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There are a few places where we test the current process' capability set
to decide if we're going to be more or less generous with resource
acquisition for a system call. If the process doesn't have the
capability, we can continue the call, albeit in a degraded mode.
These are /not/ the actual security decisions, so it's not proper to use
capable(), which (in certain selinux setups) causes audit messages to
get logged. Switch them to has_capability_noaudit.
Fixes: 7317a03df703f ("xfs: refactor inode ownership change transaction/inode/quota allocation idiom")
Fixes: ea9a46e1c4925 ("xfs: only return detailed fsmap info if the caller has CAP_SYS_ADMIN")
Signed-off-by: Darrick J. Wong <djwong@kernel.org>
Cc: Dave Chinner <david@fromorbit.com>
Reviewed-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
Reviewed-by: Eric Sandeen <sandeen@redhat.com>
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In order to determine whether a caller holds privilege over a given
inode the capability framework exposes the two helpers
privileged_wrt_inode_uidgid() and capable_wrt_inode_uidgid(). The former
verifies that the inode has a mapping in the caller's user namespace and
the latter additionally verifies that the caller has the requested
capability in their current user namespace.
If the inode is accessed through an idmapped mount map it into the
mount's user namespace. Afterwards the checks are identical to
non-idmapped inodes. If the initial user namespace is passed all
operations are a nop so non-idmapped mounts will not see a change in
behavior.
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210121131959.646623-5-christian.brauner@ubuntu.com
Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Reviewed-by: James Morris <jamorris@linux.microsoft.com>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com>
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For SafeSetID to properly gate set*gid() calls, it needs to know whether
ns_capable() is being called from within a sys_set*gid() function or is
being called from elsewhere in the kernel. This allows SafeSetID to deny
CAP_SETGID to restricted groups when they are attempting to use the
capability for code paths other than updating GIDs (e.g. setting up
userns GID mappings). This is the identical approach to what is
currently done for CAP_SETUID.
NOTE: We also add signaling to SafeSetID from the setgroups() syscall,
as we have future plans to restrict a process' ability to set
supplementary groups in addition to what is added in this series for
restricting setting of the primary group.
Signed-off-by: Thomas Cedeno <thomascedeno@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Micah Morton <mortonm@chromium.org>
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Replace the existing /* fall through */ comments and its variants with
the new pseudo-keyword macro fallthrough[1]. Also, remove unnecessary
fall-through markings when it is the case.
[1] https://www.kernel.org/doc/html/v5.7/process/deprecated.html?highlight=fallthrough#implicit-switch-case-fall-through
Signed-off-by: Gustavo A. R. Silva <gustavoars@kernel.org>
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This change ensures that the set*uid family of syscalls in kernel/sys.c
(setreuid, setuid, setresuid, setfsuid) all call ns_capable_common with
the CAP_OPT_INSETID flag, so capability checks in the security_capable
hook can know whether they are being called from within a set*uid
syscall. This change is a no-op by itself, but is needed for the
proposed SafeSetID LSM.
Signed-off-by: Micah Morton <mortonm@chromium.org>
Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.morris@microsoft.com>
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There is a plan to build the kernel with -Wimplicit-fallthrough and
this place in the code produced a warning (W=1).
In this particular case change put the fall through comment on a single
line so as to match the regular expression expected by GCC.
This commit remove the following warning:
kernel/capability.c:95:3: warning: this statement may fall through [-Wimplicit-fallthrough=]
Signed-off-by: Mathieu Malaterre <malat@debian.org>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.morris@microsoft.com>
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This patch provides a general mechanism for passing flags to the
security_capable LSM hook. It replaces the specific 'audit' flag that is
used to tell security_capable whether it should log an audit message for
the given capability check. The reason for generalizing this flag
passing is so we can add an additional flag that signifies whether
security_capable is being called by a setid syscall (which is needed by
the proposed SafeSetID LSM).
Signed-off-by: Micah Morton <mortonm@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.morris@microsoft.com>
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Many source files in the tree are missing licensing information, which
makes it harder for compliance tools to determine the correct license.
By default all files without license information are under the default
license of the kernel, which is GPL version 2.
