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path: root/fs/ecryptfs/crypto.c
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2009-04-22eCryptfs: Fix data corruption when using ecryptfs_passthroughTyler Hicks1-19/+2
ecryptfs_passthrough is a mount option that allows eCryptfs to allow data to be written to non-eCryptfs files in the lower filesystem. The passthrough option was causing data corruption due to it not always being treated as a non-eCryptfs file. The first 8 bytes of an eCryptfs file contains the decrypted file size. This value was being written to the non-eCryptfs files, too. Also, extra 0x00 characters were being written to make the file size a multiple of PAGE_CACHE_SIZE. Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
2009-03-22eCryptfs: NULL crypt_stat dereference during lookupTyler Hicks1-4/+6
If ecryptfs_encrypted_view or ecryptfs_xattr_metadata were being specified as mount options, a NULL pointer dereference of crypt_stat was possible during lookup. This patch moves the crypt_stat assignment into ecryptfs_lookup_and_interpose_lower(), ensuring that crypt_stat will not be NULL before we attempt to dereference it. Thanks to Dan Carpenter and his static analysis tool, smatch, for finding this bug. Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Acked-by: Dustin Kirkland <kirkland@canonical.com> Cc: Dan Carpenter <error27@gmail.com> Cc: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2009-03-22eCryptfs: Allocate a variable number of pages for file headersTyler Hicks1-13/+26
When allocating the memory used to store the eCryptfs header contents, a single, zeroed page was being allocated with get_zeroed_page(). However, the size of an eCryptfs header is either PAGE_CACHE_SIZE or ECRYPTFS_MINIMUM_HEADER_EXTENT_SIZE (8192), whichever is larger, and is stored in the file's private_data->crypt_stat->num_header_bytes_at_front field. ecryptfs_write_metadata_to_contents() was using num_header_bytes_at_front to decide how many bytes should be written to the lower filesystem for the file header. Unfortunately, at least 8K was being written from the page, despite the chance of the single, zeroed page being smaller than 8K. This resulted in random areas of kernel memory being written between the 0x1000 and 0x1FFF bytes offsets in the eCryptfs file headers if PAGE_SIZE was 4K. This patch allocates a variable number of pages, calculated with num_header_bytes_at_front, and passes the number of allocated pages along to ecryptfs_write_metadata_to_contents(). Thanks to Florian Streibelt for reporting the data leak and working with me to find the problem. 2.6.28 is the only kernel release with this vulnerability. Corresponds to CVE-2009-0787 Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Acked-by: Dustin Kirkland <kirkland@canonical.com> Reviewed-by: Eric Sandeen <sandeen@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Eugene Teo <eugeneteo@kernel.sg> Cc: Greg KH <greg@kroah.com> Cc: dann frazier <dannf@dannf.org> Cc: Serge E. Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com> Cc: Florian Streibelt <florian@f-streibelt.de> Cc: stable@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2009-03-14eCryptfs: don't encrypt file key with filename keyTyler Hicks1-0/+2
eCryptfs has file encryption keys (FEK), file encryption key encryption keys (FEKEK), and filename encryption keys (FNEK). The per-file FEK is encrypted with one or more FEKEKs and stored in the header of the encrypted file. I noticed that the FEK is also being encrypted by the FNEK. This is a problem if a user wants to use a different FNEK than their FEKEK, as their file contents will still be accessible with the FNEK. This is a minimalistic patch which prevents the FNEKs signatures from being copied to the inode signatures list. Ultimately, it keeps the FEK from being encrypted with a FNEK. Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Cc: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com> Acked-by: Dustin Kirkland <kirkland@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2009-02-06eCryptfs: Regression in unencrypted filename symlinksTyler Hicks1-2/+2
The addition of filename encryption caused a regression in unencrypted filename symlink support. ecryptfs_copy_filename() is used when dealing with unencrypted filenames and it reported that the new, copied filename was a character longer than it should have been. This caused the return value of readlink() to count the NULL byte of the symlink target. Most applications don't care about the extra NULL byte, but a version control system (bzr) helped in discovering the bug. Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2009-01-06eCryptfs: Clean up ecryptfs_decode_from_filename()Michael Halcrow1-27/+24
