diff options
author | Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> | 2017-10-24 13:17:20 +0200 |
---|---|---|
committer | Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> | 2017-10-24 13:17:20 +0200 |
commit | 9babb091e0ec84f7503fde0a2d9a2a16a0f48e3c (patch) | |
tree | 9b6f07288b9ca9d8444414cd7da291d7c4731da7 /security | |
parent | 5cdda5117e125e0dbb020425cc55a4c143c6febc (diff) | |
parent | bb176f67090ca54869fc1262c913aa69d2ede070 (diff) |
Merge tag 'v4.14-rc6' into locking/core, to pick up fixes
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'security')
-rw-r--r-- | security/commoncap.c | 3 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | security/keys/Kconfig | 1 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | security/keys/big_key.c | 4 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | security/keys/encrypted-keys/encrypted.c | 9 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | security/keys/gc.c | 8 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | security/keys/key.c | 41 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | security/keys/keyctl.c | 9 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | security/keys/keyring.c | 14 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | security/keys/permission.c | 7 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | security/keys/proc.c | 31 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | security/keys/process_keys.c | 2 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | security/keys/request_key.c | 7 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | security/keys/request_key_auth.c | 2 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | security/keys/trusted.c | 2 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | security/keys/user_defined.c | 4 |
15 files changed, 90 insertions, 54 deletions
diff --git a/security/commoncap.c b/security/commoncap.c index c25e0d27537f..fc46f5b85251 100644 --- a/security/commoncap.c +++ b/security/commoncap.c @@ -585,13 +585,14 @@ int get_vfs_caps_from_disk(const struct dentry *dentry, struct cpu_vfs_cap_data struct vfs_ns_cap_data data, *nscaps = &data; struct vfs_cap_data *caps = (struct vfs_cap_data *) &data; kuid_t rootkuid; - struct user_namespace *fs_ns = inode->i_sb->s_user_ns; + struct user_namespace *fs_ns; memset(cpu_caps, 0, sizeof(struct cpu_vfs_cap_data)); if (!inode) return -ENODATA; + fs_ns = inode->i_sb->s_user_ns; size = __vfs_getxattr((struct dentry *)dentry, inode, XATTR_NAME_CAPS, &data, XATTR_CAPS_SZ); if (size == -ENODATA || size == -EOPNOTSUPP) diff --git a/security/keys/Kconfig b/security/keys/Kconfig index 91eafada3164..6462e6654ccf 100644 --- a/security/keys/Kconfig +++ b/security/keys/Kconfig @@ -45,6 +45,7 @@ config BIG_KEYS bool "Large payload keys" depends on KEYS depends on TMPFS + select CRYPTO select CRYPTO_AES select CRYPTO_GCM help diff --git a/security/keys/big_key.c b/security/keys/big_key.c index e607830b6154..929e14978c42 100644 --- a/security/keys/big_key.c +++ b/security/keys/big_key.c @@ -247,7 +247,7 @@ void big_key_revoke(struct key *key) /* clear the quota */ key_payload_reserve(key, 0); - if (key_is_instantiated(key) && + if (key_is_positive(key) && (size_t)key->payload.data[big_key_len] > BIG_KEY_FILE_THRESHOLD) vfs_truncate(path, 0); } @@ -279,7 +279,7 @@ void big_key_describe(const