Update the files which contain no license information with the 'GPL-2.0'
SPDX license identifier. The SPDX identifier is a legally binding
shorthand, which can be used instead of the full boiler plate text.
This patch is based on work done by Thomas Gleixner and Kate Stewart and
Philippe Ombredanne.
How this work was done:
Patches were generated and checked against linux-4.14-rc6 for a subset of
the use cases:
- file had no licensing information it it.
- file was a */uapi/* one with no licensing information in it,
- file was a */uapi/* one with existing licensing information,
Further patches will be generated in subsequent months to fix up cases
where non-standard license headers were used, and references to license
had to be inferred by heuristics based on keywords.
The analysis to determine which SPDX License Identifier to be applied to
a file was done in a spreadsheet of side by side results from of the
output of two independent scanners (ScanCode & Windriver) producing SPDX
tag:value files created by Philippe Ombredanne. Philippe prepared the
base worksheet, and did an initial spot review of a few 1000 files.
The 4.13 kernel was the starting point of the analysis with 60,537 files
assessed. Kate Stewart did a file by file comparison of the scanner
results in the spreadsheet to determine which SPDX license identifier(s)
to be applied to the file. She confirmed any determination that was not
immediately clear with lawyers working with the Linux Foundation.
Criteria used to select files for SPDX license identifier tagging was:
- Files considered eligible had to be source code files.
- Make and config files were included as candidates if they contained >5
lines of source
- File already had some variant of a license header in it (even if <5
lines).
All documentation files were explicitly excluded.
The following heuristics were used to determine which SPDX license
identifiers to apply.
- when both scanners couldn't find any license traces, file was
considered to have no license information in it, and the top level
COPYING file license applied.
For non */uapi/* files that summary was:
SPDX license identifier # files
---------------------------------------------------|-------
GPL-2.0 11139
and resulted in the first patch in this series.
If that file was a */uapi/* path one, it was "GPL-2.0 WITH
Linux-syscall-note" otherwise it was "GPL-2.0". Results of that was:
SPDX license identifier # files
---------------------------------------------------|-------
GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note 930
and resulted in the second patch in this series.
- if a file had some form of licensing information in it, and was one
of the */uapi/* ones, it was denoted with the Linux-syscall-note if
any GPL family license was found in the file or had no licensing in
it (per prior point). Results summary:
SPDX license identifier # files
---------------------------------------------------|------
GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note 270
GPL-2.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 169
((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR BSD-2-Clause) 21
((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR BSD-3-Clause) 17
LGPL-2.1+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 15
GPL-1.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 14
((GPL-2.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR BSD-3-Clause) 5
LGPL-2.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 4
LGPL-2.1 WITH Linux-syscall-note 3
((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR MIT) 3
((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) AND MIT) 1
and that resulted in the third patch in this series.
- when the two scanners agreed on the detected license(s), that became
the concluded license(s).
- when there was disagreement between the two scanners (one detected a
license but the other didn't, or they both detected different
licenses) a manual inspection of the file occurred.
- In most cases a manual inspection of the information in the file
resulted in a clear resolution of the license that should apply (and
which scanner probably needed to revisit its heuristics).
- When it was not immediately clear, the license identifier was
confirmed with lawyers working with the Linux Foundation.
- If there was any question as to the appropriate license identifier,
the file was flagged for further research and to be revisited later
in time.
In total, over 70 hours of logged manual review was done on the
spreadsheet to determine the SPDX license identifiers to apply to the
source files by Kate, Philippe, Thomas and, in some cases, confirmation
by lawyers working with the Linux Foundation.
Kate also obtained a third independent scan of the 4.13 code base from
FOSSology, and compared selected files where the other two scanners
disagreed against that SPDX file, to see if there was new insights. The
Windriver scanner is based on an older version of FOSSology in part, so
they are related.
Thomas did random spot checks in about 500 files from the spreadsheets
for the uapi headers and agreed with SPDX license identifier in the
files he inspected. For the non-uapi files Thomas did random spot checks
in about 15000 files.
In initial set of patches against 4.14-rc6, 3 files were found to have
copy/paste license identifier errors, and have been fixed to reflect the
correct identifier.
