hutterer <peter.hutterer@who-t.net>
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button->xkb_acts is supposed to be an array sufficiently large for all
our buttons, not just a single XkbActions struct. Allocating
insufficient memory here means when we memcpy() later in
XkbSetDeviceInfo we write into memory that wasn't ours to begin with,
leading to the usual security ooopsiedaisies.
CVE-2023-6377, ZDI-CAN-22412, ZDI-CAN-22413
This vulnerability was discovered by:
Jan-Niklas Sohn working with Trend Micro Zero Day Initiative
(cherry picked from commit 0c1a93d319558fe3ab2d94f51d174b4f93810afd)
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Affected are ProcRRChangeProviderProperty and ProcRRChangeOutputProperty.
See also xserver@8f454b79 where this same bug was fixed for the core
protocol and XI.
This fixes an OOB read and the resulting information disclosure.
Length calculation for the request was clipped to a 32-bit integer. With
the correct stuff->nUnits value the expected request size was
truncated, passing the REQUEST_FIXED_SIZE check.
The server then proceeded with reading at least stuff->num_items bytes
(depending on stuff->format) from the request and stuffing whatever it
finds into the property. In the process it would also allocate at least
stuff->nUnits bytes, i.e. 4GB.
CVE-2023-6478, ZDI-CAN-22561
This vulnerability was discovered by:
Jan-Niklas Sohn working with Trend Micro Zero Day Initiative
(cherry picked from commit 14f480010a93ff962fef66a16412fafff81ad632)
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After a change for the xserver to automatically determine the seat
based on the XDG_SEAT variable, xephyr stopped working. This was
because of an old feature where xephyr used to handle evdev
directly. This was dropped some time ago, and now this check is
not needed
(cherry picked from commit 4c03b67d334b05b814239420776f2fdd4c4a98ac)
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Signed-off-by: Peter Hutterer <peter.hutterer@who-t.net>
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PointerWindows[] keeps a reference to the last window our sprite
entered - changes are usually handled by CheckMotion().
If we switch between screens via XWarpPointer our
dev->spriteInfo->sprite->win is set to the new screen's root window.
If there's another window at the cursor location CheckMotion() will
trigger the right enter/leave events later. If there is not, it skips
that process and we never trigger LeaveWindow() - PointerWindows[] for
the device still refers to the previous window.
If that window is destroyed we have a dangling reference that will
eventually cause a use-after-free bug when checking the window hierarchy
later.
To trigger this, we require:
- two protocol screens
- XWarpPointer to the other screen's root window
- XDestroyWindow before entering any other window
This is a niche bug so we hack around it by making sure we reset the
PointerWindows[] entry so we cannot have a dangling pointer. This
doesn't handle Enter/Leave events correctly but the previous code didn't
either.
CVE-2023-5380, ZDI-CAN-21608
This vulnerability was discovered by:
Sri working with Trend Micro Zero Day Initiative
Signed-off-by: Peter Hutterer <peter.hutterer@who-t.net>
Reviewed-by: Adam Jackson <ajax@redhat.com>
(cherry picked from commit 564ccf2ce9616620456102727acb8b0256b7bbd7)
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The handling of appending/prepending properties was incorrect, with at
least two bugs: the property length was set to the length of the new
part only, i.e. appending or prepending N elements to a property with P
existing elements always resulted in the property having N elements
instead of N + P.
Second, when pre-pending a value to a property, the offset for the old
values was incorrect, leaving the new property with potentially
uninitalized values and/or resulting in OOB memory writes.
For example, prepending a 3 element value to a 5 element property would
result in this 8 value array:
[N, N, N, ?, ?, P, P, P ] P, P
^OOB write
The XI2 code is a copy/paste of the RandR code, so the bug exists in
both.
