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A subsequent commit will introduce "dh" wrapping templates of the form
"ffdhe2048(dh)", "ffdhe3072(dh)" and so on in order to provide built-in
support for the well-known safe-prime ffdhe group parameters specified in
RFC 7919.
Those templates' ->set_secret() will wrap the inner "dh" implementation's
->set_secret() and set the ->p and ->g group parameters as appropriate on
the way inwards. More specifically,
- A ffdheXYZ(dh) user would call crypto_dh_encode() on a struct dh instance
having ->p == ->g == NULL as well as ->p_size == ->g_size == 0 and pass
the resulting buffer to the outer ->set_secret().
- This outer ->set_secret() would then decode the struct dh via
crypto_dh_decode_key(), set ->p, ->g, ->p_size as well as ->g_size as
appropriate for the group in question and encode the struct dh again
before passing it further down to the inner "dh"'s ->set_secret().
The problem is that crypto_dh_decode_key() implements some basic checks
which would reject parameter sets with ->p_size == 0 and thus, the ffdheXYZ
templates' ->set_secret() cannot use it as-is for decoding the passed
buffer. As the inner "dh"'s ->set_secret() will eventually conduct said
checks on the final parameter set anyway, the outer ->set_secret() really
only needs the decoding functionality.
Split out the pure struct dh decoding part from crypto_dh_decode_key() into
the new __crypto_dh_decode_key().
__crypto_dh_decode_key() gets defined in crypto/dh_helper.c, but will have
to get called from crypto/dh.c and thus, its declaration must be somehow
made available to the latter. Strictly speaking, __crypto_dh_decode_key()
is internal to the dh_generic module, yet it would be a bit over the top
to introduce a new header like e.g. include/crypto/internal/dh.h
containing just a single prototype. Add the __crypto_dh_decode_key()
declaration to include/crypto/dh.h instead.
Provide a proper kernel-doc annotation, even though
__crypto_dh_decode_key() is purposedly not on the function list specified
in Documentation/crypto/api-kpp.rst.
Signed-off-by: Nicolai Stange <nstange@suse.de>
Reviewed-by: Hannes Reinecke <hare@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
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The only current user of the DH KPP algorithm, the
keyctl(KEYCTL_DH_COMPUTE) syscall, doesn't set the domain parameter ->q
in struct dh. Remove it and any associated (de)serialization code in
crypto_dh_encode_key() and crypto_dh_decode_key. Adjust the encoded
->secret values in testmgr's DH test vectors accordingly.
Note that the dh-generic implementation would have initialized its
struct dh_ctx's ->q from the decoded struct dh's ->q, if present. If this
struct dh_ctx's ->q would ever have been non-NULL, it would have enabled a
full key validation as specified in NIST SP800-56A in dh_is_pubkey_valid().
However, as outlined above, ->q is always NULL in practice and the full key
validation code is effectively dead. A later patch will make
dh_is_pubkey_valid() to calculate Q from P on the fly, if possible, so
don't remove struct dh_ctx's ->q now, but leave it there until that has
happened.
Signed-off-by: Nicolai Stange <nstange@suse.de>
Reviewed-by: Hannes Reinecke <hare@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
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Based on 1 normalized pattern(s):
this program is free software you can redistribute it and or modify
it under the terms of the gnu general public license as published by
the free software foundation either version 2 of the license or at
your option any later version
extracted by the scancode license scanner the SPDX license identifier
GPL-2.0-or-later
has been chosen to replace the boilerplate/reference in 3029 file(s).
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Allison Randal <allison@lohutok.net>
Cc: linux-spdx@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190527070032.746973796@linutronix.de
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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Make it return -EINVAL if crypto_dh_key_len() is incorrect rather than
overflowing the buffer.
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
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It was forgotten to increase DH_KPP_SECRET_MIN_SIZE to include 'q_size',
causing an out-of-bounds write of 4 bytes in crypto_dh_encode_key(), and
an out-of-bounds read of 4 bytes in crypto_dh_decode_key(). Fix it, and
fix the lengths of the test vectors to match this.
Reported-by: syzbot+6d38d558c25b53b8f4ed@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Fixes: e3fe0ae12962 ("crypto: dh - add public key verification test")
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
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According to SP800-56A section 5.6.2.1, the public key to be processed
for the DH operation shall be checked for appropriateness. The check
shall covers the full verification test in case the domain parameter Q
is provided as defined in SP800-56A section 5.6.2.3.1. If Q is not
provided, the partial check according to SP800-56A section 5.6.2.3.2 is
performed.
The full verification test requires the presence of the domain parameter
Q. Thus, the patch adds the support to handle Q. It is permissible to
not provide the Q value as part of the domain parameters. This implies
that the interface is still backwards-compatible where so far only P and
G are to be provided. However, if Q is provided, it is imported.
Without the test, the NIST ACVP testing fails. After adding this check,
the NIST ACVP testing passes. Testing without providing the Q domain
parameter has been performed to verify the interface has not changed.
