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2023-08-01xfrm: delete offloaded policyLeon Romanovsky1-0/+1
The policy memory was released but not HW driver data. Add call to xfrm_dev_policy_delete(), so drivers will have a chance to release their resources. Fixes: 919e43fad516 ("xfrm: add an interface to offload policy") Signed-off-by: Leon Romanovsky <leonro@nvidia.com> Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
2023-07-31xfrm: add forgotten nla_policy for XFRMA_MTIMER_THRESHLin Ma1-0/+1
The previous commit 4e484b3e969b ("xfrm: rate limit SA mapping change message to user space") added one additional attribute named XFRMA_MTIMER_THRESH and described its type at compat_policy (net/xfrm/xfrm_compat.c). However, the author forgot to also describe the nla_policy at xfrma_policy (net/xfrm/xfrm_user.c). Hence, this suppose NLA_U32 (4 bytes) value can be faked as empty (0 bytes) by a malicious user, which leads to 4 bytes overflow read and heap information leak when parsing nlattrs. To exploit this, one malicious user can spray the SLUB objects and then leverage this 4 bytes OOB read to leak the heap data into x->mapping_maxage (see xfrm_update_ae_params(...)), and leak it to userspace via copy_to_user_state_extra(...). The above bug is assigned CVE-2023-3773. To fix it, this commit just completes the nla_policy description for XFRMA_MTIMER_THRESH, which enforces the length check and avoids such OOB read. Fixes: 4e484b3e969b ("xfrm: rate limit SA mapping change message to user space") Signed-off-by: Lin Ma <linma@zju.edu.cn> Reviewed-by: Simon Horman <simon.horman@corigine.com> Reviewed-by: Leon Romanovsky <leonro@nvidia.com> Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
2023-07-31xfrm: add NULL check in xfrm_update_ae_paramsLin Ma1-1/+1
Normally, x->replay_esn and x->preplay_esn should be allocated at xfrm_alloc_replay_state_esn(...) in xfrm_state_construct(...), hence the xfrm_update_ae_params(...) is okay to update them. However, the current implementation of xfrm_new_ae(...) allows a malicious user to directly dereference a NULL pointer and crash the kernel like below. BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000000 PGD 8253067 P4D 8253067 PUD 8e0e067 PMD 0 Oops: 0002 [#1] PREEMPT SMP KASAN NOPTI CPU: 0 PID: 98 Comm: poc.npd Not tainted 6.4.0-rc7-00072-gdad9774deaf1 #8 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.16.0-0-gd239552ce722-prebuilt.qemu.o4 RIP: 0010:memcpy_orig+0xad/0x140 Code: e8 4c 89 5f e0 48 8d 7f e0 73 d2 83 c2 20 48 29 d6 48 29 d7 83 fa 10 72 34 4c 8b 06 4c 8b 4e 08 c RSP: 0018:ffff888008f57658 EFLAGS: 00000202 RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff888008bd0000 RCX: ffffffff8238e571 RDX: 0000000000000018 RSI: ffff888007f64844 RDI: 0000000000000000 RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ffff888008f57818 R13: ffff888007f64aa4 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000000 FS: 00000000014013c0(0000) GS:ffff88806d600000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 0000000000000000 CR3: 00000000054d8000 CR4: 00000000000006f0 Call Trace: <TASK> ? __die+0x1f/0x70 ? page_fault_oops+0x1e8/0x500 ? __pfx_is_prefetch.constprop.0+0x10/0x10 ? __pfx_page_fault_oops+0x10/0x10 ? _raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore+0x11/0x40 ? fixup_exception+0x36/0x460 ? _raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore+0x11/0x40 ? exc_page_fault+0x5e/0xc0 ? asm_exc_page_fault+0x26/0x30 ? xfrm_update_ae_params+0xd1/0x260 ? memcpy_orig+0xad/0x140 ? __pfx__raw_spin_lock_bh+0x10/0x10 xfrm_update_ae_params+0xe7/0x260 xfrm_new_ae+0x298/0x4e0 ? __pfx_xfrm_new_ae+0x10/0x10 ? __pfx_xfrm_new_ae+0x10/0x10 xfrm_user_rcv_msg+0x25a/0x410 ? __pfx_xfrm_user_rcv_msg+0x10/0x10 ? __alloc_skb+0xcf/0x210 ? stack_trace_save+0x90/0xd0 ? filter_irq_stacks+0x1c/0x70 ? __stack_depot_save+0x39/0x4e0 ? __kasan_slab_free+0x10a/0x190 ? kmem_cache_free+0x9c/0x340 ? netlink_recvmsg+0x23c/0x660 ? sock_recvmsg+0xeb/0xf0 ? __sys_recvfrom+0x13c/0x1f0 ? __x64_sys_recvfrom+0x71/0x90 ? do_syscall_64+0x3f/0x90 ? entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x72/0xdc ? copyout+0x3e/0x50 netlink_rcv_skb+0xd6/0x210 ? __pfx_xfrm_user_rcv_msg+0x10/0x10 ? __pfx_netlink_rcv_skb+0x10/0x10 ? __pfx_sock_has_perm+0x10/0x10 ? mutex_lock+0x8d/0xe0 ? __pfx_mutex_lock+0x10/0x10 xfrm_netlink_rcv+0x44/0x50 netlink_unicast+0x36f/0x4c0 ? __pfx_netlink_unicast+0x10/0x10 ? netlink_recvmsg+0x500/0x660 netlink_sendmsg+0x3b7/0x700 This Null-ptr-deref bug is assigned CVE-2023-3772. And this commit adds additional NULL check in xfrm_update_ae_params to fix the NPD. Fixes: d8647b79c3b7 ("xfrm: Add user interface for esn and big anti-replay windows") Signed-off-by: Lin Ma <linma@zju.edu.cn> Reviewed-by: Leon Romanovsky <leonro@nvidia.com> Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