Additionally Philippe spent 10 hours this week doing a detailed manual
inspection and review of the 12,461 patched files from the initial patch
version early this week with:
- a full scancode scan run, collecting the matched texts, detected
license ids and scores
- reviewing anything where there was a license detected (about 500+
files) to ensure that the applied SPDX license was correct
- reviewing anything where there was no detection but the patch license
was not GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note to ensure that the applied
SPDX license was correct
This produced a worksheet with 20 files needing minor correction. This
worksheet was then exported into 3 different .csv files for the
different types of files to be modified.
These .csv files were then reviewed by Greg. Thomas wrote a script to
parse the csv files and add the proper SPDX tag to the file, in the
format that the file expected. This script was further refined by Greg
based on the output to detect more types of files automatically and to
distinguish between header and source .c files (which need different
comment types.) Finally Greg ran the script using the .csv files to
generate the patches.
Reviewed-by: Kate Stewart <kstewart@linuxfoundation.org>
Reviewed-by: Philippe Ombredanne <pombredanne@nexb.com>
Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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has_capability() is sometimes needed by modules to test capability
for specified task other than current, so export it.
Cc: Kirti Wankhede <kwankhede@nvidia.com>
Signed-off-by: Jike Song <jike.song@intel.com>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
Acked-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Alex Williamson <alex.williamson@redhat.com>
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This was entirely automated, using the script by Al:
PATT='^[[:blank:]]*#[[:blank:]]*include[[:blank:]]*<asm/uaccess.h>'
sed -i -e "s!$PATT!#include <linux/uaccess.h>!" \
$(git grep -l "$PATT"|grep -v ^include/linux/uaccess.h)
to do the replacement at the end of the merge window.
Requested-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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When the user namespace support was merged the need to prevent
ptrace from revealing the contents of an unreadable executable
was overlooked.
Correct this oversight by ensuring that the executed file
or files are in mm->user_ns, by adjusting mm->user_ns.
Use the new function privileged_wrt_inode_uidgid to see if
the executable is a member of the user namespace, and as such
if having CAP_SYS_PTRACE in the user namespace should allow
tracing the executable. If not update mm->user_ns to
the parent user namespace until an appropriate parent is found.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reported-by: Jann Horn <jann@thejh.net>
Fixes: 9e4a36ece652 ("userns: Fail exec for suid and sgid binaries with ids outside our user namespace.")
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
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When the flag PT_PTRACE_CAP was added the PTRACE_TRACEME path was
overlooked. This can result in incorrect behavior when an application
like strace traces an exec of a setuid executable.
Further PT_PTRACE_CAP does not have enough information for making good
security decisions as it does not report which user namespace the
capability is in. This has already allowed one mistake through
insufficient granulariy.
I found this issue when I was testing another corner case of exec and
discovered that I could not get strace to set PT_PTRACE_CAP even when
running strace as root with a full set of caps.
This change fixes the above issue with strace allowing stracing as
root a setuid executable without disabling setuid. More fundamentaly
this change allows what is allowable at all times, by using the correct
information in it's decision.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 4214e42f96d4 ("v2.4.9.11 -> v2.4.9.12")
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
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When checking the current cred for a capability in a specific user
namespace, it isn't always desirable to have the LSMs audit the check.
This patch adds a noaudit variant of ns_capable() for when those
situations arise.
The common logic between ns_capable() and the new ns_capable_noaudit()
is moved into a single, shared function to keep duplicated code to a
minimum and ease maintainability.
Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@canonical.com>
Acked-by: Serge E. Hallyn <serge.hallyn@ubuntu.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
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There are a lot of embedded systems that run most or all of their
functionality in init, running as root:root. For these systems,
supporting multiple users is not necessary.
This patch adds a new symbol, CONFIG_MULTIUSER, that makes support for
non-root users, non-root groups, and capabilities optional. It is enabled
under CONFIG_EXPERT menu.
When this symbol is not defined, UID and GID are zero in any possible case
and processes always have all capabilities.
The following syscalls are compiled out: setuid, setregid, setgid,
setreuid, setresuid, getresuid, setresgid, getresgid, setgroups,
getgroups, setfsuid, setfsgid, capget, capset.
Also, groups.c is compiled out completely.