struct key *key, struct seq_file *m) seq_puts(m, key->description); - if (key_is_instantiated(key)) + if (key_is_positive(key)) seq_printf(m, ": %zu [%s]", datalen, datalen > BIG_KEY_FILE_THRESHOLD ? "file" : "buff"); diff --git a/security/keys/encrypted-keys/encrypted.c b/security/keys/encrypted-keys/encrypted.c index 69855ba0d3b3..d92cbf9687c3 100644 --- a/security/keys/encrypted-keys/encrypted.c +++ b/security/keys/encrypted-keys/encrypted.c @@ -309,6 +309,13 @@ static struct key *request_user_key(const char *master_desc, const u8 **master_k down_read(&ukey->sem); upayload = user_key_payload_locked(ukey); + if (!upayload) { + /* key was revoked before we acquired its semaphore */ + up_read(&ukey->sem); + key_put(ukey); + ukey = ERR_PTR(-EKEYREVOKED); + goto error; + } *master_key = upayload->data; *master_keylen = upayload->datalen; error: @@ -847,7 +854,7 @@ static int encrypted_update(struct key *key, struct key_preparsed_payload *prep) size_t datalen = prep->datalen; int ret = 0; - if (test_bit(KEY_FLAG_NEGATIVE, &key->flags)) + if (key_is_negative(key)) return -ENOKEY; if (datalen <= 0 || datalen > 32767 || !prep->data) return -EINVAL; diff --git a/security/keys/gc.c b/security/keys/gc.c index 87cb260e4890..f01d48cb3de1 100644 --- a/security/keys/gc.c +++ b/security/keys/gc.c @@ -129,15 +129,15 @@ static noinline void key_gc_unused_keys(struct list_head *keys) while (!list_empty(keys)) { struct key *key = list_entry(keys->next, struct key, graveyard_link); + short state = key->state; + list_del(&key->graveyard_link); kdebug("- %u", key->serial); key_check(key); /* Throw away the key data if the key is instantiated */ - if (test_bit(KEY_FLAG_INSTANTIATED, &key->flags) && - !test_bit(KEY_FLAG_NEGATIVE, &key->flags) && - key->type->destroy) + if (state == KEY_IS_POSITIVE && key->type->destroy) key->type->destroy(key); security_key_free(key); @@ -151,7 +151,7 @@ static noinline void key_gc_unused_keys(struct list_head *keys) } atomic_dec(&key->user->nkeys); - if (test_bit(KEY_FLAG_INSTANTIATED, &key->flags)) + if (state != KEY_IS_UNINSTANTIATED) atomic_dec(&key->user->nikeys); key_user_put(key->user); diff --git a/security/keys/key.c b/security/keys/key.c index eb914a838840..83bf4b4afd49 100644 --- a/security/keys/key.c +++ b/security/keys/key.c @@ -402,6 +402,18 @@ int key_payload_reserve(struct key *key, size_t datalen) EXPORT_SYMBOL(key_payload_reserve); /* + * Change the key state to being instantiated. + */ +static void mark_key_instantiated(struct key *key, int reject_error) +{ + /* Commit the payload before setting the state; barrier versus + * key_read_state(). + */ + smp_store_release(&key->state, + (reject_error < 0) ? reject_error : KEY_IS_POSITIVE); +} + +/* * Instantiate a key and link it into the target keyring atomically. Must be * called with the target keyring's semaphore writelocked. The target key's * semaphore need not be locked as instantiation is serialised by @@ -424,14 +436,14 @@ static int __key_instantiate_and_link(struct key *key, mutex_lock(&key_construction_mutex); /* can't instantiate twice */ - if (!test_bit(KEY_FLAG_INSTANTIATED, &key->flags)) { + if (key->state == KEY_IS_UNINSTANTIATED) { /* instantiate the key */ ret = key->type->instantiate(key, prep); if (ret == 0) { /* mark the key as being instantiated */ atomic_inc(&key->user->nikeys); - set_bit(KEY_FLAG_INSTANTIATED, &key->flags); + mark_key_instantiated(key, 0); if (test_and_clear_bit(KEY_FLAG_USER_CONSTRUCT, &key->flags)) awaken = 1; @@ -577,13 +589,10 @@ int key_reject_and_link(struct key *key, mutex_lock(&key_construction_mutex); /* can't instantiate twice */ - if (!test_bit(KEY_FLAG_INSTANTIATED, &key->flags)) { + if (key->state == KEY_IS_UNINSTANTIATED) { /* mark the key as being negatively instantiated */ atomic_inc(&key->user->nikeys); - key->reject_error = -error; - smp_wmb(); - set_bit(KEY_FLAG_NEGATIVE, &key->flags); - set_bit(KEY_FLAG_INSTANTIATED, &key->flags); + mark_key_instantiated(key, -error); now = current_kernel_time(); key->expiry = now.tv_sec + timeout; key_schedule_gc(key->expiry + key_gc_delay); @@ -752,8 +761,8 @@ static inline key_ref_t __key_update(key_ref_t key_ref, ret = key->type->update(key, prep); if (ret == 0) - /* updating a negative key instantiates it */ - clear_bit(KEY_FLAG_NEGATIVE, &key->flags); + /* Updating a negative key positively instantiates it */ + mark_key_instantiated(key, 0); up_write(&key->sem); @@ -936,6 +945,16 @@ error: */ __key_link_end(keyring, &index_key, edit); + key = key_ref_to_ptr(key_ref); + if (test_bit(KEY_FLAG_USER_CONSTRUCT, &key->flags)) { + ret = wait_for_key_construction(key, true); + if (ret < 0) { + key_ref_put(key_ref); + key_ref = ERR_PTR(ret); + goto error_free_prep; + } + } + key_ref = __key_update(key_ref, &prep); goto error_free_prep; } @@ -986,8 +1005,8 @@ int key_update(key_ref_t key_ref, const void *payload, size_t plen) ret = key->type->update(key, &prep); if (ret == 0) - /* updating a negative key instantiates it */ - clear_bit(KEY_FLAG_NEGATIVE, &key->flags); + /* Updating a negative key positively instantiates it */ + mark_key_instantiated(key, 0); up_write(&key->sem); diff --git a/security/keys/keyctl.c b/security/keys/keyctl.c index 365ff85d7e27..76d22f726ae4 100644 --- a/security/keys/keyctl.c +++ b/security/keys/keyctl.c @@ -766,10 +766,9 @@ long keyctl_read_key(key_serial_t keyid, char __user *buffer, size_t buflen) key = key_ref_to_ptr(key_ref); - if (test_bit(KEY_FLAG_NEGATIVE, &key->flags)) { - ret = -ENOKEY; - goto error2; - } + ret = key_read_state(key); + if (ret < 0) + goto error2; /* Negatively instantiated */ /* see if we can read it directly */ ret = key_permission(key_ref, KEY_NEED_READ); @@ -901,7 +900,7 @@ long keyctl_chown_key(key_serial_t id, uid_t user, gid_t group) atomic_dec(&key->user->nkeys); atomic_inc(&newowner->nkeys); - if (test_bit(KEY_FLAG_INSTANTIATED, &key->flags)) { + if (key->state != KEY_IS_UNINSTANTIATED) { atomic_dec(&key->user->nikeys); atomic_inc(&newowner->nikeys); } diff --git a/security/keys/keyring.c b/security/keys/keyring.c index 4fa82a8a9c0e..a7e51f793867 100644 --- a/security/keys/keyring.c +++ b/security/keys/keyring.c @@ -414,7 +414,7 @@ static void keyring_describe(const struct key *keyring, struct seq_file *m) else seq_puts(m, "[anon]"); - if (key_is_instantiated(keyring)) { + if (key_is_positive(keyring)) { if (keyring->keys.nr_leaves_on_tree != 0) seq_printf(m, ": %lu", keyring->keys.nr_leaves_on_tree); else @@ -553,7 +553,8 @@ static int keyring_search_iterator(const void *object, void *iterator_data) { struct keyring_search_context *ctx = iterator_data; const struct key *key = keyring_ptr_to_key(object); - unsigned long kflags = key->flags; + unsigned long kflags = READ_ONCE(key->flags); + short state = READ_ONCE(key->state); kenter("{%d}", key->serial); @@ -565,6 +566,8 @@ static int keyring_search_iterator(const void *object, void *iterator_data) /* skip invalidated, revoked and expired keys */ if (ctx->flags & KEYRING_SEARCH_DO_STATE_CHECK) { + time_t expiry = READ_ONCE(key->expiry); + if (kflags & ((1 << KEY_FLAG_INVALIDATED) | (1 << KEY_FLAG_REVOKED))) { ctx->result = ERR_PTR(-EKEYREVOKED); @@ -572,7 +575,7 @@ static int keyring_search_iterator(const void *object, void *iterator_data) goto skipped; } - if (key->expiry && ctx->now.tv_sec >= key->expiry) { + if (expiry && ctx->now.tv_sec >= expiry) { if (!(ctx->flags & KEYRING_SEARCH_SKIP_EXPIRED)) ctx->result = ERR_PTR(-EKEYEXPIRED); kleave(" = %d [expire]", ctx->skipped_ret); @@ -597,9 +600,8 @@ static int keyring_search_iterator(const void *object, void *iterator_data) if (ctx->flags & KEYRING_SEARCH_DO_STATE_CHECK) { /* we set a different error code if we pass a negative key */ - if (kflags & (1 << KEY_FLAG_NEGATIVE)) { - smp_rmb(); - ctx->result = ERR_PTR(key->reject_error); + if (state < 0) { + ctx->result = ERR_PTR(state); kleave(" = %d [neg]", ctx->skipped_ret); goto skipped; } diff --git a/security/keys/permission.c b/security/keys/permission.c index 732cc0beffdf..a72b4dd70c8a 100644 --- a/security/keys/permission.c +++ b/security/keys/permission.c @@ -88,7 +88,8 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(key_task_permission); */ int key_validate(const struct key *key) { - unsigned long flags = key->flags; + unsigned long flags = READ_ONCE(key->flags); + time_t expiry = READ_ONCE(key->expiry); if (flags & (1 << KEY_FLAG_INVALIDATED)) return -ENOKEY; @@ -99,9 +100,9 @@ int key_validate(const struct key *key) return -EKEYREVOKED; /* check it hasn't expired */ - if (key->expiry) { + if (expiry) { struct timespec now = current_kernel_time(); - if (now.tv_sec >= key->expiry) + if (now.tv_sec >= expiry) return -EKEYEXPIRED; } diff --git a/security/keys/proc.c b/security/keys/proc.c index de834309d100..6d1fcbba1e09 100644 --- a/security/keys/proc.c +++ b/security/keys/proc.c @@ -179,9 +179,12 @@ static int proc_keys_show(struct seq_file *m, void *v) struct rb_node *_p = v; struct key *key = rb_entry(_p, struct key, serial_node); struct timespec now; + time_t expiry; unsigned long timo; + unsigned long flags; key_ref_t key_ref, skey_ref; char xbuf[16]; + short state; int rc; struct keyring_search_context ctx = { @@ -217,12 +220,13 @@ static int proc_keys_show(struct seq_file *m, void *v) rcu_read_lock(); /* come up with a suitable timeout value */ - if (key->expiry == 0) { + expiry = READ_ONCE(key->expiry); + if (expiry == 0) { memcpy(xbuf, "perm", 5); - } else if (now.tv_sec >= key->expiry) { + } else if (now.tv_sec >= expiry) { memcpy(xbuf, "expd", 5); } else { - timo = key->expiry - now.tv_sec; + timo = expiry - now.tv_sec; if (timo < 60) sprintf(xbuf, "%lus", timo); @@ -236,18 +240,21 @@ static int proc_keys_show(struct seq_file *m, void *v) sprintf(xbuf, "%luw", timo / (60*60*24*7)); } -#define showflag(KEY, LETTER, FLAG) \ - (test_bit(FLAG, &(KEY)->flags) ? LETTER : '-') + state = key_read_state(key); +#define showflag(FLAGS, LETTER, FLAG) \ + ((FLAGS & (1 << FLAG)) ? LETTER : '-') + + flags = READ_ONCE(key->flags); seq_printf(m, "%08x %c%c%c%c%c%c%c %5d %4s %08x %5d %5d %-9.9s ", key->serial, - showflag(key, 'I', KEY_FLAG_INSTANTIATED), - showflag(key, 'R', KEY_FLAG_REVOKED), - showflag(key, 'D', KEY_FLAG_DEAD), - showflag(key, 'Q', KEY_FLAG_IN_QUOTA), - showflag(key, 'U', KEY_FLAG_USER_CONSTRUCT), - showflag(key, 'N', KEY_FLAG_NEGATIVE), - showflag(key, 'i', KEY_FLAG_INVALIDATED), + state != KEY_IS_UNINSTANTIATED ? 