2023-07-03net: xfrm: Amend XFRMA_SEC_CTX nla_policy structureLin Ma1-1/+1
According to all consumers code of attrs[XFRMA_SEC_CTX], like * verify_sec_ctx_len(), convert to xfrm_user_sec_ctx* * xfrm_state_construct(), call security_xfrm_state_alloc whose prototype is int security_xfrm_state_alloc(.., struct xfrm_user_sec_ctx *sec_ctx); * copy_from_user_sec_ctx(), convert to xfrm_user_sec_ctx * ... It seems that the expected parsing result for XFRMA_SEC_CTX should be structure xfrm_user_sec_ctx, and the current xfrm_sec_ctx is confusing and misleading (Luckily, they happen to have same size 8 bytes). This commit amend the policy structure to xfrm_user_sec_ctx to avoid ambiguity. Fixes: cf5cb79f6946 ("[XFRM] netlink: Establish an attribute policy") Signed-off-by: Lin Ma <linma@zju.edu.cn> Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
2023-06-29net: xfrm: Fix xfrm_address_filter OOB readLin Ma1-0/+9
We found below OOB crash: [ 44.211730] ================================================================== [ 44.212045] BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in memcmp+0x8b/0xb0 [ 44.212045] Read of size 8 at addr ffff88800870f320 by task poc.xfrm/97 [ 44.212045] [ 44.212045] CPU: 0 PID: 97 Comm: poc.xfrm Not tainted 6.4.0-rc7-00072-gdad9774deaf1-dirty #4 [ 44.212045] Call Trace: [ 44.212045] <TASK> [ 44.212045] dump_stack_lvl+0x37/0x50 [ 44.212045] print_report+0xcc/0x620 [ 44.212045] ? __virt_addr_valid+0xf3/0x170 [ 44.212045] ? memcmp+0x8b/0xb0 [ 44.212045] kasan_report+0xb2/0xe0 [ 44.212045] ? memcmp+0x8b/0xb0 [ 44.212045] kasan_check_range+0x39/0x1c0 [ 44.212045] memcmp+0x8b/0xb0 [ 44.212045] xfrm_state_walk+0x21c/0x420 [ 44.212045] ? __pfx_dump_one_state+0x10/0x10 [ 44.212045] xfrm_dump_sa+0x1e2/0x290 [ 44.212045] ? __pfx_xfrm_dump_sa+0x10/0x10 [ 44.212045] ? __kernel_text_address+0xd/0x40 [ 44.212045] ? kasan_unpoison+0x27/0x60 [ 44.212045] ? mutex_lock+0x60/0xe0 [ 44.212045] ? __pfx_mutex_lock+0x10/0x10 [ 44.212045] ? kasan_save_stack+0x22/0x50 [ 44.212045] netlink_dump+0x322/0x6c0 [ 44.212045] ? __pfx_netlink_dump+0x10/0x10 [ 44.212045] ? mutex_unlock+0x7f/0xd0 [ 44.212045] ? __pfx_mutex_unlock+0x10/0x10 [ 44.212045] __netlink_dump_start+0x353/0x430 [ 44.212045] xfrm_user_rcv_msg+0x3a4/0x410 [ 44.212045] ? __pfx__raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x10/0x10 [ 44.212045] ? __pfx_xfrm_user_rcv_msg+0x10/0x10 [ 44.212045] ? __pfx_xfrm_dump_sa+0x10/0x10 [ 44.212045] ? __pfx_xfrm_dump_sa_done+0x10/0x10 [ 44.212045] ? __stack_depot_save+0x382/0x4e0 [ 44.212045] ? filter_irq_stacks+0x1c/0x70 [ 44.212045] ? kasan_save_stack+0x32/0x50 [ 44.212045] ? kasan_save_stack+0x22/0x50 [ 44.212045] ? kasan_set_track+0x25/0x30 [ 44.212045] ? __kasan_slab_alloc+0x59/0x70 [ 44.212045] ? kmem_cache_alloc_node+0xf7/0x260 [ 44.212045] ? kmalloc_reserve+0xab/0x120 [ 44.212045] ? __alloc_skb+0xcf/0x210 [ 44.212045] ? netlink_sendmsg+0x509/0x700 [ 44.212045] ? sock_sendmsg+0xde/0xe0 [ 44.212045] ? __sys_sendto+0x18d/0x230 [ 44.212045] ? __x64_sys_sendto+0x71/0x90 [ 44.212045] ? do_syscall_64+0x3f/0x90 [ 44.212045] ? entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x72/0xdc [ 44.212045] ? netlink_sendmsg+0x509/0x700 [ 44.212045] ? sock_sendmsg+0xde/0xe0 [ 44.212045] ? __sys_sendto+0x18d/0x230 [ 44.212045] ? __x64_sys_sendto+0x71/0x90 [ 44.212045] ? do_syscall_64+0x3f/0x90 [ 44.212045] ? entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x72/0xdc [ 44.212045] ? kasan_save_stack+0x22/0x50 [ 44.212045] ? kasan_set_track+0x25/0x30 [ 44.212045] ? kasan_save_free_info+0x2e/0x50 [ 44.212045] ? __kasan_slab_free+0x10a/0x190 [ 44.212045] ? kmem_cache_free+0x9c/0x340 [ 44.212045] ? netlink_recvmsg+0x23c/0x660 [ 44.212045] ? sock_recvmsg+0xeb/0xf0 [ 44.212045] ? __sys_recvfrom+0x13c/0x1f0 [ 44.212045] ? __x64_sys_recvfrom+0x71/0x90 [ 44.212045] ? do_syscall_64+0x3f/0x90 [ 44.212045] ? entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x72/0xdc [ 44.212045] ? copyout+0x3e/0x50 [ 44.212045] netlink_rcv_skb+0xd6/0x210 [ 44.212045] ? __pfx_xfrm_user_rcv_msg+0x10/0x10 [ 44.212045] ? __pfx_netlink_rcv_skb+0x10/0x10 [ 44.212045] ? __pfx_sock_has_perm+0x10/0x10 [ 44.212045] ? mutex_lock+0x8d/0xe0 [ 44.212045] ? __pfx_mutex_lock+0x10/0x10 [ 44.212045] xfrm_netlink_rcv+0x44/0x50 [ 44.212045] netlink_unicast+0x36f/0x4c0 [ 44.212045] ? __pfx_netlink_unicast+0x10/0x10 [ 44.212045] ? netlink_recvmsg+0x500/0x660 [ 44.212045] netlink_sendmsg+0x3b7/0x700 [ 44.212045] ? __pfx_netlink_sendmsg+0x10/0x10 [ 44.212045] ? __pfx_netlink_sendmsg+0x10/0x10 [ 44.212045] sock_sendmsg+0xde/0xe0 [ 44.212045] __sys_sendto+0x18d/0x230 [ 44.212045] ? __pfx___sys_sendto+0x10/0x10 [ 44.212045] ? rcu_core+0x44a/0xe10 [ 44.212045] ? __rseq_handle_notify_resume+0x45b/0x740 [ 44.212045] ? _raw_spin_lock_irq+0x81/0xe0 [ 44.212045] ? __pfx___rseq_handle_notify_resume+0x10/0x10 [ 