In kernel/capability.c, capable function was moved in order to avoid
adding two ifdef blocks.
This change saves about 25 KB on a defconfig build. The most minimal
kernels have total text sizes in the high hundreds of kB rather than
low MB. (The 25k goes down a bit with allnoconfig, but not that much.
The kernel was booted in Qemu. All the common functionalities work.
Adding users/groups is not possible, failing with -ENOSYS.
Bloat-o-meter output:
add/remove: 7/87 grow/shrink: 19/397 up/down: 1675/-26325 (-24650)
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: coding-style fixes]
Signed-off-by: Iulia Manda <iulia.manda21@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Josh Triplett <josh@joshtriplett.org>
Acked-by: Geert Uytterhoeven <geert@linux-m68k.org>
Tested-by: Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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This is effectively a revert of 7b9a7ec565505699f503b4fcf61500dceb36e744
plus fixing it a different way...
We found, when trying to run an application from an application which
had dropped privs that the kernel does security checks on undefined
capability bits. This was ESPECIALLY difficult to debug as those
undefined bits are hidden from /proc/$PID/status.
Consider a root application which drops all capabilities from ALL 4
capability sets. We assume, since the application is going to set
eff/perm/inh from an array that it will clear not only the defined caps
less than CAP_LAST_CAP, but also the higher 28ish bits which are
undefined future capabilities.
The BSET gets cleared differently. Instead it is cleared one bit at a
time. The problem here is that in security/commoncap.c::cap_task_prctl()
we actually check the validity of a capability being read. So any task
which attempts to 'read all things set in bset' followed by 'unset all
things set in bset' will not even attempt to unset the undefined bits
higher than CAP_LAST_CAP.
So the 'parent' will look something like:
CapInh: 0000000000000000
CapPrm: 0000000000000000
CapEff: 0000000000000000
CapBnd: ffffffc000000000
All of this 'should' be fine. Given that these are undefined bits that
aren't supposed to have anything to do with permissions. But they do...
So lets now consider a task which cleared the eff/perm/inh completely
and cleared all of the valid caps in the bset (but not the invalid caps
it couldn't read out of the kernel). We know that this is exactly what
the libcap-ng library does and what the go capabilities library does.
They both leave you in that above situation if you try to clear all of
you capapabilities from all 4 sets. If that root task calls execve()
the child task will pick up all caps not blocked by the bset. The bset
however does not block bits higher than CAP_LAST_CAP. So now the child
task has bits in eff which are not in the parent. These are
'meaningless' undefined bits, but still bits which the parent doesn't
have.
The problem is now in cred_cap_issubset() (or any operation which does a
subset test) as the child, while a subset for valid cap bits, is not a
subset for invalid cap bits! So now we set durring commit creds that
the child is not dumpable. Given it is 'more priv' than its parent. It
also means the parent cannot ptrace the child and other stupidity.
The solution here:
1) stop hiding capability bits in status
This makes debugging easier!
2) stop giving any task undefined capability bits. it's simple, it you
don't put those invalid bits in CAP_FULL_SET you won't get them in init
and you won't get them in any other task either.
This fixes the cap_issubset() tests and resulting fallout (which
made the init task in a docker container untraceable among other
things)
3) mask out undefined bits when sys_capset() is called as it might use
~0, ~0 to denote 'all capabilities' for backward/forward compatibility.
This lets 'capsh --caps="all=eip" -- -c /bin/bash' run.
4) mask out undefined bit when we read a file capability off of disk as
again likely all bits are set in the xattr for forward/backward
compatibility.
This lets 'setcap all+pe /bin/bash; /bin/bash' run
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Andrew Vagin <avagin@openvz.org>
Cc: Andrew G. Morgan <morgan@kernel.org>
Cc: Serge E. Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Steve Grubb <sgrubb@redhat.com>
Cc: Dan Walsh <dwalsh@redhat.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
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The kernel has no concept of capabilities with respect to inodes; inodes
exist independently of namespaces. For example, inode_capable(inode,
CAP_LINUX_IMMUTABLE) would be nonsense.
This patch changes inode_capable to check for uid and gid mappings and
renames it to capable_wrt_inode_uidgid, which should make it more
obvious what it does.