Flesh out the comments for ecryptfs_decode_from_filename(). Remove the return condition, since it is always 0. Signed-off-by: Michael Halcrow <mhalcrow@us.ibm.com> Cc: Dustin Kirkland <dustin.kirkland@gmail.com> Cc: Eric Sandeen <sandeen@redhat.com> Cc: Tyler Hicks <tchicks@us.ibm.com> Cc: David Kleikamp <shaggy@us.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2009-01-06eCryptfs: Fix data types (int/size_t)Michael Halcrow1-2/+2
Correct several format string data type specifiers. Correct filename size data types; they should be size_t rather than int when passed as parameters to some other functions (although note that the filenames will never be larger than int). Signed-off-by: Michael Halcrow <mhalcrow@us.ibm.com> Cc: Dustin Kirkland <dustin.kirkland@gmail.com> Cc: Eric Sandeen <sandeen@redhat.com> Cc: Tyler Hicks <tchicks@us.ibm.com> Cc: David Kleikamp <shaggy@us.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2009-01-06eCryptfs: Replace %Z with %zMichael Halcrow1-4/+4
%Z is a gcc-ism. Using %z instead. Signed-off-by: Michael Halcrow <mhalcrow@us.ibm.com> Cc: Dustin Kirkland <dustin.kirkland@gmail.com> Cc: Eric Sandeen <sandeen@redhat.com> Cc: Tyler Hicks <tchicks@us.ibm.com> Cc: David Kleikamp <shaggy@us.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2009-01-06eCryptfs: Filename Encryption: filldir, lookup, and readlinkMichael Halcrow1-94/+13
Make the requisite modifications to ecryptfs_filldir(), ecryptfs_lookup(), and ecryptfs_readlink() to call out to filename encryption functions. Propagate filename encryption policy flags from mount-wide crypt_stat to inode crypt_stat. Signed-off-by: Michael Halcrow <mhalcrow@us.ibm.com> Cc: Dustin Kirkland <dustin.kirkland@gmail.com> Cc: Eric Sandeen <sandeen@redhat.com> Cc: Tyler Hicks <tchicks@us.ibm.com> Cc: David Kleikamp <shaggy@us.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2009-01-06eCryptfs: Filename Encryption: Encoding and encryption functionsMichael Halcrow1-0/+433
These functions support encrypting and encoding the filename contents. The encrypted filename contents may consist of any ASCII characters. This patch includes a custom encoding mechanism to map the ASCII characters to a reduced character set that is appropriate for filenames. Signed-off-by: Michael Halcrow <mhalcrow@us.ibm.com> Cc: Dustin Kirkland <dustin.kirkland@gmail.com> Cc: Eric Sandeen <sandeen@redhat.com> Cc: Tyler Hicks <tchicks@us.ibm.com> Cc: David Kleikamp <shaggy@us.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2009-01-06eCryptfs: Filename Encryption: Header updatesMichael Halcrow1-2/+2
Extensions to the header file to support filename encryption. Signed-off-by: Michael Halcrow <mhalcrow@us.ibm.com> Cc: Dustin Kirkland <dustin.kirkland@gmail.com> Cc: Eric Sandeen <sandeen@redhat.com> Cc: Tyler Hicks <tchicks@us.ibm.com> Cc: David Kleikamp <shaggy@us.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2009-01-06eCryptfs: Filename Encryption: Tag 70 packetsMichael Halcrow1-5/+6
This patchset implements filename encryption via a passphrase-derived mount-wide Filename Encryption Key (FNEK) specified as a mount parameter. Each encrypted filename has a fixed prefix indicating that eCryptfs should try to decrypt the filename. When eCryptfs encounters this prefix, it decodes the filename into a tag 70 packet and then decrypts the packet contents using the FNEK, setting the filename to the decrypted filename. Both unencrypted and encrypted filenames can reside in the same lower filesystem. Because filename encryption expands the length of the filename during the encoding stage, eCryptfs will not properly handle filenames that are already near the maximum filename length. In the present implementation, eCryptfs must be able to produce a match against the lower encrypted and encoded filename representation when given a plaintext filename. Therefore, two files having the same plaintext name will encrypt and encode into the same lower filename if they are both encrypted using the same FNEK. This can be changed by finding a way to replace the prepended bytes in the blocked-aligned filename with random characters; they are hashes of the FNEK right now, so that it is possible to deterministically map from a plaintext filename to an encrypted and encoded filename in the lower filesystem. An implementation using random characters will have to decode and decrypt every single directory entry in any given directory any time an event occurs wherein the VFS needs to determine whether a particular file exists in the lower directory and the decrypted and decoded filenames have not yet been extracted for that directory. Thanks to Tyler Hicks and David Kleikamp for assistance in the development of this patchset. This patch: A tag 70 packet contains a filename encrypted with a Filename Encryption Key (FNEK). This patch implements functions for writing and parsing tag 70 packets. This patch also adds definitions and extends structures to support filename encryption. Signed-off-by: Michael Halcrow <mhalcrow@us.ibm.com> Cc: Dustin Kirkland <dustin.kirkland@gmail.com> Cc: Eric Sandeen <sandeen@redhat.com> Cc: Tyler Hicks <tchicks@us.ibm.com> Cc: David Kleikamp <shaggy@us.