44.212045] ? __pfx_restore_fpregs_from_fpstate+0x10/0x10 [ 44.212045] ? __pfx_blkcg_maybe_throttle_current+0x10/0x10 [ 44.212045] ? __pfx_task_work_run+0x10/0x10 [ 44.212045] __x64_sys_sendto+0x71/0x90 [ 44.212045] do_syscall_64+0x3f/0x90 [ 44.212045] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x72/0xdc [ 44.212045] RIP: 0033:0x44b7da [ 44.212045] RSP: 002b:00007ffdc8838548 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000002c [ 44.212045] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007ffdc8839978 RCX: 000000000044b7da [ 44.212045] RDX: 0000000000000038 RSI: 00007ffdc8838770 RDI: 0000000000000003 [ 44.212045] RBP: 00007ffdc88385b0 R08: 00007ffdc883858c R09: 000000000000000c [ 44.212045] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000001 [ 44.212045] R13: 00007ffdc8839968 R14: 00000000004c37d0 R15: 0000000000000001 [ 44.212045] </TASK> [ 44.212045] [ 44.212045] Allocated by task 97: [ 44.212045] kasan_save_stack+0x22/0x50 [ 44.212045] kasan_set_track+0x25/0x30 [ 44.212045] __kasan_kmalloc+0x7f/0x90 [ 44.212045] __kmalloc_node_track_caller+0x5b/0x140 [ 44.212045] kmemdup+0x21/0x50 [ 44.212045] xfrm_dump_sa+0x17d/0x290 [ 44.212045] netlink_dump+0x322/0x6c0 [ 44.212045] __netlink_dump_start+0x353/0x430 [ 44.212045] xfrm_user_rcv_msg+0x3a4/0x410 [ 44.212045] netlink_rcv_skb+0xd6/0x210 [ 44.212045] xfrm_netlink_rcv+0x44/0x50 [ 44.212045] netlink_unicast+0x36f/0x4c0 [ 44.212045] netlink_sendmsg+0x3b7/0x700 [ 44.212045] sock_sendmsg+0xde/0xe0 [ 44.212045] __sys_sendto+0x18d/0x230 [ 44.212045] __x64_sys_sendto+0x71/0x90 [ 44.212045] do_syscall_64+0x3f/0x90 [ 44.212045] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x72/0xdc [ 44.212045] [ 44.212045] The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff88800870f300 [ 44.212045] which belongs to the cache kmalloc-64 of size 64 [ 44.212045] The buggy address is located 32 bytes inside of [ 44.212045] allocated 36-byte region [ffff88800870f300, ffff88800870f324) [ 44.212045] [ 44.212045] The buggy address belongs to the physical page: [ 44.212045] page:00000000e4de16ee refcount:1 mapcount:0 mapping:000000000 ... [ 44.212045] flags: 0x100000000000200(slab|node=0|zone=1) [ 44.212045] page_type: 0xffffffff() [ 44.212045] raw: 0100000000000200 ffff888004c41640 dead000000000122 0000000000000000 [ 44.212045] raw: 0000000000000000 0000000080200020 00000001ffffffff 0000000000000000 [ 44.212045] page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected [ 44.212045] [ 44.212045] Memory state around the buggy address: [ 44.212045] ffff88800870f200: fa fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc [ 44.212045] ffff88800870f280: 00 00 00 00 00 fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc [ 44.212045] >ffff88800870f300: 00 00 00 00 04 fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc [ 44.212045] ^ [ 44.212045] ffff88800870f380: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc [ 44.212045] ffff88800870f400: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc [ 44.212045] ================================================================== By investigating the code, we find the root cause of this OOB is the lack of checks in xfrm_dump_sa(). The buggy code allows a malicious user to pass arbitrary value of filter->splen/dplen. Hence, with crafted xfrm states, the attacker can achieve 8 bytes heap OOB read, which causes info leak. if (attrs[XFRMA_ADDRESS_FILTER]) { filter = kmemdup(nla_data(attrs[XFRMA_ADDRESS_FILTER]), sizeof(*filter), GFP_KERNEL); if (filter == NULL) return -ENOMEM; // NO MORE CHECKS HERE !!! } This patch fixes the OOB by adding necessary boundary checks, just like the code in pfkey_dump() function. Fixes: d3623099d350 ("ipsec: add support of limited SA dump") Signed-off-by: Lin Ma <linma@zju.edu.cn> Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
2023-05-16Merge tag 'ipsec-2023-05-16' of ↵Jakub Kicinski1-5/+10
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/klassert/ipsec Steffen Klassert says: ==================== pull request (net): ipsec 2023-05-16 1) Don't check the policy default if we have an allow policy. Fix from Sabrina Dubroca. 2) Fix netdevice refount usage on offload. From Leon Romanovsky. 3) Use netdev_put instead of dev_puti to correctly release the netdev on failure in xfrm_dev_policy_add. From Leon Romanovsky. 4) Revert "Fix XFRM-I support for nested ESP tunnels" This broke Netfilter policy matching. From Martin Willi. 5) Reject optional tunnel/BEET mode templates in outbound policies on netlink and pfkey sockets. From Tobias Brunner. 6) Check if_id in inbound policy/secpath match to make it symetric to the outbound codepath. From Benedict Wong. * tag 'ipsec-2023-05-16' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/klassert/ipsec: xfrm: Check if_id in inbound policy/secpath match af_key: Reject optional tunnel/BEET mode templates in outbound policies xfrm: Reject optional tunnel/BEET mode templates in outbound policies Revert "Fix XFRM-I support for nested ESP tunnels" xfrm: Fix leak of dev tracker xfrm: release all offloaded policy memory xfrm: don't check the default policy if the policy allows the packet ==================== Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230516052405.2677554-1-steffen.klassert@secunet.com Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