Fixes CVE-2014-4014.
Cc: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Cc: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@ubuntu.com>
Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Cc: Dave Chinner <david@fromorbit.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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- EXPORT_SYMBOL
- typo: unexpectidly->unexpectedly
- function prototype over 80 characters
Signed-off-by: Fabian Frederick <fabf@skynet.be>
Cc: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security
Pull security subsystem updates from James Morris:
"Apart from reordering the SELinux mmap code to ensure DAC is called
before MAC, these are minor maintenance updates"
* 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security: (23 commits)
selinux: correctly label /proc inodes in use before the policy is loaded
selinux: put the mmap() DAC controls before the MAC controls
selinux: fix the output of ./scripts/get_maintainer.pl for SELinux
evm: enable key retention service automatically
ima: skip memory allocation for empty files
evm: EVM does not use MD5
ima: return d_name.name if d_path fails
integrity: fix checkpatch errors
ima: fix erroneous removal of security.ima xattr
security: integrity: Use a more current logging style
MAINTAINERS: email updates and other misc. changes
ima: reduce memory usage when a template containing the n field is used
ima: restore the original behavior for sending data with ima template
Integrity: Pass commname via get_task_comm()
fs: move i_readcount
ima: use static const char array definitions
security: have cap_dentry_init_security return error
ima: new helper: file_inode(file)
kernel: Mark function as static in kernel/seccomp.c
capability: Use current logging styles
...
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Prefix logging output with "capability: " via pr_fmt.
Convert printks to pr_<level>.
Use pr_<level>_once instead of guard flags.
Coalesce formats.
Signed-off-by: Joe Perches <joe@perches.com>
Acked-by: Serge E. Hallyn <serge.hallyn@ubuntu.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
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- Always report the current process as capset now always only works on
the current process. This prevents reporting 0 or a random pid in
a random pid namespace.
- Don't bother to pass the pid as is available.
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
(cherry picked from commit bcc85f0af31af123e32858069eb2ad8f39f90e67)
(cherry picked from commit f911cac4556a7a23e0b3ea850233d13b32328692)
Signed-off-by: Richard Guy Briggs <rgb@redhat.com>
[eparis: fix build error when audit disabled]
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
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Pull xfs updates from Ben Myers:
"For 3.12-rc1 there are a number of bugfixes in addition to work to
ease usage of shared code between libxfs and the kernel, the rest of
the work to enable project and group quotas to be used simultaneously,
performance optimisations in the log and the CIL, directory entry file
type support, fixes for log space reservations, some spelling/grammar
cleanups, and the addition of user namespace support.
- introduce readahead to log recovery
- add directory entry file type support
- fix a number of spelling errors in comments
- introduce new Q_XGETQSTATV quotactl for project quotas
- add USER_NS support
- log space reservation rework
- CIL optimisations
- kernel/userspace libxfs rework"
* tag 'xfs-for-linus-v3.12-rc1' of git://oss.sgi.com/xfs/xfs: (112 commits)
xfs: XFS_MOUNT_QUOTA_ALL needed by userspace
xfs: dtype changed xfs_dir2_sfe_put_ino to xfs_dir3_sfe_put_ino
Fix wrong flag ASSERT in xfs_attr_shortform_getvalue
xfs: finish removing IOP_* macros.
xfs: inode log reservations are too small
xfs: check correct status variable for xfs_inobt_get_rec() call
xfs: inode buffers may not be valid during recovery readahead
xfs: check LSN ordering for v5 superblocks during recovery
xfs: btree block LSN escaping to disk uninitialised
XFS: Assertion failed: first <= last && last < BBTOB(bp->b_length), file: fs/xfs/xfs_trans_buf.c, line: 568
xfs: fix bad dquot buffer size in log recovery readahead
xfs: don't account buffer cancellation during log recovery readahead
xfs: check for underflow in xfs_iformat_fork()
xfs: xfs_dir3_sfe_put_ino can be static
xfs: introduce object readahead to log recovery
xfs: Simplify xfs_ail_min() with list_first_entry_or_null()
xfs: Register hotcpu notifier after initialization
xfs: add xfs sb v4 support for dirent filetype field
xfs: Add write support for dirent filetype field
xfs: Add read-only support for dirent filetype field
...
