From caaee6234d05a58c5b4d05e7bf766131b810a657 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Jann Horn Date: Wed, 20 Jan 2016 15:00:04 -0800 Subject: ptrace: use fsuid, fsgid, effective creds for fs access checks By checking the effective credentials instead of the real UID / permitted capabilities, ensure that the calling process actually intended to use its credentials. To ensure that all ptrace checks use the correct caller credentials (e.g. in case out-of-tree code or newly added code omits the PTRACE_MODE_*CREDS flag), use two new flags and require one of them to be set. The problem was that when a privileged task had temporarily dropped its privileges, e.g. by calling setreuid(0, user_uid), with the intent to perform following syscalls with the credentials of a user, it still passed ptrace access checks that the user would not be able to pass. While an attacker should not be able to convince the privileged task to perform a ptrace() syscall, this is a problem because the ptrace access check is reused for things in procfs. In particular, the following somewhat interesting procfs entries only rely on ptrace access checks: /proc/$pid/stat - uses the check for determining whether pointers should be visible, useful for bypassing ASLR /proc/$pid/maps - also useful for bypassing ASLR /proc/$pid/cwd - useful for gaining access to restricted directories that contain files with lax permissions, e.g. in this scenario: lrwxrwxrwx root root /proc/13020/cwd -> /root/foobar drwx------ root root /root drwxr-xr-x root root /root/foobar -rw-r--r-- root root /root/foobar/secret Therefore, on a system where a root-owned mode 6755 binary changes its effective credentials as described and then dumps a user-specified file, this could be used by an attacker to reveal the memory layout of root's processes or reveal the contents of files he is not allowed to access (through /proc/$pid/cwd). [akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix warning] Signed-off-by: Jann Horn Acked-by: Kees Cook Cc: Casey Schaufler Cc: Oleg Nesterov Cc: Ingo Molnar Cc: James Morris Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" Cc: Andy Shevchenko Cc: Andy Lutomirski Cc: Al Viro Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" Cc: Willy Tarreau Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds --- kernel/events/core.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) (limited to 'kernel/events/core.c') diff --git a/kernel/events/core.c b/kernel/events/core.c index bf8244190d0f..c0957416b32e 100644 --- a/kernel/events/core.c +++ b/kernel/events/core.c @@ -3376,7 +3376,7 @@ find_lively_task_by_vpid(pid_t vpid) /* Reuse ptrace permission checks for now. */ err = -EACCES; - if (!ptrace_may_access(task, PTRACE_MODE_READ)) + if (!ptrace_may_access(task, PTRACE_MODE_READ_REALCREDS)) goto errout; return task; -- cgit v1.2.3