2023-05-10xfrm: Reject optional tunnel/BEET mode templates in outbound policiesTobias Brunner1-5/+9
xfrm_state_find() uses `encap_family` of the current template with the passed local and remote addresses to find a matching state. If an optional tunnel or BEET mode template is skipped in a mixed-family scenario, there could be a mismatch causing an out-of-bounds read as the addresses were not replaced to match the family of the next template. While there are theoretical use cases for optional templates in outbound policies, the only practical one is to skip IPComp states in inbound policies if uncompressed packets are received that are handled by an implicitly created IPIP state instead. Fixes: 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2") Signed-off-by: Tobias Brunner <tobias@strongswan.org> Acked-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
2023-04-21xfrm: release all offloaded policy memoryLeon Romanovsky1-0/+1
Failure to add offloaded policy will cause to the following error once user will try to reload driver. Unregister_netdevice: waiting for eth3 to become free. Usage count = 2 This was caused by xfrm_dev_policy_add() which increments reference to net_device. That reference was supposed to be decremented in xfrm_dev_policy_free(). However the latter wasn't called. unregister_netdevice: waiting for eth3 to become free. Usage count = 2 leaked reference. xfrm_dev_policy_add+0xff/0x3d0 xfrm_policy_construct+0x352/0x420 xfrm_add_policy+0x179/0x320 xfrm_user_rcv_msg+0x1d2/0x3d0 netlink_rcv_skb+0xe0/0x210 xfrm_netlink_rcv+0x45/0x50 netlink_unicast+0x346/0x490 netlink_sendmsg+0x3b0/0x6c0 sock_sendmsg+0x73/0xc0 sock_write_iter+0x13b/0x1f0 vfs_write+0x528/0x5d0 ksys_write+0x120/0x150 do_syscall_64+0x3d/0x90 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x46/0xb0 Fixes: 919e43fad516 ("xfrm: add an interface to offload policy") Signed-off-by: Leon Romanovsky <leonro@nvidia.com> Reviewed-by: Simon Horman <simon.horman@corigine.com> Reviewed-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
2023-03-22Merge tag 'ipsec-libreswan-mlx5' of ↵Jakub Kicinski1-0/+2
https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/mellanox/linux Leon Romanovsky says: ==================== Extend packet offload to fully support libreswan The following patches are an outcome of Raed's work to add packet offload support to libreswan [1]. The series includes: * Priority support to IPsec policies * Statistics per-SA (visible through "ip -s xfrm state ..." command) * Support to IKE policy holes * Fine tuning to acquire logic. [1] https://github.com/libreswan/libreswan/pull/986 Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/cover.1678714336.git.leon@kernel.org * tag 'ipsec-libreswan-mlx5' of https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/mellanox/linux: net/mlx5e: Update IPsec per SA packets/bytes count net/mlx5e: Use one rule to count all IPsec Tx offloaded traffic net/mlx5e: Support IPsec acquire default SA net/mlx5e: Allow policies with reqid 0, to support IKE policy holes xfrm: copy_to_user_state fetch offloaded SA packets/bytes statistics xfrm: add new device offload acquire flag net/mlx5e: Use chains for IPsec policy priority offload net/mlx5: fs_core: Allow ignore_flow_level on TX dest net/mlx5: fs_chains: Refactor to detach chains from tc usage ==================== Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230320094722.1009304-1-leon@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
2023-03-20xfrm: copy_to_user_state fetch offloaded SA packets/bytes statisticsRaed Salem1-0/+2
Both in RX and TX, the traffic that performs IPsec packet offload transformation is accounted by HW only. Consequently, the HW should be queried for packets/bytes statistics when user asks for such transformation data. Signed-off-by: Raed Salem <raeds@nvidia.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/d90ec74186452b1509ee94875d942cb777b7181e.1678714336.git.leon@kernel.org Acked-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com> Signed-off-by: Leon Romanovsky <leon@kernel.org>
2023-02-13xfrm: Zero padding when dumping algos and encapHerbert Xu1-4/+41