CVE-2023-5367, ZDI-CAN-22153
This vulnerability was discovered by:
Jan-Niklas Sohn working with Trend Micro Zero Day Initiative
Signed-off-by: Peter Hutterer <peter.hutterer@who-t.net>
(cherry picked from commit 541ab2ecd41d4d8689e71855d93e492bc554719a)
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This is more portable than libbsd as everything Just Works, even on BSD systems,
and is the recommended method of consuming libbsd nowadays.
It also helpfully lets things work with glibc-provided functions for new
enough glibc.
[For the 21.1.x backport, take inspiration from @alanc's commit to libxdmcp
at https://gitlab.freedesktop.org/xorg/lib/libxdmcp/-/commit/c01da8ebd0969efd15388ce999e121127cc46f67.]
Closes: https://gitlab.freedesktop.org/xorg/xserver/-/merge_requests/973
Co-authored-by: Guillem Jover <guillem@hadrons.org>
(cherry picked from commit 94945a52746ee2612c6cd394692f49e2ed5fc56b)
Signed-off-by: Sam James <sam@gentoo.org>
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This enables fixing a deadlock case on the client side, where the client
ends up blocked waiting for a Present event that will never come because
the window was destroyed. The new PresentWindowDestroyed flag allows the
client to avoid blocking indefinitely.
Signed-off-by: Adam Jackson <ajax@redhat.com>
See-also: https://gitlab.freedesktop.org/mesa/mesa/-/issues/116
See-also: https://gitlab.freedesktop.org/mesa/mesa/-/issues/6685
Reviewed-by: Michel Dänzer <mdaenzer@redhat.com>
(cherry picked from commit 462b06033e66a32308d940eb5fc47f5e4c914dc0)
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Signed-off-by: Olivier Fourdan <ofourdan@redhat.com>
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ZDI-CAN-19866/CVE-2023-1393
If a client explicitly destroys the compositor overlay window (aka COW),
we would leave a dangling pointer to that window in the CompScreen
structure, which will trigger a use-after-free later.
Make sure to clear the CompScreen pointer to the COW when the latter gets
destroyed explicitly by the client.
This vulnerability was discovered by:
Jan-Niklas Sohn working with Trend Micro Zero Day Initiative
Signed-off-by: Olivier Fourdan <ofourdan@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Adam Jackson <ajax@redhat.com>
(cherry picked from commit 26ef545b3502f61ca722a7a3373507e88ef64110)
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Symbols `XK_Cyrillic_DZHE` and `XK_Serbian_DZE` were pure synonyms.
(cherry picked from commit 6153c71cfb4698f1a416266564ecc748e4a25f2c)
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Signed-off-by: Peter Hutterer <peter.hutterer@who-t.net>
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CVE-2023-0494, ZDI-CAN-19596
This vulnerability was discovered by:
Jan-Niklas Sohn working with Trend Micro Zero Day Initiative
Signed-off-by: Peter Hutterer <peter.hutterer@who-t.net>
(cherry picked from commit 0ba6d8c37071131a49790243cdac55392ecf71ec)
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The event might be a DeviceEvent allocated on the stack, in
AccessXKeyboardEvent for instance. Fixes out-of-bounds read.
Signed-off-by: Mike Gorse <mgorse@suse.com>
(cherry picked from commit 2ef5ef57bd37a8bec2ac454053b283c6f87c3b40)
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Withoug a proper implementation of DetermineClientCmd, clients that
connect via an ssh tunnel are miscategorized as local. This results
in failures when we try to use SCM_RIGHTS (eg: in MIT-SHM).
Fixes: https://github.com/XQuartz/XQuartz/issues/314
Signed-off-by: Jeremy Huddleston Sequoia <jeremyhu@apple.com>
(cherry picked from commit 0ea9b595891f2f31915538192961f3404d9ca699)
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when falling back on getpeereids()
This provides a way to determine the pid of a peer connection on
systems like darwin that do not support getpeerucred() nor
SO_PEERCRED.