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2008-10-30ecryptfs: fix memory corruption when storing crypto info in xattrsEric Sandeen1-7/+8
When ecryptfs allocates space to write crypto headers into, before copying it out to file headers or to xattrs, it looks at the value of crypt_stat->num_header_bytes_at_front to determine how much space it needs. This is also used as the file offset to the actual encrypted data, so for xattr-stored crypto info, the value was zero. So, we kzalloc'd 0 bytes, and then ran off to write to that memory. (Which returned as ZERO_SIZE_PTR, so we explode quickly). The right answer is to always allocate a page to write into; the current code won't ever write more than that (this is enforced by the (PAGE_CACHE_SIZE - offset) length in the call to ecryptfs_generate_key_packet_set). To be explicit about this, we now send in a "max" parameter, rather than magically using PAGE_CACHE_SIZE there. Also, since the pointer we pass down the callchain eventually gets the virt_to_page() treatment, we should be using a alloc_page variant, not kzalloc (see also 7fcba054373d5dfc43d26e243a5c9b92069972ee) Signed-off-by: Eric Sandeen <sandeen@redhat.com> Acked-by: Michael Halcrow <mhalcrow@us.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2008-07-28eCryptfs: use page_alloc not kmalloc to get a page of memoryEric Sandeen1-12/+18
With SLUB debugging turned on in 2.6.26, I was getting memory corruption when testing eCryptfs. The root cause turned out to be that eCryptfs was doing kmalloc(PAGE_CACHE_SIZE); virt_to_page() and treating that as a nice page-aligned chunk of memory. But at least with SLUB debugging on, this is not always true, and the page we get from virt_to_page does not necessarily match the PAGE_CACHE_SIZE worth of memory we got from kmalloc. My simple testcase was 2 loops doing "rm -f fileX; cp /tmp/fileX ." for 2 different multi-megabyte files. With this change I no longer see the corruption. Signed-off-by: Eric Sandeen <sandeen@redhat.com> Acked-by: Michael Halcrow <mhalcrow@us.ibm.com> Acked-by: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com> Cc: <stable@kernel.org> [2.6.25.x, 2.6.26.x] Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2008-07-24ecryptfs: crypto.c use unaligned byteorder helpersHarvey Harrison1-23/+14
Fixes the following sparse warnings: fs/ecryptfs/crypto.c:1036:8: warning: cast to restricted __be32 fs/ecryptfs/crypto.c:1038:8: warning: cast to restricted __be32 fs/ecryptfs/crypto.c:1077:10: warning: cast to restricted __be32 fs/ecryptfs/crypto.c:1103:6: warning: incorrect type in assignment (different base types) fs/ecryptfs/crypto.c:1105:6: warning: incorrect type in assignment (different base types) fs/ecryptfs/crypto.c:1124:8: warning: incorrect type in assignment (different base types) fs/ecryptfs/crypto.c:1241:21: warning: incorrect type in assignment (different base types) fs/ecryptfs/crypto.c:1244:30: warning: incorrect type in assignment (different base types) fs/ecryptfs/crypto.c:1414:23: warning: cast to restricted __be32 fs/ecryptfs/crypto.c:1417:32: warning: cast to restricted __be16 Signed-off-by: Harvey Harrison <harvey.harrison@gmail.com> Cc: Michael Halcrow <mhalcrow@us.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2008-05-24ecryptfs: fix missed mutex_unlockCyrill Gorcunov1-1/+1
Cc: Michael Halcrow <mhalcrow@us.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2008-04-29ecryptfs: replace remaining __FUNCTION__ occurrencesHarvey Harrison1-16/+16
__FUNCTION__ is gcc-specific, use __func__ Signed-off-by: Harvey Harrison <harvey.harrison@gmail.com> Cc: Michael Halcrow <mhalcrow@us.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2008-04-29remove ecryptfs_header_cache_0Adrian Bunk1-1/+0
Remove the no longer used ecryptfs_header_cache_0. Signed-off-by: Adrian Bunk <bunk@kernel.org> Cc: Michael Halcrow <mhalcrow@us.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2008-02-06ecryptfs: check for existing key_tfm at mount timeEric Sandeen1-14/+53