When copying data to user-space we should ensure that only valid data is copied over. Padding in structures may be filled with random (possibly sensitve) data and should never be given directly to user-space. This patch fixes the copying of xfrm algorithms and the encap template in xfrm_user so that padding is zeroed. Reported-by: syzbot+fa5414772d5c445dac3c@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Reported-by: Hyunwoo Kim <v4bel@theori.io> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> Reviewed-by: Sabrina Dubroca <sd@queasysnail.net> Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
2022-12-05xfrm: add an interface to offload policyLeon Romanovsky1-0/+18
Extend netlink interface to add and delete XFRM policy from the device. This functionality is a first step to implement packet IPsec offload solution. Signed-off-by: Raed Salem <raeds@nvidia.com> Signed-off-by: Leon Romanovsky <leonro@nvidia.com> Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
2022-12-05xfrm: add new packet offload flagLeon Romanovsky1-0/+2
In the next patches, the xfrm core code will be extended to support new type of offload - packet offload. In that mode, both policy and state should be specially configured in order to perform whole offloaded data path. Full offload takes care of encryption, decryption, encapsulation and other operations with headers. As this mode is new for XFRM policy flow, we can "start fresh" with flag bits and release first and second bit for future use. Reviewed-by: Raed Salem <raeds@nvidia.com> Signed-off-by: Leon Romanovsky <leonro@nvidia.com> Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
2022-11-25xfrm: add extack to xfrm_set_spdinfoSabrina Dubroca1-4/+12
Signed-off-by: Sabrina Dubroca <sd@queasysnail.net> Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
2022-11-25xfrm: add extack to xfrm_alloc_userspiSabrina Dubroca1-3/+5
Signed-off-by: Sabrina Dubroca <sd@queasysnail.net> Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
2022-11-25xfrm: add extack to xfrm_do_migrateSabrina Dubroca1-5/+11
Signed-off-by: Sabrina Dubroca <sd@queasysnail.net> Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
2022-11-25xfrm: add extack to xfrm_new_ae and xfrm_replay_verify_lenSabrina Dubroca1-9/+28
Signed-off-by: Sabrina Dubroca <sd@queasysnail.net> Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
2022-11-25xfrm: add extack to xfrm_del_saSabrina Dubroca1-1/+1
Signed-off-by: Sabrina Dubroca <sd@queasysnail.net> Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
2022-11-25xfrm: add extack to xfrm_add_sa_expireSabrina Dubroca1-1/+4
Signed-off-by: Sabrina Dubroca <sd@queasysnail.net> Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
2022-11-25xfrm: a few coding style clean upsSabrina Dubroca1-3/+3
Signed-off-by: Sabrina Dubroca <sd@queasysnail.net> Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
2022-09-22xfrm: add extack support to xfrm_init_replaySabrina Dubroca1-1/+1
Signed-off-by: Sabrina Dubroca <sd@queasysnail.net> Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
2022-09-22xfrm: add extack to __xfrm_init_stateSabrina Dubroca1-1/+1
Signed-off-by: Sabrina Dubroca <sd@queasysnail.net> Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
2022-09-22xfrm: add extack to attach_*Sabrina Dubroca1-16/+30
Signed-off-by: Sabrina Dubroca <sd@queasysnail.net> Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
2022-09-22xfrm: add extack support to xfrm_dev_state_addSabrina Dubroca1-3/+5
Signed-off-by: Sabrina Dubroca <sd@queasysnail.net> Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
2022-09-22xfrm: add extack to verify_one_alg, verify_auth_trunc, verify_aeadSabrina Dubroca1-11/+20
Signed-off-by: Sabrina Dubroca <sd@queasysnail.net> Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
2022-09-22xfrm: add extack to verify_replaySabrina Dubroca1-8/+22
Signed-off-by: Sabrina Dubroca <sd@queasysnail.net> Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
2022-09-22xfrm: add extack support to verify_newsa_infoSabrina Dubroca1-21/+69
Signed-off-by: Sabrina Dubroca <sd@queasysnail.net> Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
2022-08-31xfrm: add extack to verify_sec_ctx_lenSabrina Dubroca1-7/+9
Signed-off-by: Sabrina Dubroca <sd@queasysnail.net> Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
2022-08-31xfrm: add extack to validate_tmplSabrina Dubroca1-9/+20
Signed-off-by: Sabrina Dubroca <sd@queasysnail.net> Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
2022-08-31xfrm: add extack to verify_policy_typeSabrina Dubroca1-11/+17
Signed-off-by: Sabrina Dubroca <sd@queasysnail.net> Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
2022-08-31xfrm: add extack to verify_policy_dirSabrina Dubroca1-4/+5
Signed-off-by: Sabrina Dubroca <sd@queasysnail.net> Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
2022-08-31xfrm: add extack support to verify_newpolicy_infoSabrina Dubroca1-7/+18
Signed-off-by: Sabrina Dubroca <sd@queasysnail.net> Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
2022-08-31xfrm: propagate extack to all netlink doit handlersSabrina Dubroca1-22/+34