Signed-off-by: Jeremy Huddleston Sequoia <jeremyhu@apple.com>
(cherry picked from commit 8a4ab2287398773a4868c220662d93bf84ec6241)
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getpeereid()
GetLocalClientCreds() was preferring getpeereid() above other implementations.
getpeereid(), however, only returns the effective uid and gid of the peer,
leaving the pid unset. When this happens, we are unable to use the pid to
determine the peer's command line arguments and incorrectly treat ssh-tunneled
traffic as local.
To address this, we now prioritize getpeerucred() or SO_PEERCRED as those two
implementations will return the pid in addition to uid and gid.
Signed-off-by: Jeremy Huddleston Sequoia <jeremyhu@apple.com>
(cherry picked from commit 165d5c1260edcb998c5cf31d3969723c7452aa7f)
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client is local
Signed-off-by: Jeremy Huddleston Sequoia <jeremyhu@apple.com>
(cherry picked from commit 2577291f010e07173d0fc8b310ac355928f8ed7d)
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This will allow us to remove build-time conditionalization on COMPOSITE
while still allowing XQuartz to disable it and use ROOTLESS.
This reverts commit 5f2d652377995c0c0c3cf07463b5018450661d13
(cherry picked from commit 66e7b7349dffda6fef51ed029fdc91b787ca4c08)
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Signed-off-by: Jeremy Huddleston Sequoia <jeremyhu@apple.com>
(cherry picked from commit 2567388a2957cef526df1b7efb2684aa74feb641)
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Signed-off-by: Jeremy Huddleston Sequoia <jeremyhu@apple.com>
(cherry picked from commit 15077090d371a2679d274c5d129a3102762d18ec)
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Regressed-in: 5d302c378d9d21b34db2434425b766ac4f05de89
Signed-off-by: Jeremy Huddleston Sequoia <jeremyhu@apple.com>
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Commit c7311654 cached the value of ResourceClientBits(), but that value
depends on the `MaxClients` value set either from the command line or
from the configuration file.
For the latter, a call to ResourceClientBits() is issued before the
configuration file is read, meaning that the cached value is from the
default, not from the maximum number of clients set in the configuration
file.
That obviously causes all sort of issues, including memory corruption
and crashes of the Xserver when reaching the default limit value.
To avoid that issue, also keep the LimitClient value, and recompute the
ilog2() value if that changes, as on startup when the value is set from
the the xorg.conf ServerFlags section.
v2: Drop the `cache == 0` test
Rename cache vars
Fixes: c7311654 - dix: cache ResourceClientBits() value
Closes: https://gitlab.freedesktop.org/xorg/xserver/-/issues/1310
Signed-off-by: Olivier Fourdan <ofourdan@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Adam Jackson <ajax@redhat.com>
(cherry picked from commit 2efa6d659508346358a1ef27b2393e18843f66a3)
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fb/rootless/damage crashes
Signed-off-by: Jeremy Huddleston Sequoia <jeremyhu@apple.com>
(cherry picked from commit 07ed1a623a4b36cdb741a322008ba53d913dc765)
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Signed-off-by: Jeremy Huddleston Sequoia <jeremyhu@apple.com>
(cherry picked from commit d1a9a50792110683ae3f993eeeffeee79cf9cbce)
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Signed-off-by: Jeremy Huddleston Sequoia <jeremyhu@apple.com>
(cherry picked from commit 9a66690eaf67c19b90e07f39b16436d34b59e27a)
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Signed-off-by: Olivier Fourdan <ofourdan@redhat.com>
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In commit b320ca0 the mask was inadvertently changed from octal 0177 to
hexadecimal 0x177.
Fixes commit b320ca0ffe4c0c872eeb3a93d9bde21f765c7c63
Xtest: disallow GenericEvents in XTestSwapFakeInput
Found by Stuart Cassoff
Signed-off-by: Peter Hutterer <peter.hutterer@who-t.net>
(cherry picked from commit bb1711b7fba42f2a0c7d1c09beee241a1b2bcc30)
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