Jeff Moyer pointed out that a mount; umount loop of ecryptfs, with the same cipher & other mount options, created a new ecryptfs_key_tfm_cache item each time, and the cache could grow quite large this way. Looking at this with mhalcrow, we saw that ecryptfs_parse_options() unconditionally called ecryptfs_add_new_key_tfm(), which is what was adding these items. Refactor ecryptfs_get_tfm_and_mutex_for_cipher_name() to create a new helper function, ecryptfs_tfm_exists(), which checks for the cipher on the cached key_tfm_list, and sets a pointer to it if it exists. This can then be called from ecryptfs_parse_options(), and new key_tfm's can be added only when a cached one is not found. With list locking changes suggested by akpm. Signed-off-by: Eric Sandeen <sandeen@redhat.com> Cc: Michael Halcrow <mhalcrow@us.ibm.com> Cc: Jeff Moyer <jmoyer@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2008-02-06eCryptfs: change the type of cipher_code from u16 to u8Trevor Highland1-4/+4
Only the lower byte of cipher_code is ever used, so it makes sense for its type to be u8. Signed-off-by: Trevor Highland <trevor.highland@gmail.com> Cc: Michael Halcrow <mhalcrow@us.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2008-02-06eCryptfs: Minor fixes to printk messagesMichael Halcrow1-3/+4
The printk statements that result when the user does not have the proper key available could use some refining. Signed-off-by: Mike Halcrow <mhalcrow@us.ibm.com> Cc: Mike Halcrow <mhalcrow@us.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2008-02-06eCryptfs: set inode key only once per crypto operationTrevor Highland1-2/+5
There is no need to keep re-setting the same key for any given eCryptfs inode. This patch optimizes the use of the crypto API and helps performance a bit. Signed-off-by: Trevor Highland <trevor.highland@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Michael Halcrow <mhalcrow@us.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2008-02-06eCryptfs: track header bytes rather than extentsMichael Halcrow1-63/+35
Remove internal references to header extents; just keep track of header bytes instead. Headers can easily span multiple pages with the recent persistent file changes. Signed-off-by: Michael Halcrow <mhalcrow@us.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2008-02-06fs/ecryptfs/: possible cleanupsAdrian Bunk1-4/+4
- make the following needlessly global code static: - crypto.c:ecryptfs_lower_offset_for_extent() - crypto.c:key_tfm_list - crypto.c:key_tfm_list_mutex - inode.c:ecryptfs_getxattr() - main.c:ecryptfs_init_persistent_file() - remove the no longer used mmap.c:ecryptfs_lower_page_cache - #if 0 the unused read_write.c:ecryptfs_read() Signed-off-by: Adrian Bunk <bunk@kernel.org> Cc: Michael Halcrow <mhalcrow@us.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2007-12-23ecryptfs: fix unlocking in error pathsEric Sandeen1-4/+4
Thanks to Josef Bacik for finding these. A couple of ecryptfs error paths don't properly unlock things they locked. Signed-off-by: Eric Sandeen <sandeen@redhat.com> Cc: Josef Bacik <jbacik@redhat.com> Cc: Michael Halcrow <mhalcrow@us.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2007-12-23ecryptfs: fix string overflow on long cipher namesEric Sandeen1-0/+1
Passing a cipher name > 32 chars on mount results in an overflow when the cipher name is printed, because the last character in the struct ecryptfs_key_tfm's cipher_name string was never zeroed. Signed-off-by: Eric Sandeen <sandeen@redhat.com> Acked-by: Michael Halcrow <mhalcrow@us.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2007-11-05eCryptfs: release mutex on hash error pathMichael Halcrow1-4/+22
Release the crypt_stat hash mutex on allocation error. Check for error conditions when doing crypto hash calls. Signed-off-by: Michael Halcrow <mhalcrow@us.ibm.com> Reported-by: Kazuki Ohta <kazuki.ohta@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2007-11-05eCryptfs: increment extent_offset once per loop interationMichael Halcrow1-2/+0
The extent_offset is getting incremented twice per loop iteration through any given page. It should only be getting incremented once. This bug should only impact hosts with >4K page sizes. Signed-off-by: Michael Halcrow <mhalcrow@us.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2007-10-27[CRYPTO] users: Fix up scatterlist conversion errorsHerbert Xu1-0/+2
This patch fixes the errors made in the users of the crypto layer during the sg_init_table conversion. It also adds a few conversions that were missing altogether. Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2007-10-24SG: Change sg_set_page() to take length and offset argumentJens Axboe1-16/+7