xfrm_user_rcv_msg() already handles extack, we just need to pass it down. Signed-off-by: Sabrina Dubroca <sd@queasysnail.net> Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
2022-06-24xfrm: change the type of xfrm_register_km and xfrm_unregister_kmZhengchao Shao1-4/+2
Functions xfrm_register_km and xfrm_unregister_km do always return 0, change the type of functions to void. Signed-off-by: Zhengchao Shao <shaozhengchao@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
2022-05-06xfrm: store and rely on direction to construct offload flagsLeon Romanovsky1-1/+2
XFRM state doesn't need anything from flags except to understand direction, so store it separately. For future patches, such change will allow us to reuse xfrm_dev_offload for policy offload too, which has three possible directions instead of two. Reviewed-by: Raed Salem <raeds@nvidia.com> Signed-off-by: Leon Romanovsky <leonro@nvidia.com> Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
2022-05-06xfrm: rename xfrm_state_offload struct to allow reuseLeon Romanovsky1-1/+1
The struct xfrm_state_offload has all fields needed to hold information for offloaded policies too. In order to do not create new struct with same fields, let's rename existing one and reuse it later. Reviewed-by: Raed Salem <raeds@nvidia.com> Signed-off-by: Leon Romanovsky <leonro@nvidia.com> Acked-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
2022-03-19Merge branch 'master' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/klassert/David S. Miller1-25/+18
ipsec-next Steffen Klassert says: ==================== pull request (net-next): ipsec-next 2022-03-19 1) Delete duplicated functions that calls same xfrm_api_check. From Leon Romanovsky. 2) Align userland API of the default policy structure to the internal structures. From Nicolas Dichtel. ==================== Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2022-03-18xfrm: rework default policy structureNicolas Dichtel1-25/+18
This is a follow up of commit f8d858e607b2 ("xfrm: make user policy API complete"). The goal is to align userland API to the internal structures. Signed-off-by: Nicolas Dichtel <nicolas.dichtel@6wind.com> Reviewed-by: Antony Antony <antony.antony@secunet.com> Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
2022-03-06Revert "xfrm: state and policy should fail if XFRMA_IF_ID 0"Kai Lueke1-18/+3
This reverts commit 68ac0f3810e76a853b5f7b90601a05c3048b8b54 because ID 0 was meant to be used for configuring the policy/state without matching for a specific interface (e.g., Cilium is affected, see https://github.com/cilium/cilium/pull/18789 and https://github.com/cilium/cilium/pull/19019). Signed-off-by: Kai Lueke <kailueke@linux.microsoft.com> Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
2022-01-26xfrm: Check if_id in xfrm_migrateYan Yan1-1/+5
This patch enables distinguishing SAs and SPs based on if_id during the xfrm_migrate flow. This ensures support for xfrm interfaces throughout the SA/SP lifecycle. When there are multiple existing SPs with the same direction, the same xfrm_selector and different endpoint addresses, xfrm_migrate might fail with ENODATA. Specifically, the code path for performing xfrm_migrate is: Stage 1: find policy to migrate with xfrm_migrate_policy_find(sel, dir, type, net) Stage 2: find and update state(s) with xfrm_migrate_state_find(mp, net) Stage 3: update endpoint address(es) of template(s) with xfrm_policy_migrate(pol, m, num_migrate) Currently "Stage 1" always returns the first xfrm_policy that matches, and "Stage 3" looks for the xfrm_tmpl that matches the old endpoint address. Thus if there are multiple xfrm_policy with same selector, direction, type and net, "Stage 1" might rertun a wrong xfrm_policy and "Stage 3" will fail with ENODATA because it cannot find a xfrm_tmpl with the matching endpoint address. The fix is to allow userspace to pass an if_id and add if_id to the matching rule in Stage 1 and Stage 2 since if_id is a unique ID for xfrm_policy and xfrm_state. For compatibility, if_id will only be checked if the attribute is set. Tested with additions to Android's kernel unit test suite: https://android-review.googlesource.com/c/kernel/tests/+/1668886 Signed-off-by: Yan Yan <evitayan@google.com> Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
2022-01-09Merge git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/netdev/netJakub Kicinski1-4/+19
Merge in fixes directly in prep for the 5.17 merge window. No conflicts. Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
2022-01-06Merge branch 'master' of ↵David S. Miller1-1/+17