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nsown_capable is a special case of ns_capable essentially for just CAP_SETUID and
CAP_SETGID. For the existing users it doesn't noticably simplify things and
from the suggested patches I have seen it encourages people to do the wrong
thing. So remove nsown_capable.
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
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Use inode_capable() to check if SUID|SGID bits should be cleared to match
similar check in inode_change_ok().
The check for CAP_LINUX_IMMUTABLE was not modified since all other file
systems also check against init_user_ns rather than current_user_ns.
Only allow changing of projid from init_user_ns.
Reviewed-by: Dave Chinner <dchinner@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Gao feng <gaofeng@cn.fujitsu.com>
Signed-off-by: Dwight Engen <dwight.engen@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Ben Myers <bpm@sgi.com>
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Nothing is using it yet, but this will allow us to delay the open-time
checks to use time, without breaking the normal UNIX permission
semantics where permissions are determined by the opener (and the file
descriptor can then be passed to a different process, or the process can
drop capabilities).
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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namespaces.
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
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This represents a change in strategy of how to handle user namespaces.
Instead of tagging everything explicitly with a user namespace and bulking
up all of the comparisons of uids and gids in the kernel, all uids and gids
in use will have a mapping to a flat kuid and kgid spaces respectively. This
allows much more of the existing logic to be preserved and in general
allows for faster code.
In this new and improved world we allow someone to utiliize capabilities
over an inode if the inodes owner mapps into the capabilities holders user
namespace and the user has capabilities in their user namespace. Which
is simple and efficient.
Moving the fs uid comparisons to be comparisons in a flat kuid space
follows in later patches, something that is only significant if you
are using user namespaces.
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
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This reverts commit d2a7009f0bb03fa22ad08dd25472efa0568126b9.
J. R. Okajima explains:
"After this commit, I am afraid access(2) on NFS may not work
correctly. The scenario based upon my guess.
- access(2) overrides the credentials.
- calls inode_permission() -- ... -- generic_permission() --
ns_capable().
- while the old ns_capable() calls security_capable(current_cred()),
the new ns_capable() calls has_ns_capability(current) --
security_capable(__task_cred(t)).
current_cred() returns current->cred which is effective (overridden)
credentials, but __task_cred(current) returns current->real_cred (the
NFSD's credential). And the overridden credentials by access(2) lost."
Requested-by: J. R. Okajima <hooanon05@yahoo.co.jp>
Acked-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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* 'for-linus' of git://selinuxproject.org/~jmorris/linux-security:
capabilities: remove __cap_full_set definition
security: remove the security_netlink_recv hook as it is equivalent to capable()
ptrace: do not audit capability check when outputing /proc/pid/stat
capabilities: remove task_ns_* functions
capabitlies: ns_capable can use the cap helpers rather than lsm call
capabilities: style only - move capable below ns_capable
capabilites: introduce new has_ns_capabilities_noaudit
capabilities: call has_ns_capability from has_capability
capabilities: remove all _real_ interfaces
capabilities: introduce security_capable_noaudit
capabilities: reverse arguments to security_capable
capabilities: remove the task from capable LSM hook entirely
selinux: sparse fix: fix several warnings in the security server cod
selinux: sparse fix: fix warnings in netlink code
selinux: sparse fix: eliminate warnings for selinuxfs
selinux: sparse fix: declare selinux_disable() in security.h
selinux: sparse fix: move selinux_complete_init
selinux: sparse fix: make selinux_secmark_refcount static
SELinux: Fix RCU deref check warning in sel_netport_insert()
Manually fix up a semantic mis-merge wrt security_netlink_recv():
- the interface was removed in commit fd7784615248 ("security: remove
the security_netlink_recv hook as it is equivalent to capable()")
- a new user of it appeared in commit a38f7907b926 ("crypto: Add
userspace configuration API")
causing no automatic merge conflict, but Eric Paris pointed out the
issue.