Most drivers need to set length and offset as well, so may as well fold those three lines into one. Add sg_assign_page() for those two locations that only needed to set the page, where the offset/length is set outside of the function context. Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <jens.axboe@oracle.com>
2007-10-22Update fs/ to use sg helpersJens Axboe1-5/+11
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <jens.axboe@oracle.com>
2007-10-16ecryptfs: clean up page flag handlingMichael Halcrow1-8/+4
The functions that eventually call down to ecryptfs_read_lower(), ecryptfs_decrypt_page(), and ecryptfs_copy_up_encrypted_with_header() should have the responsibility of managing the page Uptodate status. This patch gets rid of some of the ugliness that resulted from trying to push some of the page flag setting too far down the stack. Signed-off-by: Michael Halcrow <mhalcrow@us.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2007-10-16eCryptfs: replace magic numbersMichael Halcrow1-3/+3
Replace some magic numbers with sizeof() equivalents. Signed-off-by: Michael Halcrow <mhalcrow@us.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2007-10-16eCryptfs: remove unused functions and kmem_cacheMichael Halcrow1-150/+0
The switch to read_write.c routines and the persistent file make a number of functions unnecessary. This patch removes them. Signed-off-by: Michael Halcrow <mhalcrow@us.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2007-10-16eCryptfs: fix data typesMichael Halcrow1-10/+11
Update data types and add casts in order to avoid potential overflow issues. Signed-off-by: Michael Halcrow <mhalcrow@us.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2007-10-16eCryptfs: make open, truncate, and setattr use persistent fileMichael Halcrow1-1/+1
Rather than open a new lower file for every eCryptfs file that is opened, truncated, or setattr'd, instead use the existing lower persistent file for the eCryptfs inode. Change truncate to use read_write.c functions. Change ecryptfs_getxattr() to use the common ecryptfs_getxattr_lower() function. Signed-off-by: Michael Halcrow <mhalcrow@us.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2007-10-16eCryptfs: update metadata read/write functionsMichael Halcrow1-68/+59
Update the metadata read/write functions and grow_file() to use the read_write.c routines. Do not open another lower file; use the persistent lower file instead. Provide a separate function for crypto.c::ecryptfs_read_xattr_region() to get to the lower xattr without having to go through the eCryptfs getxattr. Signed-off-by: Michael Halcrow <mhalcrow@us.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2007-10-16eCryptfs: replace encrypt, decrypt, and inode size writeMichael Halcrow1-192/+235
Replace page encryption and decryption routines and inode size write routine with versions that utilize the read_write.c functions. Signed-off-by: Michael Halcrow <mhalcrow@us.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2007-10-16eCryptfs: remove assignments in if-statementsMichael Halcrow1-7/+10
Remove assignments in if-statements. Signed-off-by: Michael Halcrow <mhalcrow@us.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2007-10-16eCryptfs: remove header_extent_sizeMichael Halcrow1-20/+20
There is no point to keeping a separate header_extent_size and an extent_size. The total size of the header can always be represented as some multiple of the regular data extent size. [randy.dunlap@oracle.com: ecryptfs: fix printk format warning] Signed-off-by: Michael Halcrow <mhalcrow@us.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Randy Dunlap <randy.dunlap@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2007-10-16eCryptfs: make needlessly global symbols staticMichael Halcrow1-4/+4
Andrew Morton wrote: > Please check that all the newly-added global symbols do indeed need > to be global. Change symbols in keystore.c and crypto.o to static if they do not need to be global. Signed-off-by: Michael Halcrow <mhalcrow@us.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2007-10-16eCryptfs: kerneldoc fixes for crypto.c and keystore.cMichael Halcrow1-17/+52
Andrew Morton wrote: From: mhalcrow@us.ibm.com <mhalcrow@halcrow.austin.ibm.com> > > +/** > > + * decrypt_passphrase_encrypted_session_key - Decrypt the session key > > + * with the given auth_tok. > > * > > * Returns Zero on success; non-zero error otherwise. > > */ > > That comment purports to be a kerneldoc-style comment. But > > - kerneldoc doesn't support multiple lines on the introductory line > which identifies the name of the function (alas). So you'll need to > overflow 80 cols here. > > - the function args weren't documented > > But the return value is! People regularly forget to do that. And > they frequently forget to document the locking prerequisites and the > permissible calling contexts (process/might_sleep/hardirq, etc) > > (please check all ecryptfs kerneldoc for this stuff sometime) This patch cleans up some of the existing comments and makes a couple of line break tweaks. There is more work to do to bring eCryptfs into full kerneldoc-compliance. Signed-off-by: Michael Halcrow <mhalcrow@us.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2007-10-16eCryptfs: grammatical fix (destruct to destroy)Michael Halcrow1-4/+4