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/klassert/ipsec-next Steffen Klassert says: ==================== pull request (net-next): ipsec-next 2022-01-06 1) Fix some clang_analyzer warnings about never read variables. From luo penghao. 2) Check for pols[0] only once in xfrm_expand_policies(). From Jean Sacren. 3) The SA curlft.use_time was updated only on SA cration time. Update whenever the SA is used. From Antony Antony 4) Add support for SM3 secure hash. From Xu Jia. 5) Add support for SM4 symmetric cipher algorithm. From Xu Jia. 6) Add a rate limit for SA mapping change messages. From Antony Antony. ==================== Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2021-12-29net: Don't include filter.h from net/sock.hJakub Kicinski1-0/+1
sock.h is pretty heavily used (5k objects rebuilt on x86 after it's touched). We can drop the include of filter.h from it and add a forward declaration of struct sk_filter instead. This decreases the number of rebuilt objects when bpf.h is touched from ~5k to ~1k. There's a lot of missing includes this was masking. Primarily in networking tho, this time. Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Marc Kleine-Budde <mkl@pengutronix.de> Acked-by: Florian Fainelli <f.fainelli@gmail.com> Acked-by: Nikolay Aleksandrov <nikolay@nvidia.com> Acked-by: Stefano Garzarella <sgarzare@redhat.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20211229004913.513372-1-kuba@kernel.org
2021-12-23xfrm: rate limit SA mapping change message to user spaceAntony Antony1-1/+17
Kernel generates mapping change message, XFRM_MSG_MAPPING, when a source port chage is detected on a input state with UDP encapsulation set. Kernel generates a message for each IPsec packet with new source port. For a high speed flow per packet mapping change message can be excessive, and can overload the user space listener. Introduce rate limiting for XFRM_MSG_MAPPING message to the user space. The rate limiting is configurable via netlink, when adding a new SA or updating it. Use the new attribute XFRMA_MTIMER_THRESH in seconds. v1->v2 change: update xfrm_sa_len() v2->v3 changes: use u32 insted unsigned long to reduce size of struct xfrm_state fix xfrm_ompat size Reported-by: kernel test robot <lkp@intel.com> accept XFRM_MSG_MAPPING only when XFRMA_ENCAP is present Co-developed-by: Thomas Egerer <thomas.egerer@secunet.com> Signed-off-by: Thomas Egerer <thomas.egerer@secunet.com> Signed-off-by: Antony Antony <antony.antony@secunet.com> Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
2021-12-17xfrm: state and policy should fail if XFRMA_IF_ID 0Antony Antony1-3/+18
xfrm ineterface does not allow xfrm if_id = 0 fail to create or update xfrm state and policy. With this commit: ip xfrm policy add src 192.0.2.1 dst 192.0.2.2 dir out if_id 0 RTNETLINK answers: Invalid argument ip xfrm state add src 192.0.2.1 dst 192.0.2.2 proto esp spi 1 \ reqid 1 mode tunnel aead 'rfc4106(gcm(aes))' \ 0x1111111111111111111111111111111111111111 96 if_id 0 RTNETLINK answers: Invalid argument v1->v2 change: - add Fixes: tag Fixes: 9f8550e4bd9d ("xfrm: fix disable_xfrm sysctl when used on xfrm interfaces") Signed-off-by: Antony Antony <antony.antony@secunet.com> Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
2021-12-09xfrm: fix a small bug in xfrm_sa_len()Eric Dumazet1-1/+1
copy_user_offload() will actually push a struct struct xfrm_user_offload, which is different than (struct xfrm_state *)->xso (struct xfrm_state_offload) Fixes: d77e38e612a01 ("xfrm: Add an IPsec hardware offloading API") Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Cc: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com> Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
2021-11-01Merge tag 'overflow-v5.16-rc1' of ↵Linus Torvalds1-1/+1
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/kees/linux Pull overflow updates from Kees Cook: "The end goal of the current buffer overflow detection work[0] is to gain full compile-time and run-time coverage of all detectable buffer overflows seen via array indexing or memcpy(), memmove(), and memset(). The str*() family of functions already have full coverage. While much of the work for these changes have been on-going for many releases (i.e. 0-element and 1-element array replacements, as well as avoiding false positives and fixing discovered overflows[1]), this series contains the foundational elements of several related buffer overflow detection improvements by providing new common helpers and FORTIFY_SOURCE changes needed to gain the introspection required for compiler visibility into array sizes. Also included are a handful of already Acked instances using the helpers (or related clean-ups), with many more waiting at the ready to be taken via subsystem-specific trees[2]. The new helpers are: - struct_group() for gaining struct member range introspection - memset_after() and memset_startat() for clearing to the end of structures - DECLARE_FLEX_ARRAY() for using flex arrays in unions or alone in structs Also included is the beginning of the refactoring of FORTIFY_SOURCE