'I' : '-', + showflag(flags, 'R', KEY_FLAG_REVOKED), + showflag(flags, 'D', KEY_FLAG_DEAD), + showflag(flags, 'Q', KEY_FLAG_IN_QUOTA), + showflag(flags, 'U', KEY_FLAG_USER_CONSTRUCT), + state < 0 ? 'N' : '-', + showflag(flags, 'i', KEY_FLAG_INVALIDATED), refcount_read(&key->usage), xbuf, key->perm, diff --git a/security/keys/process_keys.c b/security/keys/process_keys.c index 293d3598153b..740affd65ee9 100644 --- a/security/keys/process_keys.c +++ b/security/keys/process_keys.c @@ -730,7 +730,7 @@ try_again: ret = -EIO; if (!(lflags & KEY_LOOKUP_PARTIAL) && - !test_bit(KEY_FLAG_INSTANTIATED, &key->flags)) + key_read_state(key) == KEY_IS_UNINSTANTIATED) goto invalid_key; /* check the permissions */ diff --git a/security/keys/request_key.c b/security/keys/request_key.c index 63e63a42db3c..e8036cd0ad54 100644 --- a/security/keys/request_key.c +++ b/security/keys/request_key.c @@ -595,10 +595,9 @@ int wait_for_key_construction(struct key *key, bool intr) intr ? TASK_INTERRUPTIBLE : TASK_UNINTERRUPTIBLE); if (ret) return -ERESTARTSYS; - if (test_bit(KEY_FLAG_NEGATIVE, &key->flags)) { - smp_rmb(); - return key->reject_error; - } + ret = key_read_state(key); + if (ret < 0) + return ret; return key_validate(key); } EXPORT_SYMBOL(wait_for_key_construction); diff --git a/security/keys/request_key_auth.c b/security/keys/request_key_auth.c index 6ebf1af8fce9..424e1d90412e 100644 --- a/security/keys/request_key_auth.c +++ b/security/keys/request_key_auth.c @@ -73,7 +73,7 @@ static void request_key_auth_describe(const struct key *key, seq_puts(m, "key:"); seq_puts(m, key->description); - if (key_is_instantiated(key)) + if (key_is_positive(key)) seq_printf(m, " pid:%d ci:%zu", rka->pid, rka->callout_len); } diff --git a/security/keys/trusted.c b/security/keys/trusted.c index ddfaebf60fc8..bd85315cbfeb 100644 --- a/security/keys/trusted.c +++ b/security/keys/trusted.c @@ -1066,7 +1066,7 @@ static int trusted_update(struct key *key, struct key_preparsed_payload *prep) char *datablob; int ret = 0; - if (test_bit(KEY_FLAG_NEGATIVE, &key->flags)) + if (key_is_negative(key)) return -ENOKEY; p = key->payload.data[0]; if (!p->migratable) diff --git a/security/keys/user_defined.c b/security/keys/user_defined.c index 3d8c68eba516..9f558bedba23 100644 --- a/security/keys/user_defined.c +++ b/security/keys/user_defined.c @@ -114,7 +114,7 @@ int user_update(struct key *key, struct key_preparsed_payload *prep) /* attach the new data, displacing the old */ key->expiry = prep->expiry; - if (!test_bit(KEY_FLAG_NEGATIVE, &key->flags)) + if (key_is_positive(key)) zap = dereference_key_locked(key); rcu_assign_keypointer(key, prep->payload.data[0]); prep->payload.data[0] = NULL; @@ -162,7 +162,7 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(user_destroy); void user_describe(const struct key *key, struct seq_file *m) { seq_puts(m, key->description); - if (key_is_instantiated(key)) + if (key_is_positive(key)) seq_printf(m, ": %u", key->datalen); } |