Andrew Morton wrote: > > +int ecryptfs_destruct_crypto(void) > > ecryptfs_destroy_crypto would be more grammatically correct ;) Grammatical fix for some function names. Signed-off-by: Michael Halcrow <mhalcrow@us.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2007-10-16eCryptfs: collapse flag set into one statementMichael Halcrow1-2/+1
Andrew Morton wrote: > > + crypt_stat->flags |= ECRYPTFS_ENCRYPTED; > > + crypt_stat->flags |= ECRYPTFS_KEY_VALID; > > Maybe the compiler can optimise those two statements, but we'd > normally provide it with some manual help. This patch provides the compiler with some manual help for optimizing the setting of some flags. Signed-off-by: Michael Halcrow <mhalcrow@us.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2007-10-16eCryptfs: remove unnecessary BUG_ONMichael Halcrow1-3/+0
Andrew Morton wrote: > > + mutex_lock(&mount_crypt_stat->global_auth_tok_list_mutex); > > + BUG_ON(mount_crypt_stat->num_global_auth_toks == 0); > > + mutex_unlock(&mount_crypt_stat->global_auth_tok_list_mutex); > > That's odd-looking. If it was a bug for num_global_auth_toks to be > zero, and if that mutex protects num_global_auth_toks then as soon > as the lock gets dropped, another thread can make > num_global_auth_toks zero, hence the bug is present. Perhaps? That was serving as an internal sanity check that should not have made it into the final patch set in the first place. This patch removes it. Signed-off-by: Michael Halcrow <mhalcrow@us.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2007-10-16eCryptfs: update comment and debug statementMichael Halcrow1-2/+0
Trivial updates to comment and debug statement. Signed-off-by: Michael Halcrow <mhalcrow@us.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2007-10-16eCryptfs: add key list structure; search keyringMichael Halcrow1-34/+174
Add support structures for handling multiple keys. The list in crypt_stat contains the key identifiers for all of the keys that should be used for encrypting each file's File Encryption Key (FEK). For now, each inode inherits this list from the mount-wide crypt_stat struct, via the ecryptfs_copy_mount_wide_sigs_to_inode_sigs() function. This patch also removes the global key tfm from the mount-wide crypt_stat struct, instead keeping a list of tfm's meant for dealing with the various inode FEK's. eCryptfs will now search the user's keyring for FEK's parsed from the existing file metadata, so the user can make keys available at any time before or after mounting. Now that multiple FEK packets can be written to the file metadata, we need to be more meticulous about size limits. The updates to the code for writing out packets to the file metadata makes sizes and limits more explicit, uniformly expressed, and (hopefully) easier to follow. Signed-off-by: Michael Halcrow <mhalcrow@us.ibm.com> Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com> Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2007-02-12[PATCH] eCryptfs: open-code flag checking and manipulationMichael Halcrow1-22/+15
Open-code flag checking and manipulation. Signed-off-by: Michael Halcrow <mhalcrow@us.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Trevor Highland <tshighla@us.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2007-02-12[PATCH] eCryptfs: convert kmap() to kmap_atomic()Michael Halcrow1-4/+4
Replace kmap() with kmap_atomic(). Reduce the amount of time that mappings are held. Signed-off-by: Michael Halcrow <mhalcrow@us.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Trevor Highland <tshighla@us.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2007-02-12[PATCH] eCryptfs: convert f_op->write() to vfs_write()Michael Halcrow1-5/+22
sys_write() takes a local copy of f_pos and writes that back into the struct file. It does this so that two concurrent write() callers don't make a mess of f_pos, and of the file contents. ecryptfs should be calling vfs_write(). That way we also get the fsnotify notifications, which ecryptfs presently appears to have subverted. Convert direct calls to f_op->write() into calls to vfs_write(). Signed-off-by: Michael Halcrow <mhalcrow@us.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>