Signed-off-by: Stephan Mueller <smueller@chronox.de>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
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The "qat-dh" DH implementation assumes that 'key' and 'g' can be copied
into a buffer with size 'p_size'. However it was never checked that
that was actually the case, which most likely allowed users to cause a
buffer underflow via KEYCTL_DH_COMPUTE.
Fix this by updating crypto_dh_decode_key() to verify this precondition
for all DH implementations.
Fixes: c9839143ebbf ("crypto: qat - Add DH support")
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v4.8+
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Tudor Ambarus <tudor.ambarus@microchip.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
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If 'p' is 0 for the software Diffie-Hellman implementation, then
dh_max_size() returns 0. In the case of KEYCTL_DH_COMPUTE, this causes
ZERO_SIZE_PTR to be passed to sg_init_one(), which with
CONFIG_DEBUG_SG=y triggers the 'BUG_ON(!virt_addr_valid(buf));' in
sg_set_buf().
Fix this by making crypto_dh_decode_key() reject 0 for 'p'. p=0 makes
no sense for any DH implementation because 'p' is supposed to be a prime
number. Moreover, 'mod 0' is not mathematically defined.
Bug report:
kernel BUG at ./include/linux/scatterlist.h:140!
invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] SMP KASAN
CPU: 0 PID: 27112 Comm: syz-executor2 Not tainted 4.14.0-rc7-00010-gf5dbb5d0ce32-dirty #7
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.10.3-20171021_125229-anatol 04/01/2014
task: ffff88006caac0c0 task.stack: ffff88006c7c8000
RIP: 0010:sg_set_buf include/linux/scatterlist.h:140 [inline]
RIP: 0010:sg_init_one+0x1b3/0x240 lib/scatterlist.c:156
RSP: 0018:ffff88006c7cfb08 EFLAGS: 00010216
RAX: 0000000000010000 RBX: ffff88006c7cfe30 RCX: 00000000000064ee
RDX: ffffffff81cf64c3 RSI: ffffc90000d72000 RDI: ffffffff92e937e0
RBP: ffff88006c7cfb30 R08: ffffed000d8f9fab R09: ffff88006c7cfd30
R10: 0000000000000005 R11: ffffed000d8f9faa R12: ffff88006c7cfd30
R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 0000000000000010 R15: ffff88006c7cfc50
FS: 00007fce190fa700(0000) GS:ffff88003ea00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 00007fffc6b33db8 CR3: 000000003cf64000 CR4: 00000000000006f0
Call Trace:
__keyctl_dh_compute+0xa95/0x19b0 security/keys/dh.c:360
keyctl_dh_compute+0xac/0x100 security/keys/dh.c:434
SYSC_keyctl security/keys/keyctl.c:1745 [inline]
SyS_keyctl+0x72/0x2c0 security/keys/keyctl.c:1641
entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x1f/0xbe
RIP: 0033:0x4585c9
RSP: 002b:00007fce190f9bd8 EFLAGS: 00000216 ORIG_RAX: 00000000000000fa
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000738020 RCX: 00000000004585c9
RDX: 000000002000d000 RSI: 0000000020000ff4 RDI: 0000000000000017
RBP: 0000000000000046 R08: 0000000020008000 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000216 R12: 00007fff6e610cde
R13: 00007fff6e610cdf R14: 00007fce190fa700 R15: 0000000000000000
Code: 03 0f b6 14 02 48 89 f8 83 e0 07 83 c0 03 38 d0 7c 04 84 d2 75 33 5b 45 89 6c 24 14 41 5c 41 5d 41 5e 41 5f 5d c3 e8 fd 8f 68 ff <0f> 0b e8 f6 8f 68 ff 0f 0b e8 ef 8f 68 ff 0f 0b e8 e8 8f 68 ff 20
RIP: sg_set_buf include/linux/scatterlist.h:140 [inline] RSP: ffff88006c7cfb08
RIP: sg_init_one+0x1b3/0x240 lib/scatterlist.c:156 RSP: ffff88006c7cfb08
Fixes: 802c7f1c84e4 ("crypto: dh - Add DH software implementation")
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v4.8+
Reviewed-by: Tudor Ambarus <tudor.ambarus@microchip.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
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DH_KPP_SECRET_MIN_SIZE and dh_data_size() are both returning
unsigned values.
Signed-off-by: Tudor Ambarus <tudor.ambarus@microchip.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
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p->key_size, p->p_size, p->g_size are all of unsigned int type.
Signed-off-by: Tudor Ambarus <tudor.ambarus@microchip.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
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While here, add missing argument description (ndigits).
Signed-off-by: Tudor Ambarus <tudor.ambarus@microchip.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
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* Implement MPI based Diffie-Hellman under kpp API
* Test provided uses data generad by OpenSSL
Signed-off-by: Salvatore Benedetto <salvatore.benedetto@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
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