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task_ in the front of a function, in the security subsystem anyway, means
to me at least, that we are operating with that task as the subject of the
security decision. In this case what it means is that we are using current as
the subject but we use the task to get the right namespace. Who in the world
would ever realize that's what task_ns_capability means just by the name? This
patch eliminates the task_ns functions entirely and uses the has_ns_capability
function instead. This means we explicitly open code the ns in question in
the caller. I think it makes the caller a LOT more clear what is going on.
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Serge E. Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com>
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Just to reduce the number of places to change if we every change the LSM
hook, use the capability helpers internally when possible.
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Serge E. Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com>
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Although the current code is fine for consistency this moves the capable
code below the function it calls in the c file. It doesn't actually change
code.
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Serge E. Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com>
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For consistency in interfaces, introduce a new interface called
has_ns_capabilities_noaudit. It checks if the given task has the given
capability in the given namespace. Use this new function by
has_capabilities_noaudit.
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Serge E. Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com>
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Declare the more specific has_ns_capability first in the code and then call it
from has_capability. The declaration reversal isn't stricty necessary since
they are both declared in header files, but it just makes sense to put more
specific functions first in the code.
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Serge E. Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com>
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The name security_real_capable and security_real_capable_noaudit just don't
make much sense to me. Convert them to use security_capable and
security_capable_noaudit.
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Serge E. Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com>
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security_capable takes ns, cred, cap. But the LSM capable() hook takes
cred, ns, cap. The capability helper functions also take cred, ns, cap.
Rather than flip argument order just to flip it back, leave them alone.
Heck, this should be a little faster since argument will be in the right
place!
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
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The changed files were only including linux/module.h for the
EXPORT_SYMBOL infrastructure, and nothing else. Revector them
onto the isolated export header for faster compile times.
Nothing to see here but a whole lot of instances of:
-#include <linux/module.h>
+#include <linux/export.h>
This commit is only changing the kernel dir; next targets
will probably be mm, fs, the arch dirs, etc.
Signed-off-by: Paul Gortmaker <paul.gortmaker@windriver.com>
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Conflicts:
include/linux/capability.h
Manually resolve merge conflict w/ thanks to Stephen Rothwell.
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
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If !CONFIG_USERNS, have current_user_ns() defined to (&init_user_ns).
Get rid of _current_user_ns. This requires nsown_capable() to be
defined in capability.c rather than as static inline in capability.h,
so do that.
Request_key needs init_user_ns defined at current_user_ns if
!CONFIG_USERNS, so forward-declare that in cred.h if !CONFIG_USERNS
at current_user_ns() define.
Compile-tested with and without CONFIG_USERNS.
Signed-off-by: Serge E. Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com>
[ This makes a huge performance difference for acl_permission_check(),
up to 30%. And that is one of the hottest kernel functions for loads
that are pathname-lookup heavy. ]
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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unused code. Clean it up.
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Acked-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Andrew G. Morgan <morgan@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
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In olden' days of yore CAP_SETPCAP had special meaning for the init task.
We actually have code to make sure that CAP_SETPCAP wasn't in pE of things
using the init_cred. But CAP_SETPCAP isn't so special any more and we
don't have a reason to special case dropping it for init or kthreads....
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Andrew G. Morgan <morgan@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
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So we can let type safety keep things sane, and as a bonus we can remove
the declaration of init_user_ns in capability.h.
Signed-off-by: Serge E. Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com>
Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Cc: Daniel Lezcano <daniel.lezcano@free.fr>
Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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- Introduce ns_capable to test for a capability in a non-default
user namespace.
- Teach cap_capable to handle capabilities in a non-default
user namespace.
The motivation is to get to the unprivileged creation of new
namespaces. It looks like this gets us 90% of the way there, with
only potential uid confusion issues left.
I still need to handle getting all caps after creation but otherwise I
think I have a good starter patch that achieves all of your goals.
Changelog:
11/05/2010: [serge] add apparmor
12/14/2010: [serge] fix capabilities to created user namespaces
Without this, if user serge creates a user_ns, he won't have
capabilities to the user_ns he created. THis is because we
were first checking whether his effective caps had the caps
he needed and returning -EPERM if not, and THEN checking whether
he was the creator. Reverse those checks.