to support memcpy() introspection, fix missing and regressed coverage under GCC, and to prepare to fix the currently broken Clang support. Finishing this work is part of the larger series[0], but depends on all the false positives and buffer overflow bug fixes to have landed already and those that depend on this series to land. As part of the FORTIFY_SOURCE refactoring, a set of both a compile-time and run-time tests are added for FORTIFY_SOURCE and the mem*()-family functions respectively. The compile time tests have found a legitimate (though corner-case) bug[6] already. Please note that the appearance of "panic" and "BUG" in the FORTIFY_SOURCE refactoring are the result of relocating existing code, and no new use of those code-paths are expected nor desired. Finally, there are two tree-wide conversions for 0-element arrays and flexible array unions to gain sane compiler introspection coverage that result in no known object code differences. After this series (and the changes that have now landed via netdev and usb), we are very close to finally being able to build with -Warray-bounds and -Wzero-length-bounds. However, due corner cases in GCC[3] and Clang[4], I have not included the last two patches that turn on these options, as I don't want to introduce any known warnings to the build. Hopefully these can be solved soon" Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20210818060533.3569517-1-keescook@chromium.org/ [0] Link: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/log/?qt=grep&q=FORTIFY_SOURCE [1] Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/202108220107.3E26FE6C9C@keescook/ [2] Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/3ab153ec-2798-da4c-f7b1-81b0ac8b0c5b@roeck-us.net/ [3] Link: https://bugs.llvm.org/show_bug.cgi?id=51682 [4] Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/202109051257.29B29745C0@keescook/ [5] Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20211020200039.170424-1-keescook@chromium.org/ [6] * tag 'overflow-v5.16-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/kees/linux: (30 commits) fortify: strlen: Avoid shadowing previous locals compiler-gcc.h: Define __SANITIZE_ADDRESS__ under hwaddress sanitizer treewide: Replace 0-element memcpy() destinations with flexible arrays treewide: Replace open-coded flex arrays in unions stddef: Introduce DECLARE_FLEX_ARRAY() helper btrfs: Use memset_startat() to clear end of struct string.h: Introduce memset_startat() for wiping trailing members and padding xfrm: Use memset_after() to clear padding string.h: Introduce memset_after() for wiping trailing members/padding lib: Introduce CONFIG_MEMCPY_KUNIT_TEST fortify: Add compile-time FORTIFY_SOURCE tests fortify: Allow strlen() and strnlen() to pass compile-time known lengths fortify: Prepare to improve strnlen() and strlen() warnings fortify: Fix dropped strcpy() compile-time write overflow check fortify: Explicitly disable Clang support fortify: Move remaining fortify helpers into fortify-string.h lib/string: Move helper functions out of string.c compiler_types.h: Remove __compiletime_object_size() cm4000_cs: Use struct_group() to zero struct cm4000_dev region can: flexcan: Use struct_group() to zero struct flexcan_regs regions ...
2021-10-18xfrm: Use memset_after() to clear paddingKees Cook1-1/+1
In preparation for FORTIFY_SOURCE performing compile-time and run-time field bounds checking for memset(), avoid intentionally writing across neighboring fields. Clear trailing padding bytes using the new helper so that memset() doesn't get confused about writing "past the end" of the last struct member. There is no change to the resulting machine code. Cc: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com> Cc: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> Cc: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net> Cc: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org> Cc: netdev@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
2021-09-23xfrm: fix rcu lock in xfrm_notify_userpolicy()Nicolas Dichtel1-1/+6
As stated in the comment above xfrm_nlmsg_multicast(), rcu read lock must be held before calling this function. Reported-by: syzbot+3d9866419b4aa8f985d6@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Fixes: 703b94b93c19 ("xfrm: notify default policy on update") Signed-off-by: Nicolas Dichtel <nicolas.dichtel@6wind.com> Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
2021-09-15xfrm: notify default policy on updateNicolas Dichtel1-0/+31
This configuration knob is very sensible, it should be notified when changing. Fixes: 2d151d39073a ("xfrm: Add possibility to set the default to block if we have no policy") Signed-off-by: Nicolas Dichtel <nicolas.dichtel@6wind.com> Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
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