12/16/2010: [serge] security_real_capable needs ns argument in !security case
01/11/2011: [serge] add task_ns_capable helper
01/11/2011: [serge] add nsown_capable() helper per Bastian Blank suggestion
02/16/2011: [serge] fix a logic bug: the root user is always creator of
init_user_ns, but should not always have capabilities to
it! Fix the check in cap_capable().
02/21/2011: Add the required user_ns parameter to security_capable,
fixing a compile failure.
02/23/2011: Convert some macros to functions as per akpm comments. Some
couldn't be converted because we can't easily forward-declare
them (they are inline if !SECURITY, extern if SECURITY). Add
a current_user_ns function so we can use it in capability.h
without #including cred.h. Move all forward declarations
together to the top of the #ifdef __KERNEL__ section, and use
kernel-doc format.
02/23/2011: Per dhowells, clean up comment in cap_capable().
02/23/2011: Per akpm, remove unreachable 'return -EPERM' in cap_capable.
(Original written and signed off by Eric; latest, modified version
acked by him)
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix build]
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: export current_user_ns() for ecryptfs]
[serge.hallyn@canonical.com: remove unneeded extra argument in selinux's task_has_capability]
Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Signed-off-by: Serge E. Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com>
Acked-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Acked-by: Daniel Lezcano <daniel.lezcano@free.fr>
Acked-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Signed-off-by: Serge E. Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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Expand security_capable() to include cred, so that it can be usable in a
wider range of call sites.
Signed-off-by: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
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This is left over from commit 7c9414385e ("sched: Remove USER_SCHED"")
Signed-off-by: Li Zefan <lizf@cn.fujitsu.com>
Acked-by: Dhaval Giani <dhaval.giani@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
LKML-Reference: <4BA9A05F.7010407@cn.fujitsu.com>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
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cap_get_target_pid() protects the task lookup with tasklist_lock.
security_capget() is called under tasklist_lock as well but
tasklist_lock does not protect anything there. The capabilities are
protected by RCU already.
So tasklist_lock only protects the lookup and prevents the task going
away, which can be done with rcu_read_lock() as well.
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
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As far as I know, all distros currently ship kernels with default
CONFIG_SECURITY_FILE_CAPABILITIES=y. Since having the option on
leaves a 'no_file_caps' option to boot without file capabilities,
the main reason to keep the option is that turning it off saves
you (on my s390x partition) 5k. In particular, vmlinux sizes
came to:
without patch fscaps=n: 53598392
without patch fscaps=y: 53603406
with this patch applied: 53603342
with the security-next tree.
Against this we must weigh the fact that there is no simple way for
userspace to figure out whether file capabilities are supported,
while things like per-process securebits, capability bounding
sets, and adding bits to pI if CAP_SETPCAP is in pE are not supported
with SECURITY_FILE_CAPABILITIES=n, leaving a bit of a problem for
applications wanting to know whether they can use them and/or why
something failed.
It also adds another subtly different set of semantics which we must
maintain at the risk of severe security regressions.
So this patch removes the SECURITY_FILE_CAPABILITIES compile
option. It drops the kernel size by about 50k over the stock
SECURITY_FILE_CAPABILITIES=y kernel, by removing the
cap_limit_ptraced_target() function.
Changelog:
Nov 20: remove cap_limit_ptraced_target() as it's logic
was ifndef'ed.
Signed-off-by: Serge E. Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Andrew G. Morgan" <morgan@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
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When libcap, or other libraries attempt to confirm/determine the supported
capability version magic, they generally supply a NULL dataptr to capget().
In this case, while returning the supported/preferred magic (via a
modified header content), the return code of this system call may be 0,
-EINVAL, or -EFAULT.
No libcap code depends on the previous -EINVAL etc. return code, and
all of the above three return codes can accompany a valid (successful)
attempt to determine the requested magic value.
This patch cleans up the system call to return 0, if the call is
successfully being used to determine the supported/preferred capability
magic value.
Signed-off-by: Andrew G. Morgan <morgan@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Steve Grubb <sgrubb@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
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The capabilities syscall has a copy_from_user() call where gcc currently
cannot prove to itself that the copy is always within bounds.
This patch adds a very explicity bound check to prove to gcc that this
copy_from_user cannot overflow its destination buffer.
Signed-off-by: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@linux.intel.com>
Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
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Signed-off-by: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
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